At dawn of May 10, 1940, the German attack on Holland was loosed in all its fury. After live days of bitter fighting, the Dutch Army, terribly outnumbered, had to lay down its arms. But those five days gave the Government and part of the Navy a chance to escape to Britain, whence they at once renewed the struggle. For 19 months they waged a stubborn fight against Germany and Italy. Then Japan struck—at Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Malaya. Realizing the threat to the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch promptly declared war. They fought tenaciously in defense of their rich possessions and were finally crushed only by superior strength. More than half their surface ships went down in the waters about Java, but the remaining units proceeded to Ceylon and Australia, where they joined British and American forces. This long and gallant fight by Holland’s little Navy has won the admiration of all the peoples of the United Nations.
At the time of the Nazi attack, the Royal Netherlands Navy (Koninklijke Marine) consisted of 4 light cruisers (3,350-ton Tromp, 6,450-ton De Ruyter, 6,670-ton Java and Sumatra), 8 modern destroyers of just over 1,300 tons, 8 old torpedo boats, several motor torpedo boats, 27 submarines (362 to 967 tons), the old 5,644-ton coast defense vessel Soerabaja, 4 large escort vessels, and a number of gunboats, minelayers, minesweepers, and other auxiliaries. A small but efficient Naval Air Service was also in existence. Personnel comprised about 1,000 officers and more than 10,000 ratings, some of the latter being Indonesians. Vice Admiral Johannes Theodorus Furstner was Chief of the Naval Staff and directly responsible to Mr. A. Q. II. Dijxhorn, the Minister of Defense. Vice Admiral Conrad Emil Ludwich Helfrich was Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Navy in the Dutch East Indies, to which were assigned all the large ships and a considerable number of submarines and other small units.
The Nazi invasion of Holland did not come quite as unexpectedly as had the attack on Norway one month earlier, and the Dutch army and naval staffs had made definite preparations to repel an invasion. But the Germans learned a good deal about the Dutch defense plans by the simple method of threatening an attack on several occasions during the months preceding the actual invasion. These Nazi threats consisted of concentrating strong forces on the Dutch border as though in preparation for an attack, thus compelling Holland to take precautionary measures and concentrate her own Army. In this manner the German General Staff, through its extensive espionage system, obtained a pretty accurate idea of the Dutch mobilization plans. This knowledge was put to good use when, on the morning of May 10, the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe struck their initial blows.
At dawn of that day the Nazi Air Force carried out two operations which directly affected Dutch naval resistance. One of these was the dropping of magnetic mines at the entrances to all of Holland’s principal seaports; the other was the seizure by paratroops and air-borne infantry of Waalhaven Airport, near Rotterdam. The magnetic mines offered a particularly difficult problem for the Dutch, who had no minesweepers equipped to deal with this new and ingenious weapon. The capture of WaalHaven became a naval matter when the Army, reporting that it had no artillery available to shell the Germans there, asked the Navy to assist.
All that could be done regarding the magnetic mines was to request British and French assistance, which was promptly and efficiently rendered. The Waalhaven situation, however, was met by the Dutch themselves, who ordered the destroyer Van Galen and sloop Johan Maurits van Nassau to proceed at once to Rotterdam. The Van Galen was at Den Helder, the naval base, having arrived there only a few days earlier from the East Indies. Although in need of a refit, she left at once and, working up to full speed, hurried down the coast. On the way, off Katwyk, she destroyed three Nazi transport planes which were endeavoring to land troops on the beach.
By mid-afternoon the Van Galen was off Rotterdam and, despite the danger from mines, steamed right into the Nieuwe Waterweg and began shelling the enemy at Waalhaven. Dive bombers attacked the Van Galen repeatedly, but their aim was poor and for several hours the brave little destroyer poured 4.7-inch shells into the Nazi positions. Finally, however, after 31 attacks on her had failed, the Van Galen was struck by a heavy bomb and, in a sinking condition, had to be beached and abandoned. Her crew then joined the troops fighting the Germans in the city.
The Johan Maurits van Nassau, when she arrived off Rotterdam, was ordered to remain outside, it being feared, after the Van Galen's loss, that she would be an easy victim of the dive bombers or magnetic mines. She was soon sent north to Den Helder.
On the second day of the invasion enemy bombers made a heavy attack on Flushing, where the cruiser Sumatra, recently arrived from the Indies, and several other warships were at anchor. The old gunboat Bulgia was sunk, but the Sumatra and two torpedo boats escaped damage and left for England, the Sumatra carrying 900 captured Nazi paratroops. A month later the cruiser arrived at Halifax with Princess Juliana and her two young daughters. From there the Sumatra proceeded to her regular station in the East Indies.
