Future Of The Naval Reserve

Immediately after the war ends, the Navy Department will be faced with the problems of the demobilization, and with the future of the Naval Reserve. The problems cannot be minimized, nor will it be easy to find the answers unless adequate plans are made before the victory is won. With over 90 per cent of the officers and 95 per cent of the enlisted men now on active duty subject to demobilization, discharge, or transfer to inactive duty within six months after the war ends, it becomes apparent that a chaotic personnel situation can be avoided only by careful consideration of the interests of the men, and women, who are making victory certain, and by weighing their personal desires with the exigencies that may face the country.

In this connection, we must also consider the enlisted men of the regular services, many of whose enlistments have been extended for the duration of the war. These men will merit the same treatment as the members of the Naval Reserve and those brought into the Navy through Selective Service.

Twice within a generation it has been necessary for the Navy to expand many fold from its small regular force to meet the emergencies of a major war. The Navy has gone back once to a peace-time basis, and it is to be hoped that a second reduction to such an establishment will take place in the not-too- distant future.

Those who remember the dislocations and inefficiencies that attended the demobilization of 1918-19 and the sad state to which the Navy was brought in the early 1920’s as a result of various factors will hope that planning and, if necessary, legislation to obviate such conditions will be sufficiently advanced before this war comes to its successful conclusion. Only those who have gone through the period of transition from war to peace realize that this period is more complex and troublesome than going to war. As of November 9, 1918, the Navy consisted of 32,474 officers and 497,030 men, of which number 32 per cent of the officers and 40 per cent of the men were regulars; in October of 1944, there were about eight times as many officers and six times as many men, with a very much lower percentage of regulars. The number is still increasing and the percentage of regulars is dropping as officers and men continue to be added to meet war needs. Under the law as it now stands, the officers and men of the Naval Reserve are obligated to serve on active duty in time of war or during a national emergency; while a state of war, technically, continues until peace is declared, the war will be assumed by the country to have ended when fighting ceases.

As the Secretary of the Navy stated in his annual report for the fiscal year 1919,

Scarcely had the armistice been signed when the young men who had served so well looked eagerly to return to the pursuits of peace, and only the sense of duty held them until the soldiers who had won glory in France could be brought back home in transports manned by the Navy. . . . There was danger of the Navy going stale in 1919-1920 as it had gone stale following every other war.

How stale it went in the two years after World War I is indicated in the Secretary’s report of 1922:

The Atlantic Fleet . . . has performed only the routine work incident to target practice and engineering competitions. There were no combined maneuvers on account of lack of appropriations. . . .

The Pacific Fleet . . . operated from San Pedro, California, except during the summer months. Limited appropriations confined the operations of this fleet to routine target practice and engineering competitions.

The personnel situation was at its worst during 1919-20, when the “duration-of-the- war” enlisted men were being discharged at such a rapid rate that there were insufficient experienced men to operate the ships. In order to equalize conditions between regular Navy, reserves, and those who had enlisted for the war, all were considered to have enlisted for the duration; wages in civil life were good, jobs ashore were plentiful, and there was the natural tendency to get out of uniform. All of these factors influenced most of the men in the Navy to accept their discharges.

In his annual report for the fiscal year 1920, dated December 1, 1920, the Secretary of the Navy reported:

The transition period since the war has been a trying time for the Navy, and that it has been successfully weathered is a subject for congratulation. First came demobilization, with the discharge not only of the hundreds of thousands who had enlisted for the war, but also of thousands of regulars who, having completed their terms of service, were unwilling to re-enlist unless they were assured of an increase of pay somewhat commensurate with what they would get in civil life. . . . Because of the demobilization and better financial opportunities in civil life, the task of securing recruits has been difficult and expensive, but this is a temporary condition which always follows war.

