As late as October 20, 1944, in simple and unequivocal language, Secretary l. of the Navy James Forrestal earnestly asserted to a “topside” Merchant Marine Conference:
My experience in the Navy has convinced me, as it would have any other citizen exercising the same responsibility, that the Merchant Marine is a necessary arm of both the Army and Navy. It is clear beyond a shadow of any doubt that if we are to escape the disaster of invasion in any future war, we shall have to do our fighting a long way from home. And that means . . . that there must be many millions of tons of shipping ready to carry our troops and munitions to any point where the forces of our enemies are gathered.
This view was undoubtedly crystallized from the recent reports of Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, and General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Said Admiral King in part:
No maritime nation has ever been able to fight a war successfully without an adequate Merchant Marine—something we did not have when the two ocean Navy was authorized. The Army ground and air forces and air shipping were not yet prepared to move overseas in sufficient strength for an offensive, and the Navy, even without the losses sustained at Pearl Harbor, could not alone carry the war to the enemy. We were, therefore, forced to assume the defensive in both oceans while preparations for an amphibious war were intensified.
In a similar vein General Marshall reported,
For both Great Britain and the United States, military operations in the Pacific Area and in the Far East created unprecedented logistical problems with respect to shipping. Time and space factors dictated our strategy to a considerable degree. The tremendous amount of shipping required for a modern army is not generally understood. For instance in computing initial shipping requirements, an average of six measurement tons of cargo space per man is required. Maintenance requirements average one measurement ton per month per man.
And by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Pacific Fleet Commander, one who literally has had to grapple with the problem of supply before, during, and after every engagement with the enemy, we are told:
The sea lanes of the Pacific which have been extended westward more than 4000 miles in the last year are crowded with merchant ships engaged in supplying our offensive against the Japs. Without these ships of the American maritime industry wholly devoted to winning the war, our substantial progress would not have been possible.
Here then we have it—and from the highest possible military sources—that the sine qua non of modern warfare for America is a Merchant Marine of sufficient size and speed, and manned by a trained, efficient personnel. The only alternative is to reconcile ourselves to the proposition of waiting for the enemy to land on our shores and fighting him there—which would be certainly unthinkable in terms of grand military strategy, humiliating to our national pride, and pregnant with destruction to our homes and our industries.
But surely before World War II we knew how necessary an up-to-date merchant marine was, not only to the defense of our country but to our national economy as well. For were we not given wise counsel in this matter by one who was well informed in these matters, who had led his country to victory, and to whom the interests of America were paramount—George Washington. In the earliest days of our Republic, Washington underscored this danger, i.e., reliance on the Merchant Marine of other countries, by declaring
We should not overlook the tendency of war to abridge the means, and thereby at least enhance the price of transporting productions to their proper markets. I recommend it to your [Congress] serious reflections how far and in what mode it may be expedient to guard against embarrassments from these contingencies by such encouragement to our own navigation as will render our commerce and agriculture less dependent on foreign bottoms which may fail us in the very moments most interesting to both of these great objects. . . . There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure.
And again one hundred years later when our nation had expanded from ocean to ocean, did not the world-renowned and eminent authority on the influence of sea power on history, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, U. S. Navy, write:
It is clear that an insular state, if attentive to the conditions that should dictate its policy, is inevitably led to possess a superiority in that particular kind of force [naval power] the mobility of which enables it most readily to project its power to the more distant quarters of the earth, and also to change its application at will with unequalled rapidity.
With full realization of the dual purpose of a Merchant Marine, i.e., to carry a fair share of the nation’s goods in foreign trade and to supplement its naval power, Captain Mahan declared:
In the organic and causative development of most navies, a Merchant Marine Fleet is at one and the same time their raison d’ètre and their auxiliary power.
In addition to these self-evident truths, i.e., statements of George Washington and Captain Mahan, we possessed the facts of World War I to give them confirmation.
When war broke out in Europe in 1914 90 per cent of our foreign trade was being carried in foreign bottoms, which, of necessity, were largely withdrawn from their usual trade routes by the contending powers— thus leaving the United States virtually stranded to ship its goods to foreign markets. To remedy this situation and to overhaul our Merchant Marine policy (where one could be discerned) Congress passed the Shipping Act of 1916, more specifically,
... for the purpose of encouraging, developing and creating a naval auxiliary, naval reserve, and a Merchant Marine to meet the requirements of the United States with its foreign territories and possessions and with foreign countries and to regulate carriers by water engaged in the foreign and interstate commerce of the United States.
