Naval bases in the theater of operations are an essential part of any modern fleet. Their mission is to refuel, revictual, and rearm ships, as required by operations, and to repair battle damage. Bases have played an indispensable part in the recent naval conflict and sites for future bases are now under consideration. It is timely as well as important to future planning that the status of the Naval Base, as brought out by World War II, be thoroughly understood.
The early origins of Naval Bases as we know them are founded on conceptions of over 2,000 years ago when the Phoenicians, and later the Greek fleets, maneuvered in their neighboring seas and stopping places for subsistence where necessary. At the close of each day, the crowded ships were drawn up along the shore line while crews and fighting men foraged and camped on land overnight.
As sails supplanted oars, living accommodations aboard ship improved and voyages increased in length to well beyond the confines of the Mediterranean. It was during the era of sails that ships reached their peak of independence from shore bases. Long voyages brought contacts with distant lands and their riches. Overseas trade sprang up and oftentimes conquest and colonization followed. Permanent colonial stations for supplying and reoutfitting ships in foreign trade inevitably sprang up. When the investment in a colony reached a certain point, it became expedient to establish a base, often fortified, for servicing the merchantmen and the supporting warships in the area.
The eclipse of the sailing ship by steam resulted in a shorter radius of action for the fuel-propelled vessel. The steam vessel, furthermore, rapidly gained in complexity. The steam-propelled man-of-war, with elaborate propulsion machinery and armament, became an increasingly intricate mechanical plant, requiring more and more specialized maintenance. With the vast increase in numbers of vessels and the growing requirements for fuel, ammunition, and repairs, the question of suitably located and adequately equipped Naval Bases grew to be a virtually insoluble economic problem.
In peacetime it is not possible to foresee and plan for a naval war with an unknown enemy or alliance of enemies nor to be even remotely aware of the area of probable naval activities. Public opinion is notoriously opposed to the appropriation and expenditure of large sums of money for war purposes during times of peace. Facing the practical problem of cost and appropriations, experience has taught that bases arc never provided in number, location, or completeness to serve the purposes of war when war comes.
In any event, human foresight cannot plan and construct bases of the character desired in all of the locations that might in many circumstances be demanded by sound naval strategy, nor could any national exchequer stand the strain. With the advent of war, many of the laboriously constructed bases will presumably be in areas where they are not needed, thus immobilizing large numbers of men and quantities of equipment and stores. Others will be in forward areas exposed to immediate attack.
In the Pacific, besides Pearl Harbor, we had Cavite and Guam, such as they were. Both of them fell to the enemy at an early date in the war. In the Atlantic and Caribbean, the pre-war bases were entirely inadequate. Even in Panama where impregnability is so vital the peace-time facilities had to be greatly augmented. It was necessary for the United States to arrange, through the exchange of destroyers with Great Britain, to secure the use of certain British Islands deemed necessary for the eleventh-hour construction of badly needed bases, from South America to Newfoundland.
For a variety of reasons American Naval Grand Strategy did not take even the initial steps in providing bases in the Pacific for a possible future war in that area. Had there been available to the Navy the widest control of planning and unlimited funds, it is conceivable that results in the Pacific would have been much different.
Prior to Pearl Harbor our Navy could not send additional men-of-war to the Far East as we lacked the facilities in that area to maintain them. As a matter of fact, immediately prior to Pearl Harbor, we had more ships in the Asiatic Fleet than there were facilities for their support.
The development of a naval base includes not only the supplies and facilities to repair and maintain the fleet that will operate therefrom, but it also includes the offensive- defensive power commensurate with its value and importance. In the absence of all fleet support, the defensive power of a first-class naval base should be such that its capture will require a major effort.
Under conditions that existed as we advanced into the Western Pacific our lines of supply and communication were extending while those of Japan were contracting. Modern naval warfare involves serious damage in combat. A fleet base in the theater of action permits the salvage and repair of ships which would surely sink were a long sea voyage undertaken without docking and repairs. A fleet operating in waters remote from supply and repair facilities labors under an almost insuperable handicap.
An essential part of the naval campaign in the Pacific was the successive seizure of ports in the theater of operations and the establishment therein of supply and repair facilities. Without the establishment of supply and repair facilities in successive ports, the waging of a successful campaign in the Pacific would have been impossible.
This war has demonstrated that sufficient land defenses cannot be provided to withstand the concentrated might of a modern fleet; this is particularly true when the choice of landing points is as extensive as our modern equipment permits.
