Japanese Naval Strategy

Mr. Kiralfy s thesis can briefly be sum­marized as follows: The Japanese Navy is nothing but a floating wing of the Army. It does not pursue independent naval strategy, but is subordinated to the support of land operations. Japanese naval strategy is not anchored to the principle of annihilation, nor does it consider naval battles as essentials of victory. In other words, it is defensively rather than offensively minded. The Japa­nese maintain a “fleet of minimum risks.”

Most important of all, the Japanese Navy does not seek to win command of the sea, but is satisfied with localized and temporary control of army maritime communications. The destruction of the enemy fleet is—al­ways according to Mr. Kiralfy—not the aim of the Japanese. Mr. Kiralfy implies that this is the traditional naval doctrine of Ja­pan, observed throughout her entire history.

Moreover, Japanese naval thinking is sup­posed to be fundamentally different from Western naval doctrines, an interpretation which is rather characteristic of our general appraisal of things Japanese. Western writers do frequently misunderstand the Japanese mind. Mr. Kiralfy, however, has arrived at his conclusions through a misinterpretation not only of Japanese but also of Western concepts.

To gain command of the sea is the essential mission assigned to a Western navy. Whether this is done by conquest of the en­emy’s bases, by blockade, or by the physical destruction of the enemy fleet through one or several battles of annihilation is wholly im­material. The destruction of the enemy fleet is in most cases given preference, because it is most decisive in its consequences.

There is no orthodox naval doctrine which could be characterized as “offensive” on principle. But if one must attribute offensive or defensive characters to any basic strategic pattern, it would seem that the assertion of command is offensive and the abnegation of command is defensive. Nor is any Western navy ever prepared to accept losses above those which are unavoidable for accomplish­ing its mission. Warships and highly skilled naval personnel being difficult to replace, all navies naturally strive to accomplish their aim with a minimum of loss. Also, wars are won by occupation of enemy territories, hence every navy must — to a certain point — be regarded as an adjunct to the army.

Ancient and feudal Japan never possessed a fleet in the proper sense of the word. The Japanese waged only few wars beyond their shores and, virtually up to the Meiji Resto­ration of 1868, confined their naval activities to coastal shipping and piracy. This is impor­tant in view of the fact that Mr. Kiralfy overemphasizes the historical foundations of Japanese naval thinking, the roots of which he finds in mythological Japan. Neither in Japanese antiquity nor even in her Middle Ages was there a “Japanese naval doctrine.”

The Japanese expedition to Korea under Hideyoshi may be considered as the sole ex­ception to the rule of Japanese naval im­potence. In 1592, the Japanese assembled a considerable fleet of transports and landed troops in Korea. However, a Chinese- Korean fleet under Yi-Sun, one of the great admirals of history, defeated Japan’s few warships, destroyed many transports, and succeeded in cutting the Japanese land forces off from their overseas supplies. Conse­quently, the Japanese Army was forced to retreat. Hideyoshi sent a second expedition­ary corps to Korea and created a naval force to fight against the Korean fleet. For a time, this improvised “fleet” fought with some suc­cess, but finally it succumbed to Yi-Sun’s superior seamanship and better-protected vessels. Korea was evacuated as a conse­quence of Japan’s loss of command of the sea.

If this Korean expedition proves anything, it shows that the Japanese had, at that time, no conception of sea power as such.

There is no connection between the fishing vessels and coastal craft of feudal Japan and the modern Japanese Navy. The foundation of the latter was laid in the early fifties of the last century during the last years of the Tokugawa Shogunate, i.e., after a period of 250 years during which only vessels under 50 tons were permitted in Japan. Up to and even after the Russo-Japanese War, Japan’s major warships were built by Western pow­ers. Naval training and indoctrination were first given by Holland, then by France, and later by England, whose naval concepts deeply permeated Japanese naval thinking. Even today traditional, that is to say, offen­sive British naval doctrine is taught to Japa­nese naval officers, though it may to some extent be distorted by oriental trimmings.

