The Naval Act of 1794, just as most authorizations for the construction of naval vessels since that time, created many problems requiring solution before the Navy could go into action. But in the construction of the fighting ships authorized in 1794 the problems were especially acute, for the United States had maintained no navy prior to that date. Contracts had to be made with private constructors since the Navy had no yards of its own; the ships had to be designed to meet the requirements of the government in the best possible manner with consideration for the limited number of ships authorized; naval stores and supplies of all kinds had to be procured to place the ships in fighting trim; officers had to be commissioned and men had to be enlisted to man the new fleet. Not the least important of the problems arising from the building program was the one of coppering the bottoms of the ships built at that time.
The Navy has been instrumental in developing any number of important industries and industrial processes that have had far- reaching effects upon American economic life, as in the case of the steel industry, to cite but one well-known example, which owed much of its development in its earliest stages to the action of the Navy Department when the “New Navy” was being built near the end of the nineteenth century. A similar encouragement was given to the copper industry in the days when the first Navy was under construction, a century earlier. A parallel might also be drawn between the problems the Navy has encountered in the present war, in obtaining vital materials required in the construction program, and the similar difficulties met in the days of the naval wars with France and the Barbary Powers. Further, it is of interest to note the roles played by men who had been closely connected with the founding of this nation. Let us then consider the problems of coppering ship’s bottoms for the United States Navy during the decade following the passing of the Naval Act of 1794.
Before the introduction of copper sheathing for ships, many experiments had been conducted in England in an effort to stay the action of the teredo navalis, a marine worm that, despite the strong acid of the oak that was so distasteful to the sea-worm, bored into the planking of the King’s ships to transform the bottoms into leaky sieves.1 Experiments with sheathings of pitch, paper, tar, and hair, covered with deal plank, had been regarded as effective, but too costly, while sheet lead had been found to be too heavy. Since the borers cared less for deal than for any other wood, a thin sheath over the oak gave a degree of protection in that it required some time for the worms to work their way through the deal before they could attack the oak.
In 1758, H.M.S. Alarm, a 32-gun frigate, was sheathed with copper as “an experiment of preserving it against the Worm,” and in 1761 the Lords of the Admiralty issued instructions for an examination of the ship to “observe the effect of the worm” and to determine the degree the bottom “was clean or fouled with Barnacles, Weeds, which usually collect and grow upon the bottoms of Ships in long voyages.” In the report of the Navy Board, dated August 31, 1763, the plank was found to be free from the action of the borers, the plank and the calking had not suffered any injury by being covered with the copper, and the sheathing was not fouled from weeds “or any other Cause.” The Board made note of the effect of the copper upon the iron nails that had been used to secure some of the sheathing “to vary the experiment,” and made recommendations for conducting further trials, “seeing the extension of the advantages it is capable of [and] supposing it can be brought into use.”2 By 1777, copper sheathing had been found “to answer extreamly well” on a number of frigates, and the practice of coppering was coming into general use during the period of the American Revolution.3
The copper on the bottoms thus halted the action of the teredo worms and at the same time prevented the accumulation of barnacles and other filth which had formed to the thickness of several inches on unprotected ships to retard the sailing speed by several knots. The use of copper sheathing, however, was not without its problems, for the copper was found to corrode the iron bolts and spikes with which it came in contact. The action was met, to a degree, by the use of a thin sheath of fir wood to keep the copper from coming into direct contact with the iron, until a little later, about 1783, iron bolts were largely abolished and replaced with copper, or with copper-headed iron bolts.
