Notes on International Affairs

America and the War

Persian Gulf Pipe Line. In early Feb­ruary Secretary of the Interior Ickes an­nounced plans of the United States Govern­ment to build a 1 200-mile crude oil pipe line from the Persian Gulf to a port on the Med­iterranean, as a means for assuring army and navy oil requirements in that area and re­lieving the present heavy drain on our na­tional oil reserves. The estimated cost would be from $130,000,000 to $165,000,000. The line would be controlled by the Petroleum Reserve Corporation, while the American oil interests holding developments in the Per­sian Gulf fields would guarantee a return of the cost in 25 years, a reserve of a billion barrels of oil, and sale to the government at 25 per cent below the market price at the Persian Gulf or in this country, whichever is lower. The arrangement has the approval of the President and the State Department, but is likely to encounter opposition in Congress. A refinery would be required at the Mediter­ranean terminal. In the offing also are nego­tiations among the United States, Britain, and Russia relating to the sale and distribu­tion of petroleum products in the post-war period. Such an agreement, if made, would cover about 95 per cent of the world’s oil resources. The British Government has ac­cepted an invitation for negotiations in Washington in late February, with a Russian delegation expected thereafter.

Maltreatment of War Prisoners.— On January 27 the United States War and Navy Departments made public a joint re­port revealing the torture, starvation, and murder by Japan of more than 5,200 Amer­ican prisoners and many times that number of Filipino troops captured at Bataan and Corregidor. On the next day Foreign Min­ister Eden made a similar report of “un­speakable savagery” in Japanese treatment of British prisoners, and the Canadian Gov­ernment also reported on the maltreatment of Canadians taken at Hongkong. The text of a U. S. State Department report was pub­lished on January 31. It pointed out that Japan had agreed to observe the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, and that the State Department had repeatedly called at­tention to Japanese violations. A list was presented of no less than 89 notes of protest between January 13, 1942 and January 27, 1944. One of these dealt with Japan’s “bar­barous action” in executing American avia­tors after the Doolittle raid, and stated that “the American Government will hold per­sonally and officially responsible for their acts of depravity and barbarity all officers of the Japanese Government who have par­ticipated in their commitment.” Subse­quently the State Department published a comprehensive protest sent January 27 which charged that 2,200 Americans and 20,000 Filipinos had died of mistreatment in one Japanese camp alone.

The American Red Cross in February gave a summary of futile efforts to start a regular flow of relief to American prisoners. Only two small shipments on the Gripsholm in August, 1942, and November, 1943, had got through. Numerous plans have been rejected or disregarded, including an offer to turn over a loaded ship to Japanese officers and crew.

UNRRA Funds Voted.—By mid-Febru­ary both the United States House and Senate had approved a resolution authorizing an appropriation of $1,350,000,000, or one per cent of the national income of 1943, for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The Senate added six amendments placing minor restrictions on the use of the funds and stating that no new obligations entered into by the UNRRA should be binding on the United States with­out the approval of Congress.

Latin America

Recognition for Bolivia Denied.—On the ground that the new Bolivian Govern­ment was “linked with subversive groups hostile to the Allied cause,” the American State Department announced on January 24 that it would withhold recognition of “the present revolutionary junta at La Paz.” Britain announced support of this policy the next day, and Brazil, Cuba, Uruguay, and other Latin American states took similar ac­tion. In Bolivia the expropriation of Axis firms was announced on February 12, and also some changes in the cabinet, but there was as yet no convincing evidence of a change of heart. In justification of its policy and that of 18 other American republics, the American State Department issued a de­tailed memorandum of evidence which in its view justified these conclusions regarding the Bolivian Movemente Nacional Revolucionario (MNR):

1. The platform and program of the MNR contain elements hostile to the interests of the hemisphere.
2. The MNR has connections with Nazi groups in Germany and Argentina.
3. The army officers actively linked with the junta arc under Nazi influence.
4. The junta received financial aid from pro­-Nazi sources.
5. Since it took power, the activities of the junta indicate that it continues its connections with Nazi Germany.

Costa Rica Elections.—Early returns from the Costa Rica elections of February 13 indicated the choice of the National Re­publican candidate, Teodoro Picado, as President of the Republic. The victory was regarded as a strong endorsement of a liberal and pro-United Nations policy, since the de­feated candidate, ex-President Leon Cortes Castra, showed pro-German sympathies from 1936 to 1940.

