The magnitude of our amphibious warfare in both the European theater and in the Pacific makes careful research and study of similar operations in our naval history of particular interest at this time. From the British standpoint the amphibious campaign which culminated in disaster at the Battle of New Orleans was fraught with great possibilities. A success, and Canada’s Dominion might well have embraced the Mississippi Valley to find its southern boundary upon the Gulf of Mexico; a failure, it has never achieved the importance in our eyes this brilliant victory deserves. As in many another decisive battle, we little realize that the fate of a nation hung in the balance.
Current American history gives us a popular conception of the Battle of New Orleans as a victory for Andrew Jackson’s Tennessee and Kentucky riflemen who picked off the British infantry file by file as they charged toward our cotton-bale barricades. Add to these the doughty pirate artillerymen Jean LaFitte and Dominic You, and an aroused New Orleans citizenry backed by the prayers of the Ursuline nuns, and our Louisiana history is complete. The regular Army under Jackson is seldom mentioned, and few good Americans realize that the Navy was among those present. The British who were on the receiving end seem to have been much better informed in the premises. We may learn much by reviewing this intensely interesting campaign from the British point of view.
Actually this campaign affords one of the finest examples of joint Army-Navy operations in our history. It also affords a fine example of moral courage wherein a naval commander refused to embark upon a venture which his professional experience told him was doomed to failure. Again, it gives us some of the most brilliant pages of our naval history in which good hard fighting found the best traditions of the Navy gloriously upheld. Finally, it gives us a fascinating study of hard military facts in one of the bloodiest campaigns ever to take place on our soil. Hundreds of the finest professional soldiers in the world died on the fields of Chalmette in their attempt to spread the British Empire to the mouth of the Mississippi. Let us give a glorious victory over stout foemen its just due, and not consider the Battle of New Orleans a useless conflict because a piece of paper saying “Let there be peace” had been signed in Ghent a few days before. With all credit for the indomitable courage and persistence displayed by all arms on both sides, the victory was won by the tactical genius of General Jackson. While this narrative is principally concerned with the naval aspects of that victory, we may learn much by considering the tactical mistakes of those charged with this huge amphibious undertaking—the British.
From the British standpoint, the campaign for the capture of New Orleans had everything in its favor. Politically the concept was sound. Britain had refused to recognize the secret treaty of San Ildefonso by which Spain had transferred the West Floridas (Louisiana) to France. According to the British concept, France did not own the territory she sold in 1803, and for the United States the Louisiana Purchase was presumed invalid. Should Britain by force of arms release this territory, a generous Spain just freed from Bonaparte’s yoke by the British successes in the Peninsular wars might be expected to cede these former possessions to the British Crown. Strategically the concept was equally sound. The campaign of the preceding year had been a military failure. The attempt to cut New England off from the southern states by an invasion from Canada toward the Hudson River Valley had failed by reason of Macdonough’s brilliant victory on Lake Champlain. The fleet operations in the Chesapeake, diversionary in character, had resulted in the successful raid and burning of Washington, but had come upon near disaster in the assault on Baltimore. The plan to seize New Orleans far surpassed in scope any of these previous operations. To hold the mouth of the Mississippi meant visions of a new empire, the domination of the Caribbean. The United States, strategically outflanked, would be pinned to their Eastern Seaboard and at one stroke be reduced to impotency.
The “background for war” in 1814 was a gloomy one for the United States. All our shipping had been bottled up in port and New England was sick of the war. President Madison sat amid the ruins of his capitol with the strings of an empty purse in one hand, the resignation of an incompetent Secretary of War in the other, and the clamor of New England politicians for peace at any price ringing in his ears. No one could know that the wings of victory at New Orleans would in a few years bring the fighting spirit of the west to the White House in the person of Andrew Jackson.
The one bright spot in the gloomy picture lay in the consummate skill with which our peace commissioners used Macdonough’s victory on Lake Champlain to gain a favorable treaty of peace. This battle of words resulted in a clean-cut victory for America, but the Treaty of Ghent made no mention of it. The treaty merely terminated the war on the basis of a return to all things as they were. Nothing more; no guarantees. This treaty awaited ratification, and the British alone could know that their troops were on the seas. Naturally, no one at Ghent could know that two battles had already been fought before New Orleans.