The Shipping Board created by this Act had authority
... to form one or more corporations for the purchase, construction, equipment, lease, charter, maintenance and operation of merchant vessels in the Commerce of the United States.
The Emergency Fleet Corporation was one of these corporations, formed for the construction of a large wartime fleet of merchant vessels.
Although the Shipping Board via the Emergency Fleet Corporation built a tremendous number of vessels—totaling more than eight million tons between 1916 and 1921, few were available for use during the war. As a matter of fact, Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, U. S. Navy, Chairman of the U. S. Maritime Commission, in an address delivered in the spring of 1941, stated.
. . . just for a comparison, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the last war, you had a Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation. . . . But you Taxpayers expended 3 billion dollars in 225 yards, and 2,300 ships, and not a damned one of them ever got in the show.
In truth, our allies had to transport more than half of the American Army to France and in September, 1918, we were forced to ask the British for 1,200,000 tons of cargo ships. Fortunately, the enemy did not realize just how tight the shipping situation was in 1917 when, during the very month, i.e., April, of our entry into the war 395 allied vessels totaling 847,000 tons were sunk by German submarines.
It was in fact the purchase of a large number of foreign flag ships, the seizure of scores of German and other belligerent vessels interned in American ports, plus the requisition of American tonnage already in operation and the securing of neutral tonnage by various devices, such as bunker control and food agreements with hungry nations, that provided us with the narrow margin between victory and possible defeat.
World War I was over. We had scraped through by the skin of our teeth as far as shipping was concerned—-but only because our allies had enough ships, and could (with great help from the U. S. Navy in convoying them) protect their sea lanes to Europe. And what if one of our allies had not been a great sea power? People would rather not think about that.
Did we profit from the hard (and expensive) lesson of World War I or did we blithely return to an ostrich-like position; on the one hand beguiling ourselves in contemplation of the millenium, and on the other, fretting over the cost of maintaining a healthy national interest in a national institution of proved necessity? Let us, in the words of a famous American recently passed away, “look at the record.”
As a result of the huge new construction authorized and built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation, in 1920 the nation’s registered shipping reached its all-time peak of 9,924,000 gross tons, almost ten times what it had been in 1914; and for the first time since the dark days of the Civil War, half of the tonnage entering America from foreign countries flew the Stars and Stripes. Like any rush order job, unfortunately, these ships were anything but tailor-made. However, from the standpoint of quantity, the job done by the Emergency Fleet Corporation was perhaps “the greatest shipbuilding feat in history,” at least, up to that time. In retrospect the Shipping Act of 1916 may be described as noble in purpose, expensive in execution, and productive of little good—at least during the actual war period. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 which amended it was merely noble in purpose. Here is its preamble:
That it is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United States . . .
Failure to carry out this purpose during these critical post-war years, 1920-28, destroyed the recently won prestige and power of the American Merchant Marine. In an appearance before a Congressional Committee seeking in 1928 to amend further the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, an irate spokesman for the Pacific Steamship Owners Association bluntly told the committee members:
. . . Continued repetition has dulled the keenness or the soundness of the doctrine made in the Act of 1920 because, since that time, Congress has done practically nothing to carry the mandate into effect, . . . Shipowners have often been charged with being unpatriotic, in that they have not built ships for the foreign trade in American yards. But it will be noted that patriotism is only aroused when the General Government is just to its citizens, and the General Government has not been just to our Merchant Marine, but has permitted it to go into gradual decay by its failure to provide suitable aids that would have enabled its private citizens to do what foreign nations have done for their own citizens in the shipbuilding and operating business.
The efforts of Congress to rehabilitate our Merchant Marine resulted in the Merchant Marine Act of 1928, which reaffirmed the high sounding policy of the Act of 1920, increased the construction loan fund to $250,000,000 and established provisions of pay for the carrying of mails based on the size and speed of vessels and the length of their outward voyages. This compensation was intended to offset the higher costs of constructing and operating vessels of United States registry, and thus place them on a competitive basis with foreign vessels operating in similar services. This act, although a slight improvement over the Act of 1920, failed to devise a basic formula that would insure a substantial Merchant Marine, causing Joseph B. Kennedy, First Chairman of the Maritime Commission, nine years later, to declare:
Despite the millions of dollars lavished on the American Merchant Marine during the last 15 years—including the payment of a quarter of a billion dollars in mail contracts and other subsidies—the effort so far as the establishment of a sound Merchant Marine is concerned, has been a failure.
