Some time back the Bureau of Naval Personnel addressed a questionnaire to certain Naval Reserve officers asking for a free and frank expression of opinion on the subject of a Post-war Naval Reserve; a special Board (with whose report I am not familiar) met in the Department to study the situation and make recommendations; and from time to time the Secretary of the Navy has made certain pronouncements bearing upon the subject. However, except for a brief announcement in the November All Hands (BuPers Information Bulletin) on the “Need for a Naval Reserve,” “Advantages of Joining the Post-War Naval Reserve,” and the enunciation of a plan for organization comprising two branches (Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve), we have had nothing to my knowledge that is final, definite, or official on the subject.
This article involves a broader and more comprehensive approach to the matter and accordingly it offers a broader and more detailed plan of organization, administration, and training, as a suggestion for the consideration of all concerned. It is based upon a rather extensive experience of 39 years’ continuous service as a commissioned officer in the reserve components of the Navy (Naval Militia, National Naval Volunteers, U. S. Naval Reserve Force, and U. S. Naval Reserve), a considerable part of which service has been spent in an active duty status.
REGULAR NAVY-NAVAL RESERVE RELATIONSHIP
I have given much thought to the subject of regular Navy-Naval Reserve relationship and have considered the matter not only from the standpoint of functional relationship but from the standpoint of all else that is involved in the relationship of these two components of the Naval Establishment that bears upon the morale of the Naval Reserve in its legal status as an integral, component part of the Navy. This is a matter of highest importance because it will, in the final analysis, determine the success or failure of the Navy Department in developing and maintaining the most efficient Naval Reserve it is possible to create, since this is the cornerstone of the proposed structure.
From the standpoint of Relationship, my idea of a post-war Naval Reserve contemplates nothing less than a situation in which all concerned, Regular and Reservist alike, recognize first of all that the Regular and Reserve components of our Navy are not in competition with each other at any time but complementary and supplementary to each other at all times—each absolutely necessary and essential to the other, and to the perfect whole—a situation in which each “pulls his own weight in the boat” and contributes his full share toward the achievement of a final mission commonly shared.
In the interests of the common good, the Naval Reserve should, of course, be given fair, considerate, and ethical treatment, and everything possible should be done to weld it into the most efficient Reserve it is possible to have, and to integrate it with and into the rest of the Navy. This is the Navy’s unquestionable duty. It is the duty of the Reserve to assist in every way possible in the achievement of the Navy’s mission; to render loyal support, to take the fullest advantage of opportunities made available for instruction and training; to “play ball," and above all else to bear in mind that while the dog’s tail is important it cannot be permitted to take charge and “wag the dog.” There is a broad ground upon which Regular and Reservist may meet on the basis of a common duty, common understanding, and mutual good will. They are both members of the same team—each full partners in a common undertaking. The war so recently concluded, and so determinedly and successfully waged, demonstrated beyond question the skill and capacity of a 90 per cent Reserve Navy and the amazing success of a 10 per cent nucleus of Regulars in inducting, training, and leading this “civilian” Navy to victory in two oceans.
There is but one answer to the whole question of how best to promote a proper and correct relationship between the Regular and Reserve components of the Navy. The answer is, of course—“by the adoption of, and strict adherence to, policies, procedures, practices, and programs that will be mutually helpful and will encourage and require a mutual confidence and a mutual respect.”
ORGANIZATION
Any plan of organization for the postwar Naval Reserve should provide opportunity for Naval Reserve officers to aspire to, and achieve, any rank for which, under Navy Department requirements, they may be considered qualified in accordance with standards appropriate to, and consistent with, Naval Reserve service, and the Naval Reserve should be allowed a fair and equitable voice in its own administration.
Since, in my opinion, all personnel which comprises a Reserve for the Navy should be included in the basic organization of the post-war Naval Reserve, my plan includes the Transferred Fleet Reserve as Class 1.
Since the personnel of the Merchant Marine is composed of licensed and unlicensed professional sea-goers who are “plying their trade” at all times and are therefore in an entirely different relationship to the Navy than any other personnel of the Naval Reserve, I have put Merchant Marine Reservists in a separate class—Class 4.
