The proposition.—“To be, or not to be, that is the question.” These ten short words of Hamlet epitomize the military history of Guam from 1898 to 1941.
On account of its position in the West Central Pacific, the Island of Guam, since its acquisition by the United States, has been the subject of a considerable amount of thinking, considerable planning, and considerable argument. Some of the thinking has been good and some of it has been bad; some of the planning has been executed and some of it has died; part of the argument has been based on sociological aspects, part of it commercial, part of it strategical, and part of it political. It is the present purpose to discuss some aspects briefly, and thus to compose some of the arguments and perhaps to add something toward a correct understanding of the situation as it has developed. The subject will come up for further consideration.
Strategically, Guam is peculiarly located, although it is not alone or by itself, since it is at the southern tail of the group of Marianas. It is on the ocean course from the Hawaiian Islands to the southern Philippines, Borneo, Sumatra, and the Malay Peninsula. It is 3,300 miles from the Hawaiian Islands, 1,700 miles from Manila, 800 miles from the Bonin Islands, and 500 more from Yokohama. Its nearest important neighbors are Truk, 580 miles to the southeast, and the Pelews, 700 miles to the southwest. For certain voyages by ship and by plane it may be considered a convenient or even a necessary shelter, or resting place, or refuge, as the case may be, because it is more or less at the crossroads.
Let us pose the question—how important are these crossroads to those who might travel the routes, and what does Guam have to offer; or what might it offer if it were developed? In order to answer this we must take a glimpse at the past as it was until December 7, 1941; then we shall have to look at the present, and then speculate on the future.
Briefly historical.—Previous to recorded history Guam was populated by aborigines whose origin is uncertain. The island had some intercourse with neighboring islands and other groups. It is known that natives came and went in sailing canoes from as far as the Carolines.
In 1521, Magellan stopped at Guam on his cruise around the world. His crew was in bad shape from the long restriction and the lack of proper food. He needed provisions and water, which he got and departed.
In 1668 the island received its first impact of Western civilization when a band of Spaniards, soldiers and Jesuits, arrived and attempted to take charge and impose their improvements on the natives. As a result the Chamorros finally succumbed to force and Catholicism. However, the natives thereafter crossed with the Spaniards and other strains so that by the time Guam became a dependency of the United States in 1898 there was little remaining of the aboriginal stock. Only the language remained. Chamorro is still the native language although somewhat corrupted by Spanish and Tagalog.
During the years succeeding the Spanish occupation there was a long succession of Spanish governors, who were responsible in some degree to a superior who was part of the time in Mexico, part of the time in Manila. The island in those days was indeed remote from either.
In June, 1898, Guam was taken from the Spaniards, incident to the Spanish War, by the U. S. S. Charleston (Captain Glass). The operation was a simple one without losses to us, inasmuch as the small garrison of about 100 men offered no resistance; indeed they were in no position to resist.
The whole island was designated a U. S. Naval Station, and was placed thereafter under a Naval Governor, who in fact governed, subject of course to such instructions as he received from the U. S. Government via the Navy Department.
The government was of course autocratic, but it was benign. There came to be about twenty divisions in the organization each presided over by naval officers. However, an effort was made to utilize native talent and knowledge by employing native subordinates in the various divisions of the government as well as in the district subdivisions of the island. Latterly, an attempt was made to introduce a representative form of government with indifferent success.
When the island was taken by the United States the population was about 10,000, largely agrarian, and under the United States the population approximately doubled.
Civil administration was the chief concern of the Naval Governor as in any normal and quiet community, and it was kept comparatively simple. The establishment of schools, the inauguration of a sound fiscal system including the institution of a good bank, the preservation of health, law and order, the continuance of self-support with economic development, and the development of industry and loyalty filled the years of U. S. occupation. There was not any major attempt at militarization although the subject was discussed recurrently. The people of Guam continued to be predominantly Catholic, while retaining many native superstitions and customs.
Physical features.—Whether our objective is military, commercial, or political, the general picture as it stood in 1941 requires a glance in order to give us more background. It will be understood that the essential physical features as here set forth continue, whereas the economic features and the habits of the people may have changed somewhat, in 1944, by reason of war.
