The Probable Effect on American National Defense of the United Nations and the Atomic Bomb

Two such epochal developments as the establishment of the United Nations Organization and the manufacture and employment for war of the atomic bomb naturally caused many observers to conclude that all previous human experience in diplomacy and war is useless. Some have hastily decided that all weapons except the atomic bomb and its carriers are obsolete; that previous concepts of international relations should be junked and that statesmen, generals, and admirals responsible for the peace and security of the United States must discard the lessons of the past and boldly plan a new world based entirely on novel and drastic theories derived from the possibilities of the atomic bomb and the United Nations.

The theory and practice of the use of force in international relations will be profoundly affected by the existence of the atomic bomb and the United Nations. Military and naval students should be the first to explore the revolutionary changes which will be occasioned by these new instruments of statecraft; officers responsible for the security of the United States must modify their concepts of the use of the Armed Forces and be prepared to present to hasty innovators, who would consign to oblivion all previous experience and weapons, a carefully considered program of national defense in which equal consideration has been given to the permanent and semipermanent factors which have determined the results in previous wars and to the new and untried elements now suddenly injected into world affairs. The atomic bomb and the United Nations Organization are revolutionary innovations, but their effect upon the huge mass of human beings will be gradual and evolutionary. American officers who must adjust the Armed Forces to new conditions should be the first to understand the possibilities of the new world organization and to explore the powers of the new weapons; but they should not forget their responsibility to the United States nor prematurely discard their old weapons.

President Truman has formally announced the nation’s obligations to itself and to the world. The Army and Navy with their Air Forces must first, in collaboration with their Allies, enforce the terms of peace upon our defeated enemies; second, meet the military obligations undertaken as a member of the United Nations to support a just and lasting peace by force if necessary; third, co-operate with other American nations to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of the nations of the Western Hemisphere; fourth and last, in this troubled and uncertain world the Armed Forces of the United States must under their constitutional responsibility “provide for the common defense” of the United States. If officers in high command keep these four responsibilities placed upon them by their Commander in Chief clearly in mind, they will realize that the acceptance of new responsibilities has not relieved them of their primary responsibility to defend the United States and next the Western Hemisphere. These are their ancient duties and have been a permanent charge upon the United States Army and Navy.

Provision has already been made by the High Command to enforce the terms of peace upon Germany and Japan; American officers are familiar with their responsibility to protect the United States, its overseas possessions and interests and the Western Hemisphere. Officers should therefore direct their attention to the probable effect on the strength and disposition of the Armed Forces of the obligations assumed by the United States when it became a member of the United Nations. Among other things, they will learn that the President and Congress have formally recognized that peace can only be preserved by force of arms; that only superior land, sea, and air forces can check aggressor nations bent on conquest; that these superior forces must be in a state of readiness which will permit them to suppress a predatory nation before its Armed Forces can attack. Furthermore, Congress refused to adopt an amendment offered to require the President to obtain the consent of Congress before authorizing the employment of a contingent of the Armed Forces by the Security Council of the United Nations.

This action by Congress indicates that the recent war taught the people and Congress that civilization has not yet reached the stage where Americans can cast away their arms; more important, Pearl Harbor demonstrated that it was too costly in men and money to let an aggressor strike the first blow; and the advent of the atomic bomb proved that, if the United States again waited for the enemy to launch the overt attack, the results might prove fatal. The general recognition by Americans and their government that their Armed Forces are necessary and that they must be given a freer hand to anticipate and neutralize a threatened enemy attack, makes the future tasks of the High Command easier in many ways. But it simultaneously puts a more immediate responsibility upon ranking officers in peace, in war, and most of all during a period of strained relations, like the ten tense days between November 26 and December 7, 1941. Hereafter when peace and war hang in the balance, when a potential enemy is poised to strike, an American President cannot afford to expose American cities and communities to destruction in the wistful hope that further negotiations or eloquent notes on the beauties of peace may save the nation from war. Nor should American commanders in advanced bases fully exposed to enemy attack be ordered to refrain from acts which might alarm the civil population or be considered a threat by an enemy already mobilized and in position to attack. The American High Command will be required to discern an approaching attack and put the President on guard. They must know enough of foreign affairs to judge when an enemy attack is imminent. They must realize the military consequences of future American foreign policies and warn the President when these policies lead towards war; and warn him over and over again when the crisis approaches.