The might of a modern fleet makes of doubtful value a fortified fleet base projected too far into potential enemy territory. This same might of a modern fleet makes any island naval base of very doubtful value to an inferior fleet. 'J'his situation is further emphasized by the mobile advance bases developed in World War II.
Prior to the recent war, we had developed a fleet train comprising qualitatively excellent units but which in numbers amounted to little more than prototypes. We had a few oilers, repair ships for battleships and destroyers, repair tenders for submarines, one or two ammunition ships, seaplane tenders and two or three small floating dry docks. The number of transports and cargo ships was inconsequential. Means for effecting major underwater repairs were entirely lacking.
When our task forces in the Pacific first started action against the Japanese Navy, they were entirely dependent upon the fleet train for supplies. In case of damage, ships had to make the best of their way back to Pearl Harbor or the west coast of the United States. As progress was made and islands were captured, temporary supply bases were established. As far as fuel was concerned, ships could then operate within about 2,000 miles of such bases. Advanced repair facilities were still completely lacking.
History may well record that one of the outstanding accomplishments in the naval warfare of this decade has been the creation of the Service of Supply with its mobile fleet base. As a result, the fleet today can operate over long periods of time, in any part of the world, at any distance from the continental United States. The influence of this new arm on future naval strategy and war plans will be of the utmost importance.
In the Pacific our success as an advancing naval force was largely due to the predominantly floating and therefore mobile bases which could follow the fleet while affording most of the facilities for battle repair, together with supplies of fuel, ammunition, and stores. Without the bases, many ships would have been months instead of days out of action while others could not safely have been sent back to home yards at all. The contribution is impossible to evaluate in savings of time, dollars, and lives. No matter how far pre-war planning had gone, nor what extravagances in expenditures had been resorted to, no such flexibility and service could have been rendered by an arrangement of fixed land bases.
Our naval war in the Pacific has emphasized the need of air coverage, not alone for the fleet itself and its principal units but for all amphibious operations. In the offensive operations of the nature we undertook against Japan, such air coverage and the softening up process incident to bombing and the dropping of inflammables had to be carried out by carrier-based planes of the fleet until land bases and airfields could be established. This meant subjecting carriers and the floating protective force to serious damage from normal airplane attack. All of this character of damage, partially foreseen, was enormously increased by the suicide plane attacks of the Japanese. It is no military secret that important units of the fleet were seriously damaged by the one or more planes of this character which got through. A large carrier or battleship was seldom sunk or entirely put out of action by such attack but was damaged to the extent of seriously impairing her efficiency as a fighting unit. Experience has demonstrated that even with the serious losses suffered by the enemy and the reduction of his naval strength to that of a fourth- or fifth-rate power, and the vast preponderance of our own naval strength, it would have been impossible to maintain our naval strength at the crucial point of action had we been forced, as in past wars, to send these damaged ships back thousands of miles to Pearl Harbor or the Pacific Coast.
The mobile floating bases, with dry docks and repair facilities close to the line of action, made it possible to maintain, in spite of Japanese suicide plane attack, the bulk of the fleet at fighting efficiency and gave us the preponderance in strength necessary for victory, ft is doubtful whether the United States, with its enormous productive capacity in building ships and all the other requirements for a Navy, could have built, equipped, and repaired ships fast enough had it been a requirement that damaged ships would have to return several thousand miles to continental bases for repair and reconditioning. Undoubtedly, some of the vessels so damaged would have been lost in transit and perhaps never even have reached Pearl Harbor. In any event, the strength of our Navy on the spot where it was required could not have been kept up to size and efficiency. Our victory over Japan would have entailed far more serious sacrifices than those that were incurred and would have been greatly delayed.
In view of our naval successes with this new tool in the Pacific, we face the immediate necessity of capitalizing on the wartime experience by planning vastly better mobile base units. The cost involved in their creation and maintenance, ready for naval purposes, will be negligible, as compared to the initial cost and maintenance of anything like equivalent land establishments.
In considering the place of the mobile advance base in our defense picture, there is no intention to minimize the necessity of a few impregnable, permanent land bases. Permanent bases at the Canal Zone and at Pearl Harbor are definitely indicated, and in planning the future strategy one or two more fortresses of this type undoubtedly will be necessary.
