Already the political form of the post-war world is crystallizing. Its future . . shape and some of its fundamental Policies were outlined at the conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin, held in Tehran, Iran (Persia), December 1, 1943. The military staffs joined the chiefs of state in the round table discussions and . . . concerted … plans for the destruction of the German forces, after which Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt affirmed their solemn conviction at no power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their - oats by sea, and their war plants from the air.” To hasten the downfall of the Nazis, they promised, “Our attacks will be relentless and increasing.” They deprived Hitler of any hope he might have entertained of dividing the United Nations and winning the peace by formally announcing their agreement to work together in the war and in the Peace to follow.”
Having emphasized their determination to overthrow Nazidom in Europe, the three conferees invited the co-operation of the small nations in the new world order and made specific pledges “for the maintenance of the independent sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Iran,” the state where the conference was held. These pledges refuted two items of German propaganda; first, the assertion that the small nations of Europe would be snuffed out by Russia if the United Nations won; and second, the prophecy that Great Britain and Russia would quarrel over spheres of influence in Persia and control of the Persian Gulf. The statement issued by the leaders of three great powers ended with this firm and cordial sentiment, “We came here with hope and determination; we leave here friends in fact, in spirit, and in purpose.”
The meeting in Teheran climaxed the conference at Moscow and the one at Cairo where Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt discussed with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek problems of equal interest; namely, the plan of campaign against Japan and the future of the Far East. The meeting in Cairo was equally harmonious, and its objectives were outlined in more detail. The leaders pledged their nations to the complete defeat of Japan and to the restitution of territory seized by her during the past fifty years. China was promised the restoration of her continental areas now held by Nipponese armies, including Manchuria; also, the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores which China lost in 1894. Japan will also be deprived of her gains made in the war with Russia in 1904-05 and the World War of 1914-18 and restricted to her home islands, from whence she launched her career of conquest. In due course, Korea will be granted her independence. The decisions made at Cairo are as far- reaching and will probably prove quite as interesting to the United States as those made at Teheran.
The basis for the understanding reached at Teheran can be traced to two important decisions made in the summer of 1941 when the Germans invaded Russia. In his long and colorful career, Prime Minister Churchill never displayed greater wisdom and courage than in his instantaneous resolve to go to the assistance of Russia in her hour of trial. Our State Department had previously warned the Kremlin of Hitler’s intentions to attack Russia, and Churchill’s action was promptly supported by President Roosevelt who extended American aid to Russia before the United States entered the war. The generous assistance given to the Soviet armies in that early period must have convinced Field Marshal Stalin and his General Staff that Great Britain and the United States were true friends of Russia in spite of Anglo-American dislike for communism. A year later, London and Moscow negotiated a twenty-year alliance, which further cemented the ties between the two countries and which can merge into a larger international association or serve as an Anglo-Russian auxiliary to the Four-Power Pact recently signed at Moscow. In either event, the Anglo-Russian alliance furnishes the diplomatic machinery to settle problems that primarily concern the two signatories or their European neighbors and only ultimately affect the United States and China.
Although Churchill and Roosevelt had both contributed to a better understanding between the English-speaking nations and Russia, it was the Moscow Conference attended by the three Foreign Ministers, Mr. Hull, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Molotoff, that resolved the residual differences between the three nations and facilitated the agreement reached at Teheran. And, while Anthony Eden made a large contribution to the success of the negotiations, enough is now known to claim for the Honorable Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, a lion’s share of the credit. The natural candor, the native sagacity, and the simple, straightforward approach of the Tennessee statesman removed the last barrier between Stalin and his two fighting comrades, Churchill and Roosevelt. Mr. Hull, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Molotoff were fully aware of their responsibilities and approached the difficult problems soberly but courageously. They considered pressing problems first, settled those demanding immediate solution in principle, and provided commissions, military or diplomatic, to make the settlements effective. Questions dependent upon future developments were naturally reserved for further discussions through diplomatic channels.
The three Foreign Ministers invited the Chinese Ambassador to the Kremlin to participate in the discussions affecting the Far East, and he was subsequently authorized to sign the pact for China. This turned the meeting into a four-power conference and thus prepared the way for the discussions between Chiang Kai-shek, Churchill, and Roosevelt at Cairo, which probably settled the fate of the Far East in our time. The decisions made at the Cairo meeting place the seal of diplomatic approval on a program for the return of provinces successively sliced from China, but it should not be forgotten that the salvation of that infant republic was made possible by the bravery, devotion, and newly aroused patriotism of the Chinese people, who have fought and built, literally with their fists and hands, against Japan for twelve long years. And it was Generalissimo Chiang who supplied the inspiration and the leadership to his indomitable people.