The use of coppered bottoms sometimes enabled the English to enjoy distinct advantages of speed over the French fleet, where the ships were frequently worm-eaten, as coppering had not yet become so general a practice in France as it had in England. One example will be sufficient to illustrate this advantage. Regarding the race for the Virginia Capes, in March, 1781, in which Admiral Arbuthnot managed to lead Des- touches, although the latter enjoyed a 36- hour start over the English, the French ascribed their disadvantage to the lack of copper sheathing on some of their ships.4
A little over two weeks after the passing of the Naval Act of 1794, Joshua Humphreys wrote (on April 12) to Secretary of War Knox to suggest certain radical changes and important improvements which should be incorporated in the designs for the six frigates to be built for the Navy. Since the United States could not have a fleet comparable in numbers to that of any of the major European sea powers, Humphreys maintained that the American ships had to be fast-sailers, capable of fighting or running at will, but if they should choose to fight the ships had to be equal to any ships afloat of that class. Coppered bottoms were definitely called for if the American fleet was not to experience the handicap that had worked to the disadvantage of the French in their contacts with the English fleet. On June 29, 1794, Humphreys was appointed to the post of Naval Constructor, which he held until 1801, when he was dismissed because of the lack of employment at the time.5
The report of the Naval Constructor, dated December 23, 1794, on the progress made in the building of the frigates, made special note of the advantages that could be expected from copper sheathed ships:
Their bottoms always clean and ready for any expedition; if they were not coppered, their guns, and stores of every kind, must be discharged, and they hove down every six months, (having no docks to dock them.) This will not only be an expensive job, but strain the ships exceedingly, and injure the hull and rigging more than can easily be calculated, which ought to be avoided by all means; not only so, but an expedition may be lost by the delay.
For these “cogent reasons,” as the Constructor reported, “it was finally agreed to copper them.” But if the ships were to be copper sheathed, copper was also considered necessary “in the securing of these ships, as it is not known to waste or corrode like iron,” and iron used in conjunction with copper sheathing “would be destroyed in a very short time.”6
John Adams became president March 4, 1797, and, with the aid of a Federalist Congress and a diplomatic crisis with France, a series of bills was passed to rush the frigates to completion, to establish a separate Navy Department, to build, purchase, or rent additional warships, and even to accept gifts of ships from public-spirited citizens.7 With this increased activity, the Navy Department sent out any number of instructions regarding the coppering of the ships. Secretary of Navy Stoddert, informing the citizens of Charleston that “it would be very desirable, that the Public Spirit of Charleston, should furnish one, or assist in furnishing one Vessel to the Public,” pointed to the fact that if a ship “should be offered by the Citizens to the public it will be necessary that she should be coppered.”8 When a Providence, Rhode Island, man offered to sell his ship to the government, it was suggested that the ship be donated by the citizens, and that “vessels intended for the public should be Copper Bolted and sheathed with Copper.”9 Naval Constructors were instructed to examine ships offered to the public, as in the case of the Niger, said to have been copper bolted in London, to determine whether the bolting and “Sheathing has been securely and properly done.”10 The Navy Agent at Norwich, Connecticut, in instructions regarding the building of an 18-gun ship, was told that “the Vessel must be copper butted & bolted, & sheathed.”11 Thus we see that the Navy Department had definitely adopted the policy of having all of its ships properly coppered.