By the end of the last century, the Japa­nese had finally learned to understand the importance of sea power. Consequently, when they again decided to try their luck against China, they set out to defeat the Chinese fleet, realizing that without its elimination all conquests on land would be futile. At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, the Japanese Navy was, at least on paper, inferior to the Chinese fleet.

The Chinese, unmindful of Yi-Sun’s exam­ple, employed their ships to escort convoys. Admiral Ito, the Japanese commander, was thus compelled to use all his ingenuity to bring the Chinese fleet to battle. The Chinese fleet made no attempt to interfere with Japanese troop movements. If nevertheless Ito forced the Chinese, despite their numerical superi­ority, to accept battle, he indeed reveals him­self as thoroughly offensive-minded and as partisan of the idea of annihilation.

When battle was finally joined on Septem­ber 17, 1894, eleven Japanese men-of-war, or almost half the Japanese fleet, were opposed by fourteen Chinese vessels, including two battleships. Ito, relying on the speed of his cruisers, inflicted considerable damage on his adversaries and succeeded in scattering what was left of the enemy formation, causing them to flee.

Mr. Kiralfy criticizes the Battle of the Yalu as “inconclusive,” on the basis that “Western Admirals” would have probably pressed the attack home. On the other hand, he contends that from the Japanese point of view the outcome of the battle was satisfac­tory, as it assured the security of Japanese communications. Neither opinion does jus­tice to the facts. Admiral Ito would have lacked elementary prudence if he had con­tinued his action against strong odds, risking the loss of irreplaceable ships and perhaps of the major portion of his fleet. It is doubtful whether he could have sunk the battleships. Even if he had done so, the Chinese had still a reserve fleet of more than 30,000 tons. Be­sides, the sun was setting and the battle was rapidly moving within the range of Chinese shore batteries. It is inconceivable that, un­der similar circumstances, a European ad­miral would have acted differently from Ito.

Nonetheless, Admiral Ito was by no means satisfied with his victory, which had not es­tablished his permanent command of the sea. Ito was bent on the annihilation of the Chi­nese fleet. Finally he succeeded in this pur­pose, despite the Chinese refusal to accept another battle. The Chinese naval base of Wei-hai-wei was—after a fleet demonstration —attacked from land. Then Ito’s lighter units, overcoming considerable difficulties, broke twice into the harbor, torpedoing one battleship and some other units. The second battleship was destroyed by guns from a captured fort. Thereupon the remnants of the Chinese fleet surrendered. It had been completely annihilated, and the Chinese were forced to sue for peace.

If anything unusual can be noted in these engagements, it is Ito’s exceptionally skillful handling of his craft against larger ships.

Japanese naval strategy in the war against Russia does not reveal a single instance which would suggest a fundamental difference between Japanese and Western naval thought. The Japanese established command of the sea. They consistently tried to inflict maxi­mum damage on the enemy, and actually succeeded in annihilating their enemy’s naval power without at the same time sacrificing their own.

In the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese admirals were confronted with a very difficult problem. The Russian Pacific Squadron alone had a total displacement of 190,000 tons against a displacement of 255,000 tons or the entire Japanese Navy. The Japanese had 14 as against 11 Russian major ships, reinforcements of the Russian Pacific squadron would have reduced the Japanese numerical inferiority.

Consequently, the Japanese fleet had to accomplish the following difficult tasks: ensure passage of the Japanese Army before Russian reserves arrived; keep the Russian squadrons in Port Arthur and Vladivostok separated from each other; incapacitate the Pacific Squadron before the arrival of the Russian Baltic Squadron. As it was expected that the latter—subsequently named the Second Pacific Squadron—would be very strong, the Japanese Navy could not risk substantial losses in its operations against the Russian units in Port Arthur and Vladi­vostok.

