UNITED NATIONS MOVES
Potsdam Conference.—Sailing on the cruiser Augusta, President Truman arrived at Antwerp on July 15 and proceeded directly by airplane to Berlin for the Potsdam conference. With only brief preliminary meetings the conference formally opened on July 17, President Truman acting as chairman. Contrary to their expectations, the press received little day-by-day information of decisions reached. Among matters under consideration were a united China policy, Russia’s attitude in the Far East, decisions regarding the administration of Germany and Austria, and innumerable problems relating to the restoration of Europe. In all these matters American influence would be augmented by the need of all the Allied nations for continued American credits on a large scale.
Control of Berlin.—American and British troops on July 12 occupied 12 of Berlin’s 20 city boroughs, though their administration of the areas faced difficulties because of Soviet control of fuel and food supplies. There had been a meeting the day before of American, British, Russian, and French military commanders, at which an Allied Kommandatur or Commandery for the Berlin district was set up.
The French Occupation Zone in Germany was fixed on June 23 to include the southern half of the Saar Basin, the Rhine Palatinate, and most of Baden, with a corridor across Bavaria to the Vorarlberg district in Austria. Thus France, according to her wish, administers all the German territory facing her frontier.
UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
Senate and Charter.—The signatures of representatives of 50 nations were affixed to the United Nations Charter on June 26, on which date President Truman addressed the final plenary session at San Francisco. Upon presentation of the Charter to the United States Senate for approval, it was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, which held public hearings over four days. The Committee then presented a favorable report by a vote of 21 to 1, recommending that the charter be approved without changes. Senator Hiram Johnson of California, last surviving Senator who opposed the earlier League of Nations, cast the only committee vote against the new Charter. Action in the Senate was delayed to permit prior consideration of the Bretton Woods Monetary Agreement, which had already been passed in the House by a vote of 345 to 18, and on July 19 was given approval in the Senate. Passage of the Monetary Agreement was thought to have been put forward in order to facilitate the President’s negotiations at Berlin.
State Department Changes.—At the close of June Mr. Edward R. Stettinius was selected to be United States member of the Security Council and chairman of the American delegation in the General Assembly of the United Nations organization when it is established. Mr. Stettinius’ resignation as Secretary of State was followed by the appointment to that post of former Senator and Supreme Court Justice James F. Byrnes. The appointment was at once confirmed and the new Secretary accompanied President Truman to the Potsdam Conference.
It was expected that the change in the secretary ship would be followed by an extensive reorganization of the State Department, with its somewhat antiquated machinery for handling foreign affairs. American interests abroad have increased tremendously, involving loans, trade agreements, cultural relations, and the like, and there is increased need for co-ordination of these activities and for a more consistent foreign policy. One step would be the creation of a permanent under secretary, as in the British Foreign Office. Another would be increase in salaries and recruiting of more capable all- around men for the foreign service. Many men now in the military forces have shown an interest in this field. The Foreign Policy Bulletin (July 6), published by the Foreign Policy Association, suggests that
the Department establish a training program within the Foreign Service to fit officers for the difficult tasks of diplomacy and enable the State Department to weed out those who fail, after a period of probation, to show real ability. Since the State Department needs to develop high political capacity, as well as technical efficiency, in its Foreign Service officers, the creation of a Foreign Service Institute, on a level with the Army and Navy War Colleges, is tentatively under consideration.
Views on Foreign Policy.—In the quarterly Foreign Affairs for July there are several articles of much interest in their bearing on American military and foreign policy. Some of these are here summarized, and the contents of others are indicated more briefly.
National Power and Foreign Policy (by Prof. Grayson Kirk, Columbia University). —In discussing the future military strength of the United States, and particularly the question of universal military training, the author thinks we may safely disregard the economic and social arguments either pro or con, and consider the issue solely from the standpoint of the nation’s needs for security and for carrying out its international obligations. With the question thus narrowed down, the author recognizes that technological developments have reduced the barrier of the oceans and made this nation much more vulnerable than in the past; and also that in the new world order there are no longer half a dozen or more Great Powers chiefly in Western Europe but “only three Powers of the first magnitude,” all located outside Europe, and so big that the lesser powers hardly figure in the picture. The author then assumes that world policing will require no great strength, and the only real danger lies in “a titanic struggle with one of the other great states.” He feels that our defense will lie in sound statesmanship which will avoid such a conflict or foresee it in ample time. “We shall continue in any event to have such immense naval and air strength that it seems logically improbable that we could be overwhelmed before we had an opportunity to train the necessary ground forces.” The author further suggests that the adoption of universal military service might indicate lack of faith in the new international organization. However, his final conclusion is that
the fundamentals of our future security are political rather than military. Skillful statesmanship, supported by a reasonably strong force in being and backed by the immense military potential of the United States, gives us the maximum likelihood of future security. For this combination the strongest standing military force alone is not a satisfactory substitute.