The practice of coppering ships was thus being established, but the Navy Department had to exercise care in seeing to the bolting of the ships and evidently had to deal with constructors who were bent upon using their own methods. The Navy Agents at Newport were informed of the importance of copper bolting, “for it is found that a vessel bolted with Iron & then coppered will not last more than three years, as the copper corrodes, and soon destroys the Iron.”12 To assure proper construction at Charleston, Secretary Stoddert wrote that “it is the custom here, to use copper of Composition bolts & Spikes—and no Iron below the Wales—The Copper sheathing corrodes the Iron—I presume this is the custom with you also.”13 Ships whose bottoms were to be coppered required some form of sheathing between the planks and the copper. Gibbs and Channing proposed a method but the Secretary of Navy decided that the usual method, “the use of flannel soaked in Tar, on which the Copper will be placed,” should be used,14 and the agents at New York were informed that “flannel & not paper should be used between the Ship & the Copper.”15 For a ship that had been iron bolted the Secretary of Navy suggested that “it would be well to give her a Coat of well tarred sheathing paper, then a sheath of half-inch Cedar boards—then another coat of thin paper, and over the whole, Copper.”16 In the case of the Augusta, an iron bolted ship that was purchased and armed, the Navy Department took the attitude that if the iron was properly guarded it would last for five to seven years, or “as long as the Timber of any of our new vessels.” Deal boards were to be used between the copper and the planks, but if the boards could not be obtained at once, the ship was to be coppered “without them after laying on a sufficient quantity of Sheathing Paper.”17 There seems to have been some question regarding the coppering of the Constitution, for instructions had to be sent to the Naval Constructor to have her coppered before the launching to “prevent heaving down afterwards and a Consequent heavy expence.”18
Copper was required in vast amounts for shipbuilding and the expense it entailed represented a very considerable portion of the entire cost of a ship. At the time Secretary Stoddert was urging the construction of twelve 74’s, the estimate for the copper for one ship was placed at 1,620 tons, or an expenditure of $10,960 for bolts, $17,440 for sheathing, nails, etc., and an additional $1,215 for “wollens for sheathing” between the copper and the planks, or a total of $28,400 for the copper alone,19 the same figure being given a year later when the cost of copper for six 74’s was set at $170,000.20 The itemized estimate for a 74-gun ship included 6,600 feet of bolts, 10,000 spikes, and 3,600 sheets of copper, each 4 feet long, 14 inches wide, and weighing 34 ounces to the square foot.21 Estimates for three ships, of 22-, 20-, and 16-guns, provided for additional expenditures of $10,200, $8,980, and $5,150, respectively, if the ships were to be copper sheathed and bolted, these figures representing a notable part of the total cost of building, which were estimated to be $64,359, $56,110, and $36,670, in the case of the three ships.22 Joshua Humphreys provided for the following copper for each of the 44’s, and nearly the same amount for each of the 36- gun ships: 12,000 feet of sheet copper for the bottom; 200 feet of 1 ¼-inch copper bolts for breasthooks; 1,600 feet of 1 ¾ -inch copper bolts “for floor, keelson dead wood, and sternpost knees”; 850 feet of 1 ¼-inch copper bolts “for stem, stern, keel scarfs rudder and riders”; and 1,550 feet of 1 1/8-inch bolts “for but & bilge bolts.”23
Although copper was discovered and some mines were worked in this country at an early date, it was not produced extensively until well into the nineteenth century. Before the middle of that century, Great Britain was the principal producer of the metal and the copper market of the world was largely controlled in England.24 Consequently the copper for the earliest ships had to be ordered from Europe,25 but, in order to hasten the work, the Navy Department authorized contracts for making bolts, “so far as the same may be requisite before the arrival of those ordered from Europe.”26 At one time, when the supply of copper evidently ran very low, the Superintendent of the Mint was called upon to provide “Clippings of Cents, . . . Copper in small Bars, and that of a Black Cast,” for the use of the Navy Department.27
Even the distribution of the supplies on hand was a problem of no small proportions, as the many references in the documents will attest, for all up and down the coast the shipyards were turning out ships for public use, ships requiring copper usually provided from government sources. Certain phrases reappear over and over again in the correspondence of the Secretary of Navy:
The public to furnish the copper. ... I will take immediate steps to have procured & forwarded on the Copper. . . . The copper will not all be such as you desired ... but it will come as near your Directions as possible. . . . The Copper has been ordered on. ... I wish it was possible for you to obtain Copper, but I fear it is not ... I shall immediately make Arrangements for furnishing [this article]. . . . You will please to inform me, how soon the Copper will be wanted, in order that it may be got in readiness.