It is difficult to assign any particular reason as being the cause of the sharp decline in our Merchant Marine between 1920-36. However, some of the facts and figures of this period might help to illuminate this situation.
In 1921 at the Washington Disarmament conference and again in 1930 as a signatory to the London Naval Treaty, the United States agreed to scrap part of its Navy and to curtail substantially its naval building program—all in the interests of maintaining peaceful relations with the rest of the world. The Pacifists were in the saddle and many sentimental people thought that the mere reduction in the size of a Navy brought with it as a corollary the disappearance of the lust for power and the frantic efforts to right “wrongs” and achieve “equality” that mark the clash of interests and the battle of wills and intellects throughout human history. Even accepting the acquiescence of the United States in all plans to reduce armaments, a realistic approach should have dictated construction of such merchant ships as in time of war could be converted easily to naval auxiliaries. Instead, the curtailment in naval armaments was paralleled by stagnation in the construction of merchant ships.
Another factor was the failure of American boys to “follow the sea.” Part of this was due to the large percentage of alien seamen who were sailing on American vessels during this period. In 1926, the percentage of native born Americans who had shipped on American vessels was 40.5 per cent. An additional 10 per cent were naturalized Americans. Since seamen employed on vessels engaged in coast-wise and intercoastal trades are included in these figures, the percentage of Americans in foreign trade vessels was undoubtedly even lower—based on the fact that 69.6 per cent of the seamen in coastal trade in 1926 were Americans. Other reasons why American boys did not follow the sea during this era were (1) lack of information about it, and (2) better chance for advancement ashore. But over and above these reasons was the social reason. Life at sea means a breaking of the home ties—sometimes for long periods of time. In fact, absence from home is the rule rather than the exception for men who choose the sea as their profession. It requires therefore a greater urge to cause a boy to go to sea—and remain at sea—than the ordinary attraction of a job, or another career.
Then, there was the element of tradition. True, tradition is a psychological factor, but where an institution has a tradition that is rich and full, it exerts a magnetic influence which attracts people to it. However, traditions, like other good things, must be cared for, nurtured, and kept alive—and the glorious traditions of our early Merchant Marine, i.e., the clipper ship era, had become a sterile thing, of interest only to the historians. Nor had our Merchant Marine taken a sufficiently active part in World War I to render the nation the type of service and perform the deeds of heroism that would have endeared it to the whole country.
A further impediment was the deplorable ignorance on the part of the public a few years after World War I of the functions and purposes of the American Merchant Marine as reflected in Congress’ attitude towards the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve. Although the Naval Reserve Act of 1925 provided that Merchant Marine officers would be eligible to enroll in the Naval Reserve and receive training in those duties which they would have to assume in time of war, and although some 2,000 Merchant Marine officers were enrolled by 1929, no appropriations were forthcoming from Congress for this training.
Finally one great_ disappointment, in the late 20’s and throughout the 30’s, was the lack of pride in American ships. Nowhere was this more clearly displayed than in the attitude of American travelers. In the year 1936, only 8 per cent of the 679,000 transatlantic passengers traveled on American ships.
Primary among the factors affecting our Merchant Marine after 1920 was the rehabilitation not only of the merchant fleets of our allies, but the building of new and fast ships by our recent enemy. Against this competition, America had a large number of “Hog Islanders,” with a disinterested government ownership and operation for several years. Even private operators were affected by the general sluggishness and incompetence that prevailed—and some of the more unscrupulous unabashedly lined their pockets at the expense of the taxpayers (as brought out by the Senate investigation headed by Senator Black of Alabama) and— what was even worse—showed utter disregard for the comfort and welfare of ships’ crews. America was learning another lesson (?), i.e., that the test of the virility of a Merchant Marine is not the availability of tonnage but rather how good and how fast are the ships and how competently and competitively are they operated.
In regard to how good and how fast were our ships in the post-war period, the answer may be found in the fact that between 1922 and 1937 we launched exactly two steel seagoing cargo ships; in 1937, according to the Maritime Commission’s economic survey, we ranked fourth among maritime nations in tonnage, fifth in ships with speeds of 12 knots or more, and sixth in vessels ten years of age or less. It was further revealed by the Commission’s Economic survey that,
Our foreign freight has dwindled until today, counting both subsidized and unsubsidized vessels (dry cargo), it consists of only 374 vessels of 2,311,494 gross tons. . . . Of the 2500 vessels launched in the mightiest shipbuilding program in history, but a few hundred aging specimens remain. Soon these remaining few will be incapable of further service. Then, unless some means of replacing these vessels can be found, the great endeavor of the United States at sea, so far as the subsidized lines are concerned, will be at an end. ... Of the American fleet of 1422 oceangoing vessels (of 2000 gross tons and over), 91.8 per cent will be obsolete by 1942.
