Disaster to General MacArthur's land and air forces in Leyte would certainly have come if the Japanese Fleet had not been decisively defeated by American naval forces in the Battle for Leyte Gulf in October, 1944. It was a narrow squeak, but the final outcome was the utter rout of the Japanese sea forces. Hirohito's ships suffered such destruction and damage that never again could they be assembled as a major fighting force.
A most striking aspect of the battle occurred at Surigao Strait where the southern prong of the Japanese Fleet was met and destroyed by the American Seventh Fleet. It was a matter of great satisfaction to many Americans, and it must have been a bitter pill for the Japanese, to realize that five of the six battleships of the force which thus polished off the Sans of Heaven had been damaged at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
Several of those Pearl Harbor battleships had already taken part in the landings in the Aleutians, at Tarawa, and in the Marianas; one had fought through the Normandy landings; all were yet to contribute mightily to the capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Thus before the war ended nearly all of the ships which were sunk or damaged on December 7 came back to avenge in fullest measure the Japanese treachery at Pearl Harbor.
Regarding the salvage and repair of the vessels sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor, there has been much misunderstanding in the public mind. Indeed, the public has for over four years thirsted for authentic information on every aspect of Pearl Harbor. Many persons have wanted to know details of torpedo and bomb damage, and specific causes for the sinking of our ships. Others, and especially those with a technical bent, have desired some knowledge as to methods of refloating and rehabilitation.
A Committee of Congress has explored most exhaustively what occurred before the events of December 7, without enlightening the public fully on many controversial points. The review of any disaster usually discloses that the facts which precede it are confused by views and opinions in great number and intensity, and the separation of fact and opinion becomes increasingly difficult with the lapse of time. Pearl Harbor was no exception.
86 SHIPS PRESENT-9 WERE SUNK
What occurred during and after the attack is much more factual. We know, for instance, that out of a total of 86 naval vessels in the harbor during the attack only 9 were sunk and 10 others were damaged severely. True, five of our battleships and one large target ship rested on the bottom of the harbor which was dredged to a depth of about 40 feet; three destroyers were sunk in drydock. The total count by number, type, and nature of damage was as follows:
Arizona, battleship, struck by one torpedo (possible) and about eight bombs of various sizes. One large bomb, of about 2000 pounds armor-piercing, apparently entered the powder magazines forward and caused the virtual disintegration of the forward half of the ship. A terrific oil fire burned for two days. Inasmuch as the torpedo hit has not been confirmed, it is likely that the Arizona was destroyed by bombs alone.
Oklahoma, battleship, struck by about four aerial torpedoes causing a very rapid inflow of water which resulted in the capsizing of the vessel within about eleven minutes. The ship rested on the bottom at an angle of 150° from upright. Only a small segment of the bottom and the starboard bilge were visible above the water.
California, battleship, was struck by two aerial torpedoes and one bomb. Another bomb which was a near-miss exploded close aboard and opened a large hole in the ship's port side. Another near-miss fell off the starboard bow but caused only minor damage. The California stayed afloat for over three days but gradually settled until her main deck aft was about 17 feet under water.
West Virginia, battleship, was struck by 7 aerial torpedoes and 2 bombs. The ship sank rapidly and rested on hard bottom. Fire damage throughout the ship was severe.
Nevada, battleship, was struck by one aerial torpedo and five bombs of various sizes. The vessel was able to get underway but the continued inflow of water necessitated beaching her near the entrance channel to Pearl Harbor. She was severely damaged by fire.
Utah, an old battleship used as an aerial target, was probably struck by three torpedoes. The vessel capsized and came to rest on the bottom 165° from the upright position.
Pennsylvania, battleship, was in drydock and was struck by one medium-sized bomb which caused considerable topside damage and a number of personnel casualties.
Maryland, battleship, was struck by two bombs forward which caused considerable flooding and trimmed the bow down about five feet.
Tennessee, battleship, was struck by two large bombs which caused minor damage to one turret and several major caliber guns. The limited damage was due to low orders of detonation. The ship suffered serious damage aft due to oil fire on the water near the Arizona.
Helena, light cruiser, was struck by one aerial torpedo which caused destruction of about half of the main machinery, and considerable flooding.
Oglala, minelayer, was struck by the pressure wave from the explosion of the aerial torpedo which hit the Helena. The side of this 40-year old vessel was opened up, and uncontrolled flooding caused her to capsize and lie on her side in 40 feet of water.
Honolulu, light cruiser, suffered side damage from the near-miss of a medium-sized bomb, causing considerable flooding and damage to electrical wiring.
Raleigh, light cruiser, was struck by one aerial torpedo amidships which destroyed about half of the main machinery. One bomb hit aft caused extensive flooding.
Vestal, repair ship, was struck by two bombs causing considerable local damage and serious flooding aft.
Curtiss, aircraft tender, was struck by one large bomb which caused serious local damage. Also, one Japanese plane which had been hit by anti-aircraft fire crashed into a crane of the Curtiss and caused some damage.
Shaw, destroyer, was struck by three small bombs which caused great damage including the blowing up of the forward magazines, thus wrecking the forward third of the ship. The vessel was on a floating drydock at the time of the attack.
Floating Drydock No. 2 was struck by five bombs which destroyed its water-tight subdivision and caused it to sink to the bottom together with the destroyer Shaw and the small yard tug Sotoyomo.
Cassin and Downes, destroyers, were docked abreast of each other in a graving drydock. These vessels were struck by three small bombs which exploded on the bottom of the drydock. Hundreds of fragments caused very extensive damage to the hulls and started oil fires which grew to great intensity. The combination of bomb explosions, oil fires and flooding caused the Cassin to fall off the blocks and against the Downes. The first appraisal indicated that these two vessels were total losses.
TYPE AND INTENSITY OF JAPANESE ATTACK
From the general description of damage listed above, it will be noted that severest damage was suffered by the battleships and that most of such damage resulted from aerial torpedoes. It is clear the Japanese strategy was to cripple the backbone of the American Navy and that they had adapted the aerial torpedo for use in shallow waters to a degree which made it indeed a lethal weapon. It is interesting to note that the aerial torpedo was an American invention which came back to bite us. Likewise the Japanese used dive bombing, another American development, very successfully against our ships.
It is fortunate that none of our few aircraft carriers was present in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, as later events proved the dire need for and the extreme shortage of vessels of this type. The Japanese claimed the sinking of a carrier at the berth occupied by the Utah—they knew that the Saratoga was usually moored there when in port.
From Japanese sources the fact has now been established that the attack on Pearl Harbor was made in great strength. The naval force which eventually launched its planes about 200 miles north of Oahu consisted of 6 aircraft carriers, 5 battleships, 30 destroyers and a few auxiliaries. The Japanese have stated that they launched 361 planes, of which all returned except 27. The armament carried by these various planes is not at present a matter of record. It is known, however, that every plane had a specific mission. A large number were assigned to bomb and put out of commission all air fields in the Hawaiian Islands, such as Hickam, Ford Island, Bellows, Kaneohe, and Ewa. Of the planes assigned to attack naval vessels in the harbor, a large proportion no doubt were armed with torpedoes having large explosive charges.
JAPANESE MISSION AT PEARL HARBOR
The real objective of the Japanese was to cripple the American Fleet, but the first requisite was the destruction of all American air power on the Hawaiian Islands. This latter was accomplished to an extent which seemed unbelievable to officers of the Fleet. For example, when the writer inquired of a fellow officer on the California why our aircraft were not attacking the Japanese bombers swarming overhead, the answer was that ours had all been destroyed on the ground, which was almost a factual statement.
It was ascertained from some of the Japanese planes which were shot down that each pilot had specific instructions and a very clear chart of Pearl Harbor indicating to him the target he was to attack. It might be mentioned that these charts were essentially correct even as to location of specific ships, thus indicating the accuracy of Nipponese espionage—which of course was impossible to prevent in view of the terrain and other considerations.
Naturally the Japanese, even with the large number of planes at their disposal, could not attack all targets which were of major importance. For instance, no attack was made on the extensive facilities of the Navy Yard except in the case of two drydocks which held several ships. No real damage was suffered by the large array of shops and work facilities for repairing ships, which proved of such tremendous value to the nation from December 7 onward. Likewise, the tremendous oil stowage adjacent to Pearl Harbor was not attacked at all, and it was wondered why the Japanese failed to drop at least a few bombs which might have started a conflagration that would have proved disastrous, especially to the mobility of the undamaged vessels of the Fleet in the days to follow December 7.
MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE
Aside from the material damage to our Fleet, the Japanese were successful in accomplishing the premeditated murder of nearly 3,100 Navy men at Pearl Harbor on that typically beautiful Hawaiian morning of Sunday, 7 December. Additional lives were snuffed out elsewhere in the Hawaiian Islands, particularly at air fields and in civilian areas. Several unsuspecting civilians who were flying their personal aircraft that morning were shot down by Japanese war planes.
Unlike most occurrences of the calamitous nature there apparently was nobody who could say "I told you so." This savage and unprincipled act of a leading world power came as a wholly unexpected shock. A thing deemed impossible in this age of enlightenment and peaceful purpose had actually occurred. To most persons it seemed like a horrible dream from which one struggles to be released by waking. But waking consisted of a gradual realization of the fact that the stealthy Japanese had been successful in seriously crippling our sea and air power and murdering a large number of our nationals.