The American High Command also has greater responsibilities than in 1941. As a member of the United Nations the United States is pledged to use its armed forces in conjunction with those of its associated nations. Obviously it will be necessary for all American officers and particularly for naval officers who aspire to high command to understand the duties accepted by their government under the charter of the United Nations. Some of the more important will be discussed.

The purpose of the United Nations Organization is to maintain international peace and security by long-range programs which will strengthen ties of peace by developing mutually beneficial relations among member states; and by positive immediate measures which will prevent or suppress war (italics by writer). Its organization provides the necessary organs or departments to accomplish its purpose; they are a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, an International Trusteeship System, a Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

It is the duty of the General Assembly, composed of one representative from each member state, to increase the friendship between the nations. Its powers are commensurate with its difficult assignment; it must consider and recommend international policies which will preserve international peace and security; and by influencing the basic and persistent factors in international relations, reduce economic, ideological, and political differences between nations which unchecked produce commercial rivalry, national antagonisms, and finally war. To this end the Assembly is required to make specific proposals to promote international cooperation in political, economic, and social fields in order to increase the standard of living and to promote universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It has an operating agency, the Economic and Social Council, to make particular studies and suggest means of removing economic, social, or cultural causes of war.

The General Assembly elects six of the eleven members of the Security Council. The remaining five members are permanent representatives of Great Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States, each of whom has veto power on measures proposed to prevent or suppress war; therefore, these six elected members could never control the action of the Council. Once a year the Assembly will receive annual and special reports from the Council and will express its opinion of the measures employed by the Council to preserve the peace; but the Assembly should not on its own initiative make any recommendations on any problems of peace or security which are being considered by the Council.

The veto power given the representatives of the Five Great Powers caused a storm of criticism, especially from the smaller powers. Its justification arises from the stern fact that if one of those five powers objected to the employment of military measures to ensure peace it would be practically impossible to enforce the decision without causing a major, perhaps a world war, which would of itself defeat the fundamental purpose of the Organization. The delegates at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco realized that only force could prevent or suppress war, that for all practical purposes it would be impossible to compel one of the Big Five to take remedial measures without causing a larger war than the one they sought to prevent. It would be folly to create a war between Great Britain and Russia, for example, in a futile effort to prevent war between two Balkan states.

The Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security; it acts for the United Nations, whose members agree to obey its mandates; the Council must be prepared to act at any time and immediately; therefore it must be organized as an efficient operating agency and must be in continuous session. The relationship between the Assembly and the Council can be best understood by noting that the Security Council must preserve the peace by force if required, long enough to permit the policies of the General Assembly to become effective and thus convince the nations of the world that there are better methods of settling international disputes than resorting to war. Otherwise the United Nations Organization certainly will fail.

All States entering the United Nations agree to seek a solution to controversies by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice. A Court of Justice is provided to settle all questions susceptible to a legal remedy. When disputes between member states arise, the Council will first call upon the wrangling states to settle their differences by peaceful means; it is specifically empowered to investigate disputes or any international situations which might lead to friction, in order to determine whether their future developments will endanger world peace or security, and to recommend appropriate procedure or method of adjustment. The Council can refer legal problems to and obtain advisory opinions from the Court of Justice, and even when using force it must act in accordance with the principles of the Charter; but in order not to place its members at a disadvantage with nonmember states the Organization will insure that the latter, too, act in accord with the principles of the Charter. This last provision shows that United Nations will not hesitate to take suitable measures against nonmember States.