The Marianas, extending southward in a bow shape and terminating in Guam, are the peaks of a volcanic range rising out of great depths of the Pacific Ocean. This range connects Japan and Guam through the Bonins and the Marianas. To the southeast of Guam and nearly 600 miles away is Truk which is part of another chain mostly of limestone formation which extends for nearly 3,000 miles from the Marshalls in the east, through Truk and Pelew, to the island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines.
The Marianas to the north of Guam are an attentuated group of about 15 islands, still in the process of formation. There are several active volcanoes; earthquakes are frequent. Moreover the area is in the typhoon belt and is subject on occasion to violent storms and high winds. Saipan is the most important of the group, having an area of about 70 square miles, an altitude of about 1,500 feet, and a small harbor capable of very moderate development. Here was located the seat of the Japanese government for the mandated islands. This island was taken by U. S. Naval Forces and occupied as of July 10, 1944.
Still farther to the south is Rota which is sometimes visible from Guam. It has an area of somewhat less than 50 square miles and an altitude of about 6,500 feet. Rota was a place of refuge for Chamorros during the Spanish conquest and until the Japanese occupation native customs and culture persisted here perhaps more than anywhere.
Guam has an area of about 220 miles, nearly as much as all the other Marianas together. It is indeed the largest island between the Hawaiian Islands and Davao, as well as between Japan and New Guinea. The maximum altitude is around 1,300 feet in the southern end of the island. There is a small natural harbor, undeveloped as yet. The island is much longer in the north-south direction than in any other. The southern part is volcanic and is much used for grazing. There are numerous streams in whose valleys are rich gardens. Toward the northern end of the island there are growths of valuable hardwoods. Wild foods are abundant. The principal crops are rice, corn, vegetables, and coconuts, which, when dried as copra, is the only important article of export. There is, of course, no hinterland to draw on for varied supplies, or which can be developed to support an excess population.
Fish is an important article of diet, and probably was more used in the past when the natives made large canoes, but now the fishing is almost entirely inside the encircling coral reefs.
About half the inhabitants, some 11,000, live in Agaiia, the principal town; the remainder live in villages, rural communities, or on garden lands. There is no labor market in an industrial sense, and there are no industrial resources of personnel or material.
The climate is tropical, warm and damp, but healthful. The northeast trades blow from January to June, while during the rainy season from July to December there are frequent monsoons from the southwest. Although the annual rainfall is about 90 inches, shortage of fresh water has long been an important element in the life of the island, but this has been somewhat relieved by reservoirs built by the United States.
Under the American government traffic has been by foot, oxcart, bicycle, jitney, and automobile, according to location and economic situation. The road system has been progressively, if slowly, developed.
The island is comparatively rich agriculturally; the principal harvests are corn in July and August; taro, yams, and such roots from December to February. There is a continuous supply of food products, which is in sharp distinction from other Pacific islands. However, the island has not produced enough food for the native appetite and taste, so that rice has had to be imported. Indeed, the natives like imported food and canned goods. The bush foods, such as breadfruit, arrow- root, and wild yams, can be called a reserve against starvation since they are never entirely used. The natives at one time lived largely on fish, roots, fruit, and greens, with some rice; whereas they more recently have favored corn and rice highly seasoned.
The early Chamorros would not eat meat. Indeed, insofar as known, there were no quadrupeds in the chain of islands. The Spaniards introduced horses, pigs, poultry, carabao, and cattle which were used as in the Philippines as draft animals. Deer were introduced later and multiplied rapidly. So now the natives eat all sorts of meat, poultry, and bats, practically the only indigenous mammal. The favorite fruit is the mango, but there are also bananas, papayas, and pineapples. The ancient natives had no intoxicants, and their only narcotic was the betel nut, which is still commonly used. The Filipinos taught the Chamorros to make tuba and it became popular. The most conspicuous reptile is the iguana, about 4 feet long; there is only one kind of snake, a very small one. There are also lizards and skinks. The birds are tropical, and so are largely bright- colored.
This richly endowed little island has attracted some traffic, the canoes and sailing ships of ancient times, and of late years the China Clipper.
During United States tenure communications have been greatly improved by the laying of the cable, the calling of transports and other ships, the setting up of the radio station, and finally by advent of air transportation.
As a consequence, the natives have become acquainted with U. S. money, with industry, and with politics. By the time of World War I the native population was no longer self- supporting; imports of food were necessary; and a “back to the land movement” was inaugurated. At the same time a certain part of the natives, or migratory Filipinos, or others, became politically conscious and politically active.
