Invasions have been made by our armies and those of our allies on shores thousands of miles from the United States. To support these operations and to carry them on to their ultimate successful conclusion, millions of men and countless tons of equipment, supplies, and materials are needed. Reasonably reliable estimates have been made that for each soldier landed there is required an initial 8 tons of equipment and supplies, and that an additional one to one-half tons are required each month for his maintenance as a fighting man. With the exception of some airplanes and high priority material, these must all be transported by ships, the majority being a part of the American Merchant Marine. And these ships must be loaded in our ports and over our port facilities.
Our capacity to produce war equipment has expanded enormously and far exceeds the most optimistic predictions of the pre-war years. American fighting men have again demonstrated that their qualities and the efficiency of their equipment enable them to defeat anything that the enemy has to offer when met on equal terms. But one tremendous and often overlooked problem has been that of connecting the source of supply, the continental United States, with the places where this production can be used against our enemies on the far-flung battle fronts of the world. The bottleneck of our war potential has been our ability to transport. The amount of our war production which we can bring to bear against the enemy is only as great as the capacity of our ships to carry and of our port facilities to load. For irrespective of how great our production may be, our armies and our allies can utilize only that portion of it which can be carried to them by our ships.
During the early days of the war, serious obstacles to the delivery of these goods resulted from our shortage of vessels and from enemy submarine action. The latter problem has in large part been solved, although we are still handicapped by a need for additional bottoms. A new problem, however, has been added, in that the expansion in our overseas shipments has not been followed by a proportionate increase in our port facilities available to handle and load these war cargoes, so that the volume we can send abroad is now further limited by the lack of loading facilities.
Necessity for the maximum utilization of our ships and port facilities was recognized early in the war. It was then evident that all possible measures were required to prevent any injury or loss to port facilities or to vessels while in port which would hamper or delay the flow of war supplies. Any injury which resulted in lessening their capacity would directly and proportionately reduce our ability to wage war. To prevent this, the President delegated to the Secretary of the Navy the responsibility and authority for the safeguarding of our ports, harbors, vessels, and water-front facilities in the continental United States, Alaska, the Territory of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. In turn, the Secretary of the Navy delegated this job to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, to be exercised under the supervision of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.
Operating as an integral part of the Navy during war time, the Coast Guard has since handled this task. The job which it has done is worthy of note, not only because of its success, but because it constitutes a major naval activity directly affecting the operation of our ships and port facilities, and is closely related to the control of the Merchant Marine during war time. Moreover, the measures which have been taken for port protection in this country demonstrate what can be done in ports abroad which are and will be required to supply our troops in the field.
Adequate port protection measures have been complicated by war conditions and needs. The hurried turn-around of vessels, the required speedup in loading operations, the inexperienced personnel available, the lack of sufficient repair facilities to maintain ships and loading facilities in accordance with normal peace-time standards and, above all, the crowding of our major ports, contribute to the difficulties of the job. These have been superimposed upon the previously existing hazards resulting from the wooden construction of most water-front piers, the difficulties of combating fires aboard vessels, and the vulnerability of both vessels and facilities to unauthorized approaches from the water side.
Upon the Coast Guard was placed the burden of protecting all ports and vessels in port against injury from accident, negligence, and sabotage. To handle the job, Coast Guard personnel assigned to port security duties was expanded from a skeleton force in February, 1942, to almost 40,000 men at the height of the program. The number of regular Coast Guardsmen has now been reduced to about half that figure, with the present regular personnel now being augmented by temporary members of the Coast Guard Reserve. These Volunteer Forces are composed of civilians who, after training and uniforming, serve without pay a minimum of twelve hours a week in port security work. Over 50,000 of such volunteers are now actively serving in this program, relieving regular personnel for sea duty.
Direction of the protection program in each port is handled by Captains of the Port, Coast Guard officers detailed to this duty in 64 major port cities. These Captains of the Port head organizations of officers and men proportionate in size and experience with the work to be done in each port.