Some critical comment has been passed to the effect that personnel engaged in national defense should have anticipated such an attack from the Japanese. Well, as an afterthought it is always easy to see where persons might have acted differently or thought differently. But in this case our military personnel, and civilian too in Hawaii, had approximately the same viewpoint toward the Japanese problem as did the whole American people. That viewpoint is hard to describe but included the fallacious conclusion that the Japanese were trying to get along peaceably in the world and that they would shrink from warring against a country so powerful as ours. The vicious thing which occurred was not within our horizons of thought; such an outrage simply "could not happen here."
DESTRUCTION AND FIRE
Torpedo and bomb explosions wrought much damage and initiated fires of great intensity. Tons of fuel oil were loosed on the water and burned furiously as the stiff trade wind shifted it from one end of the harbor to the other. The dense smoke from the conflagration on and around the Arizona was visible for many miles.
The harbor was soon filled with debris from sinking and damaged war ships; many injured small boats were adrift. Fragments of Japanese aircraft also littered the harbor. The whole sky over the harbor was dotted with shell bursts from our anti-aircraft guns. Some vessels, like the Arizona, sank to the bottom very rapidly; others responded to the valiant efforts of their crews to keep them afloat. Some ships showed serious lists due to acute damage. The Oklahoma capsized through an arc of 150° within ten or twelve minutes after the attack began; the Utah was more leisurely.
OUR SHIPS STRIKE BACK
The Japanese attackers were brought under anti-aircraft fire almost immediately,—as soon as it was realized that the Japanese had struck with lethal intent. In accordance with Fleet instructions all ships had certain guns manned and ammunition at hand. Prompt action was taken to man other guns and to start the flow of ammunition. On some ships this was impeded by the damage suffered in the initial stages—damage such as severe flooding, listing, oil fires on board, loss of power and light. Oil flooding within the ship was a great handicap because of deadly fumes and impossible footing on inclined linoleum decks. In spite of all obstacles and although suffering from the shock of extreme surprise, the ships' personnel gave a magnificent account of themselves. Their anti-aircraft fire was reasonably accurate and effective. It was estimated at the time that approximately 40 Japanese aircraft were shot down at Pearl Harbor, as against the later Japanese statement that 27 failed to return.
Although rocked back on their heels, our sailormen quickly rose to the occasion and demonstrated the traditional American fighting spirit. Deeds of great valor and self-sacrifice were commonplace. Every person devoted his full efforts toward fighting off the enemy, saving the stricken ships, fighting fires, alleviating suffering, and rescuing shipmates. The nation and the Navy may well feel proud of the manner in which the crews of our warships conducted themselves. Space does not permit the recording of the many outstanding examples of heroism and sacrifice. However, on one battleship an officer busied himself pushing the smaller persons through a 12-inch airport while he remained trapped and went down with the ship. When the Oklahoma capsized it was soon ascertained from hammer signals that a considerable number of persons were trapped in the bottom compartments of the ship, such compartments then being above water or within air bubbles. A rescue group was immediately organized to free as many men as possible. Holes were cut in the exposed bottom of the Oklahoma mostly by hand tools to release these men. In this manner 34 men were rescued from certain death over a period of 36 hours.
One Task Force At Sea—It might be mentioned that at the time of the action at Pearl Harbor the Pacific Fleet was divided into three task forces and that it was customary for one or two task forces to be at sea in conformity with a drastic training schedule. Such schedules included war games in which one task force might be pitted against another. Thus there was always one task force at Pearl Harbor for refueling, supplies, recreation, and rest. This latter part of the schedule was of course essential as personnel must have a reasonable amount of rest and recreation to forestall staleness in training. On December 7 it happened that two task forces were at Pearl Harbor and only one task force at sea. Possibly the Japanese had access to information regarding the Fleet schedule—or possibly it was merely luck on their part that they found two task forces available as targets. Regardless of the amount of information which might have been in possession of the Japanese, the fact is that one task force composed essentially of cruisers was at sea. This task force immediately set out to the westward in search of the enemy with the purpose of attacking and destroying him. However, we now know that the Japanese task force lay to the north of Hawaii and therefore was not sighted. As we now look back on the early days of the war it seems fortunate that our task force failed to contact the Japanese, for the greatly superior strength of the enemy task force might have caused us such losses as to greatly delay, if not prevent, the magnificent performance of our small Fleet in the dark months following the attack on Pearl Harbor.
EARLY ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
The prompt arousal of the natural fighting spirit possessed by Americans following the shock of infamous attack was paralleled by immediate action toward ship repair and ship salvage. The splendid organizational procedure which pervades our Navy was brought into full play at once. The higher brackets of command were furnished from various sources well-considered estimates of the situation as regards extent of damage, time required for repairs, prospects of salvage, etc. The purpose of the high command was to accomplish the following:
- To make immediately available to our intact task force at sea all of the undamaged or lightly damaged warships in Pearl Harbor.
- To complete at the earliest possible date the regular overhauls which had been underway on a number of vessels assigned to the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.
- To expedite repair of damages to ships not too badly hurt in order that they might be ready to fight at the earliest possible date.
- To lay out a long-range program for the refloating and rehabilitation of vessels which had been sunk or seriously damaged.
The overall purpose was to handle the program of rehabilitation so as to insure being able to live up to the Navy's high standard "of doing most with what we have" at any particular moment. In compliance with this program the ships with minor damage received first attention and were given the utmost priority.
Any estimate of the situation following a disaster or conflagration is almost certain to be pessimistic—this for the reason that superficial evidence thrusts itself before the eye and covers up values which are hidden underneath. Pearl Harbor was no exception, as was proved later.
First appraisals indicated the total loss of several ships which were later raised and saved and others from which the bulk of the machinery and equipment were salvaged and reinstalled in new hulls. However, it is interesting to note that the first official release of information to the public regarding the losses suffered at Pearl Harbor appeared overoptimistic to persons on the spot. When the President gave the American people in a radio address on February 24, 1942 the list of ships which were lost, it seemed highly improbable that the list would work out to be that short. The President's statement, however, was accepted as the directive of the Fleet in connection with salvage and rehabilitation. Within four or five months the salvage work had proceeded so favorably that it was clear that the President's list of losses could not only be met but considerably shortened.
START OF SALVAGE OPERATIONS
Salvage and rescue work began immediately following the attack, as was necessary to keep ships afloat and to prevent them from capsizing. Ships' crews worked day and night in damage control parties to prevent the spread of flooding, to reduce lists, to jettison topside weights, to fight fires, and to make essential repairs to keep ships' machinery and equipment in operation. Aid and assistance were furnished from other vessels, particularly repair ships and tenders. Civilian personnel from the Navy Yard lent a hand, as did other civilian personnel drawn from contracting firms.
Tugs like the Ortolan and Widgeon which had great pumping capacity were invaluable. Other small craft aided wherever practicable. The lowly garbage lighter YG16, sometimes nicknamed the "Violet," won commendation for its 36-hour vigil fighting oil fires.
The Vestal and Raleigh—While the officers and crews of all ships applied themselves to their jobs in accordance with the best traditions of the service, mention should be made of the Vestal and the Raleigh as outstanding cases of successful damage control work and consequent self-preservation. The Vestal, a repair ship, was tied up alongside the Arizona when the attack began. This ship was struck by several bombs and eventually the Commanding Officer was blown overboard from the bridge by the concussion of a severe explosion on the Arizona. He swam back to his ship, got her underway, and successfully beached her to prevent sinking. For his valor this plucky officer was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. Later he commanded the heavy cruiser San Francisco and was killed by Japanese shellfire in the night Battle of Guadalcanal.
The Raleigh also put up an ideal fight for self-preservation. Due to torpedo and bomb damage a large portion of the vessel was flooded and she was in imminent danger of capsizing. Every measure and artifice known to damage control personnel was utilized to keep her afloat and upright, including the removal of many topside weights, many of which were thrown overboard but recovered later by divers.
The California—The damage to the California was extensive, but strenuous efforts were made to keep her afloat. At one time it seemed probable that she might capsize as had the Oklahoma and Utah, but this was prevented by appropriate remedial action by the Commanding Officer and the damage control organization. It was only the lack of adequate pumping capacity which prevented saving the California. In spite of valiant efforts the flooding of the ship gained headway and soon all power on the ship was lost due to general flooding and to heavy smoke in the fire rooms. This originated from a serious fire on board. After three days the ship finally sank and rested on the bottom. It had been predicted that the soft nature of the bottom would not support the weight of the vessel and that she probably would sink out of sight. Fortunately, however, the California finally stopped sinking when her main deck was about 17 feet underwater and with a list to port of 51 degrees. No more strenuous effort was ever made to keep a vessel afloat. It was a source of touching gratification to witness the devoted efforts of the young Americans comprising her crew as they stayed on their jobs for three days with little or no opportunity for rest or to remove the fuel oil with which they were smeared. For most of them their bill of fare for the period consisted almost entirely of sandwiches and coffee.
Ordnance Material—On December 7 a start was made in removing from severely damaged ships all of the anti-aircraft guns which could be more advantageously used elsewhere, and also ammunition and ordnance material such as range finders, spotting glasses, etc. There was a dearth of such material in the Hawaiian area; particularly around air fields, and it was therefore a welcome relief to see anti-aircraft guns installed around the Navy Yard and the Army's Hickam Field.