Our Mineral Resources and Security (by E. W. Pherson, Chief of Economics and Statistics Branch, U. S. Bureau of Mines).— This article gives a brief resume, with tables, of our mineral resources and reserves. The figures indicate almost inexhaustible supplies of magnesium, nitrogen, coal, and salt, strong resources in iron, but “less than a 35- year supply of 21 out of 33 minerals,” including petroleum, copper, lead, zinc, and tin. The author’s chief suggestions for the future are prevention of waste, an expanded stock piling program, government aid in exploration for new deposits, and lower tariffs to permit greater imports of metals of which we are running short. He concludes:
The mineral resources of the United States, deficient as they are in some respects and seriously depleted in others, are still outstandingly great and assure a sound basis for an industrial economy for many decades. Nevertheless, we shall increasingly depend on foreign sources for some minerals, particularly metals and petroleum, unless large discoveries prove that present estimates of reserves are in error ...
Population Trends in the Orient (by Franklin Lorimer, Professor of Population Studies, American University).—Present trends, according to the author, indicate that Non-Soviet Asia’s present population of 1,200,000,000 is in for big increases, possibly doubling it within the twentieth century. This increase, though it may cause peace strains and political upsets, would decrease rather than increase military potentialities, since it would necessitate concentration of all energies on food supply. Such, however, is less true of the rapid industrial growth in Soviet Asia, which has brought the population from about 35 million in 1926 to 45 million in 1939, and the population increase in Manchuria from about 12 to 43 million in 30 years, chiefly due to Chinese immigration. The author remarks that “industrialization, urbanization, and education” are the three prerequisites to reduce fertility, and that “for every dollar spent to reduce mortality in Asia, at least one dollar should be invested in . . . research and popular education directed toward reducing fertility.”
Liberated Europe: The Economic Inexorable (by “A British Official”).—The author insists that the most serious difficulties of Europe are economic rather than political. He points out that in pre-war years the countries of Europe outside Germany and Austria imported annually a total of about 140 million tons (as compared with U. S. imports of 16 to 20 million) and paid for it largely in exports. To overcome post-war demoralization and revive production will require that the United States and other exporting nations provide to the 180,000,000 people of Europe vast quantities of foodstuffs, raw materials, credits, and shipping. This must be done quickly, or the rise and fall of Nazi Germany may result in conditions like those following the Moslem invasions of Europe.
Other Articles—“American at War” (by Hanson Baldwin) covers the European war from the Battle of the Bulge to the end, and deals briefly with the redeployment against Japan. “The Rebirth of the French Spirit” (by Andre Siegfried) takes a rather optimistic view of France’s political future. “Cartels, Patents, and Politics” (by Walton Hamilton) brings out the important part that control of patents has played in the development of national and international monopolies. “The British Commonwealth as a Great Power” (by H. Duncan Hall) expresses the view that the future will see a trend toward closer solidarity in this “most successful league of nations.” “Political Aspects of Foreign Loans” (by Herbert Feis) stresses the political effects and possibilities of big American post-war loans, particularly to the Soviet Republic and in Eastern Europe and the Orient.
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS
British Elections.—The main voting in the parliamentary election throughout the United Kingdom was held quietly on July 5, the chief issue being a choice between the continuation of “free enterprise,” advocated by Premier Churchill and his Conservative party, and the Labor party’s goal of a socialist commonwealth. The final results would not be known till July 26, after the counting of the service vote from abroad. Newspaper comment failed to indicate the big Labor victory which actually resulted.