The Cairo and Teheran Conferences were the capstones, but military officers will find the future directives for the armed forces in t e decisions made at the Moscow Conference, particularly the one reaffirming the determination of the four powers, “to continue hostilities against those active powers with which they respectively are at war until sue powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender.” This firm resolve destroyed the last hope that Berlin or Tokyo may have entertained of dividing the Big Four and obtaining a separate peace in either Moscow, London, Washington, or Chungking. Its public announcement must have had a particularly depressing effect on the German home front, for Goebbels’ agents had been assuring the Reich that if their armies failed, peace could be secured by their diplomats whenever the Nazi High Command thought it was necessary.
The pledge of the Big Four to continue the war together is of paramount importance at present. Its effect on the future of the world may be surpassed by the second resolve of this Conference which indicated that the our plenipotentiaries were “conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggressions,” and cognized “the necessity of insuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the worlds human and economic resources for armament.” To meet these future responsibilities, they jointly pledged their countries to a “Seven Point” program with the purpose of preserving a peace worthy of the sacrifices required by this war.
As the first step toward an enduring peace, the conferees promised to act together “in matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of their enemy,” and to “take the measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.” In these two statements, the four powerful plenipotentiaries showed that the governments they represented had profited by the experience of the last World War; for if, in 1918, the victorious nations had agreed to act together to prevent Germany from violating the Versailles Treaty, the present war might have been averted.
Provision number four in the Conference indicates a recognition of the need to establish at the earliest practicable date a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security. All nations, large or small, would be eligible for membership in this federation of the world, whose basic principle would be the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states. With the Big Four as a nucleus, other nations could be joined in a voluntary association of sovereign states provided only that they really be “peace-loving.” Naturally, the other members of the United Nations would be among the first to be admitted, and this number would include Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Norway, Greece, Belgium, and Yugoslavia among the European states.
The plenipotentiaries declared their purpose “of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order by consulting with one another and with other members of the United Nations in order to obtain joint action.” This very practical suggestion indicates that the responsible statesmen of four great nations realize force is still necessary in the present state of world civilization. And force means organized land, sea, and air strength.
To reassure smaller nations, they added in point number six their promise not to employ their military forces within the territories of other states “except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.” This self-denying clause was explained by Secretary Hull in his report to the Congress, as follows: “The Soviet Union, Great Britain, United States, and China have laid the foundation for a cooperative effort in the post-war world” which would enable all “peace-loving” nations—large or small—“to live in peace and security, to preserve the liberties and rights and facilities for economic and spiritual progress.” Force and power are necessary attributes of any form of government, be it a city, a state, an empire, or an international federation. But there is always danger that the power inherent in such institutions may be used to abuse individuals or weaker nations. This proviso of the Moscow agreement protects a weaker nation in the same manner that the Bill of Rights in the United States’ Constitution protects the rights of an individual American citizen. If this promise of four great nations is faithfully kept, the smaller nations need not be apprehensive that their rights and liberties will be curtailed. This is the most important point of the agreement. When three European Emperors formed the Holy Alliance in 1815, they professed very worthy motives, admitted other nations to the Alliance, but offered no safeguards Jo small states. And, within a decade, the Holy Alliance became an international menace.
The last point, number seven, contained the promise of the Foreign Ministers not to expend more resources and men, in obtaining international security, than is necessary. It reads as follows: The four powers “will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.” No patriotic military institution can justify unnecessary expenditures of men and material on armaments, which are always a means to an end. The purpose of armed forces is the protection of the national honor and the interests of a nation. Any government that would expend more money or men on armaments than is necessary lowers the standard of living of its people.
The Moscow declaration was no scrap of paper, signed in a burst of temporary enthusiasm engendered by diplomatic maneuvering; it represents the determination of the nations as well as the convictions of their statesmen in Moscow. In Washington, the House of Representatives had already passed a resolution in favor of American participation in some international organization to preserve the peace after the present war. The United States Senate, which had under consideration a similar measure, hastened to include the principles of this Conference in its resolution. Shortly after, Prime Minister Winston Churchill accepted these principles for Great Britain. On November 6, Stalin gave his approval to “the historic decisions of the Moscow Conference” which will lead to “final victory over the enemy.” Chiang Kaishek has attested that China is a willing partner not only for the duration of the war but for the post-war period.