This treaty was signed on December 24, 1814; and although the main British assault on the defenses of New Orleans did not take place until January 8, 1815, five sharp engagements with the enemy prior to that day had shown the temper of the defenders, delayed the British advance, and given Jackson the time he so sorely needed to organize his defense. The first of these actions was naval in character; in at least three of them the Navy may be said to have saved New Orleans.
And now to bring the background closer. The British Fleet and Expeditionary Force consisting of over fifty men-of-war and transports under the supreme command of Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane in the 74-gun ship of the line Royal Oak had sailed from Jamaica on November 26. Embarked in the fleet were 9,600 of Britain’s finest troops, veterans of the Peninsular campaign in Spain, under the command of Major General Keane. Also embarked were an entire retinue of military government officials, together with their wives, ready to assist Sir Edward Pakenham after he had issued the royal proclamation establishing a new government at New Orleans.
To oppose this mighty array, the largest force ever sent against the United States, Master Commandant Daniel T. Patterson, U. S. Navy, had at his command the sloop- of-war Louisiana of 16 guns and the schooner Carolina of 14 guns in the river, and five gunboats of five guns each and two one-gun cutters in Lake Borgne. Since the handling of this small squadron constitutes an epic in naval annals, and one of the finest examples of complete co-operation of naval forces in military operations which our history affords, a digression at this point to present some light on Patterson’s ability, his intimate knowledge of local conditions, and his uncanny foresight in his preparations for the defense of the city seems indicated.
The vast territory of Louisiana came to the United States in 1803 and in the same year the Navy established a naval station and a marine barracks at New Orleans. The opening of the second war with Great Britain found Commodore Patterson at New Orleans. Having completed one long tour of duty here he returned in 1808, and finally assumed command in December, 1813. Major Latour, one of the most trustworthy American contemporary historians of this campaign, wrote that Commodore Patterson “was perfectly familiar with our coast, and consequently knew what means were necessary to defend it.”
Patterson’s ability was clearly displayed well in advance of the campaign itself. General Jackson, believing that the British would make their major effort against Mobile, had stationed himself there, and on August 27, requested Patterson to join him with all the armed vessels at his command. Commodore Patterson, well knowing that his small squadron would be lost were he to leave the shoal waters in the approaches to Lake Borgne and Lake Ponchartrain, replied on September 2,1814, informing the general (to use Patterson’s own words) of his “most ardent wish” to co-operate with the Army under General Jackson “in every measure where it is practicable with the naval force” under his command, and that he would “most readily and with all his heart so cooperate” when he could “do so without exposing” his “vessels to a certain loss from a too superior force or placing them in a situation where they would be blockaded and effectually cut off from New Orleans,” or “from acting in concert for the protection of the sea-board generally . . . .” Commodore Patterson informed General Jackson that if his vessels once entered Mobile Bay, “the enemy would most unquestionably prevent their leaving it again, during the war,” and that “the consequence would be, that for want of the necessary supplies, he should soon be compelled to lay them up.” In this historic refusal, Commodore Patterson informed General Jackson that he refused his request because otherwise the “highly important city” of New Orleans
the great depot of the Western country would be left open to the enemy, who would in that event be able without difficulty to introduce in the country any number of troops they might wish without opposition and obtain possession of it ere it were known in New Orleans that they were on the coast.
With due respect for the opinions of the Naval Commander and the soundness of his decision, we must not forget Jackson’s remarks regarding the strategic importance of Mobile:
A real military man, with full knowledge of the geography of . . . this country, would first possess himself of that point [Mobile], draw to his standard the Indians, and march direct to the Walnut Hills [site of the present city of Vicksburg] . . . and being able to forage on the country, support himself, cut off all supplies from above and make this country an easy conquest.
The British activity at Pensacola which had only recently been brilliantly countered by Jackson’s raid had also served to confirm him in the importance of Fort Bowyer and Mobile. We may take as our first lesson that most “after the battle” strategists agree that the British might have done better had they centered their assault on Mobile and gained more room for maneuver of their veteran troops.