Guam, with its limited area, its centralized control, and its physical isolation, has presented a nice laboratory for experiments, and studies of native education and other colonial problems by those engaged in sociological and ethnological research.
Against such a background there persisted the question—“What do we want it for?” Or perhaps, “What are we trying to do with it?” Obviously, under the conditions, the idea of a port of call was incompatible with the idea of an impregnable fortress, which in turn was incompatible with a sociologist’s idea of human progress or with a missionary’s ideas of religious crusading.
Twenty years of progress.—The files of the Navy Department and the Naval War College, but less so of Congress, are replete with material bearing on the military development of Guam. It happens that the period since 1898 was characterized by great developments in communications and by great improvements in mechanical processes in industry. During these years sailing ships disappeared from our Navy and the new coal-burning fleet became a new oil-burning fleet. Gasoline and the internal-combustion engine came into vogue. The submarine, a brand new weapon, developed wonderfully; and the airplane was added and improved extraordinarily. Ships and planes increased in size and power. News by sailing ship was anticipated by cable, and this was largely superseded by radio. Mail, freight, and passengers formerly via sailing ship were expedited by the steamship, but at the end of the period of our occupancy these could go from San Francisco to Guam in 4 days if important enough. But Guam stayed right where it was; neither its size nor its resources changed much—nor could they.
Immediately after the 1898 capture by the United States questions of the development and the defense of Guam arose. These persisted for over 40 years during which time the same principles came to the front recurrently, starting with the report of the Merry Board in 1901.
The strategic importance of Guam has been stated and restated in every possible way, based firmly upon its position as heretofore described and upon its physical characteristics which are unique in this large area. Apparently there has never been any substantial disagreement as to the physical facts.
From 1901 until 1941 many discussions have been held, hundreds of pages of manuscript have been written, numerous recommendations have been made by interested parties to higher authority according to needs of the times and the point of view. All of the recommendations were comparatively modest. Indeed, it may be admitted that hardly any of the proposals were adequate, and this fact points to the obstacles in the way of development. During this wonderful period of 40 years hardly any recommendation for development could have been executed at such a distance fast enough to keep ahead of the times.
The most thoughtful of the Navy’s planners have always known that Guam should be made very strong, or else should be left practically undeveloped.
Through the whole period there ran two well-known threads—lack of appropriations of money for the necessary work, and uncertainty as to the foreign policy of the United States as translatable into action.
In 1907 the authoritative opinion seems to have been that Guam should be developed into an “advanced fleet base,” but all that was really recommended for the time was a coaling station.
The prospective work of developing Guam was large. The outer harbor was small and had space to anchor only a few moderate sized ships between coral heads; it was insecure in bad weather so that a breakwater to seaward would be required; the inner harbor was also small; it was inaccessible due to a reef and was not usable due to coral heads. All the necessary machinery and labor must be brought overseas. All defenses must be built from the ground up or imported, but the harbor was an all-important asset.
Under such circumstances the question of priorities came prominently to the fore. Therefore it was considered wise that the Navy concentrate on the development of Pearl Harbor, which also needed much and had little. This was a proper conception, for strategically Guam was of little use without Pearl Harbor, and neither was much good unless very strong. Appropriations were scarce and Guam was very distant.
In the period around 1911 it was fully realized by naval authorities that the fortification of Guam was necessary, and that the stationing there of a large garrison of troops would be required. However, it was again recognized that the inadequate development of Guam would merely make it more of a prize to an enemy in case of hostilities. The seizure of Guam and the Philippines was foreseen, as was also the possibility of a surprise attack on Hawaii. The importance of Guam as a base from which to operate against Japanese communications to the south and west was appreciated. It was assumed to be a part of the Japanese plan to seize Guam and to secure it as rapidly as possible in case of hostilities. It was not expected that the enemy would entertain scruples. However, it was recognized that the beginning of the fortification of Guam by the United States at that time was probably futile, in that it was probably contrary to American temper and could not be 'carried through.
Continuing along through 1915, after the war had started in Europe but before the United States was formally engaged, it was clearly recognized that the security of Guam was necessary for the security of the Philippines. Some measures were taken for temporary defenses including the arrangements for desperate defense by the approximately 500 officers and men stationed there to man the meager batteries.