The rise of Hitler and Mussolini, bringing as it did “a deification of the state,” and an era of exaggerated mercantilism, as well as nationalism, meant that new and stiffer competition for the world’s trade would develop, as would the seeds of future world conflicts.
As a result of all of these factors, i.e., (1) the obvious necessity to replace obsolescent American vessels; (2) the need for high speed tankers and other auxiliary vessels capable of being converted to Navy use thereby complementing the Navy building program; and finally, (3) a universal desire to establish a sound Merchant Marine program—an enlightened Congress in 1936 finally wrote a Merchant Marine Act that bid fair to rejuvenate the American Merchant Marine and place it once more on an even keel.
The forthright and complete declaration of policy contained in this act enabled the Maritime Commission (created by it) to chart a course that has undoubtedly been responsible for solving the staggering problem of supply in World War II. This declaration of policy, frequently referred to as the “Magna Charta” of the American Merchant Marine, provides that:
It is necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of the water-borne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and to provide shipping service on all routes essential for maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, (c) owned and operated under the United States flag by citizens of the United States insofar as may be practicable, and (d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to foster the development and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine.
In place of construction loans, and indirect aid in the form of ocean mail contracts, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 substituted direct aid in the form of construction differential subsidies, operating differential subsidies, and countervailing subsidies, for vessels employed on routes, lines, or services determined by the Maritime Commission to be essential.
In 1937 the Maritime Commission set its sights on a goal of 50 ships per year to replace America’s rapidly aging merchant fleet. To accomplish this as inexpensively as possible and at the same time bring forth a vessel with commodious quarters and low- operating cost, the Commission evolved four basic designs—the C-l, C-2, C-3, and the cargo-passenger type. In addition to these four basic designs, single-screw and twin- screw tankers were made part of the program. These vessels represented a vast improvement in merchant ships in speed and operating economy. Once again America began to look with pride at her Merchant Marine, and at the same time feel assured that the job was being done at a reasonable cost.
During this period, many private shipowners were adding to their fleets, without benefit of subsidy. This was particularly true in the field of domestic shipping, which was not entitled to receive any subsidies for either construction or operating differentials. The importance of this domestic shipping is revealed from the tonnage figures as of June 30, 1939. At this time, our active American Merchant Marine amounted to 9,303,228 tons, of which only 2,803,900 was engaged in foreign commerce. In other words, 70 per cent of our Merchant Marine was employed in domestic trade. An important factor frequently overlooked in the picture of the American Merchant Marine is the extensive participation in both domestic and foreign shipping by corporations which operate ships merely to transport their own products. Perhaps the outstanding example of such participation is the oil companies, with their huge tanker fleets—the “Esso” fleet alone totaling almost 600,000 tons in 1939 and constituting the largest private unit in the American Merchant Marine. In addition to the oil companies, there are steel companies, the Aluminum Company, the Fruit Company with its “banana fleet,” and Henry Ford’s fleet, much of which is employed on the Great Lakes. It was extremely fortunate for America and her allies that these companies had sufficient capital to maintain large fleets of vessels in good condition over the years, and that they maintained an excellent organization to operate them and well- trained personnel to man them. For example, the part played by oil tankers and their stouthearted officers and men, particularly in the early part of the war before the Maritime Commission had been able to build any sizable number of tankers, will perhaps never be adequately told or appreciated—but Navy men in, or close to, “operations” know, and are quietly thankful.
As war broke out in Europe in September, 1939, the Maritime Commission doubled its production schedule, contracting for 100 ships per year. In 1940, this was doubled again calling for 200 per year.
The inability, however, of existing shipyards to produce more ships than originally scheduled, plus the lack of facilities for the manufacture of sufficient geared-turbine propulsive machinery needed for “C” type vessels and tankers, resulted in the birth of the Emergency Cargo vessel (EC), better known as the “Liberty Ship.” Propelled by reciprocating steam engines and extremely simple in design, these Liberty ships can be produced more quickly and more economically than the “C” type vessels.
The first Liberty ship, the Patrick Henry was launched on September 27, 1941, and, “by mid-March of 1942, she had safely delivered a 10,000-ton cargo of war materials to Egypt”—and according to the latest reports, the Patrick Henry is still “delivering the goods.”