On May 12 the Nazi armies in the north of Holland pushed their way to the eastern end of the Zuider Zee Dyke, and during the evening began to advance westward along the dyke. At the Kornwerderzand locks, however, they were held up by determined Dutch resistance. To overcome this strong point the Nazis set up heavy artillery on the mainland, four miles away. The fire from this battery proved very effective, and the Kornwerderzand defenders called for help from Den Helder. Next morning the van Nassau, anchoring some 10 miles from the German battery, proceeded to shell it with her stern 5.9-inch gun. Due to fog, her target was quite invisible, but the range was established by obtaining a bearing on the dyke and by having the fall of each shell reported by the Kornwerderzand defenders, who phoned the necessary corrections to Den Helder, which then transmitted them by radio to the warship. After firing 97 shells, the van Nassau destroyed the German battery.
Following their failure to advance along the dyke, the Germans appeared on the eastern shore of the Zuider Zee. As this move was obviously in preparation for an attempt to ferry troops across to the North Holland Peninsula, which had been virtually denuded of Dutch troops, the Navy sent into the Zuider Zee the old gunboats Brinio, Friso, and Gruno, which effectively shelled the Nazis and forced them to abandon their plans. Dive bombers, however, savagely attacked the Dutch flotilla, sinking the Friso and badly damaging the Brinio, which was subsequently scuttled. The Gruno reached England several days later.
By the evening of the 13th it had become evident that further Dutch resistance was impossible. The Government, therefore, decided to surrender, but before doing so it completed preparations to flee to England and carry on the fight from there. All the warships and merchant vessels in seaworthy condition were ordered to British ports. Among the former which slipped away during the night and following day were the unfinished light cruiser Jacob van Heemskerck and destroyer Isaac Sweers, both of which had to be towed, 8 submarines, several old torpedo boats, and various other units, including the minelayer Medusa with 27 cadets of the Naval College. The van Nassau was bombed and sunk while attempting to escape, and the minelayer Hydra, riddled by machine-gun fire from aircraft, had to be beached and abandoned. Various other units, including 3 submarines, were scuttled or blown up, as were 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 3 submarines under construction. The naval base at Den Helder was thoroughly wrecked before the Nazis entered it.
Although all of Holland was now lost, her possessions in the East and West Indies were still in the fight, as well as a considerable part of her Navy and Merchant Marine. Of the last, which had totaled more than 2,900,000 tons, only some 400,000 tons had been destroyed or captured. About 2,500,000 tons thus remained under the Dutch flag, and more than half of this tonnage at once became available for war uses. The remaining tonnage was required for the inter-island trade in the East Indies and for the export of their vital raw materials, such as copra, oil, rubber, and tin, most of which went to the United States.
Dutch naval activity during the 19 months between the loss of the homeland and the outbreak of war in the Pacific was largely confined to minesweeping operations around the British Isles, air and motor torpedo boat attacks on Nazi convoys in the English Channel and North Sea, and daring submarine patrols off the Norwegian coast and in the Mediterranean. One of the Dutch submarines, the 0-21, enjoyed particular success. After sinking a number of supply ships off Norway, she went into the Mediterranean. Here she accounted for several Italian merchantmen and, on the night of November 28, 1941, crowned her achievements by sinking the German submarine U-95.
Two other Dutch warships, the sloop Van Kinsbergen and destroyer Isaac Sweers, also came into prominence during this critical phase of the war. The former, operating in the West Indies, captured or destroyed ten German or German-controlled ships. Among her victims was the 6,000-ton freighter Rhein, which she intercepted the night of December 11, 1940. The Germans set fire to their ship, but Dutch sailors boarded her and for several hours fought the flames in a desperate attempt to save her. Finally, however, they had to abandon their efforts, and the Rhein was sent to the bottom by gunfire.
The Isaac Sweers, following her completion in a British shipyard, proceeded to Mussolini’s so-called “Mare Nostrum,” where, during the summer of 1941, she was employed on the hazardous ferry service between Alexandria and Tobruk. While engaged in this work the Sweers fought off numerous attacks by Axis planes. In the latter part of the year she was ordered to Malta and attached to a British destroyer division.
On the evening of December 12 air reconnaissance reported a force of Italian cruisers and light units proceeding north along the Tunisian coast. The Sweers and British destroyers Sikh, Legion, and Maori at once left Malta and steamed hard to intercept the enemy. Shortly after three o’clock next morning the Italians were sighted off Cape Bon. Their force comprised two light cruisers, several destroyers, and a number of motor-torpedo boats.