To enable the Council to fulfill its responsibilities the Charter gives it authority to employ diplomatic, economic, or other measures not involving the use of the armed forces to halt aggressor nations; to call upon member states to apply measures short of war to a recalcitrant state, which may include interruption of rail, sea, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communications, and the severance of diplomatic and economic relations. If these measures are ineffective the Council is authorized to take action by air, naval, or land forces as may be necessary to preserve or restore the peace, including demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of the United Nations. This specific authority permits the Council to take any action with the armed forces placed at its disposal in any part of the world. To permit the Council to act promptly the Charter provides that all members of the Organization make available to the Council on its call and in accordance with special agreements, armed forces, facilities, and assistance including the right of passage through their territories necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. These agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location. The Council shall initiate and conclude these agreements as soon as possible with member states or groups of member states. These agreements shall be subject to the constitutional ratification by signatory powers. Congress has ratified membership of the United States and has authorized the President to contribute an American contingent to the Armed Forces of the United Nations which wall be placed under the direction of the Council.

The armed forces provided by the member states include air force contingents immediately available to enforce the peace; the strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, which shall be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China, or their representatives. It is presumed that the First Sea Lord of Great Britain and the American Chief of Naval Operations would be eligible to represent the two naval nations, otherwise the Military Staff Committee will be dominated by generals unfamiliar with the proper employment of sea forces.¹ The strength and degree of readiness for action of the contingents of armed forces shall be determined by the Military Staff Committee, which will also advise the Security Council on all matters relating to the Council’s military requirements to maintain international peace and security; on the employment and command of forces placed at the Council’s disposition; and on the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament.

This bare outline of the duties of the Military Staff Committee indicates that the principal interest of American military and naval officers will be with the Security Council and its military agency, the Military Staff Committee. The Military Staff Committee will be required to estimate the strength, composition, and disposition of the armed forces necessary to preserve world peace and security; to determine how the forces placed at the Council’s disposition shall be employed and commanded; and subsidiary questions of where the forces shall be stationed, and how they shall be organized and trained.

The selection of a Commander in Chief was postponed; obviously this is a delicate question and should be left to the Military Staff Committee to decide for each campaign. During the present war when Anglo- American forces were operating together the nation supplying the majority of the forces furnished the Commander of the Combined Force.

The Military Staff Committee will be responsible for the strategic direction of any armed force placed at the disposition of the Security Council. The similarity in the duties of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff and of the Military Staff Committee is evident; and the relations between the Security Council and those existing between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill during the recent war will provide useful precedents for the relations of the members of the Security Council.

Before the Security Council shall call upon a member state not represented upon the Council to provide its contingent of armed forces, it shall invite that member state to participate in the decisions of the Council affecting the disposition of that state’s armed forces, and only after exhausting all peaceful means shall the Security Council resort to the use of the Armed Forces. Obviously the delays involved in these procedures may offer an opportunity for a determined aggressor nation to strike first. The Council was accordingly authorized, at any stage of a dispute which endangers the peace and security, to recommend appropriate procedures; and if the Council deems a failure to comply with its recommendations constitutes a threat to the peace, it should take any measures [italics by writer] necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the Organization. This provision was authorized before the use of the atomic bomb, which obviously increased the necessity for giving the Council powers to take immediate action. The authority to act immediately places directly upon the Council the responsibility to use the Armed Forces at its disposition, if it appears at any time during negotiation or arbitration that the international peace or security is endangered. The tremendous responsibility implicit in this authorization is evident; and as the Security Council will be dependent upon its technical advisers to determine the imminence of the threat to peace, the responsibility of the Military Staff Committee is equally great.

The Security Council exercises its charter powers on behalf of all members of the United Nations, who are expected to assume their share of the responsibility for enforcing measures short of war, and who agree to make “armed forces and facilities and additional assistance available to the Security Council on call.” But each state will determine by agreement or agreements its own contribution towards world security, and fix the quality and quantity of the armed forces, military facilities, and other assistance to be rendered to the Security Council, and the Council can require from any state only the armed forces agreed upon by the state. Armed forces are expensive to create and maintain; in all probability member states will be reluctant to provide their full quota.²

Chapter VIII, Article 52 of the Charter, states that

Nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of the international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the policies and principles of the United Nations. (The policies and principles are simply to maintain international peace.)

Members of the United Nations entering into regional arrangements or constituting such regional agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of states concerned or by reference from the Security Council. The Security Council itself is directed by the Charter to encourage the development of pacific settlements of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states themselves or by reference to the Security Council.