The Japanese solved their problems by a surprise attack on the Russian fleet in Port Arthur. This attack, which served as the model of Pearl Harbor, was patterned after the British Copenhagen enterprises. Admiral Togo attacked with torpedo boats under cover of night, damaging two battleships and one cruiser. Togo’s intention had been, how­ever, to annihilate the Russian ships. On the next morning he tried to finish them off by attacking again, this time with battleships. This attack failed, as, due to bad timing on Togo’s part, the Japanese were repulsed by shore batteries. The destruction of the Rus­sian fleet was Togo’s unequivocal intention. He failed because he had committed a tac­tical error by miscalculating the Russian re­action to his attack. But that he had acted according to a rather radical concept of an­nihilation is clear despite the failure of the enterprise. Quite in tune with Nelson’s prin­ciple that only fools attack coastal guns with ships (today no longer true), he called the operation off. Had he pressed his attack home, it is certain that he would have suffered heavy losses and endangered Japan’s chances of winning the war. Togo, true to Western tradition, then proceeded to estab­lish a close blockade of Port Arthur.

This blockade was by no means passive. Several attempts were made to bottle up the Russian fleet in the style later followed at Ostend and St. Nazaire. By repeated at­tacks with smaller craft whose loss he could well risk, Togo attempted to inflict further damage on the Russians. He also re­peatedly lured the Russian squadron into battle. On one occasion, the Russian flagship Petropavlosk was sunk and another battleship seriously injured, both by mines. A few weeks later Togo himself suffered similar mishap and lost two battleships to mines, which caused him to become more cautious.

In view of the threat held out by the Rus­sian Second Pacific Squadron, the speedy elimination of the naval base and naval force at Port Arthur became imperative. As a na­val assault would have been tantamount to the suicide of Japanese sea power, Port Arthur was attacked by land. When the situation of the fortress became desperate, the Russian fleet attempted to flee, but was intercepted by Togo. A battle ensued in which the Russian forces were scattered. A few ships succeeded in reaching neutral ports, and a few others were destroyed by the Japanese. The bulk of the fleet, however, retreated to Port Arthur before the Japanese ships could close in for the kill.

Finally, the Japanese land forces had ad­vanced to within gun range of Port Arthur naval base. After Admiral Togo had con­vinced himself by personal inspection that the Russian ships could not again put to sea, he withdrew his ships. After months of con­tinuous action, the Japanese vessels needed a complete refit if they were to fight the Second Pacific Squadron.

As by that time Admiral Kaimura had engaged and defeated the Vladivostok squadron, the Russian First Pacific Squadron was out of action, or if one prefers the word, “annihilated.” Togo had lost two battleships but had skillfully avoided a more serious reduction of his naval strength before the decisive contest with Rozhevenski. It is difficult to see how he could have adopted a more successful or “orthodox” strategy.

The Battle of Tsushima of May 27, 1905, is a model of a battle of annihilation and an obvious refutation of the theory of a “defensive Japanese navy.” Kiralfy asserts that the destruction of the Russian fleet was only “incidental” and that its annihilation was far more due to Russian mistakes than to Japanese planning—an assertion which could be made about almost any battle. He criticizes Admiral Togo for not having intercepted Russians in the Indian Ocean (!!), out stopping to think that by doing so, Togo would have abandoned most of his tactical advantages and probably have per­mitted Rozhevenski to get through un­molested! Mr. Kiralfy also criticizes Togo because he did not “close the range more frequently, risking the loss of a number of his battleships.”⁹ In this case, the outcome of the first day’s fighting “must have been more impressive.” But Togo discontinued his action only at nightfall and ordered his destroyers and torpedo boats to attack, re­suming battleships operations on the mor­row. “American and British admirals,” Mr. Kiralfy says, “would have insisted on com­plete victory during the main engagement” (as, for example, in the Battle of Jutland?).

It is immaterial whether an enemy fleet is destroyed between afternoon and night, be­tween afternoon and next morning or by bat­tleships or destroyers. Besides, the war was not yet over. Russia still had naval forces in Europe and there was no point in wantonly risking the loss of precious battleships. Mr. Kiralfy’s argument is a perfect example of how misleading in military matters purely abstract considerations may be.