The night was very dark and the Allied units, steaming at 35 knots, were able to slip in between the enemy and the shore without being detected. The Sikh opened the action by launching two torpedoes at the leading cruiser. Both torpedoes must have found their target, for the cruiser was shaken by a heavy explosion and began to blaze furiously. The Italians had been taken completely by surprise, and several minutes after their leading cruiser had been hit, the second one was torpedoed by the Legion. Her back was broken and she commenced to sink. The enemy’s escorting destroyers and motor-torpedo boats, apparently paralyzed by the suddenness of the attack, made little or no attempt to screen the crippled cruisers; and the Sweers and Maori steamed in and finished off the first one, which by now was a mass of flames, while the Sikh and Legion completed the destruction of the second. The loss of life on both cruisers must have been very heavy. Reports from Tunis, where survivors landed, state that nearly all of the 1,200 officers and men aboard the two ships went down with them. These reports identified the cruisers as the Alberico da Barbiano and Alberto di Giussano.
During the latter part of the engagement the Italian motor-torpedo boats frequently came so close to the Allied destroyers that the latter’s gunners could not depress their weapons sufficiently to fire at them. The enemy craft, however, do not appear to have launched a single torpedo. But a destroyer, looming suddenly out of the darkness, nearly rammed the Sweers, which avoided a collision only by making a sharp turn. The Sweers fired a torpedo at the Italian as he sped past, but it missed by the narrowest of margins. The Dutch gunners, however, scored four hits on the enemy’s bridge, and soon afterwards sank a motor-torpedo boat which appeared close to their ship.
Twenty minutes after the Sikh had launched her first torpedoes the battle was over. Next morning, the Allied warships, having suffered neither damage nor casualties, returned to Malta. As they steamed proudly into the harbor, the band of H.M.S. Penelope, light cruiser, struck up “Sec the Conquering Hero Comes” and then, for the benefit of the Sweers’ company, played “Wilhelmus,” Holland’s national anthem.
Six days before the Cape Bon action, the Japanese had struck their treacherous blows at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, and the Netherlands Government in London had promptly declared war. Despite the suddenness of the Jap attack, the Dutch forces in the Far East had not been caught unprepared, and on December 7 (December 8, East Longitude Time), several Dutch submarines were actually patrolling off the east coast of Malaya, literally waiting for the Jap transports to appear. On the night of the 9-10th one of these submarines, the 0-16, delivered the first Dutch blow at the aggressor. Stalking a Jap transport into Patani, the 0-16 sank her and three other ships in the harbor. While returning to base, however, the 0-16 struck a mine and was lost with all hands save Quartermaster Cornelis de Wolf, who finally reached Singapore with the full story of the 0-16's exploit.
Other Dutch submarines also scored notable successes during the early weeks, sinking, according to official claims, 5 transports, 2 tankers, a supply ship, and a destroyer. Three transports and one tanker were sunk December 23 off Sarawak by the K XIV. Next day the destroyer (possibly the Uranami) was sunk in the same area by the K XVI, which 24 hours later sent in her last report. About this time the K XVII also failed to return from patrol; while on January 1 the 0-20, which had accounted for two transports in the Gulf of Siam, was sunk by three enemy destroyers after a spirited action. Several of her company were rescued, and one of them, Lieutenant Raoul Hordijk, eventually escaped from Hongkong to Ceylon.
Dutch aircraft were also quite active in the opening weeks and made numerous attacks on enemy convoys. Their first reported action was against shipping off Miri (Sarawak), where they scored several hits on warships, transports, and supply vessels. One of the Jap ships, a light cruiser, was severely damaged and may have been sunk. December 23, at dawn, a ship concentration at Davao was attacked by six naval flying boats. In spite of heavy fighter and antiaircraft fire, these planes played havoc with the shore installations and destroyed a 12,000-ton tanker.
In a summary of these early operations the Netherlands East Indian Government announced on December 27 that, as a result of Dutch submarine and air action, a total of 16 Japanese ships had been sunk and at least 5 others damaged. The sunken ships included, according to the official tally, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, and 4 troop transports. Among the ships damaged were two cruisers and a seaplane tender.
On January 9 Japanese bombers, probably working from their newly acquired base at Davao, attacked objectives at Tarakan, a small island off Borneo’s east coast. They concentrated on the minelayer Prins van Oranje, but failed to make any hits, although a near-hit slightly damaged the ship. The following day Japanese transports and warships, including a cruiser, appeared off the island. Dutch Army bombers attacked in the afternoon, scoring two hits on transports and several near-hits on the cruiser. But these successes were not enough, and that night the enemy effected a landing.