Initial Repairs—While preliminary salvage work proceeded, plans were developed for major salvage operations. At the same time repairs on damaged vessels were being prosecuted vigorously by all hands, particularly at the Navy Yard. The battleships and cruisers which were not severely damaged were put into condition to make them seaworthy and able to fight within a short time. Other vessels were drydocked for temporary repairs to permit passage to the West Coast navy yards for final repairs and installation of machinery and equipment which had been destroyed.
It should be understood that the many vessels which had not been damaged in any way, particularly destroyers and submarines, had put to sea following the attack, or as they were readied and supplied for offensive operations against the enemy.
SCHEDULE OF REPAIR WORK
On the basis of repairing ships in inverse order to the amount of damage suffered, the following schedule of repair work was carried out:
(a) There were three battleships which had received damage which could be repaired in a reasonably short time. The Commander in Chief was particularly anxious to expedite repairs on these battleships in order to get them to sea. All essential work was finished in about three weeks, consisting mainly of the following:
(1) The Pennsylvania required replacement of one 5 inch 25 caliber anti-aircraft gun which, together with its foundation structure, was destroyed by a 500-pound Japanese bomb. A similar gun was removed from the West Virginia and installed on the Pennsylvania.
(2) The Maryland received two bomb hits on the forecastle. One of about 100 pounds exploded on the main deck and caused miscellaneous small damage affecting the water-tightness of the forecastle deck. The second bomb of about 500 pounds passed through the port side of the ship about 12 feet under water and exploded in a storeroom near the keel. This explosion destroyed flats and bulkheads in the vicinity, and the fragments opened numerous leaks through the bottom and shell and scattered stored materials everywhere. It was an onerous job to stop these various leaks without going into drydock, but inasmuch as the drydocks were at a premium the repair work on the Maryland was of a temporary nature. The effort was successful and the 5 or 6 foot trim by the head was corrected, but not without a very trying time.
(3) The Tennessee was hit by two large bombs, probably of the 15-in, shell type. One passed through the armored top plate of No. 3 turret. Fortunately, it was a dud and caused no serious damage. The other struck the center gun of No. 2 turret and caused a large crack which would necessitate the replacement of the gun. The most serious damage suffered by the Tennessee resulted from the continuous oil fires around her stern adjacent to the burning Arizona. In spite of all precautionary measures the heat started serious fires aft which spread forward as heavy layers of paint reached ignition temperatures. Much of the hull plating became warped and some of the riveted joints were badly strained. Electric cables, including the degaussing lines, were burned out. Repairs were accomplished by working parties from repair ships and from the Navy Yard.
One of the most serious circumstances regarding the Tennessee was that she was wedged tightly between the sunken West Virginia outboard and the concrete quay inboard. It was possible to move her only after the quay had been removed by successive applications of dynamite. Some damage to the Tennessee's port side at the turn of the bilge resulted from contact with the bilge of the West Virginia as she settled to the bottom after pivoting on her torpedoed port side.
(4) The crew of the Vestal did an excellent job in accomplishing repairs to the damages caused by two bombs. As in the case of the Maryland, the bomb exploded in a storeroom in the bowels of the ship. After about ten days of pumping and removing of damaged material it was possible to accomplish temporary repairs, which permitted the vessel to remain fully afloat. When the dry dock schedule at Pearl Harbor relaxed somewhat, the Vestal was sent in for permanent repairs.
(5) The crew of the Raleigh, as heretofore mentioned, did an excellent job in keeping their ship afloat. The one bomb which hit aft did not explode but penetrated three decks and the ship's side aft. Temporary repairs to this damage were accomplished by the ship's force. Later the Raleigh was docked and permanent repairs in way of the torpedo hit were effected by the Navy Yard. Thereafter the Raleigh returned to the mainland for installation of new machinery and equipment to the extent required.
(6) The floatability of the Curtiss was in no way affected, but there was considerable topside damage from bomb fragmentation and from the gasoline fire caused by a Japanese airplane colliding with the starboard boat crane. The ship's crew went a long way in repairing the damages, which were eventually made good by the Navy Yard.
(7) The Honolulu was tied up at a Navy Yard pier. One bomb of about 500 pounds struck and passed through the pier and exploded in the water alongside the Honolulu at about frame 40 port. This near-miss opened the side slightly and ruptured a sea chest for a magazine flood, eventually causing the flooding of five magazines and the handling room of one turret; It was necessary to dock the Honolulu for repairs to the shell and to replace some electrical circuits which were flooded out. The ship was ready to sail early in January.
(8) The Helena was also moored at a Navy Yard pier. Her only damage resulted from the torpedo hit in way of machinery spaces on the starboard side. The Helena was the first ship docked in No. 2 drydock at Pearl Harbor, which was not yet completed on December 7. Temporary repairs were made to the Helena's hull to make her seaworthy, after which she proceeded to Mare Island for permanent repairs and the installation of machinery and equipment which had been destroyed.
(9) The destroyer Shaw was an interesting case of repairing a severely damaged vessel. As a result of a bomb hit, the forward magazines of the Shaw blew up and wrecked all of the ship forward of the bridge. First appraisals were that the Shaw was a total wreck but in due time it was found that the machinery and the whole ship other than the forward area were in good condition. At the earliest opportunity the Shaw was removed from the wrecked floating drydock and redocked on the marine railway. There she was trimmed off neatly and measured up for a false bow, which was eventually fabricated and installed at a subsequent drydocking. About February 10 the Shaw set sail for Mare Island under her own power, the first "wrecked" vessel to do so. Her skipper and crew were a proud set of people, and that same feeling of satisfaction permeated all of Pearl Harbor as the Shaw successfully ran her trials and then departed for the mainland.
(10) The floating drydock YFD-2 was struck by 5 bombs, 4 of which affected very seriously her watertight integrity. As work on her proceeded it was ascertained that her watertight compartments were pierced by over 150 fragments. There was also considerable fire damage. Holes affecting water tightness were patched or plugged so that the drydock could be floated on January 9, 1942. Thereafter permanent repairs were proceeded with so that the drydock was again placed in limited use on January 26, 1942 and continued to serve a most useful purpose throughout the war.
RAISING AND SALVAGING OF THE NEVADA
When the Japanese attack began, the Nevada was moored in the berth next to the Arizona. In accordance with the Fleet doctrine she immediately prepared to get underway, and was able to do so although suffering from one torpedo hit. As she steamed down the channel toward the sea entrance she was heavily attacked by dive bombers and suffered 7 or 8 bomb hits. Two of these hits in the forward areas induced serious flooding. By the time the Nevada reached the entrance she had taken on a great amount of water and it was apparent to the plucky young officer then in command that the ship should not enter the channel at the risk of blocking same. Accordingly, he decided to beach her and did a very successful job in so doing. The fine spirit of her personnel which permitted the Nevada to get underway and fight off her attackers soon was to carry her over the difficulties of refloating and rehabilitation and the eventual return home under the ship's own power.
As the Nevada lay beached near the entrance channel to Pearl Harbor she really was a sorry sight to behold. It was not a pleasant spectacle for new ships arriving to reinforce or support the Pacific Fleet. Her stern was only a few feet from the shore, while her bow was practically submerged in the deep water near the channel. The forecastle was pretty much a tangled mess of twisted steel, and the superstructure up through the bridge had been entirely gutted by fire. The inside of the ship was completely filled with water and fuel oil.
There was considerable doubt in most minds as to whether the ship could ever be floated, and there were very few who even dimly hoped that she could be of any further military value. The "Cook's tour" of damaged ships by newly arrived personnel usually brought forth pessimistic forecasts regarding the Nevada—and she was the least damaged of the battleships which had been sunk.
Optimism—However, the officers and men of the Nevada who had not been transferred were full of optimism, optimism that seemed a bit foolhardy perhaps. They insisted, especially the Engineer Officer, that the remainder of their crew be kept together in order that the ship when raised might be returned to the mainland under her own power. This fine spirit of the ship's personnel was greatly respected and appreciated. Their request was approved, but with some mental reservations. Yet this time optimism paid off!
Flooding—Immediately following December 7 the crew of the ship had set to work to remove wreckage and to condition the ship for salvage operations. Salvage personnel, including divers, had made a careful check of underwater damage and had found that most of the flooding occurred through three large holes—one a torpedo hit on the port side at frame 40 and 20 feet below the waterline, and two bomb hits, the first at frame 13 starboard which passed through the forecastle and out through the shell about 13 feet below the main deck. This bomb exploded alongside the ship and opened up a triangular hole about 25 feet long and 18 feet deep, which was responsible for most of the flooding of the ship. A second bomb passed through the forecastle and eventually out through the bottom of the ship. It exploded in the water and left a hole about 6 feet in diameter. As a matter of special interest, this bomb passed through the large built-in gasoline tanks without igniting the contents.