My Class 2 comprises all Naval Reserve personnel attached to drilling units of the Reserve, plus those who would normally be included in this class but who occupy active duty administrative billets related to the administration and training of the Naval Reserve. (Generally speaking, this corresponds to the BuPers Ready Reserve.)
My Class 3 comprises all Naval Reserve personnel not attached to drilling units, except those otherwise qualified for Class 2 who are occupying active duty administrative billets related to the administration and training of the Naval Reserve, and any other personnel not carried in other classes of the Reserve. (Generally speaking, this corresponds to the BuPers Standby Reserve.)
My post-war Naval Reserve organization includes an Honorary Reserve composed of those who have become eligible for this recognition as the result of long and honorable service, physical disability, or other qualifications as established by the Navy Department.
Combining the branches and designations proposed by BuPers and the two additional branches (classes) which I have suggested, we have the following basic organization:
Class 1—The Fleet Reserve (Transferred Fleet personnel)
Class 2—The Organized or Ready Reserve (Drilling components)
Class 3—The Volunteer or Standby Reserve (Nondrilling components)
Class 4—Merchant Marine Naval Reserve (Merchant Marine Reservists) and The Honorary Naval Reserve
Class 1 needs no further explanation as its membership is composed exclusively of those who have been members of the Regular Navy for many years—a personnel professionally qualified in accordance with Regular Navy standards and, if physically qualified at time of mobilization, immediately available for the same or similar duties with the Fleet, or otherwise as determined by the Bureau of Personnel.
Class 2 (the Organized or Ready Reserve)—the drilling component of the Naval Reserve—would consist of both general and special service personnel organized into surface and aviation Divisions, Battalions, and Squadrons as appropriate, in such numbers and at such locations within the Naval Districts as authorized by the Navy Department. All Divisions would be attached to Battalions or Squadrons as appropriate. Battalions and Squadrons, as appropriate, would be comprised of such number of Divisions as may be determined by circumstances and proper authorization.
Strictly from the standpoint of the probable needs of the Navy at M-Day, as gleaned from the lessons of this war, the idea of Specialty Divisions such as Deck, Engineering, Communication, Local Defense, Construction, Supply, Medical, etc., as drilling surface units of Class 2, suggests itself. Such a plan would promote a close solidarity of interest and efficiency, would provide for an advantageous assembly and concentration of equipment and facilities pertinent to the functioning of such units, and it might offer certain advantages relative to quick mobilization and an easier absorption of Naval Reserve personnel into a wartime Navy. From the standpoint of the Naval Reserve alone, I am inclined to the opinion that the “mixed” Division is best, but I am also of the opinion that a certain number of surface Divisions should be trained exclusively as Local Defense units. The drilling units of the Communication Reserve would in any case be carried in Class 2 and in the same drill pay status as other drilling surface units of this class.
In connection with Class 2 (the Organized or Ready Reserve), several matters must receive careful attention (Drill Facilities, Armories, Equipment, and Leadership).
Armories.—Since the drilling surface units must have suitable facilities for drill and for the storage and use of equipment required for training, the matter of Armories is of the utmost importance, bearing directly as it does on the matter of efficiency. Incidentally, the matter of Armories also bears directly upon one of the Department’s most basic policies—a policy in favor of a Naval Reserve of purely Federal status—a Naval Reserve under the exclusive control of the Navy Department at all times. However, the law permits of dual Naval Militia-Naval Reserve status for Naval Militia units, 95 per cent of whose membership is qualified in accordance with Naval Reserve requirements, and in the pre-war Naval Reserve organization many Naval Reserve Divisions were also Naval Militia Divisions. These, as a rule, were quartered in State Armories. In this respect they held a great advantage over the non-Naval Militia Divisions. While it did not always follow that the Divisions with the best Armories were awarded the trophy for highest efficiency, the non-Naval Militia Divisions were seriously handicapped and carried on under extreme difficulty on this score. In my opinion, the Armory situation confronting the purely Federal surface units was the “weak link” in the pre-war Naval Reserve “chain.”