However, Patterson’s letter to the Secretary of the Navy of November 18, two weeks before Jackson’s arrival in New Orleans, and almost two months before the Battle of New Orleans, was remarkable in its prophecy. Having planned with his gunboats and other small craft to retard the enemy on the lake, and to use fire vessels against them on the river, the Commodore informed the Secretary that he was planning to man the Louisiana so as to render her useful (and again to quote his words) in
cooperation with the batteries on shore: to cover any attack that may be made upon the enemy by land, in event of their landing troops and marching up on the borders of the river, and to annoy them on their march, from her upper deck guns which are high enough to fire over the levee with great effect; nor can the enemy get beyond the reach of her guns, having but a narrow slip of land to march on, on one side of which is the river and on the other side an impenetrable morass, through which an army cannot march nor transport artillery.
The enemy did attack over this “narrow slip” of land and the Louisiana’s battery was tremendously effective in the actions on December 28, January 1, and the fateful January 8.
The British Fleet cast anchor off the Chandeleur Islands at the entrance to Lake Borgne on December 10. To harass the landing operations and delay the passage of British troops across Lake Borgne in every way possible, Patterson stationed his gunboats under the command of Lieutenant Thomas ap Catesby Jones in the shallow waters inside the Pass Christian where no heavily gunned ships could follow them. There is no better way to describe an action than to follow the words of eyewitnesses. The following is from a British Army officer’s diary*—
December 13th five large cutters, armed with six heavy guns each, were seen at anchor in the distance, and as all endeavors to land, till these were captured, would have been useless, the transports and largest of the gun-brigs cast anchor, while the smaller craft gave chase to the enemy.
Actually there were 23 guns and 204 men in Catesby Jones’ little squadron, and to oppose them the British now brought up a small army in boats, 45 boats mounting one gun each, and carrying embarked almost 1,200 soldiers, sailors, and marines under the command of Captain Lockyer, R.N. For an account of this naval action the official report of Lieutenant Catesby Jones to Commodore Patterson follows.
On the 12th December 1814 the enemy’s fleet off Ship Island had encreased to such force as to render it no longer safe or prudent for me to continue in that part of the Lakes with the small force that I commanded. I therefore determined to gain a station near the Malheureux Islands as soon as possible which situation would better enable me to oppose a further penetration of the enemy up the Lakes, and at the same time afford me an opportunity of retreating to the Petite Coquilles if necessary.
At 10 a.m. on the 13th, I discovered a large Flotilla of Barges had left the Fleet (shaping their course towards the Pass Christian) which I supposed to be a disembarkation of troops, intending to land at that place, about 2 p.m. the enemy’s Flotilla having gained the Pass Christian and continuing their course to the Westward, convinced me that an attack on the gunboats was their design.
About 1 a.m. on the 14th the wind having entirely died away, and our vessels become unmanageable, came to anchor in the West end of Malheureux Islands Passage. [This is now known as Grand Island Passage, just off the mouth of Pearl River.] At daylight next morning still a perfect calm, the enemy’s Flotilla was about 9 miles from us at anchor, but soon got in motion and rapidly advanced towards us. The want of wind, and the strong ebb tide which was setting through the pass left me but one alternative which was to put my vessel in the most advantageous position to give the enemy as warm a reception as possible. The Commanders were all called on board, and made acquainted with my intentions and the position which each vessel was to take, the whole to form a close line abreast across the channel anchored by the stern with springs on the cables. Thus we remained anxiously awaiting an attack from the advancing foe whose forces I now clearly distinguished to be composed of forty-two heavy launches, and gun boats, with three light giggs manned with upwards of one thousand men and officers. At 10:30 the enemy weighed, forming a line abreast in open order, and steered direct for our line which was unfortunately in some degree broken by the force of the current driving Nos. 156 and 163, about 100 yards in advance; as soon as the enemy came within reach of our shot, a deliberate fire from our long guns was opened upon him but without much effect, the object being of so small a size. At 10 before 11, the enemy opened a fire from the whole of his line when the action became general, and destructive to both sides. About 11:49 the advance boats of the enemy, three in number, attempted to board No. 156 but were repulsed with the loss of nearly every officer killed or wounded and two boats sunk; a second attempt was then made by four other boats which shared almost a similar fate; at this moment I received a severe wound in my left shoulder, which compelled me to quit the deck leaving it in charge of Mr. George Parker, Masters Mate, who gallantly defended the vessel until he was severely wounded when the enemy by his superior numbers succeeded in gaining possession of the deck about 10 minutes past 12 o’clock. The enemy immediately turned the guns of his prize on the other gun boats, and fired several shots previous to striking the American colours; the action continued with unabating severity until 40 minutes past 12 o’clock when it terminated with the surrender of No. 23 all the other vessels having previously fallen into the hands of the enemy.