Thence, until after World War I, important progress was made in the government and in the organization of Guam. Heroic efforts were made by the various Governors to excite interest. Equally heroic work was performed by naval and marine personnel to set up temporary defenses, to conduct surveys and to achieve minor developments. The several Governors had plans for defense with the facilities at hand; but, on the whole, little progress was made. There was no authoritative activation.
In 1917 there was substantial opinion that Guam should be a main operating base, and that any other defense measures were temporary and in any case inadequate.
Many plans had been made and remade by the Governors for defense locally, and in the Navy Department for partial, progressive, and major developments. There were many discussions and arguments.
When World War I ended, Guam as a naval base was just about as it had been for twenty years. Indeed, it had lost ground for the world had progressed and developed, and so had southeast Asia—but Guam was about the same.
After World War I, local plans for the defense of Guam continued, but it was assumed that Guam would fall to the enemy.
Twenty years more of experience.—In December, 1919, the Army-Navy Joint Board offered the recommendation that Guam be fortified and garrisoned adequately to defend it against any force that could be brought against it. Of course, this opinion was founded on military considerations and it contained a substantial uncertainty due to the lack of definition as to what was or might be “adequate” to defend it against any force that could be brought against it. Obviously, the force that could be brought against it depended upon what nation would move against it, what facilities such nation might have at the time, and how much it might consider the efforts to be worth. These values continue to be rather indefinite because with the development of new weapons and the abandonment of old weapons the situation was susceptible to change in a rather short time. Similarly, the military resources and progress of the interested nations changed markedly in the course of time.
It is also true that the interests and intentions of the nations which were concerned with the status of Guam changed considerably in these twenty years.
In connection with the discussions in 1921 arising out of the attempts for the limitation of naval armaments, it was reasserted that Guam was necessary in the transpacific chain of bases, when equipped, fortified, and securely armed. Inasmuch as even a superior fleet is not usable without bases, it was also foreseen that Japan could easily force the United States to make an offensive effort in the Western Pacific by taking the Philippines and Guam. Obviously these places were insufficiently developed, and the whole burden of a bad campaign would be upon us. It was predicted that the cost of retaking Guam would be great if the enemy had had time to secure it. However, it was also perceived that under the circumstances it was better to have the mandated islands in the hands of the enemy than in the hands of any possible neutral power, so as to make them unusable by us after capture. The difficulty of retaking a well-fortified Guam from an Asiatic enemy without any near bases for us was well appreciated.
This point is important because through the whole period of 40 years the isolation of Guam continued to be both a reason for fortification and a reason for no development.
It is well to notice at this point that, in so far as intention went, the policy of the United States Government as a whole, in the defense of any interest that it might have in the Western Pacific, was reflected in the treatment of Guam as a naval base. In 1921 the island was garrisoned by about 700 officers and men. There were a few guns mounted, and there were a few flying boats stationed there; there was a cold storage station ship, a station tug, and a floating oil storage. The proposed naval base was wholly undeveloped. There was no breakwater. The inner basin which was proposed for submarines and destroyers was still inaccessible. In short, the station and the island as military assets were worthless and of no effect.
The Washington Treaty of 1922 put an end to any plan which may have been considered feasible at that time in spite of any acceptance of the idea that Guam had natural adaptability to defense by an inferior force.
At this period it was considered by many that the strong occupation of Guam would give control of the sea between Guam and Hawaii. The matter of communications was considered to be important, and the functioning of a fleet base presumably would guarantee the security of the Asiatic Fleet. It was conceived that, when developed as a strong advanced fleet base, Guam would assure the immunity of the Philippines, would establish favorable conditions for operations to the westward, and would permit the freedom of the fleet in case of a campaign in the Atlantic. Certainly this was a large order for a little island. The matter is more or less summarized by saying that, as an air base, it was listed for proposed development as the last of 15 named for “early completion” and, as a submarine base, was the first of six named for “early completion.” As stated before, nothing was done at that time.
It is worthy of note that the Rodman Board, a special board on shore establishments convened to make recommendation as to what shore establishments should be retained and their nature, in its report of September 27, 1922, did not mention Guam in any way whatsoever. Not only did this Board meet after the Washington of Treaty 1922, but it also met during a period of national retrenchment when the Secretary of the Treasury was taking advantage of the opportunity to garner all the shekels coming in, over and beyond the estimated receipts, and all of the balances remaining from under expenditures, so as to apply large sums to the extinction of the public debt.