The Secretary goes on to say further:

The Naval Reserve force today (December 1, 1920) comprises approximately 28,000 officers and227,000 men. This constitutes a vast source of naval strength upon which we may draw in any emergency, and its encouragement and maintenance must always demand the utmost consideration. .. . We would be recreant to our duty did we not take every possible step to promote their welfare and retain their connection with and interest in the service.

It may be of interest to explore the twenty years following this report to learn what steps were taken to encourage and maintain this “vast source of naval strength” and to “retain their connection with and interest in the service.”

The Naval Reserve had been created by. the Act of August 29, 1916, as the Naval Reserve Force, consisting of six classes, viz.: Naval Reserve, Naval Auxiliary Reserve, Naval Coast Defense Reserve, Volunteer Naval Reserve, Naval Reserve Flying Corps. This act superseded the provisions of the appropriation act for the fiscal year 1916 (Act of March 3, 1915), which created a United States Naval Reserve of men honorably discharged after one or more terms of enlistment. No provision had been made in the appropriation act for officers, nor for the enrollment of those who had had no previous service. The only civilians with training for the Navy were in the Naval Militia units, essentially state organizations.

Minor changes in the laws governing the Naval Reserve were enacted during World War I, by which the officers and men of the Naval Militia became successively National Naval Volunteers and, on July 1,1918, members of the U. S. Naval Reserve Force.

Under the requirements of war the Navy expanded from its July 1, 1916, strength of 4,293 officers and 54,234 men to the total, on November 9, 1918, of 32,474 officers and 497,030 men, of which numbers 68 per cent of the officers and 60 per cent of the men were in the Naval Reserve Force.

The Naval Appropriations Act approved June 4, 1920, carried authorization for (a) employment of not to exceed 20,000 enlisted reservists with their own consent to serve on active duty for not less than twelve months or more than eighteen months; (b) employment of 500 reserve officers in aviation and auxiliary service; (c) transfer to permanent line ranks and grades of 1,200 temporary commissioned and warrant officers of Navy and Naval Reserve Forces upon qualification to the rank, not above lieutenant, for which they were found qualified; (d) transfer of a proportionate number of staff officers to the regular Navy.

At the end of June, 1921, the Naval Reserve Force gave continuing promise of normal existence with its 26,376 officers and 203,666 men. Estimates of $12,000,000 for retainer pay and active duty pay were submitted to Congress, but “Economy!” had become the watchword, and the appropriation for the Naval Reserve for the fiscal year 1922 was $V,000,000. By the end of September the entire appropriation was expended or obligated. This left the Navy Department no option except to transfer 25,000 officers and about 200,000 men to the Volunteer Naval Reserve, members of which serve without pay, or to disenroll them.

Accordingly, all members of the Naval Reserve Force except members of the Fleet Naval Reserve and of the Volunteer Naval Reserve were disenrolled, with very few exceptions. At the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1922, the Naval Reserve Force had been reduced to 5,340 officers and 10,966 men.

Within the next few years came the period of retrenchment in expenditures; the United States was committed to a limitation of armaments, the pacifist element was growing in strength and power, and interest in naval and military affairs was at a low ebb. The Naval Reserve Force became the “redheaded stepchild” of the Navy Department, which was fighting desperately to retain at least a nucleus of a regular Navy. Congress, responsive to the expressed will of the people, kept naval appropriations at a minimum; there was then no war in sight so there seemed no reason to encourage and maintain the “vast source of naval strength” inherent in the 300,000 men absorbed into the civil population after their valuable war service in the Navy.

New legislation to provide for the Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve, and designed as a substitute for earlier laws on the subject, was prepared by the Navy Department and introduced in Congress on March 27, 1922, but did not become a law until February 28, 1925, when it was approved by the President. This legislation, known as “An act providing for the creation, organization, administration, and maintenance of a Naval Reserve and a Marine Corps Reserve,” went into effect on July 1, 1925.