Use of Patches—In order to shut off flooding from the torpedo hole a large wooden, patch was manufactured by the Navy Yard. This patch was shipshape, about 55 feet long and 32 feet deep, and extended around the turn of the bilge. The shape of the patch was obtained from measurements taken from the exposed bilge of the Oklahoma which was a sister ship of the Nevada. The patch was a massive affair and proved unsatisfactory for the purpose intended. The divers were unable to fit the patch to the hull of the ship satisfactorily for a number of important reasons, one of which was that it just seemed too large to handle satisfactorily in one piece. Eventually it was decided to endeavor to unwater the Nevada without this large patch, on the assumption that some of the bulkheads in area of the damage would be sufficiently intact to restrict the inflow of water, at least to a degree which would permit internal measures to be taken.
The two holes caused by bombs in the bow area were temporarily patched by wooden patches ordinarily referred to as window frames. The work was done by divers on the outside. The patches were drawn up reasonably tight by hook bolts. The bolts were hooked into holes burned into the small shell plating by underwater cutting torches.
All hull openings were plugged wherever possible by divers. Broken airports under water were made tight by use of wooden plates and draw bolts. Drain scuppers were plugged with mattresses, wooden plugs, and other similar material.
Pumps Used for the Work—A large number of gasoline-driven suction pumps were used to unwater the Nevada, varying in size from 3' to 10'. Inasmuch as the maximum lift of a suction pump under the operating conditions embodied was about 15 feet, it was necessary to install pumps at various levels throughout the ship. The small 3" pumps were used for "clean-up" jobs, such as for the final water in cut-up compartments, corners, etc. An excellent organization was developed to operate the pumps continuously, and this organization became very adept at diagnosing troubles and remedying them.
In the case of ships floated after the Nevada a much improved pump became available. This was the "deep-well" pump which was of the centrifugal type operated by a propeller shaft extending from the topside to the bottom of the vertical piping. Of course such pumps could be used for straight pipe lines only, and were ideally suited for use in trunks such as were common on the battleships under salvage. These pumps came in sizes varying from 8' to 12' and were capable of handling tremendous quantities of water; the 10' pump would handle about 4000 gallons per minute.
Removal of Water—As indicated heretofore, the Nevada was completely filled with sea water and oil. The plan for floating the ship contemplated the installation of a sufficient number of pumps to remove the water faster than it could flow into the ruptured shell with patches in place to the extent mentioned. As the unwatering work commenced it was apparent that there would be no difficulty in floating the vessel. However, the amount of space from which water was removed at any one time had to be governed by a schedule taking into account a large number of considerations. Some of these pertained to stability and list of the ship; others had to do with making temporary repairs inside the vessel as the water was removed, such as stopping off leaks, shoring bulkheads, etc. Others pertained to removal of debris, cleaning, preservation of mechanical and electrical equipment, etc.
Effects of Two Months' Submergence—As the water level was reduced inside the ship it was noted that all surfaces were deeply coated with fuel oil. This had some good effects but mostly bad. Steps were taken to organize working parties to remove such coating by hosing down with a hot caustic solution and rinsing with salt water. Sand was placed on the decks to improve footing. As various compartments were uncovered the ship's force removed the wreckage, stores, provisions, and eventually ammunition. Electric motors and certain items of auxiliary machinery were removed as soon as possible after they were unwatered. The motors were sent to the Navy Yard for reconditioning, as were also many pieces of equipment. As the work went on it was found that although the motors had been submerged in salt water for about two months it was possible to recondition them for service in about 95 per cent of the cases. It was also found that items of mechanical machinery that had been protected by the fuel oil were 100 per cent salvable. Even delicate instruments such as electric meters were capable of reconditioning.
As the main machinery spaces were pumped out it began to seem very probable that the machinery could be put in operable condition, and all hands developed an accelerated optimistic spirit regarding the ability of the Nevada to go home under her own power. The crew of the Nevada (about one-third original crew) applied themselves most strenuously to the job of cleaning up the ship and especially toward getting the machinery and equipment in running condition.
As successive stages of pumping were undertaken the bow rose higher and higher in the water, and it soon became clear that no great difficulty would be found in floating the ship. However, it was important to reduce the draft as much as practicable, and for this reason it was decided to remove all the oil still remaining aboard and as much of the storeroom and magazine contents as practicable. The removal of oil was undertaken by operating the vessel's fuel oil transfer pumps on compressed air which was furnished by portable compressors. The operation was wholly successful and marked the beginning of self-operation on the part of the Nevada.
Toxic Gas—As the unwatering schedule continued a number of people felt ill effects from the apparent prevalence of gas which seemed to fill the ship. The very dangerous toxic properties of this gas were discovered on February 7. On that date Lieutenant Clarkson was in the pumped-out trunk forward of the steering engine room and removed the cap from the air test fitting on the door to determine the water pressure within. The water which entered the trunk from the steering engine room released a large volume of toxic gas and Lieutenant Clarkson was overcome and collapsed. Other persons entered the trunk to rescue him, with the result that eventually six or more persons were overcome. The final result was that Lieutenant Clarkson and Chief Machinist Mate DeVries died as a result of gas poisoning. Thereafter a very careful investigation was made of the gas situation and it was determined that the gas was generated by reason of the polluted and stagnated harbor water being under pressure in closed compartments, thus forming hydrogen sulphide which is given off in large volumes in lethal concentrations when the water is released from pressure. Immediately precautionary steps were taken to provide additional ventilation, mostly suction blowers. Also persons were prohibited from entering compartments without respiratory equipment if the compartments were found to contain dangerous concentrations of gas. There were no more persons overcome by gas on the Nevada, but practically all persons working continuously on the ship were continuously subjected to some gassing.
To the Drydock—The vessel was fully afloat on February 12, 1942 and was scheduled for drydocking two days following. There was some trepidation about towing the Nevada across Pearl Harbor channel because of the possibility of some occurrence which might cause reflooding and possible sinking in the channel, thus blocking it. Careful inspections were made to insure that all bulkheads and patches were reasonably tight and that there was little if any possibility of reflooding. The drydock was put in readiness and tugs took the Nevada in tow at 0600 on February 14. Within a few hours the first vessel to be raised was safely tucked away in drydock No. 2 and there was great jubilation in the hearts of the Nevada's crew and the salvage personnel. On the coping of the dock stood the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and high ranking officers of his staff, and also the Commandant and Manager of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. This show of interest and support was a great boon to the salvage operations still ahead.
Home, Boys, Home—With the ship in drydock, the Navy Yard turned to with a will to repair the serious hull damage, to recondition the machinery, and otherwise to get the Nevada in shape to return to the West Coast. The work proceeded most satisfactorily with the result that the Nevada sailed for the Navy Yard, Puget Sound under her own power on April 22, 1942. It was a great day for the salvage organization, and indeed was a happy event for all hands of the Navy who were aware of the event.
Within a few months the Nevada was revamped and modernized and took her place in the Fleet as a highly valuable antiaircraft and bombardment vessel.
RAISING AND SALVAGING OF THE CALIFORNIA
The refloating of the Nevada without undue difficulty brought a feeling of increased optimism regarding the much more difficult jobs of refloating the California and West Virginia. True, the California had shown a strong disinclination to sink. The battle to keep her afloat had gone on for three and a half days, and was lost only because of inadequacy of pumping equipment. This was a favorable consideration in refloating the ship because it was ample proof that the inflow of water was reasonably well restricted by watertight compartmentation and closures. However, the fact that the main deck of the vessel on the low side was over 17 feet underwater presented a major problem which did not exist in the case of the Nevada.
The assistance of the Navy Yard Design Section was utilized in making technical studies of the problems of stability and hydrostatic pressures on various parts of the ship's structure. For instance, it was readily determined that the deadweight corresponding to 17 feet of water on the quarter deck was more than the structure of the ship would stand. This fact ruled out any thought of pumping out the inside of the ship to obtain the buoyancy required for flotation. Some means had to be found to remove the water above the quarter deck; this could be accomplished only by some kind of coffer-damming.
Shortly after December 7 it seemed to be agreed by the salvage experts that complete caissoning of the California and West Virginia would be necessary. This would consist of driving steel sheet piling into the bottom of the harbor entirely around the vessel in order that external and internal repairs could be made when the water was pumped out, leaving the vessel sitting on the bottom in a make-shift drydock. Of course this would be a stupendous and hazardous job, and there was some doubt as to a successful outcome on account of the softness of the bottom soil. It was clear that unless the caisson piling was driven very deep the hydrostatic pressure of some 40 or 45 feet would cause a "blow-up" of the bottom and consequent unintentional reflooding of the caissoned area. Finally a simpler cofferdam arrangement was adopted.
Type of Cofferdam Used—The cofferdam decided upon consisted of a wooden fencelike structure erected around the edge of the quarter deck. It consisted of vertical heavy 8" planking made up in sections, each section being about 30 feet long and 20 feet high. The planking extended down the side of the ship 2 or 3 feet. The weight was taken on the deck and waterway. Bolts passing through the quarter deck stanchion feet were used to draw the sections hard up against the side of the ship. Extensive internal shoring was installed to resist external pressures which would occur as the water within the fence was removed. Large bins were built near the top of the fence for holding sand bags used to overcome the buoyancy of the wood.
Handling of these cofferdam sections was accomplished by cranes mounted on barges. The exact positioning and securing was handled by divers. Watertightness was accomplished by use of various puddings, or packing materials such as old hose, oakum, sawdust, etc.