During this period the United States agreed to scrap numerous ships then under construction (a very large tonnage of battleships), agreed to relinquish its prospective naval supremacy, agreed not to fortify or further strengthen its distant Pacific islands, and agreed to turn over the captured ex- German islands of the central Pacific, which surrounded and dominated Guam, to Japan as mandates.
During the same period a coterie of the House of Representatives then dominating naval affairs undertook to demonstrate to the Navy Department and to the Congress how the Navy could be satisfactorily manned by 67,000 men; and proposed to reduce appropriations accordingly.
During the fiscal year ending 1923 the United States Government applied $613,674,000 to the extinction of the national debt, and lent $20,071,000 abroad; while known private capital amounting to $394,475,000 was lent abroad.
During the fiscal year 1923 the Naval Establishment spent for all purposes $303,943,- 019.95 (including Marine Corps). Even the fleet exercises and the cruising of ships was curtailed to reduce the costs of fuel. Exactly 20 years later, in 1943, before Guam was retaken, the United States Navy at war spent $19,356,047,886.95 (including Marine Corps and Coast Guard). During this year the average strength of the Navy was about 1,260,000, to which may be added about 240,000 for the Marine Corps and about 142,000 for the Coast Guard.
Moreover, during this period and up to the outbreak of the war in Europe, a span of about 20 years, the United States failed to foster, build, or maintain a merchant marine adequate to support either a substantial foreign trade or an overseas war in even one ocean.
The period, therefore, was not favorable to preparedness, to say nothing of fortifying outlying islands. Bare home defense supported by hopes and trust was planned for.
Even before the expiration of the treaties for the limitation of armaments in 1936 a few responsible officials of the United States began to have serious doubts about our policy in the Far East. By 1930 some of the natives and adventurers who had gone to Guam had become politically conscious and had begun to agitate. These same symptoms had long since characterized our Philippine politics with the result that independence had been promised to the Philippines because the American Government preferred to let go rather than to govern—a difficult and troublesome task at best.
In 1934 two senatorial committees headed by Senator McKellar and by Senator Gibson recommended the retention of the Philippines, although the choice was to be final in 1946. It was becoming evident that our freedom of movement in a vast ocean was concerned, both strategic and commercial. There were some individuals who felt that it would be worth while to establish Manila as the finest distribution center in the Far East, covering eastern Asia and Malaysia.
Again it was apparent that responsible people were split between three schools of thought: first, those who hopefully believed in international co-operation with such commerce and fair dealing as might be encountered without the support of any appreciable military establishment; second, those who believed in staying at home with commerce, politics, and a strictly defensive military establishment; and third, those who definitely desired to be active in commerce and in international policy supported by a strong military establishment reaching far afield.
In the meantime many responsible Filipinos were beginning to have their doubts concerning the difficulties to be encountered and the advent of Philippine independence, when preferential treatment and trade with the United States would be terminated. Some of the political agitators, particularly some of those who had been successful, began to appreciate that political activity although it might satisfy the soul, was not quite the equivalent of a really sound national economic situation with some substantial backing.
Mr. Quezon in 1939 suggested a plebiscite to take place two years before the final separation of 1946. Of course, any experienced politician, or any experienced international trader, or any experienced business man, knows perfectly well that a large question like this cannot be left dangling over a period of forty years awaiting a final determination right up to the point of separation. Such lack of determination and such vacillation merely court disaster. Not even a race-track speculator would put a dollar in it.
From the evidence it is fair to conclude that the lack of a clear-cut and enterprising foreign policy for the Western Pacific and the lack of conviction of the people of the United States over a period of 40 years were reflected by the fact that neither Guam nor any other point in the Far East was established as a tenable American naval base.
The crossroads, without action.-—In the House of Representatives Document No. 65, 76th Congress, First Session, there is recorded the report of the Hepburn Board, convened by the Navy Department under authority of the Act of May 17, 1938, to consider the subject of naval bases. Therein is recorded the statement that all of these years Guam has remained practically defenseless, and there is also the opinion that by providing sufficient air and submarine defenses, it could be made secure against anything but a major operation, or at least secure until relieved and supported. It is there recommended that Guam be adequately garrisoned and held by coast defense equipment, submarines, and sufficient aircraft, so as to dominate an area of 1,200 miles in radius. It is stated that Guam has natural facilities for submarines and is well adapted to the maintenance of an air force. By these measures it would be expected to defend the island so well as to require a very large operation of the enemy to reduce and occupy it, inasmuch as a hostile air attack by itself would not be decisive. The recommendation was that it be made into a major air and submarine base with a large garrison, and equipped so that it could be used as a major advanced fleet base. Thus Guam was to screen the Philippines, the islands of the central Pacific, and the west coast of the United States. It was also to be useful to the Asiatic Fleet as a base and as a strong point.