On the 12th Dutch aircraft twice attacked the Japs off Tarakan. These blows hurt the enemy, but they could not stop him, and during the morning his troops overcame the gallant resistance of the small garrison. The van Oranje, which had been hiding behind a minefield, attempted to escape at dawn of the 12th, but was intercepted and sunk by Jap warships.
Simultaneously with their attack on Tarakan the Japanese also appeared off Minahassa, in the northern part of spider-like Celebes Island, and landed troops at three points. Their task was easy, for only a very small force of Dutch troops was available to oppose them, while the Air Force was too occupied off Tarakan to spare planes for Minahassa’s defense.
With their occupation of Tarakan and Minahassa, the Japanese were now ready for another and more ambitious southward thrust by the eastern prong of their gigantic pincers which steadily were enveloping the Indies. At Davao they massed a large convoy and provided it with a strong naval escort. This armada left Davao on January 19 or 20 and soon afterwards was seen and reported by an American submarine. On the 22cl a Dutch reconnaissance plane sighted the Japs steaming toward Macassar Strait. The enemy’s course left little doubt that his objective was the oil port of Balik Papan on Borneo’s cast coast. A small Dutch convoy, also bound for Balik Papan under escort of the destroyer Van Ghent, was diverted when information of the enemy’s movements was received.
The Jap convoy was repeatedly attacked by Dutch and American bombers on the 23d, 24th, and 25th, and is believed to have suffered severe losses. Nevertheless, the enemy continued relentlessly toward his objective. During the early hours of the 26th four American destroyers (Division 59 under Commander Paul H. Talbot, U. S. Navy) attacked the convoy off Balik Papan and sank at least six ships. An interesting eyewitness account of this daring action appeared in the May, 1943, issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings (“Macassar Merry- Go-Round,” by Lieutenant William P. Mack, U. S. Navy).
While our destroyers were battering the Japs, the Dutch submarine K XVIII was also at work in the Strait. She sank a destroyer and put at least one torpedo into a cruiser. Final results of the second attack could not be observed due to prompt counteraction by the escorting Jap destroyers. The K XVIII was badly damaged and had to limp southward on the surface. Two days later she radioed her position, and the destroyer Evertsen was sent to escort her into Soerabaja.
During the final stages of the Macassar Strait fighting it became apparent from air reconnaissance that the Japanese were preparing to strike elsewhere—at Borneo in the west and at Amboina in the east. On January 26 Admiral Helfrich received word of a Jap convoy off the northwestern tip of Dutch Borneo, and ordered the cruisers Java and Tromp and destroyers Banckert and Piet Hein to rendezvous in the Soenda Sea. The Java got there first, but hesitated to act alone; and next day aircraft discovered that the Japs had landed at Pemangat. The Dutch ships withdrew southward.
The operations against Amboina, where the Dutch maintained a small naval base, began the morning of the 30th with an air attack. In the early afternoon a convoy appeared and the Dutch at once began to destroy all installations of military value, for prolonged resistance by their small garrison was impossible. In the evening the Jap warships commenced shelling the island, whose coastal batteries replied spiritedly. The fight raged through the night and into the following day. The enemy warships appear to have suffered considerably in this fighting, and it is reported that four of them—cruisers and destroyers—were sunk by mines or gunfire. But Amboina, despite the stubbornness of its defenders, finally succumbed to overwhelming force.
By the beginning of February the stage was rapidly being set for the final, grim phases of the desperate struggle to save the Netherlands East Indies. The general situation was not very encouraging: the British in Malaya had been pushed back onto Singapore Island; Borneo, Celebes, and Amboina had fallen; and the Japanese land, sea, and air forces seemed to be everywhere in superior strength. But there was still a chance that Java could be saved; and on February 2 the Allied naval command (“Abdafloat”), meeting at Soerabaja under Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, decided to assemble a striking force and send it against Balik Papan, where the enemy was gathering another of his ubiquitous convoys. That night the ships assembled in Madoera Strait to the east of Soerabaja. They were under the command of Rear Admiral Karel W. F. Doorman of the Netherlands Navy. Doorman was a vigorous officer who firmly believed that offensive action afforded the best defense. His squadron comprised the Dutch cruisers De Ruyler (flag) and Tromp, our Houston and Marblehead, three Dutch destroyers (probably the Banckert, Piet Hein, and Van Ghent), and five of our “flush deckers.”
While this concentration was being effected, the fourth Dutch cruiser in East Indian waters, the Sumatra, left Soerabaja for Oosthaven (South Sumatra), whence she proceeded directly to Ceylon to complete her overhaul. Her departure from Soerabaja preceded by only a few hours the first Jap air raid on that base. The attack, made on February 3 by bombers working from hastily constructed airfields in Borneo and Celebes, inflicted considerable damage on port installations. Quite a few Dutch fighter planes were shot down, while others, together with some bombers, were destroyed on the ground.