In this unequal contest our loss in killed and wounded has been trifling compared to that of the enemy which amounts to nearly four hundred.
Enclosed you will receive a list of the killed and wounded and a correct statement of the force which I had the honor to command at the commencement of the action, together with an estimate of the force I had to content against, as acknowledged by the enemy, which will enable you to decide how far the honor of our country’s flag has been supported in this conflict.
With much respect
I have the honor to be Sir
Your Obedient servant
(Signed) Thos. Ap. Catesby Jones
Lieut. Commdt. U. S. Navy
In this severely fought gunboat action the Navy met defeat at the hands of a vastly superior force; but several valuable days were gained by General Jackson in his preparations for the City’s defense.
The British now landed their whole army on what was then called Pea Island, now known as Pearl River Island (a 30-mile pull under oars); and on December 23 the first detachment of 1,600 men (all their boats could transport at one time), landed at the mouth of Bayou Bienvenu. This small army made its way up the bayou to the Villeré plantation near Chalmette without opposition or word reaching Jackson until that night. General Keane now set out his pickets and went into bivouac for the night—his left resting on the levee, and his right reaching nearly to the swamp he had just traversed during his advance. How the British got up the Bayou Bienvenu undetected was a subject for much uncomplimentary discussion later, but having attained complete surprise they failed to exploit it. Colonel Thornton with his 85th Light Infantry wished to attack at once, but General Keane had been informed that Jackson was before him in superior force and decided to wait for reinforcements. A second mistake on the part of the British was in allowing young Villeré to escape and get the word to Jackson. There was no hesitation here. Jackson attacked at once. Moreover, in order further to disrupt the British bivouac, he ordered the Carolina down the river to take the British position in enfilade. The effectiveness of Commodore Patterson’s dispositions, and the effect of naval gunfire in 1814 may be found in the following excerpts from the British officer’s diary on the events of that night:
But about half-past seven o’clock, the attention of several individuals was drawn to a large vessel, which seemed to be stealing up the river till she came opposite to our camp; when her anchor was dropped, and her sails leisurely furled. At first we were doubtful whether she might not be one of our own cruisers which had passed the port unobserved, and had arrived to render her assistance in our future operations. To satisfy this doubt, she was repeatedly hailed, but returned no answer; when an alarm spreading through the bivouac, all thought of sleep was laid aside. Several musket shots were now fired at her with the design of exacting a reply, of which no notice was taken; till at length having fastened all her sails, and swung her broadside towards us, we could distinctly hear some one cry out in a commanding voice “Give them this for the honour of America.” The words were instantly followed by flashes of her guns, and a deadly shower of grape swept down numbers of our camp.
Against this dreadful fire we had nothing whatever to oppose. The artillery which we had landed was too light to bring into competition with an adversary so powerful; and as she had anchored within a short distance of the opposite bank, no musketry could reach her with any precision or effect. A few rockets were discharged, which made a beautiful appearance in the air; but the rocket is an uncertain weapon, and these deviated too far from their object to produce even terror among those against whom they were directed. Under these circumstances, as nothing could be done offensively, our sole object was to shelter the men as much as possible from this iron hail. With this view, they were commanded to leave the fires, and to hasten under the dyke. Thither all, accordingly, repaired, without much regard to order and regularity, and laying ourselves along wherever we could find room, we listened in painful silence to the scattering of grape shot among our huts, and to the shrieks and groans of those who lay wounded beside them.
Under cover of this enfilading fire from the schooner Carolina Jackson himself led his men to the attack, and fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued in the blackness of the night. The Americans eventually withdrew taking 66 prisoners with them. Their loss was 139 killed and wounded, with 74 taken prisoner. The British lost 204 killed and wounded, a casualty list of almost one in five showing the spirit with which this action was fought.