India Plans Fail.—In a statement issued in mid-July, Viceroy Lord Wavell announced the failure of the Simla Conference, a gathering of 21 Indian leaders to consider broadening of the membership of the Viceroy’s Council as a step toward complete home rule. The failure was an outcome of the old conflict between Hindu and Moslem—a conflict thus again shown to be not merely a creation of British politicians but an almost insuperable obstacle to Indian unity. Mohamed Ali Jinnah as head of the Moslem League insisted that his organization should have the naming of all Moslem members in the new council, whereas the Congress party claimed the right to name at least one of the Moslem delegates as a representative of Mohammedan elements not associated with the League. Commenting on the outcome, Sir Stafford Cripps expressed the view that Britain should still go ahead with plans for a reorganization. He proposed the election of a constituent assembly to draw up a new Constitution. In the radical press, comment on the British proposals for both India and Burma took the attitude that the British would have to go much further to gain native support. The opportunity was open for British policy either “to take a new turn . . . or follow the old, familiar, and disastrous patterns of the past.”
WESTERN EUROPE
French Elections.—In a radio broadcast of July 12 General de Gaulle declared that in the elections set for October 14 the French people would have an opportunity not only to select delegates for a National Assembly but to decide whether France will continue as a republic under the simple three-clause Constitution of 1875 or draft a new Constitution. The General indicated his own preference for a limited revision of the 1875 constitution to “correspond to the exigencies of this difficult era.” He reminded his hearers that France has had thirteen different governmental setups in the past 150 years.
Over the troubled waters of Franco- British relations in the Near East some oil was poured by British Government assurances that its moves in Syria had been “impartial” and solely in the interest of the Allied war effort in the Far East, and that Britain had no intention to supplant the French in Syria and Lebanon. In these countries, however, anti-French demonstrations and dismissal of French officials showed continued opposition to any vestiges of French control. If France gives up her efforts to retain bases in the Levant, she may perhaps retain some economic and cultural influence.
Future of Tangier.—After Spain’s withdrawal of forces from the Tangier territory and indication of her willingness to restore its international status, conversations of British, French, and American representatives on the subject were opened on July 2. Russia shortly thereafter indicated that she also had an interest in the Tangier issue—a move which, like her Turkish proposals, suggested her increased concern in the Mediterranean area. The talks on the Tangier problem were then postponed till August 3, with the possibility that in the meantime the question of Russian participation would be settled in the conference at Potsdam. An article in the July Foreign Affairs on Tangier reviewed the government of the district since 1924 and suggested that Tangier should now come under more genuine and complete international management, presumably under the supervision of the new United Nations organization.
New Netherlands Ministry.-—After its return to the homeland the Gerbrandy Government in Exile resigned and a new Netherlands Ministry of 14 members was set up headed by Professor Willem Schermerhorn. Eleven out of the fourteen ministers had been prominent in the resistance movement. Three were former members of the Gerbrandy Government, including Foreign Minister van Kleffens, who headed the Netherlands delegation at the San Francisco Conference.
Franco Favors Monarchy.-—In a noteworthy speech before the National Council of the Falange on July 17, Generalissimo Franco declared that his government was planning and working toward a restoration of the ancient Spanish monarchy, though under conditions that would not weaken Falangist control. He made no mention of Prince Juan, third son of King Alfonso and heir presumptive, who had stated at Lausanne last March that Franco’s totalitarian government was “contrary to the character and traditions” of the Spanish people. Franco’s present moves were generally interpreted as part of his effort to continue his regime in the face of opposition from the democratic powers.
Italian Developments.—The Italian Foreign Office on July 14 announced a formal declaration of war on Japan, thus putting Italy “even more firmly in the ranks of the United Nations.” Italy broke relations with Japan last September. Within the country, the new Farri Ministry faced much opposition and unrest. Communist outbreaks in the South of Andria defied the authority of the central government, and led to conflicts between the Communists and middle party representatives in the five-party cabinet.
Leopold’s Return Barred.—The Belgian Chamber on July 17 voted to continue the regency under Prince Charles but to bar King Leopold’s return without the consent of Parliament. The King had announced two days earlier that he had decided not to abdicate but would delay his return to the country, and six Catholic members of the van Ackers Ministry had resigned in protest against the cabinet’s opposition to a full restoration of the monarchy. Within the country Catholic and conservative elements support Leopold and equally strong radical elements are opposed, with the bulk of the country still loyal to the monarchy but suspicious of the King’s policy and conduct during the war.