The results of the Conference met with equal support from the peoples of at least two countries. On November 20, the London Times, which often voices the views of the Foreign Office and always reflects a substantial section of British opinion, completed a series of three articles on “The Development of British Foreign Policy.” The Times asserted that few (British) thinkers denied the need of alliances to give requisite military power to the British Empire. And, although Great Britain had the same traditional dislike of foreign entanglements entertained by States, the Times concluded that It is inconceivable that any world organization could fulfill its purposes if it did not enjoy the whole-hearted, united, and consistent power of the three Moscow Conference powers and assured of that backing, it is inconceivable that the world organization would fail since the foundations for a new world order had been laid at Moscow. The press of the United States almost unanimously praised the work of the Conference. And Secretary of State Hull was given an ovation by members of Congress when he reported the results of the Conference to a joint session of the House and Senate.
For the commanders of the armed forces of the associated nations, the most important act is the determination of the four powers to establish and maintain international peace and security during the transition from war to peace, “with the least diversion of the worlds human and economic resources for armaments.” To military leaders of Russia, China, Great Britain, and the United States, his is both a challenge and an opportunity, t is the first concrete and official statement by civilian rulers of the four satisfied nations hat armaments are necessary to protect their interests and to maintain the peace of the world.
Between 1921 and 1939, a frantic obsession Prevailed in Great Britain, France, and the United States that armaments in themselves caused war. In their anxiety to avoid war, citizens of these three nations scrapped their armaments by actual destruction or a process of obsolescence. The United States took the lead in disarmament and persuaded the peaceful nations to renounce war as an instrument of policy, an act that made easy the path of the aggressor nations. The people of the United Kingdom always recognized that they needed a powerful navy, and except for the limitations imposed by treaties with the United States, their government would have created one. The French people likewise realized they needed a powerful army to confront Germany. But no large group of Americans recognized the need for either an army or a navy.
The approach to the problem of maintaining the peace by the plenipotentiaries at the Moscow Conference means that the four powers will not attempt to re-establish a new world order at one peace conference, or to formulate a world constitution at one international assembly. Instead, they will approach the problem of re-establishing peace and world order gradually and during the interim will conform to policies outlined and agreed upon by the four powers—Great Britain, the United States, Russia, and China—who have contributed most to the defeat of the Axis nations and who have learned in the hard school of war to co-operate in a common cause.
The United States is already committed to participate in this or a similar program. Moreover, the Senate resolution embodies distinct promise of assistance by American armed forces if necessary. This is a decided change in the attitude of the Congress which between 1921 and 1941 limited to diplomacy American efforts to preserve the peace, and thus nullified the influence of the United States between the two world wars. In the debate, Senator Tom Connally of Texas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that “this resolution has teeth in it.”
Following the Moscow Conference, Premier Stalin praised the military efforts of Great Britain and the United States, expressed gratitude for the assistance they had given Russia, and promised that the countries freed by the United Nations in Europe would be at liberty to choose their own form of government. Stalin’s statement taken in conjunction with the promise made at Moscow, that no signatory power would send troops out of its own country without consultation with the member powers, should reassure the smaller nations of Europe who have been reported by Axis propagandists to be trembling at the prospect of an overpowerful Russia.
Another important decision was to form the new international organization of “sovereign, independent states.” This method demands the smallest delegation of national authority to the international association and permits the continuation of local customs, manners, and governments. It also simplifies military problems and avoids creating an international armed force to be at the service of an international association to preserve the peace by force when necessary. In theory at least, the establishment of an international armed force might permit an international court to order an international fleet containing American ships to blockade American ports or an international army containing American troops to invade the United States. Mr. Churchill had already suggested the continuation of the Combined Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff which has functioned efficiently during the present war. Naturally Russia and China will be associated in the joint staffs and participate in the joint decisions. In organizing and directing the armed forces necessary to preserve the peace of the world, it will be wise to continue the present joint staffs of the United Nations, extend the representation to include all those making or capable of making military contributions, and use the same gradual approach. The military leaders should follow the example of the political leaders and retain the national integrity of the land, sea, and air forces, and thus avoid brigading soldiers, sailors, and aviators of different nationalities in the same formations.
The British and American military forces are perhaps the most nearly alike in their manners, customs, and traditions, but they are sufficiently different to prefer a composite organization rather than an intimate military mixture. The forces of the two nations have shown that they can be united in one organization and serve under a unit commander, thereby assuring unity of command and action. This system is necessary in various theaters of war. But, in the post-armistice era, responsibility for preservation of peace in definite areas of the world could be assigned to certain nations, whose armed forces would then accept the corresponding military responsibility. This system of regional responsibility would require a Combined United Nations General Staff to coordinate the military throughout the world.