It goes almost without saying that such extensive development would be strictly artificial. Insofar as the United States of America is concerned, Guam even then had superficially slight natural, commercial, or political value. Therefore, the development would be premised on military needs in assisting an advance across the Pacific toward the Philippines or eastern Asia, or in preventing a hostile advance of an Asiatic Power to the east or south. Defense, by offense, conforms to good military practice. However, as we have seen, independence had been guaranteed already to the Philippines and so, manifestly, the recommended development of Guam, which would require a large expenditure of money and several years to complete, must have been based to some extent on maintaining by force the independence of the Philippines, or upon the need of a strong point on the way to the assistance of the East Indies, or of a strong point on the way toward China and Japan. Nothing was done about this proposal for military development; and the proposal for modest nonmilitary improvement was rejected by Congress.
Although the United States Government failed to secure Guam against attack, or to develop it as a strong point, it still maintained a fleet in Asiatic waters without this or any other secure base. It did not relinquish forthwith and finally its administration of, or interest in, the Philippines. Nor did it abandon its stated policy of an Open Door in China, which even the Chinese themselves were unable to foster or support. Nor did it abandon its insistence on nonaggression and the abatement of other unacceptable actions in the Far Western Pacific. The inconsistencies thus evident in this international vignette may be explained as allowable license for idealistic hope.
Obviously, after the expiration of the treaty for the limitation of naval armaments the relations between the United States and Japan deteriorated steadily. During 1939 and 1940, there was discussion concerning Guam in Congress and in the Navy Department, as must have been obvious to all who cared to read the record. Of course, it had been clear that the Japanese had a program of national expansion. Their advances into Korea, Manchuria, and China were history. Their policy of expansion had been consistent for about 75 years, and further efforts were anticipated. Either in the hope of securing diplomatic concessions from the United States in its attitude against expansion in East and Southeast Asia and Malaysia, or else to gain time for more specific preparation for war, the Japanese Government made certain proposals to the United States Government concerning its position in Asia.
The negotiations continued over a long period of time, hopefully insofar as the United States was concerned, terminating in November, 1941.
Manifestly this period, when delicate negotiations were proceeding, was not a proper time to begin the fortification or even the appreciable development of an outlying base at Guam, thus injuring the finer sensibilities of all concerned, especially as Guam was physically isolated, and there had been completed none of the development work of that large amount required over a period of years.
Although a strongly held Guam might have been very useful at this period, by 1938 it was already too late to start a major development for military purposes at a point where there had never been any commercial demand or substantial development; and the international situation did not improve thereafter, a fact clearly recognized by naval authorities.
It may be accepted that there were other reasons for never attempting so large a development so far from the United States which itself could not expect fully effective defensive protection from such a fixed position on account of its great distance from the west coast of the United States and the limited capacity of Guam. It must be conceded that one small island of this sort, situated in the midst of other islands under the sovereignty of a prospectively unfriendly nation, could hardly be expected to resist successfully unless it were extremely strong. Indeed, unless it had been made and maintained extremely strong before the outbreak of hostilities in that area, any work done upon it would be a gift to an enemy strong enough to take it. In this particular matter of defense, of course, the improvement of sea power and communications, and the advent of air power, had brought about considerable changes in the situation since the United States acquired this lone island. Military and naval weapons had changed in character and power during forty years, and so had the means of countering them.
It is possible that a heavily fortified Guam would have been a source of irritation, or a cause for alarm, to Asiatic Powers, especially if used in connection with a consistently aggressive policy of trade expansion or of special interest in the Far East. However, the United States had made it plain by actions, and without ever saying so, that its military interest extended no farther west than the Hawaiian Islands. Apparently this geographical limitation did not apply to political concern and interest in Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific, which continued.