A fence of somewhat similar but much lighter construction was installed on the port forecastle which was under varying depths of water up to about 5 feet. The excellent design and most of the work of installation of this structure was performed by the Pacific Bridge Company, which company had the contract for drydock construction when the Japanese struck.
It was decided that no attempt would be made to patch externally the two torpedo holes in the port side of the California because exploratory work plus some considerable knowledge of the efficacy of torpedo bulkhead protection indicated that the flow of water through such areas could not be of great volume. However, a large patch of about 30 feet square had already been manufactured to cover the 15-foot triangular hole forward at about frame 40. This was properly rigged and secured. Divers did a great amount of work in plugging up other hull openings through the vessel, such as gunports, broken airports, drain scuppers, etc.
Pumping Procedure—The general scheme of pumping was to erect a large number of deep-well pumps of the Peerless and Pomona type at numerous locations, especially in trunks. The purpose was to provide sufficient pumping capacity to remove the water faster than it could flow in. With this tremendous pumping capacity it was realized that there might be a possibility of setting up large hydrostatic pressures and moments due to differences in water levels on opposite sides of bulkheads, etc. It was therefore decided to facilitate the flow of water without restriction throughout the ship. For this reason all doors and hatches were opened by divers before pumping commenced. In later stages holes were cut in certain bulkheads for the same reason.
Finally the day came to test out the ability of the pumps. Happily it was soon demonstrated that they were capable of lowering the level of the water inside of the fence structure. As pumping proceeded, with greater and greater difference in the level of water inside and out, it was easy to note any serious leaks near the surface. Divers immediately turned to on these weak spots and gradually increased the watertightness of the work. Within a few days the quarter deck was cleared of water and at that time a schedule of pumping operations was drawn up. This schedule allowed time to clear out wreckage as spaces were pumped out, to remove electric motors for reconditioning before long exposure to the air, to recover valuable personal property and place it in proper custody, and to recover bodies which were known to be in the vessel.
As in the Nevada, it was found that the California was thoroughly coated with a heavy film of fuel oil. Arrangements were made for a tug alongside to furnish high pressure on salt water hoses to wash down all surfaces as they were unwatered. Later, but before the fuel oil hardened, a thorough job was done by hosing with hot caustic solutions and washing down with sea water. This general method was used thereafter on all vessels.
The plan of salvage included the lightening of the weight of the California as much as possible by the removal of such items as the conning tower, cage masts, 14 inch guns, etc. This was done by the Navy Yard's 150-ton crane. The anti-aircraft battery had been removed and reinstalled elsewhere.
As spaces were emptied of water the reduced ship's force of about 300 men turned to on all kinds of work such as removal of debris, cleaning of spaces, unloading of stores and provisions, removing ammunition, etc. Such work was indeed a "lousy assignment" especially in the case of men who were not a part of the regular crew. It was a far cry from the opportunity to get on seagoing vessels to go out and fight the Japs. But it was work that had to be done and eventually was satisfactorily completed.
Due to rupturing of oil tanks by the two torpedo explosions there was a very large amount of loose oil all through the ship. Attention was given to means for picking up such oil in order to reduce the fire hazard and to minimize the amount of cleaning which would be necessary. A Wheeler system installed on a barge did a very successful job in handling such oil, and recovered about 200,000 gallons floating on the surface of the water in various parts of the ship. Oil which was still in stowage tanks was pumped out eventually by the vessel's fuel oil transfer Pumps operating on compressed air.
Condition of Machinery—While the machinery of the Nevada was found to be in good condition, it had been believed from the start that the electric propulsion machinery of the California and West Virginia would probably be a total loss. However, in view of the fine record made in reconditioning the low voltage electric motors of the Nevada and other vessels there were a few optimists who felt that it would be possible to recondition the main machinery of the California and West Virginia at least sufficiently for return to a mainland Navy Yard. This general question was discussed at great length and it was finally decided that one or two units would be reconditioned while the other two units would be broken down and completely rebuilt in place. Arrangements were made with the General Electric Company, the original supplier, to send out a force of experts to handle the job. About 60 of them arrived in due course. The work of cleaning and drying out was commenced immediately after the machinery was unwatered. This force was supplemented by Navy Yard personnel, ship's personnel, and Navy Mobile Repair Unit Nos. II and III which was assigned to the salvage organization. With respect to the success of this work, it might be stated that although a very optimistic undertaking, the results were very satisfactory. Eventually the California left Pearl Harbor under her own power on two rebuilt units, as did also the West Virginia. A very large number of electric motors were sent to the mainland for reconditioning after proper preservation procedure was taken on the ship. This program was very successful.
Condition of Boilers—As in the Nevada, the boilers were found to be in good condition except for bricking. All that was required was cleaning, both inside and out, and complete rebricking.
Recovery of Bodies—Based on the total number of personnel missing, it was anticipated that 48 bodies would be recovered within the ship. However, only 32 complete bodies were found. Due to the advanced state of decomposition, it was necessary to work out a method of removing the bodies with a minimum of handling. This consisted in stopping the pumps when several feet of water still remained on each deck, at which time a search was made for bodies floating in the water. Large canvas bags were made up so that the bodies could be floated into the bags and carried intact from the scene. This arrangement proved unusually effective in all respects.
Fire Protection—Great care was taken by the salvage organization to guard against fire. The vast amount of oil throughout the ship would have caused a holocaust if a fire once got started and heated the oil to ignition temperature. A large amount of fire extinguishing equipment was readily available at all points, and personnel organized and instructed. A rather large number of small fires occurred, usually from short circuits of temporary lighting leads. But none of these fires was permitted to gain headway on any of the ships under salvage, except in the case of the Oglala which is hereinafter referred to.
Gas Hazard—The lessons learned on the Nevada were put into full effect on the California and all succeeding salvage jobs. A generous quantity of exhaust ventilators were kept running continuously to prevent the accumulation of toxic or explosive gases. There were no gas poisonings on the California or succeeding ships, although it was frequently necessary to remove personnel from certain areas in which water under pressure was being released. Gas concentrations were continuously checked by specialists.
Removal of Meat—One of the meanest jobs on the California and West Virginia was the removal of tons of decomposed meat from refrigerated storerooms. There really was no way of performing this job in a pleasant way. A maximum of forced ventilation was pumped into spaces and gas masks were worn by members of the crew. As they brought the meat from the storerooms into passageways it was picked up by cargo nets and hooks and hoisted by cranes on barges alongside. The meat was placed on other barges and towed to sea where it was dumped, no doubt to the great relish of Hawaiian sea life. Later, on the West Virginia it was found that high pressure water hoses had the effect of shredding the meat so that it could be pumped overboard by the salvage pumps.
Protective Clothing—In the hot Hawaiian climate, especially on kona days, the personnel assigned to salvage work on board the ships had a most loathsome job. Fuel oil was everywhere, hydrogen sulphide fumes were in most places, and part of the time there was a general atmosphere of things going very, very slowly. Some sort of protective clothing for the men was essential. Boots and gloves were issued out in some cases, but there was a great shortage of such items. In lieu of boots, "nips" were made up by wrapping burlap around the feet; this offered some protection against fuel oil which covered the decks as a heavy scum when the water was pumped out. Also there was a sort of "goon gown" as the sailors called them, which were manufactured by the Navy Yard. These were a coverall of light slate-colored cloth such as is used for targets. They were fitted very loosely and secured with tie-ties instead of buttons, and were very comfortable. They became pretty well soaked up with oil after a day or two of use, at which time they were turned in and sent to a dry cleaning plant in Honolulu. Within a few days they could be reissued.
Means of Controlling Inflow of Water—As heretofore indicated, the damage to the underwater hull of the California was caused by two torpedo explosions and one bomb explosion close aboard. It was certain that the torpedo protection built into the ship was fairly effective and that the amount of water entering due to the two torpedo hits could be fairly well controlled by interior work performed by divers—including the full utilization of watertight doors, ventilation closures, pipe line stops, etc.
The large hole in the port bow caused by the bomb explosion, however, was not in the vicinity of torpedo bulkheads, although the subdivision of the ship in the general area of frames 9-15 was very favorable for restricting the spread of flooding water.
A patch to place over this 15-foot by 15-foot triangular hole was, however, manufactured. It was made up of wood reinforced by steel and was installed without difficulty. It proved very effective and was regarded as an excellent patch job—up to a certain point, which was when it was blown off and wrecked by an internal explosion on the ship.
Four days before the California was scheduled to go into drydock she was beset by an incident which at first appeared likely to cause a considerable delay. On a quiet Sunday afternoon a violent explosion occurred below the third deck forward. The immediate result was the rapid settling of the bow of the California which was now well afloat. At first there was some suspicion of sabotage, but it was finally concluded that the explosion resulted from the accumulation of gasoline vapor, inasmuch as the gasoline system and stowage just forward had been ruptured. The explosive mixture was probably set off by a short circuit in the temporary lighting system.
By the help of a diver and the barge crane, the patch which had been doing such a fine job was picked off the bottom and brought to view. It was badly splintered and torn out of shape and obviously of no further use. Instead of waiting for the manufacture of another patch it was decided to do the best with what we had. Divers were sent down into the flooded area of the ship to close the watertight hatch at the lowest level practicable, which proved to be the third deck. All water above the third deck was then removed and steps were taken to make as watertight as possible the partially distorted third deck hatch. A considerable portion of the lowered buoyancy of the bow was thus regained and docking was carried through as scheduled.
