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(See Book Review, page 973, July 1946, Proceedings)
Alfred C. Lane.—The review of Mr. Bernard Brodie’s book on the “Absolute Weapon,” an important book and a good review, inspires me to consider in what possibly important points I differ with men like the author of that book, or John Foster Dulles, for whom I have very great respect and with whom in general I find much agreement.
The two matters upon which I would like the opinion and consideration of the readers and members of the Naval Institute Proceedings are as follows:
(1) Sovereignly. Sovereignty has been defined in many ways. It seems to me that the best is that of self-limited authority.
_ There is no such thing as absolute sovereignty save that of God, but God himself limits his authority by giving us free will. There is popular sovereignty in the United States, but the people of the United States ordained a Constitution which limited their authority.
Looking back into history we had the Pax Romana in which Rome was sovereign on the land and built the Roman roads over which the legions moved at three miles an hour; but Rome also developed the Roman law, limiting the exercise of authority, for which Cicero could plead, and to which Saint Paul could appeal. Roman law still has influence, though Roman sovereignty has vanished.
Then the struggle for sovereignty spread over the seas, from the days of the struggle between Crete and Athens, and Rome and Carthage, down to the struggle between Britain and Spain over the Spanish Main. When Britannia ruled the waves she developed Admiralty law, and she did not take away the colonies from Holland or Denmark or use her sovereignty to its limit. We ourselves never did recognize any absolute sovereignty of the high seas, but much of British Admiralty law was generally accepted.
Now we have as much sovereignty over the high seas and the high airs as ever Britannia had over the high seas. While Britain commanded the seas, man learned to travel not merely three miles an hour but thirty miles an hour. Now the speed of transportation is much more than three hundred. If we are wise and magnanimous we shall follow the example of Rome and Britain and selflimit our authority by building up an Admiralty law of the air. This does not mean that we should limit our sovereignty by restricting our authority because we are afraid or are impotent. We could and should limit our authority by delegating to boards which we may voluntarily help to organize, the right to develop a code of rules for air transportation and for the inalienable rights of man, regardless of race and nationality.
(2)High Airs. After World War I there was a mistake made in providing that each nation should have control of the atmosphere above it indefinitely. Fifty years ago no nation had that control any more than any nation really owned the oceans. The control of the high airs by small nations is entirely impractical, and it has made much trouble for Switzerland that she should be supposed to do what she could not do, and in so far as she tried to do it, was liable to hurt those whom she did not wish to hurt and to make trouble for herself.
Moreover, for the orderly development of the world and its commerce, the high air should be as free as the high seas. There is no argument, it seems to me, which applies to the one which does not apply to the other. In both cases, there is need of a certain amount of control which can best be done by some form of international organization.
We have had game laws of the sea and a lot of rules regarding radio broadcasting and other human activities of this atomic age, and they must and will continue. But it might as well be understood that fundamentally the high seas and the high airs (and if you like you may say “the ether”) is a field where without abdicating our sovereignty we can very well limit authority by developing a code of just and impartial law.
Copies of the Proceedings for High Schools
Dr. Harold S. Hulbert (ex-Lieutenant, M.C., U. S. Naval Reserve).— I am enclosing herewith a copy of a letter I recently sent to the principal of East High School of Chicago, Illinois. Along with the letter I sent to Dr. Gates a copy of Part II of the April, 1946, Proceedings which contained selected articles from the Proceedings relating to the U. S. Naval Academy and its hundred years of operations.
Dr. John Gates, Principal of East High School:
I am presenting you herewith for your library a copy of Part II of the April, 1946, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings provided:
(1) that you wish to have it
(2) that you will have it bound
(3) that it remain a reference book for students in East High School library, and that it not be taken home except by boys who may perhaps be interested in entering the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis.
This material is a well polished and attractive presentation of the Academy, and it should interest those of your young men who constitutionally are potentially officers and gentlemen and engineers of the high caliber required to carry on the high traditions of the United States Navy.
As a companion book you would do well to buy Commander Lovett’s “Naval Customs, Traditions, and Usage.” It too should be kept in your library as a reference book, but potential candidates for the Academy should be allowed to take it home also.
I suggest that the Naval Institute distribute other copies of this special issue among other high schools, under similar conditions—especially among those high schools from which the Naval Academy has drawn successful midshipmen. Slade Cutter, for example, came from East High School, and he has done well in the Navy
(Editor’s note.—For various reasons, including lack of names and addresses of schools which might be interested, the Naval Institute itself is unable to adopt what seems an excellent suggestion. But it is hoped that individual members will adopt it for themselves and follow Dr. Hulbert’s example by sending copies of Part II of the April, 1946, Proceedings to their own high schools or other schools with which they are acquainted.)