The Navy Department fully realized the situation and by 1939 was moving to correct it as quickly as possible. In 1940 the Secretary enunciated a policy in favor of more adequate Naval Reserve Armories and the Department drew up plans for standard one, two, three, four, and five Division Armories. The First Battalion at Boston had taken over a navy yard building reconstructed for the special purpose of an Armory, and the Navy had acquired Federal buildings no longer required by other Departments. A new Armory, partially underwritten by Navy funds, was erected at Los Angeles, California, and other steps were in preparation. I feel sure the Navy has in mind the importance of suitable Armories for drilling units.
Equipment.—The pre-war Naval Reserve was also greatly handicapped by an almost total absence of modern or even workable outmoded equipment. While the surface Divisions with the poorest Armories naturally had the poorest equipment because of the lack of a proper place to house and use it, the best was none too good and the greater part of all of it was obsolete. In many cases emergency drills and battle problems called for simulation of the equipment and paraphernalia necessary for the exercise. As there is now a large amount of surplus military equipment of all kinds available, the postwar Naval Reserve will undoubtedly be well taken care of in this respect, and a great improvement in efficiency will result.
Leadership.—The question of active leadership for the drilling units comes naturally to mind. In this connection, it will be well to keep in mind that, while the Naval ROTC program is admirable in every way and will provide a supply of fine young Reserve officers, the need for older officers of maturity and experience in the more important billets of the drilling organization is beyond challenge, for reasons that are obvious. The importance of the Naval Reserve in the field of public relations as a link between the Navy and the great “John Q. Public,” and as an agency for the building of a strong and sympathetic background of public support for the Navy in all matters that affect its interests, cannot be too strongly emphasized. This factor of Naval Reserve opportunity and duty is a basic reason why there must be careful selection of older Reserve officers of experience to direct the local administration and training of the drilling units, because only those officers who have acquired a substantial business, professional, and social standing in the community can best serve the Navy in this important capacity. The local drilling unit is a strong focal point of interest in all things that will keep the Navy before the public in the most effective manner—local citizens actively engaged in naval activities.
Class 3 (Volunteer or the Standby Reserve)—As stated, this class would include all Naval Reserve personnel not attached to drilling units except officers and men in permanent active duty billets related to the administration and training of the Naval Reserve, and of course Merchant Marine Naval Reservists carried in Class 4.
As many of the officers and men in this class will possess the same qualifications as those in Class 2 (Organized or the Ready Reserve) but because of business, family, educational, or other considerations cannot give the time required for Class 2, Class 3 should include both general and special service surface and aviation personnel, with arrangement for appropriate unit organization.
Since in the organization which I suggest there will be no District quotas governing the procurement and commissioning of Naval Reserve officers, this plan, if adopted, and if the District Commandants are permitted to process the applications of eligibles who desire Naval Reserve commissions without regard to quotas, will permit all officers so commissioned and not assigned to other classes to be carried in Class 3—the Organized or Standby Reserve—and with no greater expense to the Government than subsistence for voluntary week-end cruises aboard Naval Reserve training vessels and active duty pay for occasional participation in other and longer periods of ordered or authorized training duty, if such duty is made available to them. The result of this would be to make of Class 3 a vast “pool” or “reservoir” of Naval Reserve officers of all ranks and classifications—all professionally and physically qualified in accordance with Department requirements, and all immediately available as required in case of national emergency or war.
Class 4 (The Merchant Marine Reserve)— As previously explained, my reason for placing Merchant Marine personnel who are enrolled in the Naval Reserve in a separate class is the fact that such personnel occupies an entirely different relationship to the Navy (and to the rest of the Naval Reserve) than does the population from which is drawn the membership of the other classes. The officers and men of the Merchant Marine are professional sea-goers and ship- handlers, whereas, for the most part, other Reservists are essentially engaged in shore occupations. Since the Merchant Marine Reserve, in the organization I suggest, is not to be in a drilling status and since its functions and the circumstances under which it will function are unlike those which apply, or can apply, in the case of Reservists in other classes, it seems appropriate, and important as well, to put it in a class by itself.