These statements could be cited almost ad infinitum.28 Copper was shifted from one part of the country to another in order to place it where it was most urgently required. Shipments were made by water or by land stages, and naval officers traveling from one section of the coast to another were instructed “to take any trouble to get on the bolts to their destination.”29 When the John Adams was being built at Charleston, the Navy Department was not informed until a very late date that copper was required. The one brass foundry at the place could not meet the demands so that the ship had to be iron bolted, the planks being put on with “composition Spikes & Treenails,” the copper sheathing being added some time after the ship had been launched.30
The merchants were able to supply the required copper in the earlier stages of the building program, and Secretary Stoddert believed that they could be counted upon to supply the needs of the twelve 74’s that he wasplanning in 1798. But,nevertheless,Stoddert thought that in the future, and possibly before the 74’s were advanced so far as to require copper, “means may be devised for obtaining it in the United States.”31 The Secretary of Navy was beginning his campaign to make the Navy independent of Europe for vital materials. “On the subject of coppering our Ships in London,” he asked Chairman Harper of the Ways and Means Committee if he didn’t “think it high time we should be out of leading strings,” and expressed the hope that “the whole Copper for the 74’s will be the produce & manufacture of our own Country,” arrangements having been made to that end, which he believed would be “attended with success.”32 Every article required for the Navy, with the exceptions of hemp, canvas, and copper, could be supplied at home. But Secretary Stoddert was trying to impress upon Congress the advantages to be found in supplying even these materials domestically, when he wrote to Josiah Parker, Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs:
The consumption of these articles in the United States must amount annually to several millions of Dollars, and besides the safety of possessing within ourselves every thing requisite for Naval defense, it is not unimportant that so large a sum, instead of being paid to other Countries, should be applied to the encouragement of Industry and enterprise in our own.
Stoddert, however, realized that the United States would remain dependent upon foreign countries “until the wisdom of Congress shall devise effectual means to encourage the growth of the first [hemp] and the manufacture of the last two articles [canvas and copper] at home.”33 The manufacturing of copper would require the expenditure of considerable sums of money and could only be accomplished with “effectual Public assistance.” The problem, at this time, was becoming more urgent as Great Britain had prohibited the exportation of copper “under the apprehension of a failure in its mines.”34
As a means of promoting the domestic production of copper for naval purposes, the Navy contracted with Benjamin Henfrey, of Philadelphia, to manufacture bolts, spikes, nails, and sheets from the “production of . . . Gap Mine, or other mines within the United States.”35 Shortly thereafter, on August 23, 1799, another contract was made, this time with Jacob Marks and Nicholas Roosevelt, for similar items, the merchants to set up machinery for making bolts and sheets, “of the kind suitable to be used in the construction of public Ships of War, . . . and sufficient to supply the public demands.” The Navy set forth the principal object of the contract as being the encouragement of the “establishment of domestic manufactures of Copper on a scale proportioned to the probable demands of the United States for the Navy Department.”36
About five months after this second contract had been made, the Secretary of Navy was beginning to “doubt more and more the success of the attempt” to supply the 74’s with domestic copper and was making inquiries looking toward other sources of supply.37 A year later it was still uncertain as to the degree the contracts would be executed, for the manufacturing of sheet copper required expensive machinery “beyond the reach of individual capifal and enterprise.”38 The Secretary had reason for his doubts concerning the production of domestic copper, for the spikes sent by Roosevelt had been unsatisfactory. The Secretary of Navy, after consulting Humphreys, sent detailed instructions as to the process to be employed, and forwarded a copper spike he had made in Philadelphia to serve as a model for the future work. Roosevelt was urged to decide whether or not he would be able to produce suitable bolts and spikes, and if not he was told that the “best way will be to give up the thing at once.”39 Thus far the Navy had advanced $14,000 to Roosevelt for the business, and by January, 1801, the amount had reached a total of $51,800,40 but the change of administration in March of that year and the abandonment of ship construction brought great financial loss to Roosevelt, who had made great expenditures to complete the contract.41
Paul Revere was also turning his skill to the manufacturing of copper sheathing for the Navy.42 Soon after he had learned of the plans for the building of the frigates, in 1794, he offered to supply bolts, rudder braces, etc., for he could purchase several tons of copper at Boston and his works were equipped for the business. Revere provided bolts, spikes, cogs, braces, pumps, etc., for the Constitution, by a process known in this country only to himself. This process had cost him a considerable amount of time and energy in developing, but Revere could write, with some satisfaction, in 1799, that no other man in the New England States could melt copper and draw it into bolts and spikes. The bill sent to General Henry Jackson, the government agent at Boston, for Revere’s work for the Constitution amounted to $3,820.33.