Even though the acquisition of the Philippines in 1898 be accepted as an accident to the American people, the assumption and retention of a theory like the Open Door in China, and the adherence to a position unfavorable to Japanese expansion in the Far East, can hardly be classed as accidents, nor yet as fate. Such tenets can come only from inner consciousness or the mental processes of the holder, or else they are passed on to him by another; they cannot be classed as fortuitous. However, the possible consequences of the inconsistency here apparent probably had never been well considered by any but trained military personnel.
The crossroads, with action.—On December 8, 1941, within an hour of the receipt of news of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Guam was bombed by Japanese planes. After further bombing about 7,000 Japanese troops landed at several points within the next two or three days. The Americans were made prisoners and at the end of about a month were sent to Japan for internment. One U. S. Navy man survived on the island until it was retaken. The Americans destroyed no utilities prior to the Japanese landing but the Japanese disrupted the water supply presumably to obtain metal. Water became a major problem on the island. Food was also a problem but it was not so acute.
In June, 1944, a very large expedition of U. S. naval ships, landing craft, Marines, and Army of the United States operated against the Marianas Islands, of which group Guam, Saipan, and Tinian are the most important.
The expedition was far from home, and had to prepare for the landing by air bombing and bombardment, followed by the landing of troops in force with artillery and supplies in order to take these islands held strongly by the Japanese. Meanwhile, the operation had to be very heavily covered against the Japanese fleet threatening from the west. The landing operations were preceded by repeated air bombings over a period of weeks and were preceded and covered by heavy ship bombardment.
The actual landing on Saipan, the headquarters of the Japanese command, was executed on June 15 by Marines and Army with much equipment. Organized resistance ceased July 9. Our casualties were about 16,500, of whom over 3,000 were killed. There were about 22,000 Japanese buried.
The landing on Tinian was a part of the same operation. It began on July 24 and organized resistance ceased on August 1. Our casualties were over 1,800 of whom about 300 were killed. There were about 5,100 Japanese buried.
The landing on Guam by Marines and Army troops began July 21 and all organized opposition ceased August 10. Our casualties were over 7,000, of whom over 1,200 were killed. About 14,000 Japanese were buried.
In each case there was extensive mopping up to be done after organized resistance ceased. There were important operations going on at sea meanwhile—surface, submarine, and air—and the fleet involved was very large. These operations against the Japanese fleet to the westward were very favorable to us.
The combined facilities of these islands, developed as might be possible or undeveloped, if necessary, thereafter became part of the advanced area to be used to the utmost in further operations against Japan and the Japanese forces wherever they might be found.
Thus Guam, our island at the crossroads, came back to us at great cost, bringing with it of necessity several small neighbors so that their combined value for naval operations in this war to the west and north would be far greater thenceforth than the value of any one of them.
Old values revalued.—'Insofar as the United States has been concerned with it, Guam has been a lonesome island. Looked at as a military asset it is still rather lonesome but its situation is now vastly improved and its value much enhanced. In this war so far, the United States has occupied or neutralized the Marshalls, the Carolines, the Marianas, and the Pelews. If to these are added the Hawaiian Islands, Midway, Wake, Johnson, and Palmyra, it is evident that the United States holds steppingstones to the Philippines, the East Indies, Malaysia, China, and Japan. For military purposes these islands are much more important than they used to be. Airplanes have made them so, although the distances are still very large.
Sea power depends on surface ships, aircraft, and submarines; and these rest on bases, firmly held, at which may be secured provisions, fuel, water, ammunition, spare parts, repairs, further training, and rest. In any naval establishment one good base is valuable, but one is never enough, especially for continued operations. A system of several operating bases in mutual support is required, so that if one be cut off, or closed, or captured, another is available. The smaller the ships and the more numerous, the more is this necessity evident. When carrier-based aircraft are concerned, numbers of decks are important, and when shore-based aircraft are concerned numbers of landing fields and service stations are essential. A dead ship may stop and drift; a dead plane can only fall and it must land on the surface; so a system of air stations is important. These must be occupied, held, and supplied. Therefore, an island system of air stations without rail transportation, requires ship transportation and a system of harbors and bases. These air stations and ship bases may not be at the same exact spots but they need to be close enough for mutual assistance, mutual support, and common supply. Both require troops, ground forces, and numerous auxiliaries. The advent of airplanes, which are so useless on the ground, has added an accent to an old truth about dispersing to subsist and concentrating to fight. In war, too, all weapons are important to a complete military operation.