The Navy must make an entirely new approach to the question of the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve than that which has governed its policy in the past. In keeping with the practice of every other first-class maritime nation, the Merchant Marine Reserve of the post-war Naval Reserve should be developed to the highest possible extent. In my opinion, it should have both an officer and an enlisted component. When war came, for one reason or another, the enlisted Merchant Marine Naval Reservists totaled less than 400. As a start toward a correction of this situation and as a start toward the recruitment of an enlisted component for this class of the Reserve, it is suggested that it would seem feasible to amend the Maritime Act of 1936 (as amended) to include a requirement that a certain percentage, at least, of the unlicensed personnel of United States merchant vessels built or operated in whole or in part with Federal funds, be Reservists. In other words, make the present law that applies to the officer personnel of such vessels applicable to unlicensed personnel as well.
The organization which I propose would provide for no drills of any sort aboard merchant vessels, but would provide for periodic “tours of duty” aboard vessels of the Navy for licensed and unlicensed Merchant Marine personnel enrolled in the U. S. Naval Reserve.
The war furnished ample opportunity to gauge the skill and capacity of non-Reservist Merchant Marine officers serving in merchant vessels engaged in support of the Fleet, especially in the Port Director’s organizations of the Naval Districts where their knowledge of piloting, berthing, wharfage, stevedoring, cargo stowage, loading and unloading proved of inestimable value. While it is highly important to organize and train a Naval Reserve component that is familiar with Navy ship organization and with modern naval weapons in order that the crews of combatant ships of the Navy may be promptly augmented in time of war or national emergency, and while this must be accomplished largely by the Fleet Reserve and the drilling units of Class 2, as the law does not permit of arming merchant vessels in peacetime, it is also highly important in my estimation to build a strong and effective Merchant Marine Reserve.
The Federal and State Maritime Academies, with a compulsory course in Naval Science included in the curriculum, and with qualification for and acceptance of appointment as Midshipman, USNR, as a necessary requisite for entrance, occupy a similar relationship to the Navy with respect to the Merchant Marine Reserve as do the Naval ROTC colleges in their relationship to the Navy and the rest of the Naval Reserve. It is suggested that, in recognition of the outstanding contribution to the war effort made by these Academies in training officers for the Merchant Marine and for the Navy, and to insure an adequate future supply of properly trained and Navy-indoctrinated Merchant Marine Reserve officers, NROTC or similar status and benefits be conferred upon the Midshipman students of these Academies.
Transfers.—The organization of the postwar Naval Reserve would provide for intertransfers between the Regular Navy and the Naval Reserve, between the Naval Reserve and the Regular Navy, and between the several classes of the Naval Reserve, under appropriate circumstances, and with credit for total service in either or both for the purpose of establishing eligibility for retirement and other service benefits resulting from long and honorable continuous service.
War Billets.—Except in very special cases, there would be no peacetime assignment of Reserve personnel to war billets. War billets for Naval Reserve officers would be sound policy if we could be assured that the entire Naval Reserve would be called to active service at the same time. This was not the case during the period 1939-41 when the requirements of the Limited Emergency and the National Emergency prior to the declaration of war, and the accompanying conditions under which Naval Reserve officers were placed on active duty during this period, made it desirable and necessary to fill billets as Reserve officers became available, and without regard for the fact that in many cases other officers not yet ordered to active duty were slated for these billets.
Honorary Naval Reserve.—(Not to be confused with the Honorary Retired List). The significance of this class will largely be to provide the Navy Department with the means of retaining certain personnel in the Naval Reserve who can no longer be appropriately carried in other classes.
ADMINISTRATION
The law constitutes the Naval Reserve an integral component part of the U. S. Navy, and therefore, as far as the Navy is concerned, the Reserve is a purely Federal force —is in Federal status at all times. Since the Naval Reserve is actually a part of the Navy, Naval Reserve administration, in my opinion, commences with the basic concept that, insofar as practicable, the Naval Reserve should be administered like any other part of the Navy—by and through the various offices and bureaus of the Navy Department, with each office and bureau exercising its specific and appropriate function.
