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Lieutenant (j.g.) Harold G. Williams, U. S. Naval Reserve, wrote the editor the following letter from France, September 30, 1944.
Not so very long ago I was attached to a Naval Reconnaissance Party for Lorient. Though the campaign of the Brittany peninsula was fast turning into a rout for the Kraut, they were putting up very stiff resistance in practically every port that could be of any use to us. They had also turned the entire peninsula into what we called Indian country. After the tragic fate of a previous reconnaissance party which the Jerries ambushed, killing Captain Ives and Lieutenant Commander Hooper, my commanding officer, we were given specific instructions not to advance to our objective until we had the permission of 8th Army Corps Headquarters. We, therefore, had to wait several days for the capitulation of the German garrison at St. Malo. It was while champing at the bit that we visited several of the neighboring towns.
On one of these occasions I casually inspected a bookstore that had been thoroughly ransacked by the Germans. Not expecting to find anything of interest, I was surprised to discover a book which was practically a century-old account of an eighteenth century sea-land engagement between the English and the French. It was not the official account of the battle, nor the letters of Louis XV, nor the diaries that caught my eye but the old lithographs portraying the amphibious warfare and gunfire of the English ships. I bought the book for 30 francs (60 cents). Upon returning to the bivouac area I opened the book and with the cutting of each new page my interest grew, for it was the account of a battle that had taken place 186 years previously in almost the same spot from which the reverberations of heavy cannon fire could be heard at that moment. After the fall of St. Malo, I visited most of the spots mentioned in the account of the battle.
Later we moved down to a charming little town called Pont Aven, formerly an artists’ colony founded by Gaugin, which was almost within hailing distance of Lorient and thousands of Germans. There we waited for the fall of Lorient, which, at this writing, has not yet been realized. Three weeks of waiting forced me to turn literary. If you can use this material in your magazine, it will make me feel that all of that time was not wasted. We were later recalled to Cherbourg where I had the lithographs photographed. They turned out very well being much clearer than the originals.
The Battle of St. Cast—Amphibious Warfare of the Eighteenth Century
Ever since man has been able to navigate large enough ships in sufficient numbers to attempt attacks on the coasts of England and France there has been amphibious warfare in the Channel. The attacks began centuries ago with the Vikings, eventually giving rise to the English and French navies, who in turn indulged themselves in this expensive and sanguinary activity. The Allied invasion of France this summer of 1944 is no more than the most gigantic and most successful amphibious invasion yet undertaken. This time the English come to France as liberators, but there were other days when they would have liked very much to gain a foothold on the French channel coast, and one of the most notable and little known examples of eighteenth century amphibious operations is the Battle of St. Cast.
This short but lively little battle was only one of many sea-land engagements which took place between France and England during the Seven Years’ War, when the French armies, discouraged and beaten, were, after the defeats at Minden and Cre- velt, thrown back across the Rhine by the
Prussian Army; and the French Navy, destroyed and driven from the seas by the English, could no longer counter the blows against Canada, India, and Senegal, nor even protect its own Channel coast. Pitt, the Prime Minister of England, no less bulldog than his modern counterpart, decided that beachheads on the coasts of the Breton and Cherbourg peninsulas would make powerful diversions in favor of Germany, ruin French commerce, and completely dissipate what was left of French morale. Thus in the summer and autumn of 1758 three expeditions were launched against the French littoral: the first in June, against St. Malo; another in August, against Cherbourg; the third in September, against St. Cast, a little to the right of Cape Frehel, northwest of St. Malo and Dinard. The first two landings met with practically no resistance and in a short time the British retired. The Battle of St. Cast, however, put a stop to these impertinent and humiliating raids.
On the morning of September 3, 1758, the Coast Guard observed from the ramparts of Cape Frehel about six leagues away, an English fleet of 105 sail1 directing its course towards the Bay de la Frenaie. Messengers were immediately dispatched to the leaders of all parishes in the neighborhood, while flame and smoke signaled from post to post the approach of the enemy.
However, the fleet, after having remained under sail the entire day, dropped anchor that night to the north of Pile Agot and to the east of Fort La Latte. The next morning it entered the mouth of the St. Briac River and discharged twelve to thirteen thousand soldiers on French soil. At once, General Bligh, Commander in Chief of the expedition, accompanied by the Prince of Wales, the future George III, set up camp near the village of St. Briac. From this position the English could move with equal ease on St. Malo and St. Servan, on Dinan, Lamballe or St. Brieuc. Before coming to a decision as to which one of these directions to take, General Bligh, following the usual customs of the day, looted a little, burned a little, and gen-
1 This number was recorded by the Marquis de la Chatre, commander of the garrison at St. Malo, who took part in the battle.
erally raised hell with the natives; then he pushed a reconnaissance party as far as Dinard.
While French troops and numerous volunteers in the neighborhood gathered at Lamballe and Dinan, previously designated places of rendezvous, St. Malo placed itself in a state of siege. M. de la Chatre provisioned his forts, established new batteries, and called on the town for detached companies of the Guet-de-la-Mer.[1] He then ordered the frigate Renoncule, commanded by M. du Chilleau, brought abeam of Dinard in order to render full effect of her port broadsides. The small boats on the Ranee River were seized and manned by corsairs.