Naturally there will arise differences of opinion about the necessity to employ force, the amount, the kind, and when its use should cease. These problems will have to be reconciled, or the federation will fly asunder. And, it will require the highest statesmanship to reconcile these differences. The real hope of success lies in a gradual approach, and in continuing the common unity of the four powers who signed the Moscow agreement. Only the grim necessities of war compelled these four nations to forget their petty differences and co-operate in making war. Their desire to prolong the peace must supply the necessary impetus to continue their united action after the compulsion of war is removed. It will be to their advantage to co-operate, for they are at the present moment generally satisfied with their territories and possessions. These nations are naturally inclined to preserve the peace. Consequently they form a cadre around which can rally the remaining, members of the United Nations and the smaller nations, who in the past have been continuously menaced by the predatory nations. If the Big Four pull together, they can become the indestructible core of a world league that can preserve the peace.
It cannot be denied that Great Britain, Russia, China, and the United States have acquired most of their present possessions by force. The Chinese Republic, the oldest of the four, first became an empire through the absorption of her neighbors. Great Britain and Russia increased their territories almost simultaneously; one mainly by sea, and the other mainly by land, until they became the two greatest empires of the world. The United States expanded more rapidly than any of the others, and in about sixty years spread from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. It would be folly to suggest that their territories, now politically integrated, should suddenly be divided into small independent states that could neither preserve their economic nor political independence. As far as the United States is concerned, the surrender of General Lee at Appomattox determined that no state of the Union can secede peacefully.
The bonds of the British Empire are more flexible than those between the states in the Union. After the last war, for example, Great Britain permitted the Irish Free State to withdraw from the British Empire. Yet to the people of Great Britain, the word empire has the same significance that the word union has to citizens of the United States. Churchill was only reflecting this loyalty when he announced that he did not intend to Preside at the liquidation of the British Empire. The British Minister of Production, Oliver Lyttleton, a leader in the Conservative Party, underscored this statement and Predicted that Great Britain will emerge from the war “a great military power.” He stoutly avowed that the Conservatives, the majority party in the United Kingdom, “ … are proud of our imperial mission, . . . and confident that we can fulfill it to advantage,” and he firmly asserted that the primary aim of the Conservative Party is to strengthen the ties of empire. If those Americans to whom the word empire has a sinister sound remember that to the average Briton it signifies union, Anglo-American co-operation in the post-war world will be facilitated. And, for purely selfish reasons, if no other, Americans should look forward cheerfully to the emergence of Great Britain as a “great military power.” We certainly do not wish to be associated with a “weak” Britain which we would have to protect.
Russia and China, who obtained their extensive territories by simply expanding their imperial frontiers, have now adopted a soviet and a republican form of government, respectively. But individuals in Russia and China have less personal freedom than British subjects in the crown colonies or India simply because for generations Russians and Chinese have lived under despotic laws. Local customs, native habits, and regional laws cannot be immediately changed. Thus, if the Big Four are to form the nucleus of a World Federation, it will be necessary for citizens of those sovereign states to concede the right of self-government to their colleagues. They should also remember that in world politics as well as in law, “a wrong persisted in becomes a right.” They should make no attempt to disintegrate Great Britain, Russia, China, or the United States, which attained their strength by absorbing provinces and smaller states, some willingly, others by force. Any principle can be carried to an unreasonable extreme; the right of self-determination indefinitely applied would divide the world into ever more numerous and helpless states, at the very moment when responsible leaders of the United Nations have staked their hopes of future world peace on a closer federation of the four great powers.
If Russia, China, Great Britain, and the United States cannot form the nucleus of a new world order, it will be futile to attempt a larger organization. If they can co-operate, they will be sufficient. Together, these four nations can supply such overwhelming land, sea, and air forces that the most foolhardy nation would hesitate to challenge their combined might. Prior to 1939, each of these powers was satisfied with its possessions; in the discernible future, there are no irreconcilable conflicts of economic interest. Each one is sufficiently powerful so that it cannot be easily imposed upon by the others. History has proved that they can co-operate as allies or defend their own interests tenaciously. Russia and England united to defeat France under the first Napoleon; during a century of rivalry, they fought against each other in the Crimean War, were on the verge of hostilities in 1904, but formed an entente in 1907. Out of this full experience Anglo- Russian statesmen should have learned that they have little to gain by a conflict that will always suggest a fight between “an elephant and a whale.” Without allies neither nation could inflict a vital injury on the other.
Russia and the United States have been traditionally friendly. At the Vienna Conference in 1814-15, the Czar Alexander II informed Castelreagh, the representative of Great Britain, that he sympathized with the American attitude toward impressment and neutral rights on the high seas, an act that facilitated the Treaty of Ghent. In our Civil War, when England and France were openly sympathizing with the South, Russia sent two naval squadrons, one to San Francisco, the other to New York, to demonstrate her friendship for the United States. During the Russo-Japanese War, we were misled into sympathizing with the Nipponese, but during the first World War acknowledged our error by protecting Siberia from dismemberment by Japan. The only difficulties between Russia and the United States have arisen over domestic issues. In President Taft’s administration, the United States remonstrated with the Czar’s government for its treatment of Russian Jews, and since the last World War, the Comintern (now dissolved) has attempted to interfere with our domestic concerns. If each of the two nations will refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of the other, there can be no real cause for conflict.