Next morning 54 enemy land-based bombers attacked (he Allied fleet off Kangean Island, about 30 miles north of Bali. The action lasted three hours and resulted very unfavorably for the Allied fleet. The De Ruyter and Tromp, steaming at 30 knots and twisting frantically, avoided all bombs intended for them, but the Houston and Marblehead were badly hit.
Doorman withdrew southward. The Houston with the Tromp as escort, and the Marblehead accompanied by two of our destroyers, were sent around to Tjilatjap, on Java’s south coast, for emergency repairs. The Houston arrived there on the 5th and the Marblehead, whose injuries were particularly severe, limped in the following day. After completing temporary repairs, the Marblehead proceeded to Ceylon and thence around Africa to the United States.
Admiral Doorman’s squadron was now seriously reduced in strength. Nevertheless, it was ordered out of Soerabaja to watch the southern exit of Macassar Strait, from which it was feared the Japs would emerge to take Bandjermassin (Borneo) and Macassar (Celebes). From either of these points their land- based bombers would be within easy striking distance of Soerabaja or Bali. The Japs did come down the Strait, and in such overwhelming strength that Doorman, with virtually no aircraft at his disposal, dared not attack. On February 11 he withdrew into the Indian Ocean, where his ships would be relatively safe from an air attack.
Meanwhile, alarming reports had been received in Java: the Japs had effected landings at Palembang, in southern Sumatra; two of their convoys had been sighted in the South China Sea steaming toward Banka and Billiton islands; and the enemy had landed and was fighting the British on Singapore Island itself. As these developments represented a grave threat to Java, Doorman on the 12th left his position south of Soembawa, sped west, passed through Soenda Strait (between Java and Sumatra), and on the 13th put in at Oosthaven and Tandjong Priok (port of Batavia).
That same day Admiral Helfrich, who had succeeded Admiral Hart in command of “Abdafloat,” called a conference at Batavia. It was decided to send Doorman’s ships northward on a sweep through Caspar Strait (between Banka and Billiton), around Banka, and then homeward through Banka Strait (between Banka and Sumatra). It was hoped that this plan would enable Doorman to intercept one of the Jap convoys which had been reported in the area.
The squadron put to sea on the evening of the 14th. Doorman appears to have had with him the De Ruyter, Tromp, 4 Dutch and 6 American destroyers. At sea he was joined by the British heavy cruiser Exeter and the Australian light cruiser Hobart, both of which had just come from Singapore. The night run through Caspar Strait was made without contacting the enemy, but shortly before dawn the Van Ghent grounded on Tima Island, and the Banckert had to be left behind to take off her crew and as much equipment as could be salvaged.
A few hours later Jap aircraft spotted the Allied warships northeast of Banka and made two heavy though unsuccessful attacks on them. Doorman then decided against taking his squadron through narrow Banka Strait and withdrew southward through Caspar Strait, arriving at Oosthaven and Tandjong Priok the evening of the 15th— the very day that Singapore fell. At Oosthaven the Java, which had been engaged on convoy duty to the west, joined the squadron, and she and the Tromp destroyed the port installations there. Both cruisers then withdrew to Tandjong Priok. After fueling his ships and detaching the Tromp and several destroyers to Soerabaja, Doorman took the De Ruyter, Java, Piet Hein, and the U.S.S. John D. Ford and Pope through Soenda Strait to Tjilatjap. The enemy’s air superiority over the Java Sea had made the northern route too dangerous except in an emergency.
Following Doorman’s return from the sweep through Gaspar Strait, naval headquarters was moved from Batavia to Bandoeng, high up in the mountains to the southeast, while the evacuations of Banka and Billiton were ordered. The destroyer Van Nes was dispatched to cover the Billiton evacuation, but on the 17th she and a merchant vessel with her were sunk by Japanese bombers. On the 18th enemy planes again raided Soerabaja, sinking the submarine K VII and the old coast defense vessel Soerabaja. Eight of the 24 bombers were shot down.
It was now apparent that the enemy’s next move would be against Bali in an effort to complete his double naval envelopment of Java. On the 18th our “Fortresses” attacked a convoy steaming south in the Java Sea and the following day a scouting plane sighted the convoy approaching Bali. Helfrich determined on a bold course. His plan of action, formulated on the assumption that the Japs would anchor in Bandoeng and Lombok Straits—to the east of Bali, called for three separate night attacks. Doorman would strike first, run through the Straits, and continue on to Soerabaja. Three hours later four American destroyers under Commander T. H. Binford, with the Tromp (Captain J. B. de Meester) in support, would come in from Soerabaja, dash through Bali Strait, round the south side of the island, and then go north and homeward through Bandoeng-Lombok Strait. Finally, six Dutch motor-torpedo boats based on the minelayer Krakatau in Pangpang Hay were to attack at daybreak.