Rozhevenski’s squadron consisted of no less than eight battleships and nine cruisers, while Togo after the loss of two battleships had only four battleships and eight “ar­mored cruisers.” To be sure, some of the Russian battleships were superannuated and the Japanese ships were speedier. It is also true that Russian superiority in high caliber guns was partly compensated for by a better rate of fire on the Japanese ships. Neverthe­less, the Japanese fleet was by no means su­perior in material strength. Togo could not risk the loss of a “number” of battleships, but had to implement gun firing vessels with his torpedo-carrying craft to match Russian hitting power. When at nightfall Togo with­drew his heavy units, he did not break off his offensive but continued his efforts to annihi­late the Russian squadron by means which were most appropriate for night action, namely torpedo boats and destroyers. And he had to remove his own major ships if those smaller vessels were to operate effectively. Since two Russian battleships and one large cruiser were sunk during the night, Togo’s intentions can hardly be interpreted differ­ently.

Japan’s naval activities at the outbreak of the First World War were also commented upon by Mr. Kiralfy who asserts that, ac­cording to Western ideas, the Japanese should have destroyed the German Far Eastern Squadron of Admiral Graf Spee. But according to Japanese thinking, Mr. Kiralfy continues, there was no need to pay any at­tention to the German warships, “provided they did not interfere with land operations.” The Japanese would have hardly succeeded in locating Spee’s ships even if they had wanted to. Spee had left Tsingtao a few days before the outbreak of the war in Europe and his whereabouts were completely unknown. Besides, the Japanese, having entered the war after the British had requested their participation, put several heavy ships under the command of the British Admiral Jerram whose strategic concepts can hardly be de­scribed as “oriental.” The rest of the Japa­nese fleet closely co-operated with the Brit­ish, for all practical purposes doing what they were asked to do, that is, convoying British troopships, patrolling certain routes and participating in the hunt for the danger­ous Emden. One might criticize this strategy, but it cannot be said that it is incompatible with Western concepts. When Spee’s squad­ron was finally located, German ships were beyond reach not only of the Japanese Navy, but also of the British warships in Asiatic and Australian waters. Despite his slow progress, Spee could not have been over­taken by the Japanese.

The facts of the present war are not yet sufficiently known to permit definite conclusions, yet the main lines are no longer obscure. The Japanese Rear Admiral Yokoi, Naval Attache in Berlin summarized the strategic mission of the Japanese Navy in the Pacific war as follows:

1. The American Pacific Fleet concentrated in the Central Pacific will be attacked by surprise and thoroughly beaten. By that means, the Japanese Navy will gain liberty of movement in the Western Pacific
2. At the same time landing operations will be undertaken against the most important English and American bases …
3. Any good occasion to annihilate the enemy’s main naval forces must at all costs be exploited, even while attack on the bases is in progress.
4. Regardless of the damage which will be inflicted on the enemy at the beginning of hostilities, it is the essential mission Japanese Navy, in co-operations with the German and Italian navies – which are not strong enough in themselves to achieve total annihilation – to annihilate the entire English-American fleet strength, including new construction, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and, of course, in the West, but at the same time to maintain, if possible, the strength of the Japanese Navy without great losses …”

Before making any move with the Army, the Japanese crippled the American battle fleet, which constituted the greatest single ob­stacle to the execution of their plans. They also eliminated the British and Netherlands ships in Far Eastern waters. For the first six months of the war they thus gained undisputed command of the western Pacific. The attack on Pearl Harbor proves beyond the shadow of a doubt that the Japanese un­derstand the importance of establishing command of the sea, and do not at all con­sider the Navy as a mere annex of land power. Indeed, no land operation whatsoever was directly involved in the attack on Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Yamamoto’s navy acted entirely on its own.