The principal features of this law (a) transferred all members of the Naval Reserve Force and the Marine Corps Reserve, respectively, to the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve; (b) tenure of office of officers was during the pleasure of the President; (c) preserved benefits of continuous service to men enlisting in the reserve within three months of discharge from the Navy; (d) safeguarded interests of transferred members of the Fleet Naval Reserve; and (e) provided for additional classes to be known as Merchant Marine Naval Reserve and Volunteer Reserve.

The years 1923, 1924, 1925, and 1926 saw little change in the activities of the Naval Reserve. It was in the doldrums and was kept alive largely through the interest and effort of a group of men who had made naval training a lifetime hobby. Training cruises were arranged for the units of the then Fleet Naval Reserve, and there was authorization for drill pay as well as for subsistence while on week-end cruises.

By June 30, 1926, the Reserve had recovered from the knockdown blow of 1922 only to the extent of having an enrollment of 3,736 officers and 18,868 men, plus 7,173 sixteen- and twenty-year fleet reservists.

For the next twelve years, i.e., from 1926 to 1938, the Naval Reserve drifted along with no very great change in its status. Boards, from time to time, were convened to consider Naval Reserve matters and to recommend new legislation. The Naval Affairs Committee of the House appointed a select committee to frame a new Naval Reserve law in January, 1936, but the committee made no recommendation. The Navy Department sponsored the draft of a bill in March, 1937, but the Bureau of the Budget deemed it not in harmony with the President’s program at that time.

Finally, on May 6, 1938, the Secretary of the Navy transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives “a draft of a proposed bill to provide for the creation, organization, administration, and maintenance of a Naval Reserve and a Marine Corps Reserve” and recommended its enactment. Hearings were held, and in these it was brought out that the Naval Reserve then consisted of:

Fleet Naval Reserve Officers	1,170
Merchant Marine Naval Reserve Officers	3,602
Volunteer Naval Reserve Officers	7,387
Total		12,159
Fleet Naval Reserve Enlisted Men	9,863
Merchant Marine Naval Reserve Enlisted Men	70
Total		22,680
Fleet Naval Reserve Transferred Men	15,760	15,760

With certain modifications, the draft submitted by the Secretary of the Navy became “The Naval Reserve Act of 1938” and is still the basic law governing the Naval Reserve, a component part of the United States Navy. This law provided for (a) the Fleet Reserve of men who had had sixteen or twenty years’ active naval service; (b) the Organized Reserve of officers and men attached to active units required to attend drills; (c) the Merchant Marine Reserve; (d) the Volunteer Naval Reserve, and (e) the Marine Corps Reserve.

All reservists now on duty are serving under the provision of the Naval Reserve Act of 1938 that

Any member of the Naval Reserve, including those on the honorary retired list . . . may be ordered to active duty by the Secretary of the Navy in time of war or when, in the opinion of the President, a national emergency exists, and may be required to perform active duty throughout the war or until the national emergency ceases to exist.

This same act authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to “release any member [of the Naval Reserve] from active duty either in time of war or in time of peace.”

Published estimates as to naval personnel, including Marine Corps and Coast Guard, indicate that the total will approximate 3,500,000 by June 30, 1945. Demobilization of the Navy at the end of World War II, therefore, involves about six times as many individuals as were affected in 1919.

In the consideration of the action to be taken to insure an adequate reserve for the future, and to avoid the many personnel troubles that plagued the Navy during the 1920’s, a realistic approach to the next ten years is essential.

Two basic factors will govern the enlisted and officer strength of the Navy in the next decade. First, how many men will be required to man the ships, aircraft, and stations that must be kept in commission to accomplish the tasks that become the obligations of the United States in the post-war years? Second, how much money will the people of the United States appropriate annually for the military establishment, Army and Navy, including air arms?