Admiral Doorman, with the Dc Ruyler, Java, Piet Hein, John D. Ford, and Pope, left Tjilatjap the morning of the 19th and steamed southeast during the daylight hours. At dusk, however, he turned north and at 9:00 p.m. “Action Stations” was sounded. The five ships, working up to 30 knots, raced through the night toward the black mass of Bali’s mountains and the narrow entrance to Lombok Strait. An hour later, exactly on schedule, they found the Japs signaling to one another with blinkers.
Steaming at full speed into the concentration of enemy ships, the Allied squadron opened the action with torpedoes and guns. The enemy, recovering quickly from his surprise, switched on searchlights and opened a heavy fire. The Java received a bad hit in the stern; the Piet Hein, astern of the Java and leading the Ford and Pope, went down under an avalanche of shells from the two Jap cruisers.
Our two destroyers followed in the wake of the Dutch cruisers as they steamed through the Strait. Then they turned, ran back among the confused enemy, and torpedoed several ships. The exact amount of damage inflicted is unknown, for the glare of burning ships, exploding torpedoes, bursting shells, and wavering searchlights made accurate observation impossible. The action was over within 30 minutes. The Dc Ruyler and Java, having broken through the Strait, continued on to Soerabaja, while our destroyers returned to Tjilatjap.
Commander Binford’s division reached the scene at the appointed time and saw firing still in progress; the Japs, in their confusion, were fighting among themselves! This firing died down as Binford made his approach. Attacking at top speed our destroyers scored numerous torpedo hits. The enemy replied furiously and inflicted heavy damage on the Stewart, division leader, but most of his shells fell short, as he was afraid of hitting his own ships. The Tromp, however, received a heavy pounding as she came up to cover the destroyers’ getaway. As our ships steamed out of the Strait and turned west toward Soerabaja, the Tromp radioed that she was badly damaged. At first it was feared she was lost, but next morning she returned at full speed to Soerabaja. On the 24th she left for Fremantle to effect repairs.
Little or no information concerning the action of the Dutch motor-torpedo boats is available; but Lieutenant Mack, in his excellent article “Battle at Bali” (June, 1943, Naval Institute Proceedings), says that they went through without seeing anything and consequently made no attacks.
Although the battle had resulted in heavy loss to the Japanese, they effected a landing and quickly overran Bali. Their aircraft, based on Sumatra and Bali, were now able to bomb Java almost at will. Invasion convoys, meanwhile, were being assembled at Macassar and off Banka Island. The situation was rapidly becoming critical and demanded immediate counteraction. On the 21st, therefore, “Abdafloat” decided to form two striking forces—one based on Tandjong Priok and one operating from Soerabaja. The former, or western, force was to consist entirely of British and Australian ships: the heavy cruiser Exeter, old light cruisers Danae and Dragon, the Australian Hobart and Perth, and five British destroyers. To the eastern force, under Doorman, were assigned the Dc Ruylcr, Java, Houston, Banckerl, Korlenaer, Witte dc With, and all of our available destroyers. With this latter force it was hoped to strike again at the enemy off Bali, but his overwhelming strength there made it necessary to discard this plan. The enemy’s movements and apparent intentions then dictated a change in the composition of the striking forces, and the Exeter, Perth, and three destroyers were ordered to join Doorman’s flag.
On the 25th the Japs were reported on the move down Macassar Strait. Helfrich decided to risk everything in a desperate thrust and ordered Doorman to concentrate his squadron off Madoera Island. After assembling his ships Doorman made a wide sweep in search of the enemy. Next morning his squadron was unsuccessfully attacked by bombers. The Dutch Admiral then turned and steamed slowly eastward—his movements closely observed by enemy seaplanes.
The Allied crews had been at battle stations for 36 hours when Doorman, after radioing Helfrich “Exhaustion point far exceeded,” turned toward Soerabaja to rest Iris men. But a short time later another air reconnaissance message was received, both by Helfrich at Bandoeng and by Doorman off Soerabaja: over 40 Jap transports, escorted by several cruisers and destroyers, had been sighted off Bawean Island, some 100 miles north of Soerabaja. Helfrich promptly ordered Doorman to “Proceed, search for, and attack the enemy, notwithstanding the air attack.”