In dealing with civilian operators of vessels and facilities, a military organization such as the Coast Guard possesses only such powers as are granted to it by law. While the work to be done constitutes a military function, the fact that it is handled in relation to American citizens in non-war areas requires that all civilian rights be protected. Basic legal authority for the program is found in the Act of June 15, 1917, (USC Title 50, Sections 191-194 as amended) often referred to as the Espionage Act, and in Executive Order 9074. The former provides that during time of national emergency the Secretary of the Navy may make rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement of vessels in the territorial waters of the United States. The Executive Order provides that the Secretary of the Navy shall take such steps and issue such regulations and orders as shall be necessary for the safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, and water-front facilities. This Executive Order has been implemented by Public Law 127,78th Congress, approved July 9, 1943, which makes it a misdemeanor to violate regulations issued by the Secretary for port protection. Regulations which have been issued under the above authorities thus have the force of law and their violation is subject to criminal penalties. It is these regulations which form the basic framework for the structure of the port protection program.
Steps which have been taken for the protection of ports and vessels in port fall into three major categories: these are (1) control of personnel having access to vessels and water-front facilities; (2) fire protection activities; and (3) measures for the safe loading and stowage of dangerous cargoes.
Measures to control water-front personnel have been designed to limit the number of persons having access to vessels and waterfront facilities, to provide a means of checking on the background of persons to be admitted, and to bar all persons considered to be dangerous. The basis of this part of the port protection program is the Coast Guard identification card, which is a prerequisite to any person being permitted aboard vessels or water-front facilities. While these cards do not constitute passes in the sense that they do not authorize the admission of any person, no one can go aboard any vessel or water-front facility unless he possesses one of these cards. To obtain an identification card, an applicant must submit proof of his citizenship status, be sponsored by a reputable person or organization, be fingerprinted on forms cleared through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and submit photographs. By controlling the issuance of these cards and by denying or taking up such cards, substantial control has been exercised over all persons going into water-front areas. When it is necessary to remove personnel from the water front or to deny them access thereto, control of these identification cards provides the means of enforcing such orders.
In co-operation with this identification card program, owners of vessels and facilities have instituted pass systems which, while privately handled, are co-ordinated and supervised by the Captains of the Port. In order to go aboard a vessel or facility, therefore, regulations provide that a person must have an identification card issued by the Coast Guard, a pass approved by the owner and operator of the vessel or facility, and a legitimate reason for going aboard at the particular time he seeks to be admitted.
To control approaches to vessels and facilities from the water side, the Coast Guard has relied upon a licensing procedure and the utilization of harbor patrols for its enforcement. All vessels moving in or departing from local waters must obtain a license from the Captain of the Port, which licenses contain various restrictions as to areas in which the vessel shall not operate. Harbor patrols constantly checking upon moving vessels implement these license requirements and have been able to control operations of boats in port areas so as to insure that no unauthorized approaches are made to vessels or facilities. Combined with the establishment of restricted areas, anchorage areas, and explosive loading areas, in which small boat operations are not permitted, these measures have enabled the Coast Guard to keep out unauthorized persons and vessels from places important to the war program and vulnerable to injury.
Fire has been recognized as the greatest possible source of danger to vessels in port and to port facilities. During the pre-war years, loss from this cause had been huge, for the construction of vessels and waterfront facilities not only makes them particularly susceptible to fire but makes the combating of such fires extremely difficult and hazardous. One of the primary elements of the port protection job, therefore, has been the development of an adequate program for fire prevention and fire fighting.
The fire prevention phase of this work has been aimed toward removing fire hazards by improvement of housekeeping conditions, by changes in construction, and by the installation of protective devices. Officers and men well trained in this work, either through their pre-war experience or at Coast Guard schools, have been assigned to inspect all water-front facilities and to make recommendations for the removal of existing fire hazards. Owners and operators of waterfront facilities, local fire departments, insurance underwriters, and others have co-operated with almost complete unanimity in this work. The results which have been attained have been substantial; even with the great increase in the use of our port facilities, the number of water-front fires since the inception of this program has been reduced below the level of the pre-war years.