This concept places “first things first” and contemplates Naval Reserve policy and long-range planning as a basic function of the Chief of Naval Operations, with a fully co-ordinated effort on the part of each subordinate office and bureau in support of policies and programs enunciated by the Chief of Naval Operations. In support of this concept it is submitted that the size, composition, location, and mobilization efficiency of the Naval Reserve will, to an appreciable extent, determine the readiness of the Fleet for action—which last is a responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations. In further support of this idea, the Operating Force Plan of the Navy which, when approved, becomes the objective program of the Navy, is prepared by the Chief of Naval Operations. The approved plan determines how many vessels are to be kept in commission, and in what degree of commission; how many shore establishments are to be maintained, and to what extent they are to be maintained. In like manner, then, it would be the function of the Chief of Naval Operations to determine the strength of the Naval Reserve, the composition and location of its various units; what new units, if any, are to be established, and where; and what and where, if any, Naval Reserve units already established are to be disestablished, and why.
Under this plan, the Chief of Naval Operations, through the Director of a Naval Reserve Policy Division, who would be the Coordinator of Naval Reserve Matters for the Navy Department, would determine Naval Reserve policy and long-range planning; would supervise Gunnery Exercises for the Naval Reserve and co-ordinate these with Gunnery Exercises of the Fleet; would have cognizance of planning in connection with the procurement, allocation, upkeep, and overhaul of vessels and powerboats for the training of the Naval Reserve; would co-ordinate Naval Reserve cruises and schedules and determine the availability of vessels in Regular commission for the annual cruises; and would exercise direct-control and cognizance over certain functions of the Intelligence and Communication Reserve.
The Bureau of Naval Personnel, whose function for the Regular Navy is to procure, train, and distribute personnel and to supervise other personnel matters, would exercise similar functions for the Naval Reserve; the Bureau of Aeronautics would have cognizance of Naval Reserve aviation matters in liaison with the Bureau of Naval Personnel; the Bureau of Ordnance would provide ammunition for Naval Reserve target practice and exercise functions with respect to the Naval Reserve similar to those affecting the Regular Navy; the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts would have cognizance of Naval Reserve property accounting and would provide necessary clothing and equipment; the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery would have cognizance of all matters pertaining to the health and hygiene—the physical standards, qualifications and examinations of the Naval Reserve; the Bureau of Ships would have its own special function and its own responsibilities regarding Naval Reserve matters; the Bureau of Yards and Docks, amongst other matters, would have a very special responsibility related to the program of carrying out the Department’s policy with respect to providing the Reserve drilling surface units with adequate and suitable Armories—one of the heaviest responsibilities in the entire Naval Reserve picture, as Armories are one of the key factors of Naval Reserve morale and efficiency. Only as the result of such an administrative program involving all offices and bureaus and the “principle of everything in its proper place” can the Naval Reserve ever achieve its identity as an actual component and integral part of the Naval Establishment to the extent contemplated by law.
The initial step in the administration of the post-war Naval Reserve is, in my opinion, the re-establishment of the Naval Reserve Policy Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, as it was set up on April 15, 1940, by directive of the Secretary of the Navy, designating the director of this Division “Coordinator of Naval Reserve Affairs for the Navy Department.” The Director of this Division would be a Rear Admiral of the Regular Navy.
There would be a Naval Reserve Division in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Regular Officer-in-Charge of which would be designated “Director of Naval Reserve.” He would administer the Reserve subject to policies established by the Chief of Naval Operations.
The Assistant Director in the Naval Reserve Policy Division of Operations and the Naval Reserve Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel would, in each case, be a Naval Reserve officer of appropriate rank and experience in Naval Reserve administrative matters. In addition to the Naval Reserve officer or officers attached to Naval Operations and the Bureau of Naval Personnel, there would be a Naval Reserve “desk” in each and every office and bureau of the Navy Department in charge of a Naval Reserve officer of appropriate rank and experience who would serve as assistant to the head of the office or bureau regarding all matters pertaining to the Naval Reserve, and act as liaison officer for that office or bureau with respect to all such matters.
