Toward the end of December, 1942, not many days after Japan’s initial acts of treachery against the territories of the United Nations, the tiny island of Hongkong fell to the Japanese invaders who had launched their assault from the Chinese mainland. Since then, a meager amount of authentic information has filtered through from the Far East regarding the fashion in which the British crown colony has been used by the conquerors to meet their war needs. Just recently, however, it was revealed that the enemy-occupied island is serving as a major repair base for the Merchant Marine and Navy of Japan in the Southwest Pacific. There Chinese shipyard workers are worked relentlessly to recondition Japanese warships, tankers, and freighters which have been damaged by American warplanes and submarines. In order to hide the effectiveness of the war of attrition being waged constantly by our air and sea forces in the Pacific, these crippled vessels are towed into the enemy base under the cover of darkness. Once repaired, they are then sent to sea again by the Japanese who arc striving desperately to maintain their sea power in the face of increasing pressure from the United States and her allies.
Hongkong is also being forced to assist the Japanese in other ways. It is reported, for example, that during a 12-month period the Asiatic invaders built six new merchant vessels of 5,000 tons apiece in the shipyards of the strategically located port. In another step to bolster their badly depleted Merchant Marine, the Japanese salvaged and put back into service all the Allied ships which were scuttle in and around the island during the battle of Hongkong. Among the ships salvaged were two American freighters which were repaired in the Cosmopolitan Hock and are now at sea flying the Japanese flag. These developments are the latest in a long series of events which have given the small colony an interesting and important part in the naval and political history of the Far East. Few insular territories, in proportion to their size, have commanded more prestige in world affairs than the British possession.
Hongkong, whose name signifies “the place of sweet streams,” and surrounded by a number of even smaller isles, is located off the southeast coast of China about 90 miles south of the great Chinese port of Canton. Approximately 10 miles long and from 2 to 5 miles wide, it is of rocky formation with a maximum altitude of 1,809 feet at the top of Victoria Peak. The island rests on the east side of the estuary of the Chu-Kiang or Canton River, and is separated from the mainland by little more than a mile of water called the Lyernun Strait. This proximity to the Chinese shore was not only destined to enhance Hongkong’s prestige during periods of peace, but it was also to affect seriously the military position of the small territory in any war where an enemy was entrenched on the adjacent portion of China proper.
Prior to its occupation by the British, Hongkong was a sparsely inhabited, little known spot, one of the many tiny islands bordering the Asiatic mainland. During the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Western powers began to intensify their activities in the Far East, Great Britain, like the others, sought to gain vantage points from which she could expand her influence in that rich, underdeveloped region of the world. One such place was the port of Shanghai, whose location at the mouth of the Yangtze provided a commanding position with respect to the commercial growth of China’s vast central provinces. There the British worked industriously to compete successfully with the rest of Europe and America in winning the lucrative trade of the area. Moving down the coast of the Celestial Empire, the British looked for a similar locale which, controlled completely by themselves, would give their country striking advantages toward securing a lion’s share of the markets and natural resources of South China. Their choice fell to Hongkong, which was to be converted into a British naval station and imperial outpost and whose rapid development was symbolic of the role enjoyed by the Navy and Merchant Marine of Great Britain in constructing her overseas empire.
Occupied by the British in 1841 during a conflict between the Chinese Empire and the leading powers of Europe, Hongkong was ceded to the Westerners the following year in the Treaty of Nanking. After a century of British rule, another ambitious – but this time an Asiatic — people, the Japanese, were to seize the small island. When the British initially acquired the crown colony, its population was about 5,000, made up of pirates, fishermen, farmers, and granite-workers, living in huts made of baked-mud bricks, and holding no intercourse with the outside world beyond Canton. As the result of British policy, Hongkong became a densely populated area and a great commercial center whose name was known everywhere.