EASTERN EUROPE
Turks Face Soviet Demands.—Reports from Ankara at the end of June indicated that the Soviet Government had made at least four demands on Turkey as the basis for a new treaty. These were:
(1) The return to Russia of the districts of Kars and Ardakan in Asia Minor, taken in 1921.
(2) Acceptance by Turkey of certain territorial changes in the Balkans in favor of the smaller states.
(3) Revision of the Montreux Convention on the Straits.
(4) Granting to Russia of bases in the Bosporus and Dardanelles, enabling her to share in their defense.
Turkey of her own accord was inclined to view favorably only the proposal for a revision of the Straits Convention, and, even in this matter, would naturally oppose any surrender of Straits control. This would be a concern also of England and of all nations with Mediterranean interests. In any case, the attitude of Turkey toward the Russian proposals would be governed largely by the support given her by the other major powers.
Polish Agreement.—Real progress toward a settlement of the Polish question was seen in the Moscow announcement at the close of June that a new Polish Government had been organized in conformity to the Crimea agreement and acceptable to the Allied Nations. The new ministry of 21 members would include five representatives from London and five additional representatives from within Poland. Edward R. Osubka Morawski remained Premier, and former Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczk became Deputy Premier. The Presidency was to be organized as a three-man council. In the new Government the key posts were held by Communists but there was some representation for the Democratic parties, and it could be assumed that even Polish Communists would stand solidly for an independent Poland. Labor Minister Stanczyk declared that, while Poland would be a friend of the Soviet Union, she would not be “the 17th Soviet Republic.” Free elections were promised.
The United States and Britain extended recognition to the new Warsaw regime, and Mr. Arthur Lane Bliss was named as American ambassador to Poland. He had been appointed last September as representative to the Exiled Polish Government in London, but had afterward remained in this country studying Polish problems. Chief of these problems is that presented by the exiled London government which declined to fold up, the 3,500 officials still abroad, and the Polish army of 250,000 serving with the Allies. Most of these are assumed to be opposed to the present government in Warsaw and unwilling to return unless assured of free elections and a free voice in public affairs.
FAR EAST
Emergency Measures in Japan.—The Japanese Cabinet in early July declared a two-month “state of emergency” for railway transport in order to speed up the distribution of foodstuffs and munitions. It was to extend until September 12 and included measures to break freight jams and speed repairs after air attacks. Measures were also taken to plant vegetables in devastated areas of 35 or more cities and to increase camphor production as a source of synthetic gasoline. There were reports of popular demonstrations resulting from the increasingly destructive air and naval bombardments.
In the United States there continued to be talk of the need for a clearer statement of the “conditions” of “unconditional surrender.” President Truman in his V-E Day broadcast had already stated that these terms implied neither enslavement nor extermination of the Japanese people. As generally interpreted, they mean primarily surrender of all Japanese conquests and elimination of militarists and militarism. To some, they mean, further, a complete overthrow of the old imperial system.
Sino-Soviet Talks.-—Early in July China’s newly appointed Premier, T. V. Soong, arrived in Moscow for talks with Soviet leaders, and five days later as another Moscow visitor there appeared Marshal Choibalsan, friend of Russia and Premier of the Outer Mongolian People’s Republic. The outcome of these talks was not made known, though they undoubtedly would have a bearing on Russia’s future policy in the Eastern war.
A Middle Course.—Writing on “How Can U. S. Best Promote Unity in China?” Mr. L. K. Rosinger in the Foreign Policy Bulletin for July 6 advocates a reorientation of American policy so as to make it neither anti-Chungking nor pro-Yenan, but first of all anti-Japanese. In any event, he concludes,
it is dangerous for this country to lose the opportunity to be a mediator in China by supporting Chungking to the hilt, while refusing to deal with Yenan. There is much merit in the suggestion made by the New York Herald Tribune on June 29 that if efforts to settle the internal situation in China fail, the United States should perhaps “ignore bitter opposition from the Kuomin- tang and send American troops into the Communist areas to assist and supply the Red guerrillas who are fighting the Japanese.” The editorial notes that, “with both Kuomintang and Red armies dependent on American supplies, civil war could be discouraged by threats of withdrawal of assistance from an aggressor.” The adoption of such a course would mean that the United States had assumed a middle role in Chinese politics, such as it seeks in the affairs of the world at large.