In the course of her march through Siberia to the Pacific, Russia frequently menaced, China and became the leader in advocating the dismemberment of that defenseless nation in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Since the World War, Soviet Russia as encroached upon the western frontiers of ma, but against this aggression must be Weighed the military assistance furnished by e Soviet government to Chiang Kai-shek in the critical days when Great Britain had closed the Burma Road and the United States was unable to furnish munitions or fuel to Chungking.
Great Britain was one of the first nations to establish trading ports in China. But British suzerainty was generally of a limited nature, just sufficient to maintain order so that trade could be carried on, and while British commerce had priority, citizens of other nations) including the Chinese, had free access 0 British colonies in China. In 1899-1900 Great Britain supported, somewhat reluctantly, John Hay’s “Open Door” policy; and after the Nine-Power Treaty in 1922 voluntarily returned Wei Hai-wei to China. The history of Anglo-Chinese relations is such that there is no real reason why the two powers should not co-operate in establishing a world order.
The relations of China and the United States have nearly always been friendly. It was necessary for American sailors and marines to march to the relief of American citizens in Peking in 1900, and during various riots in China, American marines have landed to protect citizens of the United States. But the Boxer Indemnity was used to educate Chinese students at American universities and it was an American, John Hay, who formulated the “Open Door” policy in 1899 which guaranteed the territorial integrity of China. Since that time the United States has consistently defended Chinese independence. The “Open Door” policy has justified itself in the unification of China. When Japan began her invasion, she anticipated an easy military victory over China and contemplated making her a willing vassal. But the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and the ideals of a republic learned by Chinese students in the United States kept alive Chinese resistance. When Japan decided to attack the United States in 1941, instead of being able to draw upon the resources and man power of a friendly China, she was compelled to leave a large part of her army to continue the occupation of a temporarily defeated, but unbroken China.
Relations between Great Britain and the United States are most intimate and, often for that reason, most irritating. Americans brought their ideas of self-government, freedom of worship, and freedom of speech from England. Freedom of speech, a common language, and easy communications also mean that any criticism of the United States made in the United Kingdom is published in the American press the following morning. The reverse is true; the bitter comments of an Anglophobe in New York, Chicago, or Boston, about the British Empire appear in the London and sometimes the provincial press the following day. The best proof of the strength of Anglo-American friendship is its ability to bear the strains imposed by a common language.
Americans also inherited an instinct for trade, a love of the sea, and the tradition of a great merchant marine from their British forebears. Hence, in addition to being political friends, the British and Americans are often commercial rivals. There are questions of commercial aviation, radio and cable communications, merchant marine, branch factories abroad, control of certain strategic raw materials that will need to be settled between the two English-speaking nations. Fortunately, their citizens are trained in democratic processes, which means they are accustomed to compromises. Granted good will on both sides, these two naval nations, whose common heritage is the sea, should find the basis for a common understanding.
The question of Anglo-American relations is being carefully considered by leading statesmen in the United States and Great Britain. Of particular interest to American naval officers is the recent speech by the Honorable Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, before the English-speaking union in Chicago, in which he discussed the previous relations of the two nations, bad, indifferent, and good. To this sketch of their historical background, Colonel Knox added the significant parts of the speech of the Secretary of State, the Honorable Cordell Hull, to the Congress and considered the future roles of the American and British people and their navies. Building upon Secretary Hull’s statement that “within the framework of that movement in the atmosphere of mutual understanding and confidence which made possible its beginning in Moscow, many of the problems which are difficult today will, as time goes on, undoubtedly become more possible of satisfactory solution through frank and friendly discussion,” Secretary Knox added the practical suggestion that “whatever structure of international organization is erected after this war, it can rest upon no firmer foundation than such close economic and military co-operation among all the nations as has existed between the English-speaking peoples for a century and a quarter.”