The practical application of this brief statement is that in the days of sailing ships Guam was a useful port of call for limited service and rest. By itself its position as a military asset did not improve through the years—first, because all ships increased in size but the harbor of Guam was not developed, neither did it increase in size; second, the endurance of ships became such that they did not need to stop at Guam for service and there were no advantages in stopping there for rehandled supplies; third, Guam as a small island lacked military support within any usable distance, and this was true first for ships and later for planes and ships. However, Guam became significantly an important service station for transpacific flights. In order to hold Guam, alone as it was at such a long distance from any support or source of supply, it must have been made strong and kept strictly up to date during a long period of great technical development.
The practical military situation is now much changed, for Guam in the future can be strong inherently, perhaps; but it can be infinitely more strong than formerly because it can be supported by United States forces operating from island bases in all directions. Thus by recent events the situation of Guam may have been improved for the future.
Guam cannot be considered a military asset unless the political situation is favorable. Surely the military and the political objectives should be compatible. If the United States Government continues to have no political interest in the Far East, then Guam and the other Pacific islands are of no particular interest to the Navy. However, it behooves us to examine the subject and to determine whether the United States has important political interests in the Far East—and then to act in consonance with this determination in planning both political and military matters.
It is important to observe that the political relation of Guam may have been improved recently; it certainly has been clarified in one respect. Whereas the fortification of Guam may have been inhibited at one time as a concession to the sensitiveness of a diplomatic equal, no such inhibitions need apply to a defeated enemy who took the military initiative. The way is surely open to the consideration of new elements in a changed situation for the area.
The practical businessman believes there is not much use of politics, or yet of the military, unless there be some corresponding economic benefit. So now the point is reached. It was no American who discovered the markets of the Orient or the riches of the East Indies. The Portuguese, the Dutch, the British, the Japanese and a few others came along first. A few Americans have tapped the markets and the resources in a modest way, but the American Government has not been too much concerned; nor has the Chamber of Commerce quite decided what to do about it. Yet the American people have chosen to wage a gigantic transpacific conflict for the relief of a great area which, except for Guam, never belonged to the United States, or else had been promised independence as in the case of the Philippines. Certainly the people of the area in general had never been accustomed to any high degree of freedom in a political or democratic sense. Perhaps the United States has been harboring a psychological chimera, or perhaps has been influenced to protect the interests of other nations as a favor to be paid for indirectly. Is the United States properly the arbiter of international behavior; or is the United States, in this case, merely the victim of an unprovoked assault; or do we naturally like to fight about every so often? No one of these items quite explains why we are in this Pacific war—evidently the reason is complicated, and, consequently, does not reveal our post-war action or even our intention.
When the war is over, however, the United States will be confronted with some new and important problems, such as: greatly diminished natural resources, need for raw materials, a large number of men seeking employment, a large number of corporations seeking markets for their goods, a high rate of taxation, and a huge public debt. We may still be the most richly endowed nation in the world, all things considered, but our situation and our needs will have changed. We shall need trade and commerce.
Looked at in the general sense of trade, the countries of the Western Pacific after this war will probably have to offer, for the satisfaction of our tastes and needs, selected portions of an impressive list, including copra, vegetable fibers, kapok, leather, medicines, metals, petroleum, rubber, silk, spices, tea, timber, wool, and many special items. We shall be seeking markets for many articles in the production of which we excel, including automatic devices, automotive equipment, chemicals, construction materials, dyes, electrical and electronic apparatus, engines and parts, fabricated metals, farm machinery, glass, hardware, instruments, machinery and mechanisms, paints and varnishes, textiles, tools, and a host of specialties. Perhaps too it would be wise, now that the barriers are down through the processes of war, to maintain lively intercourse by way of demonstrating that we can do something else besides wage war.
In a military sense we shall be the most powerful nation in the world with the help of excellent mechanized equipment. In a political sense, we perhaps can be one of the most influential nations in the world if we so choose, and if we act wisely. We shall be in a position to build markets throughout the world insofar as others are able to pay for our product; and particularly in the rich Western Pacific which will have been well primed with American equipment, public works, and development—even subsidized with American dollars and fertilized by American flesh and blood.
It remains for us to take or reject our opportunities, and to choose our methods; or to put aside every advantage gained.
Over forty-five years ago we arrived at Guam, the crossroads of the Pacific. We are there again and now we have to choose our future course for it appears that our freedom of movement in a large area is involved.