Public Relations Training
Lieutenant (junior grade) Gerard A. Donohue, U. S. Navy.—Before the war the Navy had done little in the field of public relations. There were, of course, officers and men assigned to this type of duty, but they were seldom specialists, and their work consisted mainly of handing out press releases and killing unfavorable publicity. At that time there did not seem to be a need for any more than this.
However, when the Navy started to mobilize, the people suddenly found themselves vitally interested in the Navy, what sort of a Navy we had, how it operated, and above all how good was it. The policies of the Navy had a direct bearing on the lives of a great many of our citizens. The Navy learned, as all of our corporations and industries had learned a few years earlier, that it had a definite public relations problem.
Public relations does not mean press agentry, propagandizing, or newspaper space-grabbing. “It simply refers to those relations of ours which have a general social significance. It is the function of the public relations counsel to find what these relations are, what social effects they have, whether these effects are contrary to the public interest and what modifications in them may be necessary to bring them in line with the public interest.”[1]
To solve many problems, the Public Relations division was greatly expanded, and specialists—public relations counsels, newspaper and advertising men—were called in to fill the billets. Facts were disseminated quickly and accurately; recommendations on policies that affected the general welfare were made so that they might best benefit the public. The problems were solved.
But with the war’s end this division, like its fleet counterparts, found itself almost stripped of personnel. The officers and men who had built up the organization were returning to civilian life. This, however, does not mean the end of the public relations division. Five hundred officers and men are being assigned to this type of duty, but this is not a job for part time or poorly trained men any more than gunnery or navigation. A new rating of Journalist has been authorized for the men; the officers will be trained in civilian colleges and universities.
The first class of officers recently assembled at the Journalism School of the University of Missouri for a two months course. The Journalism School there is the oldest in the world, and has retained predominant place among schools of this type. This first class consisted of ten officers from Ensign to Lieutenant Commander who had experience or particular aptitude for this type of duty. Upon the results of this course will depend the length and subject matter of future courses. The students took the regular course in newspaper makeup and routine, technique of magazine article writing, photography, and a specialized course in Public Relations. This last mentioned course consisted of a series of lectures and seminars on the theory and operation of public relations, augmented by talks with various prominent men in related fields. There were also frequent trips to St. Louis and Kansas City where the class studied at close hand the operation of newspaper plants, radio stations, and advertising and public relations agencies. Public relations counsels of the various corporations discussed their particular problems, how they solved them, and offered suggestions as to how the Navy could solve some of its problems.
I believe that these officers received as good an indoctrination as was possible in two months, but I think that the course should be extended to two years. An organization such as the Navy whose primary, in fact, sole reason for existence is the protection and service of the citizens and which is in turn dependent on the public for its support, should have at least as good a Public Relations Division as any large corporation. And the only way that this can be achieved is by having fully trained officers and men in its public relations division.
The Decisive Battle of the Pacific War *
(See page 627, May, 1946, Proceedings)
Captain Harry L. Givens, Jr., U. S. Marine Corps.—In the July issue of the Marine Corps Gazette in the Military Digest section there appears an article, “The Decisive Battle of the Pacific War,” by Walmer Elton Strope. A reference footnote explains that this article was first published in the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings of May 1946.
In paragraph five, the following statement is made: “A close study of communiques reveals that from November 15, 1942, until June 18, 1944, not a single Japanese capital ship was engaged by our forces.” As a Marine officer aboard one of our cruisers in the South Pacific Fleet during 1943 and 1944, I would like to take exception to that statement. Unless a heavy cruiser and a light cruiser are not considered capital ships I can personally vouch for the fact that we did engage Japanese capital ships during this period. The engagement that stands out in my memory is the naval engagement off Empress Augusta Bay on November 1 and 2, 1943, in which a division of American light cruisers, accompanied by destroyers, intercepted, engaged, and turned away with heavy damage to the enemy forces a Japanese force composed of heavy and light cruisers and destroyers. Believe me, the splashes I saw that night were not made by destroyers unless the Japanese had a secret weapon, a destroyer that mounted eight inch rifles! If I recall correctly, aircraft on the next day spotted the wounded enemv forces at or on the way into Rabaul and "finished them off.
I would appreciate correction on this matter if I have received the wrong impression.