Some appreciation of the rapid growth of our Merchant Marine may be had from the following table, which shows the deliveries of commercial vessels of 2,000 dead-weight tons or over for each of the years 1938 to 1943 inclusive:
Year |
No. |
Dead-Weight Tonnage |
1938 |
26 |
278,487 |
1939 |
28 |
342,042 |
1940 |
53 |
634,234 |
1941 |
103 |
1,088,497 |
1942 |
746 |
8,089,732 |
1943 |
1896 |
19,238,626 |
1944 (first 8 mos.) |
1109 |
11,059,586 |
Although we cannot do them justice, “time out” should be taken now to heap congratulations upon Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, U. S. Navy, Chairman of the Maritime Commission, and Rear Admiral Howard L. Vickery, U. S. Navy, Vice-Chairman of the Maritime Commission, for the colossal job done, and what is most important, done in time to make it count.
The story of ship repair during World War II is equally revealing—for according to the War Shipping Administration, approximately 12,300 vessels of all types, each 1,000 gross tons or over, were repaired in 1942; 17,172 in 1943; and 12,856 for the first seven months of 1944. Employment too, reached all time highs. (See table, next page.)
Next in the order of chronology and logic but equal in the order of importance to the building of this great merchant fleet is the manning of it—especially in time of war. Unfortunately there has been considerable confusion in the public mind regarding the status of the merchant officer and the merchant seaman.
July |
Employment Private Shipyards |
Employment Private Shipyards, plus Navy Yds |
1938 |
58,600 |
93,600 |
1939 |
73,600 |
111,600 |
1940 |
102,500 |
177,300 |
1941 |
233,900 |
380,000 |
1942 |
792,600 |
1,038,000 |
1943 |
1,388,400 |
1,721,000 |
1944 |
1,236,700 |
1,562,900 |
To keep the record straight, it should be emphasized that the men who man merchant ships—-whether they are officers or unlicensed personnel, whether they wear uniforms (Maritime Service) or not, are civilians. They are not members of our armed forces; they have volunteered to go to—or remain at— sea, in order to man the “bridge of ships” necessary to bring us victory. The fact that there are today in our shipyards qualified merchant seamen is clear evidence that going to sea in merchant ships is as optional as any other civilian job. To the men, therefore, who have gone to sea continuously since Pearl Harbor no praise can be too great—for those who know will never forget what gallantry it took to “keep ’em sailing” during those fretful days and wakeful nights of 1942 and 1943.
There are at present approximately 170,- 000 merchant seamen, the bulk of whom are members of the unlicensed personnel. Most of these men have been recruited and trained since Pearl Harbor. The small nucleus of pre- Pearl Harbor men for the most part are now serving as Captains and First Mates or Chief Engineers and First Assistant Engineers. It is around them and the steady reliable AB’s, bos’ns, and oilers that the “new Merchant Marine” has been built. For, despite the elaborate and intensive training now provided by the Training Organization of the War Shipping Administration, these new recruits must look to their heads of departments for guidance and direction and to the “old timers” for ship know-how; and as on a naval vessel to the “skipper” who really sets the “tone” of the ship.
The job of training merchant seamen or youngsters anxious to go to sea has been largely the work of the United States Merchant Marine Cadet Corps, the United States Maritime Service, and the State Maritime Academies. The original source of authority for such training exclusive of the State academies comes from Section 101 of the Merchant Marine Act 1936, wherein in part it was directed that a Merchant Marine be developed and “manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel.” By Executive Order on July 11, 1942, the training of merchant seamen was transferred to the War Shipping Administration from the United States Coast Guard where it had been since March 31, 1942. Prior to this, it had resided with the Maritime Commission.
The Merchant Marine Cadet Corps is considered the cream of the training program and the United States Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, Long Island, is likened to West Point and Annapolis. The Academy is open only to unmarried male citizens of the United States between the ages of 17 ½ and 23, who possess a high- school or college education. Once appointed to the academy, cadet-midshipmen spend the first three months ashore at one of the basic schools or at the academy; the next six months at sea as cadet-midshipmen aboard a merchant ship; and the final nine months at the Academy.