Despite preventive measures, some fires will nevertheless occur, so that it has been necessary also to provide an adequate firefighting program. Municipal fire departments are generally competent, but they have been handicapped in the past by the lack of specialized equipment and “know-how” to combat water-front and vessel blazes. Evidence of this inadequacy of equipment is shown by the fact that there were less than 40 fire boats in United States ports prior to the war, although it is impossible to combat such fires from the water side without these vessels. To remedy this situation, the Coast Guard has built or converted the largest fleet of fire boats in the world. That fleet now consists of 261 boats distributed among about 100 ports, the smallest having a pumping capacity of 2,000 gallons per minute and all containing the latest foam and fog equipment. It should be emphasized that this fire-fighting program is designed to supplement rather than to supplant the work of the municipal fire departments, and that it has been carried on in close co-operation with them. So successful has been this combined fire prevention and fire-fighting program that in the largest American port, water-front fire losses of millions of dollars during the year prior to the institution of the Coast Guard program were reduced to a few thousand dollars in the first year of its operation, even though the use of the port increased substantially during that period.
Modern warfare is largely based on the use of explosives and petroleum, and unbelievably huge quantities of these materials are being shipped abroad. Because of the hazardous nature of these articles, it is necessary that all possible precautions be taken in their handling, loading, and stowage. Failure to do so would result not only in a serious hazard to the vessel and her crew, but might destroy an entire area. The recent explosion of an explosive laden vessel at Bombay which wrecked that port, the Port Chicago blast, and the lessons learned from the Halifax disaster of the last war, have demonstrated the need for adequate supervision of these articles being placed aboard ships. Responsibility for the imposition of safe standards for loading and stowage was placed in the Coast Guard by Executive Order 9083, which transferred certain functions formerly exercised by the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation of the Department of Commerce. Such supervision now constitutes an integral part of the port security program.
Supervision of the loading of explosives and other dangerous articles is handled by specially trained Coast Guard details. All longshoremen are examined as to their knowledge of the products to be handled and the methods of handling them prior to their being issued explosive loading permits. All persons coming aboard explosive loading facilities or vessels are searched to insure that no potentially dangerous articles are brought aboard. All loading equipment such as winches, booms, and tackle is tested, and the construction of the magazine is examined to determine that it is in accordance with approved standards. No loading can be commenced prior to the filing of a stowage plan and its approval by the supervising Coast Guard explosives loading officer. The actual stowage is supervised by Coast Guard details to insure that it is in accordance with the safety standards established by the regulations. In exceptional cases, military necessity may require that a portion of these regulations be waived at the request of the Army or Navy, but every effort has been made by them to comply with these basic safety measures and to reduce such requests to a minimum.
For over a year and one-half, the Coast Guard has been supervising all explosive loadings aboard ships at Army Ports of Embarkation facilities. Recently the Coast Guard has also undertaken to supervise such loading at Navy facilities, and regulations for the loading of dangerous cargoes are now being applied to Navy shipments. Coast Guard Cargo Safety officers and enlisted men trained in this work are now being assigned to naval installations to handle this expanding task.
While the port security program has been extremely successful in the past, the job is by no means finished. On the contrary, its scope has been steadily expanding. The volume and importance of this work varies in direct proportion with the number of vessels and the quantity of war cargo passing through our ports, and, with our armies and allies on the offensive shipments of war cargoes have been steadily increasing. The job is not a glamorous one, nor is it one sought by the men required to perform it, but it must be successfully handled to insure the continued maximum flow of supplies to our armies abroad. With the experience gained in the past two years, there appears little question but that this work will not only be successfully carried on in American ports in the future, but will be expanded to foreign ports conquered by our armies and required as integral link in our chain of supply.