Upon receipt of the reconnaissance message Doorman turned northeast, called for 25 knots, and formed his ships into line of battle. In the lead were the British destroyers Jupiter, Encounter, and Electro; following them came the flagship De Ruyter and after her, in the order named, the Exeter, Houston, Perth, and Java. Behind the cruisers steamed our destroyers John D. Edwards, John D. Ford, Alden, and Paul Jones; while to the left of the cruiser division were the Dutch destroyers Witte de With and Kortenaer. On these gallant ships rested the last hopes of saving Java and her 45,000,000 inhabitants from the grasp of Imperial Nippon.
Shortly after 4:00 p.m. Japanese warships appeared on the horizon. They were not the convoy escort, but a strong covering force of eight or nine cruisers and several divisions of destroyers. Two of the cruisers were of the 10,000-ton Nali class. Doorman was outmatched two to one, but he did not for a moment hesitate to close with the enemy.
Space does not permit a detailed account of the bitter engagement which followed. An excellent description of it was contained in Lieutenant Mack’s article, “The Battle of the Java Sea,” in the August, 1943, issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings. The text of the Navy Department’s communique of March 14, 1942, together with interesting comments on the battle and events preceding it, was given in the Naval Institute Proceedings for April, 1943 (“Java Sea: A Memorable Naval Battle,” by James K. Eyre, Jr.).
The first Dutch warship to go down was the Kortenaer. During the day action she was torpedoed by a Jap submarine and broke in two. Her survivors spent many hours in the water, but about 11:00 p.m. the Allied cruisers steamed past the life rafts and a sailor on the Houston threw over a float with a light attached. A short time later H.M.S. Encounter came along and picked up the men.
H.M.S. Electro was also lost in the first phase of the battle, while the Exeter suffered a bad hit in the boiler-room and, escorted by the Witte de With, returned to Soerabaja. After fighting off an enemy cruiser and several destroyers, both ships reached Soerabaja at two o’clock next morning.
Shortly before midnight of the 27- 28th the four remaining Allied cruisers, now without any destroyer screen, sighted at least two Jap cruisers. A brisk 15-minute action ensued in which damage was almost certainly inflicted on the enemy. Soon after this action was broken off, other enemy ships were sighted. Doorman, apparently anticipating a torpedo attack, suddenly ordered a 90- degree turn to starboard. While this order was being executed the phosphorescent wakes of torpedoes were seen. The Java, last in the Allied column, had not quite completed her turn when she was struck aft, on the port side. She burst into flames and began to sink. Doorman then ordered another turn, but just as he did so the De Ruyter was torpedoed. Within a short time she too was enveloped in smoke and flames. Shells stacked on her decks exploded and showered all over the ship. Finally, all hands were ordered overboard and the flagship followed the blazing Java to the bottom. Admiral Doorman went down with the De Ruyter, as did her commanding officer, Captain E. E. B. Lacomble. Captain P. B. M. van Stralen of the Java was also lost.
The Houston and Perth notified Bandoeng and Soerabaja of what had happened and then, in fulfillment of Doorman’s orders, proceeded to Tandjong Priok, arriving there the morning of the 28th. Here they were joined by the Evertsen. That night the three ships endeavored to run through Soenda Strait. The last heard from them were messages from the Perth and Evertsen telling of contact with enemy warships in the Strait. It is now known that the Houston and Perth were sunk and that the Evertsen was driven ashore in a crippled condition.
The damaged Exeter, accompanied by the Encounter and the U.S.S. Pope, left Soerabaja the evening of the 28th and turned east. Next morning, off Madoera, they encountered three enemy cruisers. Only the Japs know the details of this final phase of the Battle of the Java Sea.
The Witte tie With, having developed engine trouble, was unable to accompany the Exeter, and on March 1 was sunk by Jap bombers at Soerabaja.
With the annihilation of the Allied fleet disappeared all hope of saving Java, and hasty preparations were accordingly made to demolish the Soerabaja naval base. Rear Admiral Pieter Koenraad, base commandant, directed this work, which was carried out with painstaking thoroughness. A few warships were able to get to sea, but the majority had to be scuttled, among them the destroyers Banckerl and U.S.S. Stewart; 6 motor-torpedo boats; the submarines K X, K XIII, and K XVIII; the minelayers Gouden Leeuw and Serdang; and the minesweepers Pieter de Bitter, A, B, C, and D. Twenty-seven merchant vessels and several score small craft were also sunk in the harbor, completely bottling it up, while four floating docks were extensively damaged.