Safe in Drydock—The scheduled date for placing the California in drydock was April 9, 1942, and in spite of the explosion casualty and other difficulties this date was met. Again the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and other high ranking officers were on the coping of the drydock to welcome "The Prune Barge," as the California was affectionately nicknamed by sailors who served on her. When the dock was pumped down, the usual discovery was made, namely that the underwater damage was less than anticipated. Permanent repairs to the underwater hull were instituted immediately by the Navy Yard and the work was carried on rapidly in order to have the dock available for use of major vessels in case of serious battle damage. The repairs-to the California were scheduled in such a way that it would be possible to remove the California from dock on not more than 72 hours' notice. Fortunately this was not necessary.
After flooding water was entirely removed from the inside of the ship, a careful inspection was made to determine the types of damage which permitted the spread of flooding water throughout the ship. In general such flooding was caused by ruptured pipe lines, ventilation ducts, drains, and some damaged closing plates over oil tanks and voids. The importance of the design of pipe lines, sea connections, and ventilation ducts was amply demonstrated.
RAISING AND SALVAGING OF THE WEST VIRGINIA
Salvage work on the West Virginia proceeded fairly rapidly during the latter stages of work on the California as additional shipments of essential pumps and other materials arrived in Hawaii. By the time the California was drydocked the salvage operations on the West Virginia were moving forward at high speed. Even though the floating of the West Virginia was a very much greater job than in the case of the California, she was fully afloat on May 17, 1942 and placed in drydock on June 9.
Nature of Damage—Unlike the California, there was very little water on top of the main deck of the West Virginia because of the lesser depth of water and harder bottom on which the West Virginia rested. The extent of damage to the West Virginia was however many times greater than in the case of the California. The ship had been struck on the port side by six torpedoes and the whole side for a length of nearly 200 feet was virtually wrecked. Another torpedo had struck near the rudder and had destroyed the external steering arrangements and most of the internal steering system. Very serious oil fires had been started by either bomb or torpedo explosions, and the fire damage throughout the ship had destroyed considerable structural strength as well as the contents of the various compartments. Thus the salvage of the West Virginia was a new problem. Obviously, some sort of external patching would be necessary to shut off the flow of water along the port side, as it was readily apparent that the damage to the multiple bulkheads was too great to permit controlling the inflow of water in any other manner.
Type of Patch Installed—The Navy again utilized the splendid talents of the Pacific Bridge Company in designing and installing the two patches required, one from frame 43 to 52, the other from 611 to 97i. These patches were made up in sections about 13 feet long. Each section extended from the turn of the bilge to a point well above the main deck, a total height of about 50 feet. The sections were of composite design of steel, heavy timbers, and concrete. The general makeup consisted of 24-inch steel "I" beams running vertically, a large number of 12 inch by 14 inch timbers running longitudinally, with vertical 4 inch planking on the waterside. These sections were shored against the side, including the armor plates. The upward thrust of buoyancy pressures was transmitted from the large "I" beams to the underside of the armor belt. The outer edge of the sections was about 2 feet from the original shell of the ship. Each section was hauled up snugly at the bottom and was held in place by hook bolts taking up in holes burned by divers through the shell of the ship. The joints between sections were made reasonably tight by old rubber hose and other packing materials. Draw bolts were used to hold sections together snugly. The forward patch consisted of three sections, while the large patch consisted of 11 sections. The barge cranes were used to place the patch sections in proper location; negative buoyancy was obtained by use of heavy lead weights placed on a shelf near the bottom. These weights were removed for future use after each section was secured.
Use of Concrete—After the sections were all installed and properly secured, a large amount of underwater concrete was poured to seal off the patch along the bottom. This produced reasonable watertightness between the damaged hull and the patch and at the same time provided means for taking up the "buoyancy pressure of the patch against the bottom. The concrete was a rich mixture, that is, one of cement to three and a half of aggregate. Similarly, concrete was used to seal off each end of each patch. The fore and aft thickness of the concrete was about 4 feet. For the whole job about 650 tons of concrete were used.
It was foreseen that when the buoyancy support of the patches was lost in drydock it would be necessary to support the patches in place. Accordingly, heavy steel rods were rigged in a vertical position and welded to intact portions of the hull, so that these rods would take the weight of the patch in drydock.
It might also be mentioned as a point of interest that access doors for divers were provided in the patches about every 40 feet so that divers could move in and out as required to fit and secure the patches in place. Before pumping started these doors were secured and made watertight.
Pumping Procedure—For a week prior to final readiness of patches a number of the large capacity pumps were operated for several hours per day to circulate the water within the ship. Much of the water had been stagnant and under pressure for nearly six months, and experience on the California and Nevada had indicated that such water would be heavily charged with dangerous concentrations of hydrogen sulphide gas. Insofar as possible all main compartments were opened up to permit removal of old water and inflow of new. Of course it was not possible to remove stagnant water from small compartments such as storerooms, for which reason some difficulty with toxic gas was later experienced.
After the patches had been installed the whole battery of pumps was started to ascertain the tightness of the patches and their ability to control the inflow of water. The water level within the ship was lowered readily and there was soon a difference of three or four feet between the inside level and the outside level. But such happy results were short-lived as the pumps were unable to lower the water any further, indicating that very large leakages existed somewhere. As per custom the divers inspected both inside and out and gradually found the causes for the inflow and remedied them. Within a few days the patches were made reasonably tight, air ports were plugged, and fragment holes not previously detected were stopped up. It was soon determined that the plan and procedure would prove entirely satisfactory.
Use of Compressed Air—Compressed air had been used to some extent on the California but it was used very greatly on the West Virginia. It became necessary to remove all the water and oil which could be pumped or blown in order to reduce the draft sufficiently to dock in drydock No. 1. It was desired that the larger drydock be left available for battle-damaged combatant vessels. The Commander in Chief was not willing to tie up drydock No. 2 for the time required to make flotation repairs to the West Virginia, if this could be avoided.
Compressed air was used extensively in partially damaged oil tanks, feed tanks, and for the operation of machinery such as fuel oil pumps, winches to hoist 16-inch ammunition, stores, and trash; even 5-inch ammunition hoists were operated by hooking up air drills. The steering engine room had been badly wrecked by a torpedo hit on the rudder and it was not practicable to patch this area and pump out the flooded spaces. Instead air pressure was applied to force out some of the water and considerable buoyancy was gained thereby.
Possibility of Damage to the Large Patches—As the vessel came afloat it was recognized that a serious hazard existed in the possible failure of the large patches, either due to inadequate design or to damage, either of which might cause collapse. Such collapse would permit the sudden inrush of water which might snuff out many lives, and could cause the ship to capsize. The side of the ship and the decks in way of the patch were so badly destroyed that any sizable failure would certainly cause the ship to sink and under certain conditions might cause capsizing. Steps were taken to recondition many watertight doors and hatches that had been damaged on the port side. A schedule of counter flooding of the emptied oil tanks and voids on the starboard side was set up and men on watch instructed accordingly. Care was taken to insure that tugs and running boats gave the patched area a wide berth.
The possibility of serious teredo damage to the wooden patch sections that had been installed for two or three months was not lost sight of. Also, the possibility of air raid damage was ever-present, and an air raid bill was worked up to insure the most practicable manner of handling any such damage sustained; this included a fire fighting crew with necessary equipment. It also included the availability on the crane barge of several heavy collision mat type of patches to repair quickly any damage to the main patches. Fortunately, none of the possible hazards materialized, due in large part to the fact that possible air raids were turned back at the Battle of Midway.
Toxic Gases—The amount of hydrogen sulphide on the West Virginia greatly exceeded that found on the California. Additional precautions were taken under the expert direction of a medical officer. A bulletin board was kept up to date to indicate compartments which were safe and those which were considered unsafe. The latter ones could only be entered by using a rescue breathing apparatus or suitable face mask with air hose. Hydrogen sulphide was found in greatest concentrations in storerooms containing a large amount of paper or many cardboard containers. In addition to hydrogen sulphide, there were many cases of oxygen deficiency and a few cases of carbon monoxide. These of course were readily remedied by proper ventilation, which was available in large quantities.
Recovery of Bodies—Sixty-six bodies were recovered from the West Virginia, and were handled very satisfactorily in the same manner as in the California. There were some exceptions inasmuch as bodies were found in unusual locations. In the after engine room a number of bodies were found lying on top of the main steam pipes; it is likely that the men sought that location because of the air bubble which existed in the upper spaces of the flooded area. Three bodies were found on the lower shelf of a clothing storeroom which had not been flooded. These were clad in blues and jerseys instead of the regular whites. A calendar was found in this compartment on which each date had been checked off from December 7 to December 23, 1941. The battle station of these men was apparently in the adjacent pump room. It was noted that the emergency rations had been consumed. A manhole to the fresh water tanks below the pumps had been removed. The indications were that the men had obtained adequate food and water but had finally succumbed to oxygen deficiency.
Reduction of Mean Draft to 33 Feet—In order to dock the ship in drydock No. 1 it was necessary to get the mean draft down to about 33 feet. This required strenuous efforts on the part of all hands in removing all weights aboard that could be handled, such as loose water, oil, stores, provisions, meat, shells, powder, wreckage, personal effects, guns, armored turret tops, etc. The officers and crew of the West Virginia won great admiration by their devotion to their task and its very successful fulfillment. The crew at that time was considerably less than 400. Sixty of these were marines, and it should be mentioned that these marines saw to it that they did nothing less than their share of the onerous work.