This sentence reveals the naval statesmanship of Secretary Knox. He is seeking to stabilize the agreements made at Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran, and to establish a world organization by evolution, by a continuance of the processes that have proved practicable in establishing the understanding between the English-speaking peoples of the world in peace and in war. Accepting the principles advocated by Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox indicated the practical means to support these principles with the armed forces. Following this logical development, Secretary Knox reached the conclusion that “the present instruments of military cooperation [the Combined Staffs] must be maintained,” and the peace must be based “on the cooperation of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, China, and the united and associated nations.” Naturally, the Secretary of the Navy paid particular attention to the disposition and duties of the Anglo-American navies; he anticipated continuation of “the present working agreement between the British and American navies.” Mr. Knox described in detail the present Anglo-American agreement which “assigns to the British fleets control of the eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean; while the United States Navy guards the western Atlantic and the entire Pacific. When the ships of either nation pass into the control area of the other, they pass into the command of the controlling navy.” This common sense arrangement embodies the practical methods of the American and the British people. The naval authorities of the two nations did not arrive at this method by involved theories or fine-spun logic. This division of naval responsibility resulted from the necessities of the present war; it has met the strain of that war; it surely should be equal to preserving the peace. This disposition of naval forces has already justified itself by its successes in clearing the oceans of German submarines; in opening the Mediterranean to ships of the United Nations and denying it to those of the Axis nations; and in reducing the size, the effectiveness, the radius of action, and the activities of the Japanese fleet and merchant marine.
Secretary Knox was not boasting when he declared that the present organization and disposition of the American and British navies already “is the backbone of our post-war naval police force organized and functioning. The cooperation of the technical missions and the maintenance of economic balance we use today in war can, without interruption, be used tomorrow in peace and for peace.” Secretary Knox has suggested the easiest and most practical method of enforcing the decisions made at Teheran, Cairo, and Moscow. It only remains for the British and American navies to continue the kind of cooperation outlined by Secretary Knox and controlled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make effective the American and British contribution to the future world order, provided, and this is essential, that they recover and employ the former belligerent rights of men-of-war on the high seas.
To understand the necessity of reviving belligerent rights on the seas, it is necessary to take a quick backward glance at the evolution of sea power. In the middle of the seventeenth century, soon after England defeated the Netherlands Navy and became the preponderant sea power, a sagacious Dutch statesman, DeWitt, tried to evade British sea power not by attempting the destruction of the Royal Navy, but by nullifying the belligerent rights on the sea which underlay and gave effect to sea power. DeWitt’s aplomb was superb, for no nation had exercised belligerent rights on the sea more effectively than the Dutch when their Navy was supreme. DeWitt invented a new doctrine, “Free Ships, Free Goods,” which had no precedent in the law of the sea. If accepted, it would have freed the Dutch ships carrying enemy goods from the possibility of capture by the British Navy, thus enabling the Dutch owners to profit by carrying enemy goods safely in their neutral bottoms.
Cromwell and Monk jeered at DeWitt’s doctrine, which was so absurd that for the next century it excited only derision. In 1752, it was revived by Frederick the Great who denied that British ships had the right to search, detain, or capture neutral ships at sea because they carried enemy goods. Frederick attempted to retaliate by confiscating the private property of English merchants in Prussia, but the British government took such a firm stand that Frederick the Great abandoned his new idea. The next patron saint of the doctrine, “Free Ships, Free Goods,” was Catherine the Great of Russia. During our Revolutionary War, she announced in a state paper the doctrine of “Armed Neutrality,” which was accepted by the three Scandinavian countries and Holland. Although embellished with new words, it was DeWitt’s principle that a voyage in free ships removes the taint from enemy goods. This attempt failed, and at the Battle of Copenhagen in 1801, Nelson broke up a second attempt to achieve “Armed Neutrality” by the Baltic states. Thanks to the vigorous action of British statesmen and British admirals, when the crisis of the Napoleonic Wars was reached, the British Navy possessed and exercised all its ancient belligerent rights. And it was British assistance based upon these time-honored rights that enabled Holland, Prussia, and Russia to throw off the yoke of Napoleon.
Forty-one years after the Battle of Waterloo, the French government, which had habitually opposed the exercise of all the belligerent rights on the sea, persuaded a British cabinet to sign the Declaration of Paris, the second article of which affirmed that “the neutral flag covers enemy’s merchandise with the exception of contraband of war.” DeWitt must have arisen in his grave clothes and applauded. After two centuries, his doctrine had finally prevailed over the Royal Navy.
Americans who have been beguiled by the slogan, “Free Ships, Free Goods,” into advocating “Freedom of the Seas” should note that the opposition to the exercise of the traditional rights of belligerents at sea came first from Holland, whose Navy had just been defeated by England’s; next, from Frederick the Great, who had no Navy and who exercised all the attributes of land power ruthlessly; then, by Catherine of Russia, who was so devoted to neutral interests at sea that she had no consideration left for neutrals ashore and presided over the partition of Poland; of course, by France, whose Navy had been habitually defeated by the British; and finally, by the small Scandinavian states who had comparatively large Merchant Marines but could not afford a Navy and who have always been willing to profit by carrying cargo for belligerents. These advocates offered very moral reasons for their actions, but even a superficial examination will reveal their selfish motives.