In each Naval District the Naval Reserve would be administered by the District Commandant. To each District the Bureau of Naval Personnel would assign one Reserve officer of Captain or higher rank in permanent active duty status as Director of Naval Reserve. This officer would also be given the additional designation of “Aide to the Commandant for Naval Reserve.” To each Naval District the Bureau of Naval Personnel would assign one Naval Reserve officer of appropriate rank in permanent active duty status for duty as Assistant to the Director of Naval Reserve. These two officers would be the most competent and experienced in the field of Naval Reserve administration available to the Commandant.
To each Naval District the Bureau of Naval Personnel would assign one officer of the Regular Navy of appropriate rank for duty as Inspector-Instructor of Naval Reserve, and one officer of the Regular Navy of appropriate rank for duty as Assistant Inspector-Instructor, together with a generous number of Regular officers of lesser rank for assignment to the various drilling units as Instructors.
Right here I think it is pertinent to say that I am in total disagreement with anybody who advocates limited terms of active duty and frequent rotation for Naval Reserve officers ordered or assigned to permanent active duty in peacetime. That idea does not seem practical for the Reserve because the officers selected for such duties must be highly trained specialists in Naval Reserve matters, and because most Naval Reserve officers are essentially civilians engaged in civilian occupations. Like any other successful civilians, they have acquired their status in the business or professional world as the result of much hard work, keen competition, honest effort, and many times an investment of money. The younger officer has not acquired the same efficiency, he hasn’t “settled down,” and he doesn’t possess the required experience either in the business world or in the Navy; the older, better- qualified Reservist is more than likely the older, experienced, and successful business man whose responsibilities will not permit of absenting himself from his business for a period of, say, four years. Such an officer in peacetime just can’t take four years right out of the middle of his civilian concerns. Such a plan does not appear to be feasible as it would narrow the Department’s choice on the one hand and would on the other hand restrict the opportunity for peacetime active duty to those Naval Reserve officers of independent means, those out of employment, or those of lesser qualification and consequence either in civilian life or in the Reserve. Such a plan would most certainly defeat the purpose involved is the best reason I can think of for maintaining Naval Reserve officers on active duty in peacetime, which, in my opinion, is to preserve a continuity of naval reserve policy, procedure, and practice in a situation where of necessity officers of the Regular Navy must be rotated at more or less frequent intervals. The policy of peacetime active duty for Naval Reservists is, in my opinion, basically correct—but it can work to advantage only if those selected for such duty are the best qualified for their duties available and if they are permitted the opportunity of becoming “career” men and acquiring the benefits of paid retirement in the interests of their future financial security —just like any other officer of the Navy who gives his undivided attention to the Navy.
Incidentally, in the picture of Naval Reserve organization, administration, and training, it will be most healthy to the morale of the Naval Reserve if provision is made to recognize long and faithful service (with a requisite amount of active duty) through the medium of some reasonable program of paid retirement. Such a program is embodied in Mr. Vinson’s Bill (HR-771), Mr. Kopple- man’s Bill (HR-2293), or Mr. Walsh’s later Bill (S-389), which propose to amend Section 310 of the Naval Reserve Act of 1938 to provide for paid retirement for Naval Reservists who have not less than 20 years’ service in any of the Armed Services of the United States, at the rate of 2½ per cent of the active duty pay for the rank on the Honorary Retired List or the pay in the highest rank or rating held on active duty (whichever is higher) multiplied by the number of years of active duty performed, not to exceed a total of 75%.