Transfer to Drydock—The West Virginia was floated on May 17 and was placed safely in drydock on June 9, 1942. Immediately following drydocking the Navy Yard undertook the difficult job of effecting permanent repairs to the port side damage. Prefabricated sections of the heavy multiple-sided structure were installed more rapidly than had been anticipated. The slowest job was found to be the construction of a new rudder and steering engine parts—slow due to the great shortage of steel casting capacity throughout the country.
As in the case of previous ships, electric motors and instruments were removed for preservation treatment very soon after they were exposed to the air. A large number of such items were reconditioned for future use on the vessel; all major items and those pertaining to vital circuits were shipped to the mainland for rewinding.
A view of the West Virginia in drydock exposed the very great damage suffered by the ship, but on the other hand it also showed that a large proportion of the ship was still there. A great amount of manpower and material was necessary, of course, to bring back the ship as a fighting unit of the Fleet. But the aggressive action of the shore-based facilities accomplished this within a reasonable time.
FLOATING AND SALVAGING OF THE OGLALA
Perhaps the most interesting salvage job at Pearl Harbor was that of the U.S.S. Oglala, the flagship of Commander Minecraft Force. It was interesting because of the variety of problems presented in her salvage and the many difficulties which seemed to beset the work.
At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack the Oglala was tied up outboard of the Helena. An aerial torpedo passed under the shallow draft Oglala and exploded against the side of the Helena. The force of this explosion was sufficient to cause some damage to the Oglala, at least enough to permit sufficient flooding to cause the vessel to capsize some two hours after being damaged. Such capsizing would not have occurred except for the fact that the Oglala was a vessel 40 years old, with very inadequate compartmentation and structure. In her younger days she had plied between Boston and New York on the Old Fall River Line. She was acquired by the Navy in World War I.
Possibilities of Salvage—When the smoke of battle cleared away comments were freely cast about as to what should be done about the ugly duckling, the Oglala. She was considered a total loss, and she fouled one of the most valuable piers of the Navy Yard. Her removal was therefore considered of high priority. Many schemes were put forth looking to her removal, but none of them contemplated full salvage and future use of her antiquated hull. One proposition was to blow out the water by use of compressed air— thus to float her so she could be towed on her side either for beaching or into drydock for righting. But it was soon found that her structure was not sufficiently strong or tight to hold the air pressure necessary. Another proposition was to blow up the ship with dynamite and pick up the pieces for scrap. A modification was to cut her up with underwater cutting torches and remove her piecemeal by cranes from this valuable berthing space. Still another scheme was to rig her between two pairs of large lifting barges so that she could be cleared of the bottom and towed to a shallow beach. But barges of the type required were at a premium so that ultimately this scheme had to be abandoned.
Thus nearly everybody had some ideas as to what treatment should be accorded to the poor old Oglala, but for one reason or another none of them proved as simple and efficacious as the orthodox salvage procedure which was finally adopted. Of course there was some delay in getting started on the Oglala because of the lack of salvage material previously referred to, and also because the work was given priority following the battleships, even though clearing of the dock space was very important.
Scheme of Salvage—The Oglala lay on her port side in about 45 feet of water, so that the starboard side amidships was only a few feet out of water. The scheme consisted of two steps. The first was to right the Oglala by use of salvage pontoons, and the second was to refloat her by the same technique as employed on the California.
Ten submarine salvage pontoons were available in Pearl Harbor and the use of these was authorized by the Navy Department. These pontoons were 'sunk in appropriate locations along the weather deck of the ship and were secured to heavy chains which passed under the ship and to stoppers welded to the starboard side. As the water in the pontoons was displaced by compressed air there would be exerted a turning force of some five to seven hundred tons. In order to assist the pontoons in breaking away from the mud two other forces were applied. The first was the use of compressed air in the hull of the Oglala to the maximum extent practicable. Another was a pull of some 50 to 100 tons exerted by winches on a barge anchored outboard of the Oglala. Rough calculations indicated that the forces to be applied would be sufficient for the job.
Righting of the Vessel—At the appointed time on April 11, 1942 an attempt was made to right the ship. However, as the pontoons were blown they came to the surface one by one, indicating some failure in the chain attachments. This first effort was a failure and it was found that the bridles attaching the two chains to each pontoon had parted. They were old and worn items (like the ship they served) which had been recovered from the scrap heap. It was necessary to replace them with new and stronger material. The second attempt was made on April 23 and was entirely successful. The ship came to rest on her bottom with an initial list to port of about 20 degrees which was gradually reduced to something under 7 degrees.
Use of the Fence-Type Cofferdam—The quarter deck cofferdam used so successfully on the California was modified to suit the Oglala. The cofferdam was installed around the deck edge from stem to stern. The depth of water above the deck varied from 6 feet forward to something over 25 feet aft. The installation arrangements were similar to those described for the California. Before the cofferdam could be installed satisfactorily it was necessary to remove practically all of the wooden deck house and top hamper. This was done by hoisting cranes assisted by divers.
Pumping out the Ship—The pumping arrangements were similar to those previously used. It was decided, however, that in view of poor compartmentation of the Oglala it would be well to install a patch over the damage found in her port bilge after the vessel had been righted. Divers took the necessary measurements, and the patch was built on the dock and installed by divers. It was soon concluded that the refloating of the vessel would be comparatively easy.
Trouble, Trouble, Trouble—The Oglala soon came to be known as the Jonah ship on account of the various troubles encountered in salvaging her. The first failure occurred when the water level inside the cofferdam was pumped down about 7 feet. At that time two of the California cofferdam sections which had been lengthened showed signs of distress and gradually failed. This was not a design failure, but resulted from the action of some "practical men" in the field substituting 12" by 12' timbers for the steel "H" beams called for by the blueprint.
After this failure was remedied the pumping was resumed and the vessel came afloat on June 23, 1942. However, drydock considerations required that the draft not exceed 371 feet. As the vessel rose higher in the water the stability was greatly reduced, this because of the weight of the cofferdam totaling 1300 tons, and also due to the large amount of free water surface within the ship. Calculations indicated that these adverse factors would produce negative stability well before the draft could be reduced to 371 feet. Some remedial steps were taken to reduce the topside weight, but it became apparent that the draft could not be reduced much below 40 feet without undue impairment of stability, or without accepting other risks in connection with removing part of the cofferdam structure.
The next casualty was nothing less than the resinking of the ship during the night of June 25-26. This was somewhat sad, of course, but was a very interesting and instructive casualty. It was caused by the plugging up of float-controlled pumps which were depended upon to keep the bow of the ship well up. When these pumps failed the bow gradually settled, and as it settled water ran forward at an ever-increasing rate, because of the fact that there were no athwartship bulkheads on the mine deck. Unfortunately, the bow went down and down until it came to rest on the bottom in 48 feet of water. Soon the stern followed, as might be expected. This was an excellent example of the loss of longitudinal stability due to free surface. The salvage crew went to work with considerable vim the next morning, in spite of some discouragement; the vessel was brought afloat again the following day.
The next casualty was another "practical man" failure. This time the stern section of the cofferdam collapsed on June 29 due to failure of two 10' by 12' timbers. The designer realized this weak spot and on the plan called for tie-rod supports at three points, but the tie rods had been omitted by the field force. The result was that the Oglala once more sank to the bottom. Repairs were soon made to the cofferdam and the vessel was refloated two days later.
The next casualty was a fire which broke out within the cofferdam during the evening of July 1, 1942. The fire was started during a gasoline refueling operation on one of the 6- inch pumps. Some of the gasoline splashed on to the hot exhaust manifold and immediately ignited. This caused the attendant to drop the 5 gallons of burning gasoline into the water, and this in turn set on fire a heavy layer of fuel oil on the surface of the water within the cofferdam. The fire was brisk indeed for about twenty minutes, by which time it was extinguished by the prompt and efficient action of the fire watch on board plus the crew of the U.S.S. Ortolan and the Navy Yard fire department. Damage to the cofferdam proved to be superficial only, so that this near-serious casualty did not set back the work.
Docking of the Oglala—Number 2 drydock was ready to receive the Oglala on July 3, 1942. At that time the vessel had a mean draft of a few inches less than 40 feet. She was placed in drydock looking for all the world like Noah's Ark except that there was no roof over the straight sides of the cofferdam. Very little of the Oglala itself was in sight above the water; only a small portion of the bow area.
The damage to the underwater hull was found to be very moderate and the Yard proceeded forthwith to make permanent repairs. The cofferdam was quickly removed and steps were taken to rehabilitate the vessel. There was considerable discussion as to what use the Oglala might be put. Admittedly she had rather small value as a naval vessel, but in those times any kind of a ship was a mighty valuable commodity. Eventually she was reconditioned and put into service as a repair vessel and tender for motor torpedo boats.