The great continental powers, who were so concerned in defending rights of neutrals and private property at sea, did not spare either neutral or private property ashore when their armies were in the field. Frederick the Great was the first modern leader who made the enemy nation furnish supplies and man power for his armies; the armies of Catherine the Second fairly swept occupied countries clean of all property—private and public; and Napoleon boasted that he made conquered nations pay for their subjugation. Yet these three great conquerors shed crocodile tears over the lawful capture by British ships at sea and judicial condemnation by Admiralty courts of neutral goods and private property destined for enemy use by owners who deliberately took the extra hazard for war-time profits. During both our Revolutionary War and the Napoleonic Wars, Americans joined these European conquerors in acclaiming the doctrine, “Free Ships, Free Goods.” The reason was obvious and selfish. By 1812, the United States had a Merchant Marine only second to Great Britain’s and no Navy to protect it. American statesmen piously repeated the same reasons given by Catherine, Frederick, and Napoleon.
The Declaration of Paris of 1856 left to naval belligerents the following rights: to visit and search” any merchant ship met on the high seas, to verify her nationality and to insure that her voyage and cargo were lawful; to exercise this power even on a merchant ship under convoy of a neutral man-of-war; to blockade an enemy’s coast and in consequence to pursue and capture a blockade runner at any time, anywhere on the high seas until the end of the blockade-breaking voyage; to capture enemy property in enemy ships and all contraband of war or goods destined to the enemy for use in the war even when found on neutral ships. The Declaration required a belligerent to commission public ships of war only in his own Ports, to abstain from privateering or fitting out privateers, and to submit any captures to a prize court. A captor could not destroy the papers of the captured ship, embezzle any property aboard, or sink a captured ship. Under penalty of capture and confiscation, it further required that neutral ships submit to search, and abstain from supplying either belligerent with contraband of war and from attempting to break blockade. The Declaration of Paris further forbade the transfer of an enemy ship to a neutral flag and left to the prize courts of the belligerent country to declare and administer the law of nations affecting belligerent rights on the sea.
Lord Salisbury wrote in 1897 after forty- one years’ experience with the Declaration of Paris that it was “a rash and unwise procedure” which in any future war would reduce the pressure that a nation with a sea power could exercise upon its enemy. But, in 1909, Lord Loreburn and Sir Edward Grey recommended the abandonment of more belligerent rights on the sea. In attempting to justify his recommendation, Lord Loreburn asserted, “I urge the exemption of private property from capture at sea, not upon any ground of sentiment or humanity . . . but upon the ground that on the balance of argument, coolly weighed, the interests of Great Britain will gain. ...” He admitted that “no operation of war inflicts less suffering than the capture of unarmed vessels at sea.” He did not advocate the exemption of private property on humanitarian grounds, but simply because, in his lay judgment, it was to the advantage of Great Britain in time of war. Lord Loreburn’s opinion arose from his fears that in the future some hostile navy might control the sea, and he hoped under those circumstances to protect the United Kingdom from starvation by appealing to an international court which would magisterially forbid the belligerent ships to capture at sea foodstuffs bound for England because they were property of or consigned to private citizens.
The Admiralty courts in Great Britain and the United States (mainly during and immediately following our Civil War had pronounced most of the decisions which in 1909 formed the body of international law applying to the capture of enemy and neutral goods and ships at sea. It is a historic fact that the British and American Admiralty courts followed legal precedents and exercised impartially the judicial powers necessary to the enforcement of the law of the sea. Largely from these American and British precedents, by 1909, there had evolved well-defined procedures which were known and understood by merchant mariners as well as by naval officers. This sea law had developed as naturally on the high seas and in the Admiralty courts as the common law of England developed ashore and in the Inns of Court in London, and this sea law protected equally firmly the rights of the belligerent men-of-war and the rights of the owners of the merchant ships and their cargoes. Anglo-American navies and Admiralty courts had given form and justice to naval warfare at sea which provided much more protection to neutral ships and goods and to the private property of belligerents than was offered to private property ashore by the organized armies of either European or American nations when they operated in the field.