Commodore Giles C. Stedman, U. S. Naval Reserve, Superintendent of the Academy, in a recent address spoke of the 3,200 merchant marine officer graduates in glowing terms, declaring:
It now behooves us to give attention to the extension of our course of training for the better and more complete education of our merchant officers to produce a well rounded, broadly educated officer and gentleman; not only highly trained in every branch of his profession, but thoroughly and culturally educated to be a fitting representative of our Merchant Marine and of this Nation in every foreign port.
Commodore Stedman also stated that,
On October first of this year [1944], the course of training in the Merchant Marine Cadet Corps has been extended to two years. It is confidently expected that we will swing into the full four year course prior to the end of the war.
The United States Maritime Service under the Training Division of the War Shipping Administration also conducts schools for officers. In these schools deck and engine men who have completed at least 14 months sea service are trained for 4 months and then permitted to sit for licenses as third mates or third assistant engineers.
The biggest job, from the standpoint of numbers, has been the training of new men coming into the maritime industry. These men serve, when trained, in the deck, engine, and steward’s departments. In addition to this group, training is also offered in special upgrading schools to assist and qualify officers in the raising of their licenses, and to qualify ordinary seamen for certificates as “AB’s.”
From 1938 to January 1, 1944, 13,577 officers, 1,875 radio operators, and 52,965 unlicensed seamen in all ratings have been graduated from the various schools and made available to the Merchant Marine. And on January 1, 1944, there were an additional 10,695 officer candidates being trained by the following schools: 7,167 by the United States Merchant Marine Cadet Corps; 2,532 by the United States Maritime Service; 996 by the five state academies. At the same time there were 12,964 unlicensed men and 936 radio men undergoing training. These numbers dwarf those of World War I during which training was limited to officers of whom 11,425 received superficial training.
When all the proper honors have been paid to the schools and their training, some may be interested in reading what a true friend of the ambitious unlicensed seaman said in an address to the first officers’ graduating class at Fort Trumbull:
. . . As an ex-seaman who got his experience in the forecastle and obtained a license without any help except such hints as he could get from officers on ships where he was working, I resent the apparent neglect of the worthy unlicensed man. The majority of our best officers in the past have come up through the forecastle and it is grossly unfair to deny promotion to worthy and responsible unlicensed men only because they have not been to a schoolship or have not been cadets. It is not the American way of doing things!
The author of the above is at present a Lieutenant Commander in the Naval Reserve in command of a Destroyer Escort Transport.
Shortly after Pearl Harbor, merchant ships were being attacked port and starboard, by German submarines, and many recall the harrowing tales told by torpedoed American seamen picked up along our Atlantic coast. At the time there was no provision for giving nation-wide recognition to these merchant seamen. However, early in 1942, the alert Chairman of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Congressman Schuyler 0. Bland, invited witnesses to testify before this Committee regarding this matter. The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 263) on which these hearings were held was intended to provide decorations for outstanding conduct or service by persons serving in the Merchant Marine. Although only five witnesses appeared on behalf of this resolution, the groups they represented reflected the entire industry, i.e., shipping companies, labor organizations, and government departments. At the time these hearings were held tankers were bearing the brunt of German submarine attacks and the independent unions representing the officers and men on these tankers made the following recommendations with regard to decorations and awards.
(1) A medal or decoration for a special act of valor and gallantry outside of the normal course of duty, particularly where such acts result in the saving of additional lives, or cargo or vessel;
(2) An award or decoration for some unusual action of a type that, in the eyes of the superior officer such as the master, warrants commendation.
(3) A pin or medal or special ribbon to designate individuals who have been on a ship that has been sunk by enemy action. In the case of men whose have lost their lives in sinkings due to enemy action, it is suggested that the wife, or nearest relative if there is no wife, should receive such award.
It is further suggested that whatever is decided with respect to this matter, it be retroactive to the entrance of the United States into this war; namely, December 7,1941.
With the passage of this resolution (H.J. Res. 263) embodying the above recommendations, plus the passage of H.R. 7548, “a bill to provide for the issuance of a device in recognition of the services of merchant sailors” a tremendous step forward was taken in recognizing the significance of the merchant officer and merchant seaman in World War II.
As of July, 1944, 70 Merchant Marine Distinguished Service Medals (the highest award that can be earned under present legislation) had been awarded to officers and seamen; more than 43,000 seamen who served on a ship “directly attacked or damaged by an instrumentality of war” have applied for the Merchant Marine Combat Bar; and the Mariner’s Medal (awarded to merchant seamen who suffer serious physical injury or death as the result of enemy action) has been awarded in 500 instances.