Section 6 of S-1405 (Mr. Walsh), which passed the Senate in November of 1945, goes a step in the right direction by amending existing law by providing that any officer of the Regular Navy or Marine Corps or of the Naval Reserve Components thereof may, in the discretion of the President, be retired on his own application after more than 20 years of active service, at least 10 years of which must have been active commissioned service, with provision for retired pay at the rate of 2½ per cent of the active duty pay with longevity credit of the rank with which retired, multiplied by the number of years of service for which entitled to credit in the computation of their pay while on active duty, not to exceed 75 per cent of said active duty pay, etc. However, very few Naval Reservists will ever qualify for paid retirement on the basis of twenty years of active duty, unless they are ex-Regulars who have come over into the Reserve and now become eligible for such retirement because they can combine their Regular and Reserve active duty. There is certainly no objection to the idea of ex-Regular Reservists getting retirement, but what the Reserve needs (and in my opinion deserves) by way of retirement with pay is a provision of law under which Reservists who have completed long and honorable service (say, 20 years) in the Naval Reserve, of which a reasonable period (say, 5 years) is active duty, may retire with pay at the rate of 2½ per cent of last active duty pay rate, or highest rank held in active duty status, whichever is higher, multiplied by the number of years of such active duty, not to exceed 75 per cent. Such a law would recognize and reward long continued service and sustained interest in the Naval Reserve as such, and it would make it possible for Reservists to qualify for paid retirement under practical conditions applicable to Reserve service. Such a retirement bill would certainly do a great deal toward encouraging interest and promoting morale.
TRAINING
While there would be opportunity for participation in week-end cruises on a voluntary basis, and occasional voluntary participation in cruises and training duty of longer duration, there would be no regularly scheduled training program for Class 1 Reservists.
Class 2 personnel attached to drilling units would be expected to attend 50 drills per year, with attendance at 43 drills per year required for maintenance of efficiency and status. Drill pay would be at the rate of one-thirtieth of the monthly pay of rank or rate per drill.
Class 2 personnel attached to drilling surface units would be required to participate in a two-week Annual Cruise and Target Practice. Class 2 aviation drilling units would be required to perform two weeks Annual Training Duty at designated air bases, air facilities, on board aircraft carriers of the Fleet, or under such other circumstances as may be deemed appropriate by proper authority.
We must give careful consideration to Class 3 (Volunteer or the Standby Reserve) because it must be borne in mind that it is in this group that well over 90 per cent of the Naval Reserve commissioned personnel and the more highly skilled enlisted men will ultimately be numbered.
To my mind the experiences gained in the various officer-training units such as the Communication School at Harvard, the Radar Schools at Harvard and Bowdoin, the Line School at Miami, and the numerous other similar activities scattered throughout the country, should not be allowed to fade into the hazy fog of our naval service memories, but rather should set the pattern for our ever-vigilant future preparations. In this connection I realize of course that a huge number of officers—or enlisted personnel—on active training duty with pay, cruising in naval vessels, or otherwise, would impose a staggering financial burden upon the taxpayer; however, I firmly believe that the Navy already has, and will continue to have, adequate facilities to train large numbers of Reserve officers during the summer months at its 52 NROTC colleges and universities whose activities for the most part are ordinarily lying fallow during the scholastic vacation period.
It has long been the custom of the teaching profession for the ambitious instructors to attend summer courses of brief duration for the purpose of improving techniques or enriching professional knowledge in related fields. Practically every college operates a summer school and all are well patronized, ofttimes, I am told, by students motivated by love of knowledge for its own sake or pride in increasing an already above-average cultural endowment. Invariably, the cost of instruction is borne by the student, and I am also informed that teachers are not paid to attend classes of this type.
If the Naval ROTC program can be arranged to offer a series of courses of two or three weeks’ duration in intensive instruction in the various fields of specialization, with travel, subsistence, and dormitory costs only paid out of Reserve appropriations, I am sure the instruction would be of immense value in the training of Class 3 Reservists, particularly if correspondence courses were regularly employed throughout the balance of the year, and this program could be augmented by occasional training afloat in order to furnish opportunity for some practical application of the theoretical knowledge thus gained. Certainly, if Harvard, for instance, could turn out competent novice communicators in 60 days in wartime, an equally valuable product should result from leisurely guided courses in a program such as described—at any rate, the locale for close to a hundred thousand young officers is already an operating feature of the Naval Establishment and the program suggested would provide for a fuller use of an existing facility in the interests of the National Defense.