The fleet repair base, with which we are here principally concerned, naturally divides into various activities. The function of that part of the base having to do with ship maintenance is to repair fighting ships and send them back into action without delay. Its other function, in the case of more extensive damage, is to make rapid temporary repairs so that ships may proceed safely back to permanent bases for extensive repairs. It must not be overlooked that in many cases the crew of a badly wrecked ship may need a long respite in their homeland while their ship is being restored to fighting trim. An outline of some of the varied base activities is set forth in the following tabulation.
Components of the Mobile Advanced Base |
||
Activity |
Afloat |
Ashore |
Personnel |
|
|
Combatant |
Transports |
Barracks |
Repair |
Crew barges |
Barracks |
Construction |
Transports |
Camps |
Medical |
Hospital ships |
Hospital |
Recreation |
— |
Fields and buildings |
Supply |
|
|
Food |
Supply ships |
Reefer boxes |
Water |
Evaporator barge |
Reservoirs |
Clothing |
Supply ships |
Sheds |
Fuel |
Oilers, barges |
Tanks |
Ammunition |
Ammunition ships |
Magazines |
Other |
|
Shed |
Repair |
|
|
Dry docks |
Large, medium, small |
|
Marine railways |
|
For small landing craft |
Shops |
Repair ships, repair barges |
|
Cranes |
Floating cranes |
Truck cranes |
Materials |
Cargo ships |
Plates, shapes, billets, etc. |
Defense |
|
|
Airfields |
Seaplane base |
Landing strips, shops, stores |
Anti-aircraft |
Ships |
Batteries |
Radio, radar & cable |
|
Buildings |
Nets |
Nets |
Net depot |
Mines |
Mine layers |
Mine depot |
Construction & Service |
|
|
Construction |
Navy Pontoon gear |
Camp, gear, earth moving and hoisting equipment, power units, |
Power |
Dredges Power barges |
Power plants |
Transportation |
Tugs, launches & barges |
Piers, wharfs, roads, trucks |
Harbor |
Buoys, moorings |
Breakwaters, ranges, beacons |
Special |
Anchor laying Sludge removal |
Magnetic testing |
The most radical innovation and the nucleus of the modern mobile base is the floating dry dock. The large sectional dry docks and other dry docks of smaller capacity which have been transported overseas with precision and dispatch permit repairs to vital and vulnerable underwater bodies of all classes of ships. Whereas only a few years ago the successful oversea towing of a large floating dry dock justified the writing of a book of experiences, today floating dry docks have been and are being towed across the Pacific and the Atlantic as a matter of well- organized routine. Average speeds of 6 to 8 knots are the rule.
Repair base auxiliaries supplied in the recent war were in most instances capable of rendering useful service but like the other units of the base they had never had the benefit of a planned background which would enable them to fit into the base assembly with maximum effectiveness. It was obvious, for example, that repair facilities provided before the advent of advance base dry docks of 100,000 tons lifting capacity, could not be expected to have the size and capacity to match the docks. Under war pressure the many diverse units were rushed into service without time for co-ordination one with the other. The units of the future must not only be effective in themselves but they must be conceived and planned as elements of an integrated Service Force.
The housing of crews to enable them to render effective work on a three-shift basis in hot or cold climates is in itself worthy of a fresh attack. Large crew barges providing less crowding in quiet, air-conditioned quarters will more than pay their way. The supply of power and the handling of heavy materials need to be thought out on a modern industrial basis.
Numerous suggestions for the improvement of fleet dry docks based on field experience are already under consideration. The time taken to get the big sectional docks into service after arrival at destination can and should be reduced. The transportation of gear elsewhere than on the deck of the sections and quicker methods of joining sections together will both contribute to this desirable end. Self-propulsion of ship-shaped docks or sections is feasible if it can be proved to warrant the additional machinery. Preliminary tests on the docking of ships in the presence of wave motion arc promising enough to indicate that smooth water may not be essential for dry-docking ships.
Important companions to the dry dock are repair ships and barges of various types and sizes. For heavy work there is no reason why a complete section of a navy yard machine shop or a structural shop with traveling bridge cranes should not be placed on a barge. A barge of this type will contain tools of large enough capacity to undertake any advance base repair work. It is not now contemplated that the mobile base will be equipped to make heavy castings and forgings nor to handle very large machining jobs. The number and types of shop and fields of work is a matter to be determined in planning future floating repair units.
A good harbor adjacent to the operating area is, of course, indispensable to the establishment of an effective mobile base. The primary characteristics of such a harbor are adequate size, suitable depth of water for anchorages and for the operation of floating dry docks, protection from wind, sea, and enemy ships, and a surrounding area suitable for housing the airfields, storage, and other activities which may be located ashore.