When the Essex was building at Boston, Revere wrote to the Secretary of Navy, telling him of the material he had supplied for the Constitution, of the 5,000 pounds of bolts and spikes he had already turned out for the Essex, and of the 600 pounds of spikes for the Congress, and inquired about a supply of copper to be used in a project he had in mind for rolling sheet copper. Revere was having difficulties in obtaining old copper for his work, and wanted to know if the Schuylers, or any other mine in the United States could supply copper.
The launching of the 32-gun frigate Boston was accompanied by a fanfare from the Massachusetts Mercury, calling attention to the fact that she was “the first Copperbot- tomed ship built in America, whose bolts and spikes (drawn from Malleable Copper) had been manufactured in the United States,” and expressing the public obligation to Revere “for his indefatigable attention to this Branch of Naval Architecture, especially at a time when the British Government has prohibited the exportation of that valuable Article.” 43Later generations might be inclined to make light of Revere’s accomplishment, or even to think him to be somewhat of a braggart when he wrote to Secretary Stoddert that there was no one in either Philadelphia or New York who could make copper so malleable that it could be drawn into bolts and spikes under the hammer, but the industry was yet in its infancy and the process was known to but few persons even in England.
The project for the 74-gun ships, and the plans for producing domestic copper, soon brought about negotiations between the Navy Department and Paul Revere. Stephen Higginson was asked to engage Revere to produce bolts and spikes, and if satisfactory samples of sheet copper could be made, and if the price was not more than that for the English product, Revere was to be engaged to supply the sheathing for a 74-gun ship.44 Copper bolts and spikes could be obtained more easily than the sheets, so the chief concern was for supplies of sheathing copper, for England was no longer a source of supply and, indeed, it was uncertain whether America would soon be able to import it from any foreign source. Higginson, under instructions from the Navy Department, was making arrangements with Revere whereby the latter should undertake to erect the necessary works for rolling copper.45 Encouraged by the government, and with the promise of a loan, Revere bought the property of the old government powdermill, at Canton, as the site for his works. Rollers were ordered from England for those of American make were of inferior quality. The project was a great undertaking for Revere and it required every bit of money he could “rake or scrape,” but, by
October 26, 1801, he could write to the new Secretary of Navy, Robert Smith, that the works were erected and that he had rolled sheet copper which had received the approval of the best judges.
At the time the dome of the new State House was coppered, a correspondent for the Massachusetts Spy wrote that the copper had been supplied by Colonel Paul Revere and Son, who had 30,000 pounds of sheet copper ready for delivery to the government of the United States for the bottoms of the 74-gun ships that had been ordered some time before. The job for which Revere was probably most noted, however, was the re-coppering of the Constitution, in June, 1803. Captain Preble had the ship examined and found the bottom to be “ragged & full of small Holes, . . . the Copper being entirely worn out.” The usual report and recommendations were made and the Secretary of Navy authorized the agent at Boston to supply the copper from the store. An entry in the ship’s logbook recorded the cheers of the carpenters, calkers, and seamen on the occasion of the completion of the job, the work having been accomplished in fourteen days, with copper made in this country.46
Revere was busy these years with supplies for the Navy but he also managed (before October 29,1803) to provide bolts and spikes for over twenty merchant ships. The supply of copper for his work seems to have given him some concern for he suggested that the government ships be instructed to stop at Smyrna to take on copper in ballast for the United States, and thought that all of the old copper removed from the ships of the Navy should be salvaged and reworked. After about two years, during which time Revere had not been paid for any of the copper supplied to the Navy, the bill amounted to between $24,000 and $25,000.
Revere continued to perfect the work of manufacturing copper for, in 1804-05, he and his son went to England, France, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, to study the methods in use in those countries. The Revere copper was used in the boilers of a steam ferry built by Robert Fulton, in 1809.47 After the death of Revere, the business was carried on by the son until 1828, when the Revere Copper Company was chartered, and even today an important branch of the industry carries the founder’s name.