Training and instruction for Class 3 Reservists would be voluntary. Circumstances permitting, there would be occasional opportunity for participation in annual cruises and other periods of ordered or authorized training duty, with or without pay.
Full and by, it is assumed that a Reserve officer’s field of specialization will closely follow, or be based upon his civilian background, education, and training. In the prewar Naval Reserve much of the emphasis and most of the available funds were allotted to the training of the officers and men of the Organized Reserve who comprised a relatively small percentage of the total membership of the Naval Reserve. As subsequent events were to prove, the Naval Reserve in existence at M-Day was not even a drop in the bucket, and as an organization its identity was quickly lost. Its officer complement was largely shunted into administrative billets ashore, and generally speaking, fared rather badly in competition for promotion with the “freshly-inducted” wartime citizen officers whose training was received on the job in actively operating units afloat, after indoctrination in a training school.
If we are to envision a Navy made up of a comparatively small Regular force and a huge Reserve, we must provide for the training of adequate numbers of officers and enlisted technicians for the immediate manning of our Fleets. This does not mean training a force of a few thousand individuals as “all round” naval officers, but rather the procuring and educating of several hundred thousand men in the various specialty fields that go to make up the Navy. It is much simpler to train engineers, communicators, radar, and gunnery officers than it is to attempt to turn out professional naval “experts” with all-round proficiency; and, for the purposes of a wartime mobilization, it is not necessary to go to the trouble of schooling the nonprofessional officer in more than one branch of naval activity.
At intervals of not less frequently than every two years, Class 4 Reservists would be required to participate in a cruise of not less than one month in vessels of the Navy in regular commission. On a voluntary basis, they would be given opportunity for participation in other periods of training duty, as circumstances permit.
A Naval Reserve Squadron composed of not less than five vessels assigned to drilling surface organizations of the Ninth Naval District would be maintained on the Great Lakes for the purpose of augmenting armory drills, week-end cruising, and for annual cruises and target practice. In rotation, and not less often than once every four years, the drilling surface units of this district would be required to participate in saltwater cruises in vessels of the Navy in regular commission.
Naval Reserve training vessels would be assigned to each Naval District as appropriate for the purpose of augmenting armory drills and instruction, and for week-end and other short periods of training afloat for Reservists of any class. To each of the Naval Reserve training vessels there would be assigned a skeleton ship-keeping detail, as appropriate, under the command of an officer, warrant officer, or petty officer of the Naval Reserve.
There would be opportunity for Naval Reserve officers to participate in occasional tours of duty in the Navy Department, at the district headquarters, navy yards, air stations and bases, and other facilities as appropriate and as circumstances permit.
All divisions of the drilling component of the Naval Reserve would be inspected at least once per year by the Naval Reserve Inspection Board attached to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
As a stimulus to interest and efficiency, the Navy Department would award trophies to the battalion, squadron, and surface and aviation divisions attaining the highest score of efficiency at the annual inspection.
As a stimulus to interest and efficiency, the Navy Department would award a suitable trophy for the surface division making the highest score at annual target practice.
CONCLUSION
Admiral King, when Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Personnel, have stressed the urgent need for a strong and efficient Naval Reserve and have urged all Naval Reservists who do not transfer to the Regular Navy to “stand fast” in their status as Reservists.
The experience Naval Reservists gained in the active theaters of operations afloat, and in the supporting field of logistics as related to the activities of our Navy Shore Establishments, during the war just concluded, is of such a nature and scope as to be of inestimable present and continuing value to the Navy and is of extreme importance in any plan or program concerning the organization, administration, and training of the post-war Naval Reserve as such.
In the face of the Navy’s need for a Reserve component of material proportions, it is highly urgent that the experience gained at such great cost should not be dissipated. Every Naval Reservist should retain his commission and should lead the way in furnishing the Navy and the Nation at large with the most effective example of a continuing, unselfish patriotism through his active interest in and support of, and if circumstances permit, his active participation in, the post-war Naval Reserve program, thus guaranteeing for himself and for his fellow- Americans a perpetuation of the things he believes in and for which he fought. Let's go, Naval Reserve!