Prior to any future hostilities, every advance base site of potential interest to us, whether in our possession or not, will have been surveyed, planned and, to whatever degree practicable, prepared for its war role. At bases in our possession, at least the essential harbor clearing and dredging will have been performed and breakwaters installed. It is probable that most of the locations chosen will be the site of a peacetime commercial airfield with its radio station, quarters, shops, and other requisites. The plan for wartime occupation of the base would cover the occupation of the harbor by the floating dry docks, repair units, and all other accessories selected for use at that site. On shore, layouts would be complete for wartime airfields, storehouses, piers, and other scheduled facilities.
A permanent base becomes a well-known landmark and the target for enemy aerial photography and espionage. The chances are that before the outbreak of hostilities every important detail of the establishment will be known to the foe. The greater destructiveness achieved by aerial bombing, the less justifiable becomes investment in the fixed base. Contrasted to this, the layout of the mobile base for “Island No. 10,” as War Plans may designate it, is completely developed and filed away. For a designated harbor the base may be a “custom built” assembly of units to meet the local requirements or a “ready-made” assembly designated for instance as type A, type B, etc., each suitable for a number of typical locations. The harbor is basically ready, the location of airfields, storage and recreational areas are planned in detail, depending upon strategic requirements. Certain areas are cleared, bench marks for ranges established, a radio station and, if expedient, commercial landing fields arc built and in operation. The total investment at the prey of the enemy will be small.
At anchor in one of our home harbors lie the various units comprising the advanced repair base. Seagoing floating dry docks of several sizes form the nucleus. Personnel barges, floating shops, supply ships in great variety fill out the maintenance armada which awaits transfer to the planned site. No move to send forward the base will be made until the area to which it is assigned has been cleared of the enemy to a degree warranting the establishment of the base. The very occupation may well be on a progressive scale, moving in units and building up strength as enemy strength wanes. In planning the occupation of an advance base site, it will probably be found desirable in early stages to depend entirely on the floating units. As occupation continues, the shore facilities will be developed so that both floating and shore units will ultimately work as a balanced repair, supply, and air base. Protection will be furnished by the fleet, by land- based planes, and by air defenses rather than by heavy artillery.
In peacetime the mobile base units will, as far as practicable, be kept in commission and utilized in groups. In any event a certain number of units will be kept fully manned to provide training and for the preparation of operating instructions. When an emergency comes, it appears practicable to depend largely upon industry to supply the additional units from designs kept up to date as well as to furnish the skilled artisans, in the form of construction battalions and repair battalions, to man them.
The mobile base is an entirely flexible force. The assembly of units for a particular base at a certain juncture in the war will depend upon such factors as number and size of combatant and supply vessels in the area, the size and suitability of a harbor, the distance from the homeland, the hazard from enemy attack, and the availability of base units. The composition of the floating establishment can be varied at will.
The conception of a completely planned base is new. It will require a thorough appraisal of all of the elements involved, their integration into a consistent whole and then, it is hoped, the design and construction of units to outfit at least one, but preferably several, peacetime bases. The time to begin formulating the general characteristics of the new bases is now, and the time to design and build the prototype units is as soon after hostilities as the experiences of the recent war can be crystallized into complete designs. The immediate establishment of a Navy board of combined strategy and design for this purpose may be in order.
To insure that the mobile advance base is suitable to serve the future fleet, the design of docking, repair, and supply facilities should keep pace with the design of the combatant types and with the developments of science and industry. Continuing research and experiment are necessary to the end that there will at all times be in existence one or more up-to-date bases with plans for quick duplication in case of war. It is reasonable to assume that methodical post-war analysis of the requirements of the advance fleet base will yield large dividends in improvements and economies in first cost and in operation. The inclusion in the fleet of an clement as novel and as complex as the modern mobile base should also result in a post-war reappraisal of its place in the fleet and its administration.
If the foregoing premises arc accepted, then the whole subject of naval bases must be restudied before decision is reached as to the overseas locations which should be developed and the degree of development of each location. That we should retain all captured islands which may some day be of strategic value, either to us or our possible enemies, is beyond argument; that we should retain other selected locations is highly desirable. Our retention of localities suitable for base development has the twofold object of having such locations available when required and of denying their use to possible enemies. For the first time in modern history it may now be possible to reconcile both the strategic and economic demands of Naval Bases. To that nation which best thinks through and utilizes the new potentialities will go a huge margin of sea power.