The number of merchant seamen dead, missing, or prisoners of war as of October 1,1944, was 5,800—a staggering total considering the size of our Merchant Marine before Pearl Harbor. And while the payment of bonus and war risk insurance (in case of death or disability) and the awarding of medals and other decorations are to be commended as in keeping with justice, it must not be forgotten that these 5,800 men and the many thousands more who have been injured are not members of the Armed Forces but civilians—men whose peacetime job of going to sea suddenly was transformed to a bloody though watery battleground— and they remained on that battleground.
There has been considerable talk about the wages and war bonuses of the officers and men of the Merchant Marine—much of it incorrect. Unfortunately this tends to stir up people (particularly if they have relatives in the Armed Forces) against the merchant officer and seaman and indirectly against the entire Merchant Marine. The wages of seamen have not increased greatly since the beginning of the war. As a matter of fact, the same “Little Steel” formula for granting increases in wages, overtime, etc., to shore side employees has been applied to the Merchant Marine through the Shipping Panel of the War Labor Board. Furthermore, the man at sea, particularly the unlicensed man even with his war bonus, is not as well off financially as his brother ashore, working in a shipyard—as the difficulties of the Recruitment and Manning Division of the War Shipping Administration will attest.
For example, the $87.50 per month that ordinary seamen and mess men receive or even the $100 per month of an able bodied seaman (certainly a semiskilled worker) cannot be compared with the $175 per month which is generally the minimum for laborers in shipyards; or with the $250-$300 per month earned by riggers in shipyards—a job that an able bodied seaman is generally qualified to perform.
As for war bonus—war bonus is not a wage; it is premium money paid because of established danger in an area through which a ship is scheduled to sail. Flight pay in the Army or Navy is predicated on a similar assumption, i.e., risk of life or limb beyond that which might normally be expected. Again it should be borne in mind that the men going to sea in merchant ships may be called seagoing civilian war workers.
Before Pearl Harbor war bonus arrangements were made between shipping companies and whatever labor organization was certified by the National Labor Relations Board to represent the men on the ships of each respective company. The danger at this time was not very great and yet for certain voyages the war bonus rate was 75 percent of the regular wages and on other voyages as high as 100 per cent. In addition, there were port bonuses, where the ports to be entered were deemed to be perilous.
After Pearl Harbor, Vice Admiral Land requested representatives of shipping companies, labor unions, and government departments to come to Washington and work out a program that would be calculated to avoid any possible strike among seamen because of war bonus. The result of this conference was the establishment of the Maritime War Emergency Board composed of three members—one from the Maritime Commission, one from the Department of Labor, and one public member. This is the board which has issued all decisions involving war bonus rates, war bonus areas, war risk insurance, etc., since the war. Never has it authorized more than a 100 per cent voyage bonus, and that only for certain waters. Incidentally, a 100 per cent bonus would enable an AB to earn $200 per month provided he was on a 100 per cent bonus voyage for the entire month. Where a special area bonus of $5.00 per day is paid this is limited to what the Maritime War Emergency Board declares to be particularly dangerous waters, i.e., where ships are subject to constant attack by land-based planes, surface ships, and submarines.
Even in the matter of war risk insurance the total allowance made is $5,000 in case of death and up to $7,500 for disability arising from war or marine risk. Today as a result of various reductions in the war bonus rate and changes in the war bonus area, it is quite possible for a seaman to earn as little as a 33| per cent war bonus for long periods of time. $87.50 or even $100 per month, plus 33§ per cent war bonus does not represent a competitive wage, when one thinks in terms of defense workers ashore—who are undergoing no risks and who can be at home with their families every night.
There are many other factors that have a vital part in the make-up and operation of the American Merchant Marine. However, there is not space at this time to cover these adequately. And so we proceed to sum up this relation between Merchant Marine and National Defense—a relation most succinctly stated by Rear Admiral A. S. Merrill, U. S. Navy, Director of the Office of Public Relations, Navy Department, in an address to the American Merchant Marine Industry:
We need your ships; we need your men; we need the shipbuilding facilities which you create; and we want the overseas transportation under American control which a strong Merchant Marine provides.
Of course in maintaining such a Merchant Marine some thought must be given to other nations and their claims to a fair share of the world’s commerce. Here however is where a basic argument will start—an argument that can lead even to war. Vice Admiral Land, in an address delivered at the Seventeenth Annual Dinner of the Propeller Club, has offered what appears to be an equitable approach to this matter:
Commercial rivalry based upon free competition is a good thing, making for lower costs and increased efficiency. Commercial rivalries abetted by Government and manipulated for national advantage is not conducive either to amity or good business.