Performance of the U.S.S. Ortolan—Major credit for the successful salvaging of the Oglala goes to the officers and crew of the Ortolan. That vessel was attached to the Submarine Base Pearl Harbor as a submarine salvage vessel and had on board a goodly number of qualified divers, and also personnel familiar with the use of submarine salvage pontoons. The officers and crew of the Ortolan were assigned to the Oglala job shortly after December 7, and they took a great interest in all aspects of the work. This initiation in salvage work and battle damage repairs turned out to be just the kind of experience the Ortolan required. Following the salvage of the Oglala she was assigned to the South Pacific Force and hung up a most remarkable record as a salvage tug in handling battle damage repairs, underwater diving work, pulling ships off reefs, etc.
SALVAGE WORK ON THE CASSIN AND DOWNES
These two vessels were a sorry spectacle indeed following the December 7 attack. They were docked abreast of each other in drydock No. 1. The first bomb passed through the deck edge of the Cassin and exploded between the two vessels. The fragments riddled the side of the Downes in way of oil tanks and started an oil fire which proved disastrous. Another bomb struck the Downes and exploded in the chart house. A third bomb exploded between the two vessels causing further riddling of the sides of both ships and increasing the intensity of the oil fires. The tremendous heat of the oil fires resulted in many oil tank explosions and the detonation of the warheads in one of the torpedo tubes of the Downes. It was necessary to flood the drydock in order to protect the Pennsylvania and to help control the oil fires which were now raging. Eventually the Cassin capsized and caused serious damage to her main hull structure. The high temperatures of the oil fires caused serious and widespread damage to hull plating and strength members. The first appraisal was that both ships were total losses.
Saving Something from the Wreck—As the Cassin and Downes were inspected in detail under more favorable circumstances it was ascertained that considerable portions of the vessels were still intact, especially the machinery components and much of the equipment in spite of some damage due to water, oil, and heat. The pessimists proposed to cut up the vessels for scrap or to tow them out to sea and sink them. The optimists desired to recondition the vessels with a minimum of work necessary to make them suitable for patrol or escort duty. Arguments were traded back and forth for some time and eventually it was decided by the Navy Department that new hulls would be constructed at Mare Island and that the Navy Yard Pearl Harbor would ship to Mare Island as much of the hull structure as would be worth-while and the bulk of the machinery and equipment. The salvage job was eventually handled on that basis, and parts not shipped were cut up as scrap.
Work of the Destroyer Repair Units—Reference has heretofore been made to the valuable contributions to salvage work on the part of Destroyer Repair Units (afterwards called the Pearl Harbor Salvage and Repair Unit). This very worthy component was transferred from San Diego to Pearl Harbor shortly after December 7 and consisted of some 600 working hands plus additional numbers for housekeeping and maintenance. Their spirit and devotion to duty was most commendable and they performed outstanding service in handling certain aspects of battleship salvage. On that work they had to do mostly with specialties such as temporary lighting, removal of electric motors for reconditioning, preservation of machinery components, tending pumps during the night watches, etc. On the Cassin and Downes they did practically all of the work.
On these two vessels they did a tremendous amount of patch work by electric welding to close up the hulls so the vessels could be floated out of drydock. In the case of the Downes it was necessary to reconstruct a considerable portion of her side in way of the torpedo explosion. . The Downes was floated out of drydock on February 6, 1942. The Cassin was righted on February 5, 1942 and was floated out on February 18, 1942. This made the drydock available for Fleet use, particularly for battle damage repairs, which was a matter of first consideration.
Both before and after removal from drydock the Cassin and Downes were stripped of their machinery components, shafting, equipment, etc., and later were placed in drydock for removal of important hull sections for shipment to Mare Island. It is estimated that approximately 50 per cent of the two ships was installed in the new hulls bearing their names.
WORK ON THE ARIZONA AND UTAH
Reference has been made to the fact that the Arizona was substantially destroyed by the explosion of her forward magazines and that the Utah was resting on the bottom nearly upside down. Due to the time which their salvage would entail, and the need for conservation of labor and materials, it was decided to refrain from major work on these two vessels. However, a very large amount of work was done in connection with removal of valuable items, such as guns, ammunition, safes, etc. Fuel oil also was a most valuable commodity and a scarce article in the spring of 1942. Accordingly, a large amount of oil was pumped from the intact oil tanks of these vessels, and about a million gallons was recovered from the Oklahoma. All of this work was tangible proof of the marvelous performance of the divers and their organization.
WORK ON THE OKLAHOMA
Salvage work on the Oklahoma was restricted to removal of materials such as mentioned above, but arrangements were made for a long-time salvage operation which involved the manufacture of major equipment necessary to bring the ship to an upright position so that she could be refloated. The scheme consisted of setting up about 20 high-geared hauling winches on Ford Island. These winches were operated by fractional horse power electric motors and were rigged with high leverage to exert a tremendous turning moment on the ship. It was also contemplated that some submarine salvage pontoons be employed to help break the ship out of the mud and that compressed air be used inside the ship to blow out the water on the outboard side and thus to exert an additional righting moment.
This work was given a low priority, but went along in due course, and eventually the Oklahoma was righted and floated. The cost of reconditioning her as a naval unit appeared disproportionate to the value of the ship, for which reason various utilizations of the ship were proposed from time to time. However, none of these materialized and the vessel is still afloat in Pearl Harbor. The Navy Department has recently authorized her sale to help alleviate the national shortage of scrap metal. Even though the vessel was not put to any useful purpose her salvage constituted one of the most difficult salvage operations of all time and is a great credit to the personnel who carried the work through. Her removal released a very valuable berth for use of large combatant ships.
DIVING OPERATIONS
Without a very large number of highly qualified divers the salvage work at Pearl Harbor could not have been accomplished. The underwater work performed by divers was revealed after some ships were placed in drydock—most persons were amazed at the extent and the proficiency of the work.
The divers of the salvage division were drawn from a number of sources—some from the ships under salvage, some from the Navy Yard, some from the civilian contractor, a considerable number from Destroyer Repair Units, many from the U.S.S. Ortolan and U.S.S. Widgeon and a few from the Submarine Base. In all there were nearly a hundred. The work was divided up into special assignments depending upon individual proficiency, such as inspection and measuring of underwater damage, removal of underwater wreckage, installing and attaching cofferdams, patches and closures, operation of watertight doors and hatches inside the ship, interior inspections to find inflow of water, operation of ships' pumps on compressed air, and utilization of pumping system and valves, removal of submerged guns, ammunition, recovery of confidential matter, etc. It is noteworthy that all of the diving work in the salvage operation, much of it of a hazardous nature, was accomplished without a single severe casualty. The total work consisted of approximately 3,000 dives totaling about 9,000 diving hours. Most of the diving work was done on the Oglala; next the West Virginia, then the Nevada and California. Later a large amount of diving work was done on the Oklahoma which is not included in the above totals.
THE NAVY YARD, PEARL HARBOR
Rejuvenation at Pearl Harbor in material matters was handled in the greater part by the officers and civil service employees of the Navy Yard. Their spirit was not lagging. Essential materials and manpower were hurried from the mainland to build up the repair capacity. Thousands of mechanics and lesser ratings throughout the country volunteered for service at the Navy Yard. The force available at the Yard to serve the Fleet grew quickly from a few thousand to ten times that number. Throughout the war this great military outpost contributed mightily to the success of naval arms. The Navy Yard's accomplishments in repairing the damages suffered by vessels of the Fleet on December 7 were of the very highest order—a marvelous performance.
PEARL HARBOR IN RETROSPECT
The disaster suffered by our nation at Pearl Harbor demands careful scrutiny and analysis. The lessons learned will always be of great benefit to the Government—to the State Department as well as to the military forces. An idealistic people have been awakened to the stern possibilities which can quickly upset a peaceful world and threaten the very foundations of civilization.
As is usually the case, the extent of the disaster can be visualized in truer proportions only in retrospect. The immediate appearance of any disaster hides the truth. True evaluation comes only with the passage of time. Pearl Harbor was a bitter blow; of that there is no gainsaying. The crippling of our Fleet and Air Force was a most serious military setback. The loss of nearly 3,500 lives was a finality that can never be turned back. But there were compensating features, and retrospectively one can well nigh detect the all-guiding hand of Providence outlining the future of our nation.
The loss of 3,500 lives can not be mitigated in any possible way, but let us not forget that such a loss is small in a major battle on either land or sea, or even in a cataclysm of nature. The material loss, though great, was rectified not only by a successful salvage program but in many other ways as well. The shock of material loss induced a great spiritual gain.
Some great military leader has said that the spiritual is to the material as ten is to one. Pearl Harbor generated spiritual values within the military forces which carried through to great victories. The same is true of the civilian forces, both in military organizations and on the home front.
Except for Pearl Harbor the United States could not have entered the war as a united nation. The fact that this calamity solidified our people in the fields of politics and industry made possible the great marvel of war production which knew no limitation. Pearl Harbor consolidated our people into the greatest war machine imagined by man. In the battle zone and on the home front the kaleidoscopic effects of Pearl Harbor insured all-out war and guaranteed unconditioned victory.
Captain Wallin graduated from the Naval Academy in the class of 1917, and after World War I he took postgraduate instruction in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering. On Pearl Harbor Day he was Material Officer of the Battle Force, Pacific Fleet, and immediately thereafter was made Fleet Salvage officer. As a member of the Staff of Commander Service Force Pacific Fleet and the Commandant, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, he had full charge of salvage work at Pearl Harbor.