The plain intent of Chapter VIII is to utilize regional associations such as the Pan- American Union and existing arrangements similar to those already made by the Pan- American States to preserve peace and security in the Western Hemisphere. These arrangements will facilitate the solution of international differences in the Western Hemisphere by the American powers without requiring the intervention of the Security Council. Chapter VIII would apply also to European associations such as the former Balkan League organized by Venizelos, and to the recent bilateral treaties made by Russia with Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, and France.

The substance of Chapter VIII was recommended at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. At San Francisco it was accepted; in addition it was specified that special arrangements concerning the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness, their general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided, should be negotiated as soon as possible between the Security Council and states, or between the Security Council and groups of member states. At San Francisco the Security Council was specifically authorized to deal with groups of member states, which means the Security Council is specifically authorized to deal with the Pan-American Union. It was also provided that the Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council, may establish regional subcommittees of the Military Staff Committee. This provision implements the plan of decentralization by authorizing a general staff in the Western Hemisphere under the auspices of a regional subcommittee of the Pan- American States.

The wisdom of such decentralization is evident, particularly in the case of the Pan- American Union which is an organized entity prepared to mediate disputes in the new world. If unhappily it becomes necessary to use force to preserve the peace in the Western Hemisphere, it would be better to have the forces supplied by Pan-American States rather than by European or Asiatic forces.

The actions of the Committee of the United Nations which met at San Francisco all tended to strengthen the recommendations made at Dumbarton Oaks. A specific proviso was added; member states shall grant the right of passage across their territories to armed forces operating under the Security Council. This was a necessary addition because the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, Russia, China, and the United States agreed in Moscow that “after termination of hostilities, they will not employ military forces within the territories of other states except for purposes outlined at the Moscow conference.” No state enjoys the presence of foreign troops on its soil; even friendly disciplined troops are a nuisance. And unless under strict control, soldiers usually mistreat inhabitants. But it might become necessary to march the armed forces of the United Nations across the territory of a member state in the interest of peace. In this event a member state must grant permission.

Although devoted to the ideal of lasting peace, the provisions of the Charter are generally very practical, but Chapters XI and XII added at San Francisco should be carefully considered by American members of the Military Staff Committee. These chapters fix the policy of the United Nations toward non-self-governing states, commonly known as colonies and dependencies; they establish an International Trusteeship System to administer and supervise territories placed under the United Nations, and prescribe the membership of the Trusteeship Council. The policy of the United Nations towards non-self-governing territories is to insure the people of these territories against abuses, and to facilitate their general advancement-—to develop self-government, and to assist the inhabitants in the development of free political institutions according to their various stages of civilization —all with a view to furthering international peace and security. To implement this policy is the responsibility of the International Trusteeship System which will supervise territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War, of territories now held under mandate, or of any territory voluntarily placed under the system. The terms of the trusteeship for each territory shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, and shall include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and the responsible authority, which may be one or more states of the United Nations.

The principal sponsors of the Trusteeship System were officials of the American State Department who hoped this new agency could be employed gradually to emancipate colonies and dependencies throughout the world. American military officers opposed the idea of placing islands in the Pacific under such a cumbersome form of government. As a concession to military opinion in their own country, State Department advocates of the 1945 version of mandate territory inserted a proviso that there may be designated in any territory placed in trusteeship strategic areas which may include part or all of the territory in trust. These strategic areas would be administered with a view to maintaining or restoring peace. All authority of the United Nations in the strategic areas of the trust territory would be administered by the Security Council; all its authority in other parts of the trust territory by the General Assembly. Thus on Okinawa part might be administered by the Security Council, part by the National Assembly. Even in the strategic areas the Security Council, without prejudice to security considerations, shall avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council in handling the affairs of these areas; which means that any measures affecting the comparatively few natives in the island bases would have to be approved by the Trusteeship Council, whose main concern will be to improve the living conditions of their wards. In other words, to prepare the islanders for a civilization they probably do not desire, these island bases cannot be used primarily for the prevention or suppression of war but for the civilization of the natives.