It was now evident to Keane that no advance could be made while the Louisiana and Carolina could take station on his flank. In the words of the diary again:
Our advance was still fettered to the bank, from which it was additionally prevented from moving by the arrival of another large ship, which cast anchor about a mile above the schooner. Thus were three battalions kept stationary by the guns of these two formidable floating batteries, and it was clear that no attempt to extricate them could be made without great loss, unless under cover of night. During the whole of the 24th, therefore, they remained in this uncomfortable situation; but as soon as darkness had well set in, a change of position was effected. To march by the only road was rendered impracticable, so completely was it commanded by the shipping. In a word, all things had turned out diametrically opposite to what had been anticipated; and it appeared, that instead of a trifling affair more likely to fill our pockets than to add to our renown; we had embarked in an undertaking which presented difficulties not to be surmounted without patience and determination.
On December 25, Christmas Day, General Sir Edward Pakenham arrived and took command—the whole British force was now arriving on the scene. Pakenham realized immediately that his men could not even get in position while the ships commanded his flank, and during the night he ordered up a battery of nine field pieces and two howitzers. At daybreak on the 26th this battery opened up on the schooner Carolina with red-hot shot, setting her on fire. Her crew then abandoned ship and she blew up. The Louisiana by dint of vast exertion warped herself out of range and escaped up the river, taking position to command the entire front of Jackson’s position. The immediate menace of the shipping being removed, here again a quotation from the British officer’s diary will afford a most accurate narrative:
We advanced about four or five miles without the smallest check or hinderance; when, at length, we found ourselves in view of the enemy’s army, posted in a very advantageous manner. About forty yards in their front was a canal, which extended from the morass to within a short distance of the high road. Along their line were thrown up breast-works, not indeed completed, but even now formidable. Upon the road, and at several other points were erected powerful batteries; while the ship, with a large flotilla of gunboats, flanked the whole position from the river. Scarcely had the head of the column passed the houses, when a deadly fire was opened from both the battery and the shipping. That the Americans are excellent shots, as well with artillery as with rifles, we have had frequent cause to acknowledge; but perhaps, on no occasion did they assert their claim to the title of good artillerymen more effectually than on the present. Scarce a bullet passed over, or fell short of its mark, but all striking full into the midst of our ranks, occasioned terrible havoc. The infantry, however, was not long suffered to remain thus exposed; but, being ordered to quit the path, and to form line in the fields, the artillery was brought up, and opposed to that of the enemy. But the contest was in every respect unequal, since their artillery far exceeded ours, both in numerical strength and weight of metal. The consequence was, that in half an hour, two of our field-pieces, and one field-mortar, were dismounted; many of the gunners were killed; and the rest, after an ineffectual attempt to silence the fire of the shipping, were obliged to retire.
After this setback Pakenham decided he must bring up his heavy guns—practically a siege train—to silence the batteries on the opposite shore and put the Louisiana out of action. Because of this respite Jackson was enabled to strengthen his position still further. For four days the British struggled with sea and swamp by day and moved their heavy guns into position across Jackson’s front by night—and for four days men and guns poured into New Orleans and men worked feverishly to meet the British challenge. Patterson now removed the unengaged side of his battery from the Louisiana and mounted these guns and several others to be served by the Marines in two very strong redoubts on the levee—still commanding the flank of the British advance.
On January 1 these guns got their trial by fire. The British formed up their army for the assault and opened up with their artillery preparation along the whole line from their prepared positions. But the diary of the British officer can again present the best account of the ensuing action.
A heavy cannonade therefore commenced on both sides, and continued during the whole of the day; till, towards evening, our ammunition began to fail, and our fire in consequence to slacken. The fire of the Americans, on the other hand, was redoubled; landing a number of guns from the flotilla, they increased their artillery to a prodigious amount; and directing at the same time, the whole force of their cannon on the opposite bank against the flank of our batteries, they soon convinced us, that all endeavours to surpass them in this mode of fighting would be useless. Once more, therefore, were we obliged to retire, leaving our heavy guns to their fate; but as no attempt was made by the Americans to secure them, working parties were again sent out after dark, and such as had not been destroyed, were removed.