It is assumed that officers and men of the Coast Guard will resume their regular duties, and that reduction of Coast Guard personnel will be the responsibility of the Commandant of that organization. Combatant ships now Coast Guard manned will either be placed out of commission or will be manned by Navy crews. Reduction of the Marine Corps to a peacetime basis affects the Navy demobilization because funds for the Marines are included in Naval Appropriations Acts, and because the strength of the Corps is based on naval requirements. No attempt will be made in this paper to estimate future requirements for the Marine Corps; it is sufficient to say that our bases in the Atlantic and the Pacific will need many more Marines than were in the service prior to 1940.

From the war strength of three million, exclusive of Coast Guard and Marine Corps, it will be necessary to retain a minimum of 500,000 officers and men on active duty in the Navy to meet our obligations under any organization that may be set up for the maintenance of world peace and world order. Will half a million of the three million now in the Navy be willing to accept permanent status in the Navy when peace treaties become effective?

On the basis of experience after the last war, there will be only a few who are willing to continue in the Navy besides officers of the regular Navy, petty officers of the regular Navy with eight or more years of service, and a small percentage of reservists. Service in the Navy in peacetime is a business; in wartime, service is a patriotic duty. A slogan like “Your Navy Needs You!” has little appeal unless the man to whom the slogan is directed needs the Navy. Service must therefore be made attractive if the postwar Navy is to be manned by volunteers to the extent necessary for post-war obligations.

There can be little prospect, nor is there a need, to keep the post-war Navy manned on a war basis. As in this war, most of the personnel for any future war must come from the Naval Reserve; we will have the ships and may have learned from the lessons of the last twenty-five years the futility of disarmament. If the lesson has been learned, ships will be scrapped only as they become obsolete and are replaced by modern units.

How can we be assured of a Naval Reserve competent and adequate in number to commission ships in “storage” and to fill the billets ashore?

Much of the pre-war organization of the Naval Reserve, as developed during the period of the renaissance between 1938 and 1941, appears sound and should be renewed. Since the primary consideration is provision of trained personnel, the Bureau of Personnel is the logical agency of the Navy Department to have supervision and control of all Naval Reserve matters.

Under the Chief of Naval Personnel should be a rear admiral or senior captain, U. S. Navy, who is conversant with and cognizant of reserve problems, requirements, and capabilities, with the title of Director of the Naval Reserve. Assistants from the Navy and from major subdivisions of the reserve should be assigned to the office of the Director; there will be a natural rotation of directors and regular officers assigned to the division, but there should be a policy that limits reserve officers to four years of duty with the Director. A Naval Reserve Inspection Board, under the Chief of Naval Operations and composed entirely of regular officers, will keep fully employed inspecting units of the Naval Reserve.

In each Naval District, there should be a Director of the Naval Reserve (regular Navy) and an Assistant Director (Naval Reserve). The Assistant Director will be limited to four years of active duty in the District, but may have an additional period of the same length in the Naval Reserve Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Sufficient assistants and instructors for administration, procurement, enlistments, discharges, records, etc., will be essential in each Naval District; these may be either regulars or Naval Reserve. A minimum allowance of officers for a District Naval Reserve Headquarters includes:

Captain, U.S.N., as Director, Naval Reserve; Captain or Commander, U.S.N.R., as Assistant Director; Commander, U.S.N., as Training Officer. As Assistants to Training Officer and Instructors* there should be 5 Line Lieutenants, U.S.N.; 5 Line Lieutenants, U.S.N.R.; 1 Medical Officer; 1 Civil Engineer; 2 Communications Officers; 5 Naval Aviators (U.S.N. or U.S.N.R.); 1 WAVE Officer; and a Clerical Group of U.S.N., U.S.N.R., and Civil Service employees.

A weakness of the old Organized Reserve was the shortage of instructors; with the proposed enlarged reserve, there will be fulltime jobs for as many instructors as can be made available. Rotation of duty between the fleet and the Naval Reserve should prevent stagnation of ideas and keep Naval Reserve training abreast of fleet ideas.