Critical observers at San Francisco thought the real motive of American advocates of this system was to persuade or compel colonial powers like Great Britain, France, and Holland to convey their dependencies to the United Nations by setting the example with the islands captured by American forces in the Pacific during the present war. After the 1914-18 war the American State Department sponsored the policy adopted by the United States of leading the world to disarm by example; in spite of the unhappy results of that recent experience the Department is apparently willing now to lead the way in sacrificing American authority in the islands captured from Japan and necessary as bases, both for American security and world peace.

The United States is in actual possession of most of the islands formerly mandated to Japan, and other Japanese islands such as Iwo and Okinawa. These islands were essential as bases for American land, sea, and air forces during the war, and are still necessary as American bases to insure that the Japanese government and people comply with the peace terms; these islands are also necessary for the United States in order to fulfill the pledges made at Moscow, Teheran, and Cairo, to guarantee the independence of the Philippines, to do its share in preserving the peace in the Pacific, and finally for the protection of continental United States. Yet in the hope of possibly improving the living standard of a comparatively few Japanese and Polynesians it is suggested that the United States either turn these islands entirely over to the United Nations or turn them over and receive back certain areas which the American Army and Navy under the sponsorship of the Security Council can develop as bases. Great Britain and the United States once held joint control over the Samoan Islands. The resulting friction almost brought on war; yet a condominium of about fifty nations is proposed to govern the islands of the Pacific. The sponsors of this proposal were animated by high motives, but if the United States parts with complete control over essential naval and air bases it will jeopardize the defenses of the Western Pacific.

In preventing or suppressing war by force when other means have failed, the Security Council under the Charter is authorized to use land, sea, and air forces directly under the supervision of the Military Staff Committee, or land, sea, and air forces under Regional Associations responsible to the Security Council, or a combination of both. And to meet emergencies the Charter provides that contingents of air forces from member states be placed at the disposition of the Council. The United Nations Air Force could be concentrated in one area or it could be organized in regional groups and stationed in various strategic positions available for immediate service. Member states are requested to furnish air bases and facilities for this Air Force. These air contingents must be equal in skill and courage to any they are likely to fight; and if they are to operate as a unit they will have to train together, use the same formations, develop and accept a similar strategical concept, and gradually adopt a common operational doctrine. Their planes must equal any in speed, maneuverability, armor, and armament and their equipment must be up to date, which means continuous replacements.

The Security Council is required to negotiate promptly with member states to determine the numbers, types, and formations of land, sea, and air forces and the facilities each state is to place at the disposition of the United Nations. In making this extremely necessary and important determination the Military Staff Committee should take full advantage of the experience gained in the last war; should consider the natural aptitudes of certain nations for land or sea warfare; and should apportion the burden of preparing the necessary armed forces so as to utilize the national resources and traits to the best advantage; and should reduce the cost of armaments, remembering however that it is better to err slightly on the side of overpreparedness.

After agreements have been negotiated with member states, each state will be responsible for maintaining its quota of armed forces and facilities. Not only is each state allowed to determine its contribution but there is no penalty provided if the quota is not furnished. It is easy to foresee that after the first enthusiasm for the United Nations wears off the most difficult function of the Security Council will be to obtain prompt contributions from member states. Each member state is permitted to maintain its quota of forces on its territory, under its own control for recruiting, training, and mobilization. If a regional system is adopted it will often be possible for the Regional Staff to call upon a particular state to provide the force necessary to care for an incipient outbreak. And with naval and air task forces available at strategic bases, local detachments could be quickly re-enforced if required. If several aggressor nations combined and synchronized their movements it would be necessary to mobilize the forces of more than one region. But if the quotas are made available and the Military Staff Committee is alert and in constant communication with the Regional Staffs, the Security Council can probably suppress most outbreaks with regional forces before the enemy becomes formidable.

The real danger will be the difference of opinion among members of the Security Council or Military Staff whether danger is so great and so imminent that the use of force is justified in accordance with the principles of the Organization. When the frequent differences of opinion by members of an Admiral’s or General’s staff are recalled, only an optimist will believe that there will be unanimity of opinion among the Security Council. There will be much better chance of agreement among a Regional Staff, but it is only necessary to recall the divergence of views among Pan American states concerning the policy to be adopted towards Argentina to visualize the almost insurmountable difficulties confronting the Security Council.