Those of us who are responsible for the development of American shipping recognize these things and we have taken them into account in our plans for the future. We have no ambition to hog the seas; we will play ball with anybody who is willing to play ball with us. All we ask is that our legitimate requirements—which everything considered are not unduly large—be accepted by our friends abroad.
Despite the Admiral’s sage advice, predicting the future of the American Merchant Marine has by now become a national indoor sport, and the guesses range all the way from “We’ll have a Merchant Marine second to none” to “We’ll let our Merchant Marine rust and rot.” Without, therefore, making any forecasts, let us list the factors inclining toward the maintenance of a strong Merchant Marine and those which appear to reduce its chances of survival.
Primary among the favorable factors are:
(1) The Merchant Marine Act itself which has been accepted by all interested groups and admittedly has provided the necessary encouragement and leavening influence which made possible the orderly construction of so many ships and the manning of them with so many trained men, in so short a time.
(2) The prima-facie evidence of a strong merchant marine, i.e., plenty of fast ships (Victory ships and high speed tankers), excellent shipyards and plenty of them, and thousands of well- trained officers and seamen, etc.
(3) Those intangible, but none the less real, gains, achieved during the war by the Merchant Marine, i.e.,
(a) wider dissemination of information concerning the Merchant Marine through news and feature stories;
(b) deeper personal interest in the Merchant Marine among the people in the interior of the country because of relatives and friends in the Merchant Marine;
(c) strong traditions built up among Merchant Marine men themselves through common participation in attacks on the enemy, i.e., amphibious operations, and in attacks by the enemy, i.e., torpedoings, air and sea attacks; plus friendships developed through long voyages, training schools, academies, etc.
(d) Greater recognition achieved by merchant seamen as evidenced by distinguished service medals, combat bars, mariner’s medal; as well as Navy citations and public praise from high ranking Army and Navy officers and other Government officials.
(e) Personal pride of all connected with the Merchant Marine in its war-time achievements.
(4) The necessity of maintaining a larger Navy concerned with widened horizons and additional duties—which in turn will require a larger Merchant Marine to service it in ships and personnel.
(5) The use of the airplane as a supplementary instrumentality in steamship operation. This would be of special value, particularly since we now enjoy aviation supremacy.
(6) Good Employer-Employee Relations. During the war there has been no labor trouble in the Merchant Marine industry. One reason for this is the no-strike pledge made by the unions; but perhaps an even stronger reason is the close association of Merchant Marine personnel with all branches of the armed forces, and their joint participation in amphibious operations. As a result it just has not occurred to anyone that a strike could be possible in time of war in the Merchant Marine.
These good relations can be continued in peacetime; (1) if there is proper respect by each of the parties, i.e., employer and employees (individually and collectively) for the rights of the other, (2) genuine sincerity in the reaching of agreements, and (3) complete integrity in the carrying out of these agreements.
Among the factors working against the maintenance of a large Merchant Marine are:
(1) The restoration of the Merchant Marine in foreign nations; and the establishment of a Merchant Marine in countries which formerly either had none or where, if one existed, it was of little consequence. Among such countries are Brazil and Argentina. Even Switzerland now has ships—eight of them.
(2) The desire of all to reduce Government expenditures and thereby their own taxes.
(3) Serious labor trouble in the marine industry, either among ship personnel or shore personnel (longshoremen), due to strikes in the industry—for example,
In 1934 there were 1,068,867 man days of idleness and
In 1935 there were 749,533 man days of idleness due to such strikes;
In 1936 there were 1,361,021 man days of idleness and
In 1937 there were 732,153 man days of idleness due to strikes affecting vessel personnel alone.
A repetition of this would be disastrous, as with a larger Merchant Marine far more men would be involved.
(4) Too much government control, preventing that flexibility necessary to meet certain competitive conditions.
(5) Failure to continue the present popularity of the Merchant Marine through proper contacts, i.e., legislators, educators, business men, newspapers, radio, etc.
(6) Failure to handle the disposal of excess tonnage properly.
(7) Inability to obtain affirmation of the right of American steamships to engage in International Air Transport.
In conclusion, all concerned with the future of America’s naval auxiliary—the American Merchant Marine—will endorse the position of Secretary of the Navy Forrestal,
We must keep the country conscious, as it is today, that the sea and air around and above the United States must be secure for the American Flag. If we ever again forget that immutable truth, we don’t deserve survival as a nation.