Argentina Breaks with Axis.—On January 26 the Ramirez Government in Argentina announced its long delayed deci­sion to break oil diplomatic relations with the remaining Axis nations, Germany and Japan. Later, on February 4, relations were also severed with Bulgaria, Vichy France, Hungary, and Rumania. The action was based on unneutral activities of Axis diplo­mats and their agents, and followed not long after the arrest and confession of an Argentine consular official in Trinidad charged with espionage. Subsequent in­vestigations, as announced by Argentine Government sources, proved what was al­ready well known—that the country had been converted “into a world center of espionage.” Much of the information was sent to “a neutral country in Europe,” pre­sumably Spain. In Washington and London, the action at Buenos Aires was received with some reserve, Secretary of Stale Hull ex­pressing “gratification” and the hope that Argentina would “proceed energetically to adopt the other measures which all of the other American republics have concerted for the security of the continent.”

As a result of the rupture three members of the Ramirez Cabinet resigned but were later persuaded to remain, and in mid- February there was a further shake-up forc­ing the resignation of the Foreign Minister, Alberto Gilbert. There was sharp conflict within the cabinet over the degree of co­operation with the United Nations, though it appeared doubtful whether among the military factions supporting the Ministry there was any favoring a complete abandon­ment of the “neutral” point of view.

Venezuelan President’s Visit.—Gen­eral Isaias Medina Angarita, President of Venezuela, made an official visit to the United States in the latter part of January. It was stated that three members of his party would remain in this country to work out plans with Henry J. Kaiser for the de­velopment of iron and cement industries in Venezuela. In a speech at New York on January 25 the President spoke of the “har­monious union of North American capital and technique with our natural resources and manpower” as a contribution toward a better post-war world. Venezuela was spoken of as a nation “without a public debt, with­out annual deficits, and with perhaps the highest income per capita in all Latin America.”

Britain and Western Europe

Ties of Empire.-—British statesmen in recent months have shown an increasing concern in strengthening the ties of the Union of British Commonwealths, partly as a means of assuring its due weight of influence in any collaboration with such powerful partners as the United States and the Union of Soviet Republics. Notable among the approaches to this problem was that of Premier Jan Christiaan Smuts, who pro­posed that the small democracies of western Europe band together with Britain so that together they would constitute an equal partnership with the other powers. A second proposal was that of Lord Halifax on Jan­uary 24 at Toronto, to the effect that the individual commonwealths should share equally with the mother country in determin­ing upon common policies in matters of for­eign and colonial affairs, defense, and world communications. On the other hand, the in­evitable centrifugal tendencies among the commonwealths have been manifested in the Australia-New Zealand pact, outlined else­where in these Notes, showing a desire to settle Pacific problems on a regional basis. In Canada also a trend toward independent relations with the United States is evident in recent proposals to extend and expand the tariff reductions begun in 1935 and 1938. From London it has been announced that a conference of commonwealth prime ministers is planned for early April, but that this is to be not a full-fledged “imperial confer­ence” but an informal meeting of leaders.

Low Countries Agreement.—The atti­tude of Belgium toward closer co-operation with Britain, as proposed by Prime Minister Smuts, was indicated by the comment of the Foreign Minister of the exiled Belgian Gov­ernment to the effect that Belgium might do well to join the British commonwealths. The Netherlands, with its large colonial empire, is more hesitant, though it is more than ever true that the security of its overseas colonies is dependent on the sea control of the major powers. As between the Netherlands and Belgium, a closer relationship has been indi­cated not only by a financial accord announced last fall, but by more recent plans for a future customs and general economic union of the two countries, in which Luxem­burg would be included but not the Dutch and Belgian colonies.

British Tighten Blockade.—The Brit­ish Admiralty in mid-February took steps to tighten the sea blockade of Germany by declaring a new danger area for shipping in the entire Bay of Biscay and the western end of the British Channel. As defined, the area runs from the Scilly Islands 360 miles westward, then 400 miles southward, and then due east to the French coast near the Franco-Spanish border. The action followed the capture in the south Atlantic of several blockade runners carrying goods from Japan, and is no doubt designed to shut off more completely the running of supplies in and out of French ports, as well as to afford bet­ter protection for Allied shipping in this area.

Talks with Turks Halted.—On Febru­ary 10 it was announced that the secret talks at Cairo between Turkish staff officers and the British military mission had been in­definitely suspended, and further, that they had bogged down chiefly because of the Brit­ish unwillingness or inability to assure Tur­key of military supplies essential to any full- fledged military operations. While Turkey remains fully confirmed in the British alli­ance, it has for some time been clear that her neutrality will continue unless (a) an Axis move threatens her frontiers, or (b) Allied control of the Mediterranean can give Turkey better protection against air attack in the Aegean. Seeking only an opportunity for peaceful development as a modern state, Turkey has no territorial ambitions which would immediately tempt her to join either side in the war.