The division of the Naval Reserve into (a) Fleet, (b) Organized, (c) Volunteer, and (d) Merchant Marine sections was a logical subdivision, but did not work out too well, largely because we got into the war by stages instead of in the way our planners had visualized our entry. The Fleet Reserve of 16- and 20-year men had an effective percentage of about fifty when we needed these men and called them to duty; too many were physically disqualified for any service, and many more were fit for shore duty only. The Organized Reserves were first called on a volunteer basis, which disrupted the divisions, and then were ordered by divisions to transports, cargo ships, or other types of vessels, instead of to the destroyers for which they had been specially trained. The Volunteer Reserve lacked training and was little better indoctrinated than the civilian who had had no previous connection with the Navy. The Merchant Marine had almost no enlisted men, and the ranks held by Merchant Marine officers bore little relation to the capabilities of these officers; when war was declared many Merchant Marine Reserve officers who did not volunteer for active duty remained on an inactive status to draw war zone pay, while their contemporaries, also operating in war zones, were paid from the much lower Navy pay table.

Organized Reserve.—In order to carry on systematic training for those whose residence, circumstances, and interest in the naval service make regular attendance at drills practicable, it is desirable that the Organized Reserve be re-established and enlarged. Naval Reserve armories now converted to other use should be rehabilitated and armories provided where none exist. Destroyer escorts and frigates assigned to battalions will promote morale. Certainly, a minimum strength of 5,000 line officers, 5,000 staff officers, and 100,000 men should be trained and immediately available during the period when plans for permanent peace in the world have not had time to demonstrate their enduring efficacy. All branches of the Navy need representation in the Organized Reserve, and the following might well be the organization in one of the populous naval districts:

30 Battalions, of 500 enlisted men (and women) each
20—Ship’s Company, comprising Deck, Engineer, Communications, Supply, Commissary, Medical
4—Aviation, with ground personnel
4—Amphibious, with landing craft operating and repair personnel, construction companies, field communicators, etc.
2—Hospital, complete with nurses, corpsmen, technicians, specialists, etc. (for a major base hospital).

Specialist groups within some of the appropriate battalions should be formed for training in mine warfare, combat intelligence, photography and photographic interpretation, underwater defenses and detection, and aerology, to name a few of the many distinctive lines of naval endeavor.

Officers and men of the battalions will be members of the Organized Reserve, will have an allowance for uniforms, will be paid for attendance at drills, and will be required to perform two weeks’ training duty, with pay, annually. The Navy will have the obligation to furnish suitable instruction, adequate instructional material, and an opportunity for the training period. If these men are sufficiently interested in preparing themselves for useful service in the Navy, the United States can hardly adopt a pinch-penny attitude that will make this preparatipn insufficient. The Organized Reserve has no justification unless it is composed of officers and enlisted personnel able to go to duty without delay, and able to perform the duties of their ranks or ratings with a minimum of further training.

Many details of the organization and training need to be worked out. The good features of the pre-war Organized Reserve should be retained, and results of our experience during the war can be applied as practicable. Planning is essential and should not be deferred up to the moment when action becomes necessary. In this connection, it is noted from the press that the War Department has appointed a board of officers to draw up plans for the reserve components of the Army.

Fleet Reserve.—The Fleet Reserve will comprise the fully trained men who have had sixteen or twenty years, or more, in the Navy. Those who are physically qualified for duty are immediately available to perform the duties of their ratings, and experience in this war has taught us the value of these “old-timers.” In 1940-41 this group was a disappointment to some officers in the Navy Department who had insufficient knowledge as to the general qualifications, physical, mental, moral, and professional, of the men after varying periods of inactive duty. Provision for a biennial physical examination of all men in this category will keep current an accurate estimate of the availability of the 16- and 20-year men for active duty. Since most of the 16-year men will have completed 20 years before the end of the war, and few others who enlisted originally before July 1, 1925, will have less than 20 years, practically all of our Fleet Reservists will have had at least 20 years of service, and all who transfer in the post-war years will be in the 20-year group.