There is a very simple method that will enable the United Nations to provide for the immediate future. Provision has already been made for the occupation of Germany and Japan and the return of their troops to their homelands; plans have been made for- the recovery of all lands occupied by the Germans and Japanese: these are tedious and difficult tasks, but suitable agencies have been or are being established by Russia, Great Britain, and the United States to facilitate these operations.

If, in addition, the British and American Navies under the Security Council continue the working agreement between the two navies in effect during the recent war, which placed responsibility on the British fleet for the Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean, and on the U.S. Fleet for the Western Atlantic and the entire Pacific, the United Nations will have absolute control of the sea. If in addition to providing their share of the troops occupying Germany, Russia, and France maintain law and order in their own borders and along their own frontiers, there will be little occasion to call on any special detachments from the United Nations. At present the most valuable contribution China can make is to unify her own warring factions. When this is done China can accept a larger share in preserving world peace.

Not only will these temporary arrangements provide for the dangerous interim between the close of hostilities and the time when the United Nations is ready to take on its tremendous responsibilities, but they will probably indicate the simplest method of providing for the prevention or suppression of war. And it will probably be found that world peace can be preserved with the least effort if Great Britain and the United States maintain peace on the oceans, Russia and China on most of the great Eurasian continent. Great Britain and the countries of western Europe would preserve the peace in Europe and most of Africa; and the United States, Canada, and States of Central and South America would preserve the peace in the Western Hemisphere; the United States would maintain the peace and security in the Pacific, except that Russia, China, France, New Zealand and Australia, and Holland would guard their own coastal waters in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans and the Baltic and Black Seas.

If this division of responsibility for the peace and security of the world were made, there would be little need to form composite international forces. Difficulties of organization which are magnified in international organizations would be avoided, and the forces that were made available to protect the peace and security of the world would be mostly stationed in or near their own home bases.

Most Americans will agree that at present the preservation of peace and security is the primary interest of the United States. It is not necessary to anticipate all the advantages claimed for the United Nations to believe that when the United States contributes to world peace as a member of that Organization it is acting in its own self-interest.

The Chiefs of the American Armed Forces have already been told by the President that they must be prepared to meet the military obligations of the United States as a member of the United Nations. If these obligations demanded more expenditure than is required for the protection of American interests, taxes of Americans already burdened with the greatest national debt in world history would have to be increased. So it is fortunate that the same types and numbers of forces required to furnish the American share of the United Nation’s Armed Forces can be effectively used to protect continental United States, the Western Hemisphere, the western Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans; provided that the United States retains complete control of the sea and air bases acquired in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and that the Security Council adopt the regional system of defense to preserve world peace and security. Furthermore, insistence now on these two conditions will make it unnecessary to combine American Forces into a heterogeneous military agglomeration, speaking all languages, consuming different food, employing variegated equipment, and inspired by different military concepts.

Before the atomic bomb arrived, responsible officials realized that peace could only be preserved if the Security Council was authorized to destroy the armed forces of an aggressor nation before they became a threat to peace. The atomic bomb has increased the necessity for immediate action by the United Nations, and in event they disintegrate has made it imperative for the government of the United States to authorize the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take similar preventive measures. Otherwise an unscrupulous, predatory power can destroy many American industrial and strategic cities prior to a declaration of war. Presuming Congress will grant such powers, the Chiefs of Staff have to establish an effective intelligence service to obtain information of enemy intentions in time to thwart them.

Whether or not the United Nations endure, and whether or not the War and Navy Departments are consolidated, the atomic bomb makes close and cordial co-operation between American Statesmen, Admirals, and Generals mandatory. Only the President, the nation’s Chief Executive and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, can constitutionally wield all the powers necessary to co-ordinate foreign policy with the necessary force to ensure its success. And the President can only provide the forces with the loyal support of the Congress. So it is also essential that the President invite Congress to form a Special Committee of National Defense composed of the Chairman and the Senior Minority member of the House and Senate Committees on Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, Naval Affairs, and Appropriations. This special Committee should join with the Secretaries of the State, the War and the Navy Departments, in regular conferences on foreign policy and the military means to support it. Thus Congress could be kept continuously informed of our current foreign commitments and of their responsibility to provide the necessary funds, without which America’s Armed Forces will be impotent when needed.