With or without Turkish support, how­ever, an Allied move into the Balkans might actually be welcomed by certain Axis satel­lites such as Rumania, which would favor surrender to Anglo-British forces rather than face occupation by the Soviets or more com­plete submission to German control. Ru­mania, further, has some food surpluses which could be utilized in devastated areas of southeastern Europe.

Northern Europe

Soviet States Get Envoys.—The Su­preme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., in the final ses­sion of the 10th Congress on February 1, ap­proved a plan of increased autonomy for the component states of the Soviet Union. The change would apparently grant to the sepa­rate republics a limited control over military affairs and foreign relations, though subject always to the supreme authority of the cen­tral government, and might include diplo­matic representation for the separate states in foreign capitals and in international con­ferences. Over the actual purpose of the change there was much speculation. A plausi­ble explanation was that this grant of in­creased self-rule might facilitate measures for bringing back the three Baltic states, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, into the Soviet Union. Under the new plan their re­entry might assume the aspect of voluntary union in a group of self-governing states. Presumably also the change might facilitate the incorporation of East Poland with the Ukrainian Republic and of Bessarabia or other areas to southward in the “Molda­vian” republic. The possibility of using 16 votes in international gatherings might be a subordinate factor in the plan. It must be remembered that the 16 republics of the Union are not in any sense of equal size or importance, since the central republic of the Great Russians has 70 per cent of the total population and 78 per cent of the territory. There are seven republics on the European frontiers if we include White Russia, three little republics in the Caucasus, and five re­publics on the Persian and Indian borders east of the Caspian.

Finland Seeks Peace.—Very definite Finnish moves toward peace were seen in the arrival at Stockholm on February 12 of Dr. Juhu Passikivi, who negotiated the 1940 peace with Moscow. With him were former Foreign Minister Erkko and other officials. Though up to February 20 there were no re­ports of meetings with the Soviet envoy at Stockholm, Mme. Kolontay, it was evident that the Finns were seeking contacts and in­dications of Russian terms. These undoubt­edly would be severe, but less so than they might be later. One suggestion was: Russian occupation of Finland till the final peace, restoration of the 1940 frontiers, demobiliza­tion of the Finnish Army and reorganization of the government, and a guarantee of Fin­land’s survival after the war. Previous to Dr. Passikivi’s arrival in Stockholm, Secre­tary of State Hull had again warned Finland of the dangers of delaying peace moves, and the Russians had given a more pointed threat by a heavy air bombardment of Helsinki. A problem for Finland is the con­tinued presence of German divisions in her northern territory, though General Dietl, their commander, is said to have urged Hitler that they be evacuated.

Soviet Polish Policy.—Establishment in February of a Soviet-sponsored “Council of Polish Patriots” within conquered Polish territory gave further indications of the Soviet policy (1) to decline dealings with the Polish Exiled Government as at present or­ganized, (2) to insist on the Curzon line as a basis for any negotiations, and (3) to avoid so far as possible the intercession of Russia’s western allies in her dealings with Poland and other border states. In reply to queries in Parliament on January 26 as to Britain’s Polish policy, Foreign Minister Eden stated that his government, according to (he At­lantic Charter, would decline to recognize territorial changes unless based on “the free consent and good will of the parties con­cerned,” and that Britain would seek to avoid a “unilateral settlement” of the Polish problem. The United States proposal to mediate, made early in January, was an­swered from Moscow later in the month by a courteous statement that the “opportunity was not ripe,” Poland meantime had made a special request that the American and British Governments “define their views” on the frontier.

In late January, after a long investigation of the mass executions of 11,000 Polish offi­cers in Katyn Forest, a Soviet committee presented convincing evidence that these atrocities were not committed by the Rus­sians in March, 1940, as alleged, but by the Germans in August-September of 1941. The daughter of Ambassador Harriman and numerous correspondents were shown the evidence on the scene.

Southern Europe

Curbs on Spain.—At the end of January the American State Department announced that, in agreement with the British Govern­ment, Caribbean oil shipments to Spain were to be held up, pending alterations in Spanish policy. Several matters of unneutral conduct calling for correction were mentioned in the announcement. First, Spain was to turn over a dozen or more Italian merchant ships and several naval units now held in Spanish ports. Second, there was to be a halt on ex­port of vital war products to Germany, such as wolfram ore for tungsten. Third, the ac­tivities of Axis spies were to be suppressed in Spain and Tangier. Fourth, the remains of the Spanish Blue Division, now reduced to 1,500 or probably fewer, were to be with­drawn from the Russian front. Finally, there was to be some check on the reported ar­rangement providing Germany with a credit of about 400,000,000 pesetas for debts in­curred during the Spanish civil war. None of this credit was to be used for the purchase in Spain of strategic war materials. Spain’s only immediate reaction to the stoppage of petroleum imports was an announcement in early February that she would continue “strictly neutral” and would “submit to no pressure . . . against her right to maintain neutrality.” The restrictions on Spanish im­ports indicated that Anglo-American diplo­macy was in a position to take strong meas­ures in dealing with the shaky Franco regime. It is notorious that the German embassy in Madrid has long served as clearing house for espionage and propaganda in Latin America.