Of the fatigue undergone during these operations by the whole army, from the General down to the meanest sentinel, it would be difficult to form an adequate conception. For two whole nights and days, not a man had closed an eye, except such as were cool enough to sleep amidst showers of cannon-ball; and during the day, scarcely a moment had been allowed, in which we were able to do so much as break our fast. We retired, therefore, not only baffled and disappointed, but in some degree disheartened and discontented.
Finding himself overmatched in artillery, largely due to enfilade fire from the Louisiana and Patterson’s shore batteries on his flank, Pakenham now resolved to send a force across the river and take these batteries in reverse. At the same time he made preparations for a general frontal assault on the American position.
The British 85th Light Brigade was assigned the task of crossing the river to silence or capture Patterson’s batteries. To carry these 1,400 men across the river many boats from the British Fleet were needed; and the week from January 2 to January 8 was consumed in digging a canal from the bayou to the river for the passage of these boats. Sailors from the fleet aided the troops by working in shifts on this canal. By January 8 all was in readiness for the combined assault.
While Pakenham thus busied himself with his plans to capture Patterson’s batteries and rid the river of the troublesome shipping, Jackson was enabled to render his position almost impregnable to a frontal assault. Patterson was also busy across the river and increased the strength of his redoubt batteries with several additional guns.
He had also kept Jackson informed of the enemy’s activities by frequent reconnaissance trips down the river, and to quote from his official report to the Secretary of the Navy,
During greater part of 7th reconnoitered the enemy at Villeries Plantation, whose canal I was informed they were deepening, and opening into the River for the purpose of getting their Launches in, which upon examination with my glass I found to be true, and informed Genl. Jackson of my observations, by letters, copies of which I enclose herewith.
Consequently Jackson was ready for the British on the 8th. The British plan was simple. Their 85th Light Brigade was to cross the river during the night of the 7th and fall on the naval and marine batteries from the flank and rear in the darkness of the early morning hours. A rocket was to signal the completion of their task, at which time Pakenham would assault along the front.
The execution of this plan was faulty, due primarily to natural obstacles. The banks of the newly dug canal fell in, and delayed the passage of the boats. Less than 400 men of the Light Brigade succeeded in crossing the river; and they did not even effect a landing until after daybreak, farther down stream than planned. Insufficient allowance had been made for a stronger current in the river. Pakenham waited in vain for the sound of
firing which would herald the attack upon the batteries across the river—his troops had been formed up for hours for the assault. At daylight the American batteries opened on the closely formed British troops, and Pakenham, faced with the destruction of his troops where they stood, must advance or retire. He ordered them to the assault, a fatal decision. A realistic picture from the British point of view is again presented by the diary.
Hastening forward, our troops soon reached the ditch; but to scale the parapet without ladders was impossible. Some few, indeed, by mounting one upon another’s shoulders succeeded in entering the works, but these were instantly overpowered, most of them killed, and the rest taken; while as many as stood without were exposed to a sweeping fire, which cut them down by whole companies. It was in vain that the most obstinate courage was displayed. They fell by the hands of men whom they absolutely did not see; for the Americans, without so much as lifting their faces above the rampart, swung their firelocks by one arm over the wall, and discharged them directly upon their heads. The whole of the guns, likewise, from the opposite bank, kept up a well directed and deadly cannonade upon their flank; and thus were they destroyed without an opportunity being given of displaying their valour or obtaining so much as revenge.
And, on the opposite bank of the river, although the Light Brigade carried our redoubts in a very spirited attack they were hours too late. Morgan’s poorly equipped and untrained militia were dispersed, and Patterson’s handful of navy and marine gunners were driven out of their works, but not until they had spiked their guns to prevent their use by the enemy. The work of these batteries had been done, the main assault had been broken up. The shattered British troops had withdrawn from the field of battle, carrying the mortally wounded Pakenham with them.
Jackson had won the day for America. The greatest amphibious operation ever attempted against our shores had failed. Today, as we march shoulder to shoulder with the British in an assault upon the common foe, there can remain little doubt that all Britain will join us in rejoicing that Fortune failed to smile upon her battle standards before the ramparts of New Orleans more than one hundred years ago.
*A Narrative of the Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans in the years 1814-1815. (Anon.) By an officer who served in the expedition. Published by John Murray, London, 1821. Note: This officer is believed to have been an officer of the 85th Light Infantry, possibly Colonel William Thornton, one of the finest regimental commanders in the British Army.