All of the above-named warships were destroyed on March 2 with the exception of the Pieter de Bitter. She was not scuttled until the 6th, on which day three of her sisters attempted to escape. Two of them, the Jan van Atnstel and Eland Dubois, were sunk next day in Madoera Strait—the van Amstel by a Jap destroyer. The third ship, the Abraham Crijnssen, camouflaged with tree foliage, succeeded in reaching Australia. She was the last ship to leave Soerabaja and reach a friendly port. Six Dutch submarines and various surface ships also arrived at Australian bases, while a number of other units, including the submarine 0-19, proceeded to Ceylon.
The last blow delivered by the Dutch in the Java Sea at this time resulted in the destruction of a Jap flotilla leader. She was sunk the night of March 2-3 by a motor- torpedo boat.
Two days after the scuttlings at Soerabaja, it was announced in London that Admiral Helfrich had been given a “special mission” and that Rear Admiral J. J. A. van Stavoren had succeeded him as Commander of Netherlands Naval Forces in the Southwest Pacific. It was later disclosed that Helfrich had assumed command of the Dutch forces which had gone to Ceylon.
Since the loss of their rich colonial possessions in the Indies, the Dutch have had to confine their naval activity in those waters largely to submarine operations. These, however, have been remarkably successful, and quite a few Jap transports, tankers, and supply vessels have been sent to the bottom.
During the latter part of 1942 the Dutch surface units at Ceylon, operating with Britain’s Eastern Fleet under Admiral Sir James Somerville, were actively employed on convoy escort duty, but they had no opportunity to engage Japanese surface forces. In May, however, Dutch cruisers and other surface units participated in the expedition against Madagascar. Later in the year the Sumatra, which had been escorting convoys from Ceylon to Bombay and from Bombay to Capetown, was ordered to England. Accompanied by a single destroyer, she arrived safely at her destination, but only after having had a narrow escape from a concentration of Axis submarines. In November the light cruiser Jacob van Heemskerck sank the German armed raider Ramses II off the west coast of Australia.
During 1942-43 several new warships were delivered by British yards to the Netherlands Navy. They included the destroyers Van Galen and Tjcrh Hiddes, submarines Dolfijn and Zwaardvisch, frigate Johan Maurits, and four corvettes. The United States Navy, under Lease-Lend, also turned over the subchaser P.C. 468. Renamed Queen Wilhelmina, she was delivered to her Dutch crew on August 6, 1942, at the Washington Navy Yard.
Several weeks after the Queen Wilhelmina was commissioned, Admiral Furstner, now Minister of the Navy in the Dutch Government, arrived in Washington to confer with Secretary Knox. He then went to Willemstad (Curasao) to inspect the Netherlands Naval Forces in the Caribbean theater. These forces, comprising motor-torpedo boats, patrol vessels, and subchasers, were under the command of Captain (now Rear Admiral) C. J. Baron van Asbeck. For many months they had been working in close cooperation with American naval units defending the sea lanes against Axis submarines.
Dutch naval activity about the British Isles during 1942-43 was confined, as in preceding years, to minesweeping and convoy duties and to attacks on Nazi convoys by M.T.B.’s and aircraft. The work of the aircraft was particularly effective, and in February, 1943, it was announced that in 36 attacks a single squadron of the Netherlands Naval Air Service, flying American- built Hudson bombers, had sunk 111,000 tons of shipping.
On the night of November 8 9, 1942, the great Allied landings in French North Africa were made. Among the many warships which escorted the huge invasion armada was the famous Isaac Sweers. But the Sweers’ good luck was no longer with her, for on the 13th she was torpedoed by an enemy submarine off the Algerian coast and went clown with the loss of 138 of her company of 220 officers and men.
Several months later, in February, the Sweers was partly avenged by the new submarine Dolfijn, which sank an Italian submarine oil Sardinia. A few days after the announcement of this success, the Netherlands Admiralty disclosed that, since the invasion of Holland, Dutch submarines had sent more than 200,000 tons of enemy shipping to the bottom. Other successes have since been obtained in both European and Far Eastern waters.
Two Dutch warships, the sloops Flores and Soemba, participated in the Sicilian campaign, their 5.9-inch guns being used to good effect on the enemy’s shore batteries. On one occasion the Soemba forced the outright surrender of an Italian battery and then promptly shifted her fire to a column of Axis tanks, forcing it to retreat inland. The Flores, apart from engaging in numerous coastal bombardments, assisted in the destruction of a U-boat. Both she and the Soemba won high praise from British naval officers directing the operations.
Holland is lost; the East Indies are gone; more than half the ships and several thousand men of the Koninklijkc Marine lie at the bottom of the sea, but the flag of Oranje still flies proudly from more than 60 warships manned by nearly 7,000 stubborn Dutch. The last word has yet to be said with the Imperial Japanese Fleet, for the Netherlands Navy fights on.