On the 5th General Bligh appeared to decide in favor of St. Malo for his first attack. He moved his men half way to Dinard, strong detachments crowning the heights behind the harbor and others establishing themselves on the left bank of the Ranee. But they were immediately dislocated by heavy fire from the batteries from the frigate and the corsairs. Meanwhile, the English fleet, troubled by a strong west wind, was forced to find more secure anchorage in the waters near St. Cast. Gradually Bligh fell back to prepare land defenses so as to be able to protect the re-embarkation of his troops. The reason for the hasty retreat of seasoned English troops to prepared defenses when the French had very small and disorganized forces is inexplicable. While the English lost a great opportunity to deal a telling blow before they encountered any real resistance, the French rapidly assembled their forces. The Due d’Aiguillon, escorted by two squadrons of dragoons and 800 coast guardsmen, arrived at Plancoet to observe the enemy and prepare to attack. He ordered M. Morel d’Aubigny, who occupied Dinan with a considerable force, to advance on Ploer, and to send a detachment under the command of the Chevalier de Polignac as far as Pleurtuit, in order to be able to communicate with St. Malo. Simultaneously, M. de la Chatre left St. Malo with his group to harass the left flank of the enemy, advancing up to
Ploubalay and joining hands with de Polig- nac.
Bligh, perceiving that his position was no longer tenable, moved to Matignon and established himself in front of and behind the town, on the route to St. Brieuc, placing his right flank to the sea and his left to Saint- Pbtan, where the advance posts of the French, under the direction of the Chevalier de Saint-Pern, were located. This new position of the English general was not a happy one, for he found himself in the middle of the French forces and almost encircled. All this time French reinforcements hurried to join those already in the lines. M. de Balle- roy arrived at Henanbihen with two regiments and two squadrons of dragoons. He was followed by the regiment Royal-des- Vaisseaux which brought the artillery from Brest. An additional battalion joined the center of the line at Plancoet. De la Chfttre and d’Aubigny, bringing the artillery from St. Malo, filed behind the enemy and along his right flank in order to cut all communications with the sea. The time had arrived to commence the attack on all sides. If that had been done, not one of the thousands of English troops would have regained their ships. However, the Due d’Aiguillon was not satisfied with the location of several regiments. He delayed the attack for their relocation, but the strategic moment that comes to each battle was lost. The English began to retire to their ships during the night, covering their retreat by small advance posts which kept up a deceiving fire throughout the night.
On the morning of the 11th when the Duke discovered his mistake, he gave the order to his troops to move on St. Cast as rapidly as possible. The Duke, accompanied by his staff and some dragoons, rode to the coast and saw the English, defended by seven vessels and two bomb-ketches (Gali- otes a bombes), commence to board their ships in good order.
At 11:30 dispositions were taken for a general attack. The right was conducted by the Count de Balleroy, the center by the Marquis de Broc, the left by the Count d’Aubigny, and the reserves by the Chevalier de Saint-Pern. The artillery was placed on
the right wing, near the Moulin des Dunes.
D’Aubigny, fearing any further delay, attacked the hastily erected English defenses with the head of his column, composed of volunteers and three companies of grenadiers. At the same moment the English lines opened up with a withering barrage, the infantry firing at close range with great rapidity. The ships, moored abeam between, the points of de l’Isle and de la Garde, vomited bullets and bombs. D’Aubigny’s brave men had been obliged to stop at the foot of the enemy entrenchments by the unexpected hail of lead, but their audacity had given the signal for the general advance of the French forces from all directions. They scaled the sand dune trenches and fought hand to hand, shouting like mad, while French artillery sank several of the ships in the bay. Finally, after two hours of bewildering combat, the ebb tide forced the enemy fleet to weigh anchor and seek deeper waters. In the excitement they had apparently forgotten about the forty-nine-foot, four- knot tides that beset the bays of the St. Malo region.
The English losses were considerable. Three launches (chaloupes) loaded with troops were destroyed and several ships of the line set on fire. Of 3,000 prisoners, who were abandoned on the beach, 1,400 were killed or seriously wounded. Among the prisoners were four colonels, four naval captains (what they were doing ashore has not been explained), and four lieutenant-colonels. French losses were: seven officers killed, 57 wounded; 148 soldiers and petty officers killed and over 200 wounded. Casualties among the civilian volunteers, though not recorded, must have been exceedingly high.
The Battle of St. Cast has long been forgotten, but in its day, it too was important, for it put an end to the amphibious landings on the French coast which were so humiliating to Louis XV and La Belle France.
This account is taken from the official documents, letters and eyewitness accounts of St. Cast—Recueil de Pieces Officielles et de Documents conlemporains relalif au combat du 11 September 1758, published by the Soci6te Archeologique et Historique des C6tes-du-Nord, St. Brieuc, 1858.
[1] They were the mobile national guard of the times. Each caption of the Coast Guard had 10 of these companies with 50 men to each. Volunteers, they were either cannoneers or riflemen.