The Battle of the Coral Sea was also an application of orthodox sea power concepts, waged offensively by the Japanese for the exclusive purpose of gaining command of the waters northeast of Australia. The battle of Santa Cruz shows similar aspects. In the bat­tle of Midway the Japanese fleet had come out with battleships, aircraft carriers, and other naval units, for the sole purpose of gaining bases which would establish unchal­lenged command in the Central Pacific.

In the battles off Guadalcanal, the Japa­nese showed that they clearly understood that in order to expel the American forces from the island they had to gain naval con­trol in its surrounding waters. In their re­peated attempts to hold the island they did not shrink from using battleships, and they left the Japanese garrison to their fate when they found their naval effort too costly.

It is remarkable that the Japanese are the true promoters of some of the most offensive naval weapons, such as the torpedo and the aircraft carrier. Japanese submarines select warships as their preferred targets, and not cargo and transport ships. For them, Nel­son’s catchword can truly be applied that they hunt enemy warships wherever they can find them. Through the activities of Admiral Yamamoto, the Japanese were pioneers in naval aviation. Insofar as their indoctrination is concerned, it emphasizes aggressive spirit and offensive action. Japan is also past master in the application of the element of surprise—the outstanding feature of offensive thinking.

With such tactics, with a strategy of Port Arthur, Tsushima, and Pearl Harbor, with Admirals like Ito, Togo, and Yamamoto, the Japanese Navy must be deemed as an essen­tially offensive force. In the words of Admiral Yokoi, Japanese naval strategy aims at “the annihilation of the enemy’s naval forces and the simultaneous occupation of all bases which are the source of their activity.”

As late as February 23, 1944, that is, after the big American offensive in the Pacific got under way, the Japanese Admiral Sankichi Takahashi summarized the strategic concept of the Japanese Navy as follows:

As was observed in the battle of the Japan Sea [Tsushima], the victor is the one who attains mas­tery of the sea. The destruction of naval strength is the method by which to grasp mastery of the sea. ... In sea battles the power that gains command of the seas last, wins, and annihilation of enemy naval strength is the most important way to attain this end. (Italics by author.)

Admiral Takahashi is a former Commander in Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet. His statement must, therefore, be considered as a most authoritative interpretation of Japanese naval thought. Rarely, indeed, have more “orthodox” views been expressed by Western Admirals.

To be sure, in the present war, the Japa­nese have not achieved the results they ex­pected. The elimination of the Anglo-Ameri­can navies was only temporary. Considering the, comparatively speaking, weak forces which were at their disposal, the Japanese scored astounding successes by concentrating their major blows against Allied sea power. That these successes were not decisive is due not to imperfect understanding of sea power on the part of the Japanese. The Japanese erred only in underestimating our strength.

After two years of war, the Japanese now face considerable naval superiority which, as time goes by, will continue to grow. The ad­vantages which they enjoyed in former wars and between 1941 and 1943 are gone, and the Japanese Navy will henceforth be obliged to fight on the defensive.

Any differences between western and Jap­anese naval strategy can be largely explained by the particulars of Japan’s position. It may be true that in response to the neces­sarily amphibious operations in the Far East, the Japanese Navy has co-operated more closely with the Army than Western navies have been accustomed to doing thus far. As Japan’s industry is incapable of main­taining a large fleet in offensive action, Japa­nese admirals are naturally reluctant to incur irreplaceable losses. But fundamentally there is no difference: the mission of the Japanese Navy, like that of any other navy, is to es­tablish permanent command of the sea in its sphere of operations. If the question is asked “Why the Japanese fleet avoids action,” the answer is certainly not that the Japanese, on account of a naval doctrine of their own, are not interested in, or do not grasp the impor­tance of, naval action. The Japanese fleet avoids battle chiefly because the Japanese admirals are afraid to lose against superior forces.

After all, naval “concepts” are nothing but a summary of practical experience. If the Japanese want to win, or to avoid defeat, they must maintain command in the China and Japan Seas and in the Western Pacific. And we cannot assist the Japanese better than by assuming that they have not grasped the problems of sea power.