Nevertheless, the British cabinet at the instigation of Lord Loreburn and Sir Edward Grey called the London Conference of 1909 and hastily accepted all the suggestions to decrease belligerents’ rights on the sea including the establishment of an International Prize Court, made by Russia, France, and Germany. A century of peace on the high seas had relaxed the robust British ideas of the exercise of sea power to such an extent that Great Britain was willing to heed the advice of the three great land powers, one of whom had been striving since 1650 to nullify the effects of sea power. President Theodore Roosevelt well knew the value of sea power, and was urged by Captain A. T. Mahan to reassert the traditional law of the sea; he was handicapped by the previous policies of the American government. Even the sagacious Elihu Root, Secretary of State, succumbed to Sir Edward Grey’s arguments. President Theodore Roosevelt could not or would not revise our former policy. His successor, President Taft, had as much confidence as Sir Edward Grey or Lord Loreburn in international courts. The government of the United States accepted the London Conference. Fortunately, both for Great Britain and the United States, when the British Parliament was called upon to endow the International Prize Court with jurisdiction previously exercised by British Admiralty courts, the House of Lords rebelled and defeated the measure which had already been guided through the House of Commons by Edward Grey. In order to utilize British sea power in 1915, Grey was compelled to disavow the London Conference and reassert the former rights of naval belligerents.
In arguments between advocates of the rigorous exercise of sea power and those who would nullify sea power, both admit that there is no more effective and humane method of enforcing international sanctions or waging war than by the suppression of trade on the high seas. Any merchant who chooses can keep his goods at home, and they will be in no jeopardy. Only when a wartime trader deliberately exposes his goods on the high seas in the effort to profit by serving a belligerent is his property jeopardized. It is not a coincidence that the original advocates of neutral rights on the seas were jurists and statesmen of the three great continental nations of Europe whose ambitions were thwarted by sea power and of the small nations like Holland and the three Scandinavian countries who in time of war have been unable to protect their commerce either as neutrals or as belligerents.
There is a substantial historical basis for the hope that Anglo-American control of the seas would do much to ensure peace for several generations, perhaps a century. From 1815 to 1914, the supremacy of the British Navy was never challenged, and during this period there were no world wars. During this hundred years, Great Britain only fought one first-class power, Russia, in the Crimean War, which is itself fair evidence that Great Britain exercised her enormous sea power with moderation. And, it is a matter of record that despite the rise of high tariff nations, Russia, Germany, France, and the United States, during the nineteenth century, Great Britain maintained a policy of free trade; thus permitting foreign merchants to carry on their commercial transactions without hindrance in British territories.
This century of peace, sometimes called the “Pax Britannica,” culminated in the Victorian Era at which it is now fashionable to sneer. But almost half of the twentieth century has passed, and anyone who prefers peace to war would choose the nineteenth before the twentieth century. The only other Period of world peace comparable with the Pax Britannica” was the eighty years under the five virtuous and able Roman Emperors, "'hen peace-loving citizens enjoyed “the advantages of wealth and luxury” and basked m the glory that was Rome. But Gibbon also reveals that “this long peace,” enforced at home and abroad mainly by the Roman Legions, gradually reduced the “minds of men to the same level,” and extinguished “the fire of genius.” The personal valor of the Romans remained, but “they no longer possessed that public courage which is nourished by the love of independence, the sense of national honor, the presence of danger, and the habit of command.” It is true that England’s long peace dulled the apprehensions of her governments, but since the Royal Navy and not the Praetorian Guard had preserved the peace, Britons escaped the civic enervation that overtook the Romans. The experience of Athens as well as Great Britain proves that sea power and overseas possessions do not destroy democracy.
History itself suggests that the co-operation of the Anglo-American navies could give the world another long era of peace, similar to the “Pax Britannica,” and there is additional reason for this optimism because the two great land powers, Russia and China, have joined to support the two great sea powers in their determination to make a durable peace. It will be essential that the Anglo-American governments exercise control of the sea with moderation and restraint and not attempt the commercial domination of the world. Unquestionably, difficult problems will arise that will jeopardize the understanding between the four great powers. And, it will be easy for chauvinists in any country to raise points of difference. But granted a spirit of moderation in London and Washington, these two countries could exercise joint control of the seas, and avoid another world war by maintaining a friendly understanding with the two great continental powers, China and Russia. And if Great Britain and the United States provide powerful navies to help preserve the peace of the world, they should not be expected also to contribute huge standing armies. Thus the two English-speaking nations could continue their historic policies of using their fleets as their first line of defense.
In the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt and Churchill declared they sought a peace that would “enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.” This ideal would be immediately attained if the Anglo-American nations continue their control of the seas. If their present supremacy on the seas is maintained, they will dominate the ocean areas which lie beyond the reach of Russian and Chinese land power, and the Big Four could continue to restrain any evil- disposed nation by economic sanctions enforced by sea and land blockade. If these measures short of war failed to restrain predatory nations, Anglo-American fleets, in conjunction with their air forces, could again absolutely deny the use of the ocean highways to any power bent on world domination. There will be no chance in such a world for the rise of another Hitler or Hirohito.