French Recognition Nearer.—It was reported early in February that the Ameri­can and British Governments might soon be expected to extend fuller recognition to the French Committee of National Liberation, accepting it as the provisional government not only for the colonies but for metropolitan France, until a permanent government could be organized. Noteworthy British steps in this direction were two financial accords with the Committee announced in February, one fixing exchange rates at 200 francs to the pound, and another establishing a mutual aid arrangement for credits on military aid offered by each government to the other. On January 31 the United States Government also gave assurances that it would have no further dealings with the Vichy Government or any French collaborators with Germany. From the point of view of the French Com­mittee, the chief advantage to be drawn from fuller recognition would be that upon the re­occupation of French metropolitan territory in whole or in part, the Committee, rather than an Allied military government, would presumably take over control. In the mean­time the politicians in Algiers have busied themselves with arrangements for the trial of ex-Vichy officials now under arrest on charges of treason. It was announced that trials of minor offenders would begin in February, but that those of more important figures, such as former Premier Pierre Etienne Flandin and Pierre Boisson, former High Commissioner for French West Africa, might be deferred until after the Allied landing in France.

Government in Italy.—While in Italy the Allied Governments in February granted Marshal Badoglio’s regime an extension of authority in southern Italy as far north as the Salerno-Bari line, they made it clear that no assurance could be given of permanent support. In the occupied territories the six chief anti-Fascist parties had already grouped themselves into an Italian Libera­tion Committee and had adopted a program which called for both King Vittorio Emanuele and Marshal Badoglio to step aside in favor of their “Executive Junta of Liberated Italy.”

Pacific and Far East

South Pacific Pact.—Australia and New Zealand in January entered into a note­worthy agreement to co-operate in their for­eign policies and to establish secretariats for that purpose in their respective ministries. Future meetings were to be held for deter­mination of a 'common policy relating es­pecially to post-war settlements in the Pacific area. Principles embodied in the January agreement were: (1) that the final peace settlement should be made in respect to all enemies after all hostilities were con­cluded, i.e., that there should not be one set­tlement for Europe, and another later for the Pacific; (2) that the occupation of any ter­ritory as a war measure should not constitute a basis for post-war claims; (3) that there should be an international agreement pre­venting future friction over the world’s trunk air routes; and (4) that there should be no change in the sovereignty or control of Pacific Islands except in an agreement in which Australia and New Zealand are parties.

The agreement was not taken as directed against either Britain or the United States, as dominant partners in the United Nations, but rather as a means of insuring that the two commonwealths should have a voice in decisions relating to the Pacific, and that their security should be safeguarded. The commonwealths must realize from bitter ex­perience that this security is dependent on American as well as British sea power, and they would undoubtedly favor a strengthen­ing of American strategic control in the central and south Pacific area. Their par­ticular concern is the zone of islands stretch­ing from Timor on the west to Samoa, and including New Guinea and the Solomons. For this area Mr. Walter Nash, New Zealand Minister to the United States, suggested in January that his “personal idea” would be “an international advisory or consultative council . . . composed of nations having in­terests in the area, such as the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand.”

Japan in the Philippines.—In early January the Japanese controlled radio in Manila announced that the offer of amnesty to Filipinos opposed to the puppet regime in the islands would be withdrawn on January 25. Thereafter the Government “would take drastic action to force the guerrillas to sur­render.” There was also a warning from Lieutenant General Masharu Homma, for­mer leader of the invasion forces, that the guerrillas had better surrender before it was too late. The radio messages gave a sufficient indication of continued resistance to Japa­nese control in the islands, however disguised as “independence.”

Tojo’s Warning.—Addressing the Japa­nese Diet on February 5, Premier Hideki Tojo spoke of a critical military situation in which “the fate of the Greater East Asia sphere and the rise or fall of imperial Japan will be decided.” He said success would de­pend on “the total mobilization of the 100,000,000 people” of Japan. In the Mar­shalls he described American forces as “eagerly pressing their advance... in order to destroy the might of time which is a very important strength to Japan.” In view of the far more rapid increase of American military and naval strength, this reference to the ad­vantage of time on the side of Japan was not at all clear, unless it might refer to some weakening of American popular support for a Far Eastern campaign. The reports of the Prime Minister’s speech intended for for­eign consumption were considerably dif­ferent from those given in domestic broad­casts.