The basic law provides for the enrollment in the Fleet Reserve of regular officers who have resigned from the service, but this provision of the law was invoked in very few instances. It would be desirable to accept for enrollment as Fleet Reservists those regular officers who resign under honorable conditions. Special inducements might be offered to them if they keep themselves professionally qualified for the duties of their ranks.

Volunteer Reserve.—The greater portion of men and women released from active duty at the end of the war will be faced with the necessity of getting and holding jobs, completing their educations, re-establishing themselves in their homes and communities, and readjusting themselves to civil life. Most of them will not be in a position to attend regular drills or classes, either because of lack of desire, or want of opportunity. At the same time, they may wish to retain their connection with the Navy, and surely the Navy should wish to retain their interest and co-operation.

Into the Volunteer Reserve should go the hundreds of thousands of men and women who have served their country well in the trying war years. If it is apparent that the Naval Reserve is to be a militant vital organization with good leadership, adequate support from the Navy Department, and a definite program, the response from the personnel now carrying on afloat and ashore should be good.

The following plan is suggested for discussion and consideration:

(a) Upon discharge or release to inactive duty, under honorable conditions and if physically qualified, all enlisted men and women are afforded the opportunity to enroll in the Volunteer Naval Reserve for four years, with the option of transferring to the Organized Reserve in their home districts.
(b) All enlisted personnel will be enrolled in the ratings held by them.
(c) Officers will have the same rank in the Naval Reserve as their running mates who remain in the regular Navy. Ranks are to be adjusted within two years after the war ends.
(d) Officers and enlisted personnel will be required to submit a report to District Commandants annually, giving pertinent data as to address, next of kin, employment, special skills or attainments, etc.
(e) Qualified personnel will be enrolled as officers or enlisted men in appropriate ranks or ratings by Directors of Naval Reserve in the various districts.
(f) Officers will be eligible for promotion with their running mates in the regular Navy, but must qualify for the higher rank by examination within one year after they have been notified that they are eligible. Those who fail to qualify will be dis- enrolled.
(g) Since all inductees through Selective Service are, by law, members of the Naval Reserve for ten years after the end of the war, these men will be considered a part of the Volunteer Reserve unless they enlist in the Navy or join a unit of the Organized Reserve.
(h) Retainer Pay of $20 will be paid annually to all members of the Volunteer Reserve who comply with paragraph (d) above (i.e., submit the annual report).

Merchant Marine Reserve.—Re-establishment of the Merchant Marine Reserve on a peacetime basis will be more complicated than for any other branch of the Naval Reserve. There are now two distinct groups of officers trained in the Merchant Marine. One group is on active duty in the Navy, and in this group officers have been promoted to higher rank with other officers of the Navy. The other group has served with the Merchant Marine throughout the war but has had no increase in naval rank, though most of these men have been promoted in the services of the companies for whom they sail. An additional complication is the issuance of appointments with naval titles to officers of the Maritime Service who hold Naval Reserve commissions in lower ranks or have resigned from the Naval Reserve.

Hundreds of new officers have been trained for the merchant service and are commissioned in the Maritime Service or in the Naval Reserve. In the interest of uniformity, it is considered highly desirable that all officers of the U. S. Merchant Marine be appointed or commissioned in one service; from the standpoint of availability for war, the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve should be that one.

The enlistment of Merchant Marine unlicensed personnel in a special class of the Naval Reserve offers no advantages. In time of war the expansion of the Merchant Marine will require more men than will be available.

Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps.— Continuation of the N.R.O.T.C. in colleges and universities is the best method of providing young officers for the Naval Reserve.

Conclusion.—The re-establishment and continuation of the Naval Reserve after the war require advance planning. A policy prepared and accepted with a reasonable assurance that it will govern the transition from war to peace, and that will carry on during the foreseeable future, is essential if we are to profit by the hard lessons of the last twenty- five years. This time let us hope that we shall be more successful in our effort to “retain the connection with and interest in the service” of this “vast source of naval strength.”