Coppered bottoms continued in use for ships designed for the Navy, for the merchant service, and for the whalers,48 until iron came into general use in shipbuilding. But this came about long after the United States Navy had won its many laurels in the numerous important and often spectacular engagements with the enemy—an accomplishment due in no small part to the work of John Adams, Benjamin Stoddert, Paul Revere, Joshua Humphreys, and all of the others who had a hand in the building of the first Navy.
1. R. G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power . . . (Cambridge, 1926), p. 11.
2. A. L. Cross, “On Coppering Ship’s Bottoms,” American Historical Review, XXXIII (1927-28), pp. 79-81.
3. Ibid., p. 81; Albion, op. cit., p. 11.
4. A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston, 1914), pp.385-86, 494, and passim.
5. J. H. Frederick, “Joshua Humphreys.” Dictionary of American Biography, vol. IX, pp. 376-77.
6. American State Papers, Naval Affairs, vol. I, p.9
7. Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918 (Princeton, 1939), pp. 38-39.
8. Naval Documents Relating to the Quasi-War between the United States and France (Washington, 1935-), vol. I, p. 230. Hereinafter this collection will be cited as Quasi-War.
9. Ibid., pp. 277-78; also see pp. 246-47,339.
10. Ibid., vol. II, p. 311; also see vol. I, pp. 351-52.
11. Ibid. vol. II, pp. 532-33.
12. Ibid., vol. I, p. 217.
13. Ibid., pp. 330-31.
14. Ibid., p. 217.
15. Ibid., vol V, p. 251.
16. Ibid., vol. I, p. 230.
17. Ibid., vol. IV, p. 55.
18. Naval Documents Relating to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers (Washington, 1935-), vol. I, p. 205. Hereinafter this collection will be cited as Barbary Wars.
19. A.S.P., Naval Affairs, vol. I, pp. 65-68.
20. Quasi-War, vol. V, p. 139.
21. Ibid., vol. VI, p. 95.
22. A.S.P., Naval Affairs, vol. I, p. 35.
23. Barbary Wars, vol. I, pp. 71-74.
24. V. S. Clark, History of Manufactures in the United States, 1607-1860 (Washington, 1916), pp. 76, 203, 295,330.
25. Barbary Wars, vol. I, pp. 71-74; A.S.P., Naval Affairs, vol. I, pp. 9-10.
26. A.S.P., Naval Affairs, vol. I, pp. 9-10.
27. Quasi-War, vol. I, p. 290.
28. See Quasi-War, vols. I, II, III, passim; also “Letters of Stephen Higginson,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1896, pp. 805, 809.
29. Quasi-War, vol. I, p. 227.
30. Ibid., vol. III, pp. 97-98,307-08,313.
31. A.S.P., Naval Affairs, vol. I, p. 66.
32. Quasi-War, vol. IV, p. 112.
33. Quasi-War, vol. V, p. 59. The last quoted passage was later cut from the letter.
34. Ibid.
35. Quasi-War, vol. Ill, p. 194.
36. Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 118-19.
37. Ibid., vol. V, p. 92.
38. A.S.P., Naval Affairs, vol. I, p. 74.
39. Quasi-War, vol. V, pp. 100-01.
40. A.S.P., Naval Affairs, vol. I, p. 79.
41. Carl W. Mitman, “Nicholas Roosevelt,” Dict. Am. Biog., vol. XVI, pp. 133-34.
42. Two good accounts of this period of Revere’s life may be found in E. H. Goss, The Life of Colonel Paul Revere (Boston, 1891), vol. II; and Esther Forbes, Paul Revere & the World He Lived In (Boston, 1942).
43. May 21,1799, in Quasi-War, vol. III, pp. 223-24.
44. Quasi-War, vol. V, p. 542, and vol. VI, p. 95.
45. Ibid., vol.VI, p. 517.
46. Barbary Wars, vol. II, pp. 413-14,416,426.
47. Katharine A. Kellogg, “Paul Revere,” Dict. Am. Biog., vol. XV, pp. 514-16.
48. See Henry Hall, Report on the Ship-Building Industry of the United States (Washington, 1882), p. 27.