It is plain that the atomic bomb alone could not prevent or suppress war. Bombs must be delivered by ships, planes, guns, robots, or hand. Some time will elapse before atomic bombs can be launched across the oceans as V-bombs were hurled across the English Channel; and any other method of delivery is subject to interception. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have to prepare the Armed Forces for the immediate future and consequently must base their defense upon weapons now available in which American forces are trained. Also the United Nations are pledged to use other methods such as blockade and suppression of trade before resorting to war, so the Security Council would not be justified in dropping atomic bombs until less drastic means had been tried, unless the threat to world security was imminent and overwhelming.

The atomic bomb has already complicated diplomacy and war, it will supplant some weapons; but it will not render obsolete all existing weapons. It is only the latest in a long line of weapons developed by civilized nations, each of which has been more deadly than its predecessors. Heretofore, increasing the deadliness of weapons has had little effeet on the number or extent of wars. During the last half century there has been a greater improvement in weapons than in the preceding century; yet in the last half century there have been two world wars against only one in the preceding century. In that century and a half, increasing the destructive powers of weapons did not reduce the number of wars. The sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were crowded with wars with scarcely any improvement in weapons. A naval lieutenant who served with Drake would have been at home on the gun deck of Nelson’s ships. Since the industrial revolution which began after Waterloo, weapons have continuously improved. They have improved more in war than in peace but their improvements depended more on science and industry than peace or war.

Careless terminology christens wars with such adjectives as “global,” “world wide,” and “universal.” No war to date has engulfed the entire world simultaneously, and in all probability no future war will encompass the globe. The last miscalled “global” war never reached the shores of the Western Hemisphere or Australasia, only breathed lightly on North and West Africa leaving the rest of that huge continent unscathed, and allowed all of Asia except the central coastal regions, East China, and Burma to escape. The latest war fell heaviest on Western Europe and European Russia; amid the natural sympathy for those caught in that catastrophe, there is substantial consolation in recalling that these areas if assisted can be rapidly rehabilitated. The same scientific developments which made war more devastating will increase the rapidity of physical rehabilitation; nature has always furnished the human race with the urge and the power to reproduce wars’ human casualties.

The real difficulty confronting the world is to restore Europe without reconstituting the German menace. And in the Far East the problem is not how to restore but to unify China. The most difficult problem of all is to accommodate the conflicting ambitions of Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. If these three nations co-operate they can utilize the United Nations Organization to prevent or suppress wars for a period long enough to ascertain whether the people of the world really prefer peace to war, and are willing to moderate their ambitions enough to permit their statesmen to keep the peace.

Our first concern is the future of America. The United States emerges from the war in possession of the atomic bomb, necessary air and sea bases in the Pacific, already equipped and fortified, with the world’s greatest navy with its own integrated air force: these together with the Army strategic air force can preserve the peace and security of the North Pacific, and using bases maintained by Australia and New Zealand could lend assistance to these British Dominions. Likewise the United States has some and can obtain other air and sea bases in the Atlantic which will enable its forces to control the western Atlantic and join forces with the British fleet to operate together in the eastern Atlantic. In addition the United States can assign a large contingent of its strategic air force to the Security Council ready for instant use. When occupation of Germany and Japan is over, the United States could contribute more than its share of armed forces to prevent or suppress war. These same forces would be sufficient to protect the United States, the Western Hemisphere, and American interests overseas in case the United Nations fails to endure, provided there is added a small, highly trained regular army to furnish the ground troops and capable of expansion in wartime.

The sensible American procedure would be to provide security for the next decade with weapons already proved and available; meanwhile increase the men and money available for research, and co-ordinate their efforts with civilian scientists, so that the United States will continue abreast of all improvements; depend during the coming decade upon the world’s greatest navy with emphasis on air carriers and submarines provided with essential bases; co-ordinate the Army strategic air force with fleets and task forces rather than with the ground troops, for offensive action; and limit the regular army in the United States to a small, highly trained field army, comparable to a Navy task force, capable of rapid expansion.