Fifty years following Great Britain’s acquisition of the island, a second wave of Western imperialism swept through the Far East. Again the various European powers sought to wring additional territorial concessions from the tottering Manchu Dynasty. For her part, Great Britain strove to better the strategic position of Hongkong vis-a-vis the Chinese mainland. It was considered advisable, for reasons of security, to have control of the territory immediately facing the British possession. In 1861, the British, with this view in mind, had annexed the peninsula of Kowloon, a tiny finger of land about 3 square miles in size which was directly opposite the crown colony. By the Convention of June 9, 1898, China leased to Great Britain for 99 years an additional area called the New Territories, which included a small agricultural section of the adjoining Kwangtung Peninsula, the island of Lan-tao, and the waters of Mirs and Deep Bays. This territory, plus land reclaimed in Kowloon Bay, Wanchai, and North Point, brought the total area of the colony to approximately 391 square miles.
By itself, Hongkong did not have any inherent commercial significance, for the island’s small size automatically limited Britain’s trading opportunities there. The rocky isle was to be noted chiefly as a transshipment center to which tremendous quantities of British products found their way, to be shuttled across intervening waters to Canton and other ports of South China. Among the principal British staples in this traffic were opium, sugar, and flour. In return, large shipments of Chinese raw materials flowed outward through Hongkong to the world beyond. Conscious of the crown colony’s potentialities, the British stimulated its commercial growth by making it a duty-free port, the sole exceptions in recent times being import taxes on tobacco and intoxicating liquor. The wealth which the foreign trade produced caused a number of local industries to spring up on the island, including tobacco manufacture, sugar-refining, shipbuilding and repairing, rope-making, and the production of knit goods. Deep-sea fishing also grew in importance.
At one time Hongkong was the first port of the world in terms of foreign commerce. For instance, in 1900 some 17,247,023 tons of shipping engaged in foreign trade cleared the colonial port, which was 500,000 tons more than similar figures for either New York or London, its nearest competitors. As late as 1929, Hongkong accounted for 30 per cent of the total trade of China, with 52,278 vessels aggregating 37,640,694 tons visiting its harbor during the year. Originally, Great Britain enjoyed a complete monopoly of the crown colony’s commerce, but eventually they shared it with others. Prior to the outbreak of war in the Far East, the mother country absorbed 50 per cent of the total annual trade - estimated to be about $600,000,000 — with a large share of the remainder going to India, Australia, and the United States.
The harbor of Hongkong, one of the best in the world, has contributed heavily to the island’s development. Splendid anchorage is available for a large concentration of vessels. The harbor is also pre-eminently beautiful, excelled only, perhaps, by that of Rio de Janiero. The sea approach by day through countless green isles, and the view of the city with its richly inhabited peak rising steeply in the background, leave the voyager with an unforgettable impression. Moreover, at no other place is there such a complete diffusion of the various types of surface craft which have been devised by man in his continuous struggle to conquer the sea. This characteristic of Hongkong was vividly portrayed more than a decade ago by a European naval officer:
All sorts of ships mingle in the waters of Hongkong. From pictures in the dictionary, we recognize the classical ones, from the transoceanic steamboat to the squat trawler, from the noble three-master to the slim destroyer. Others are native to the Far East. There is the junk, with its low-lying hulk and high stern, rigged with sets of sails like the wings of a butterfly or a bat. Some of its sails open and fold like fans or window blinds. There is not a manoeuvre, however bold or dangerous, which could stump these mariners, who have navigated the high seas or shot the rapids of rivers since their childhood. The sampans are propelled by men and women facing the bow and leaning on their oars like Venetian gondoliers or Mediterranean fishermen.
But besides this infinite variety of picturesque boats you can see everything that can float. Even naval engineers or futurists could not conceive such droll, incongruous craft as those the industrious Chinese has invented for his pleasure, his wanderings, and his small tasks. One of them looks like a slew pot, another resembles a basket. A hollow tree trunk or three bamboos tied together is enough for the Chinese Triton, be he gamin or graybeard. The paddles about, constantly risking his life among the huge ships with their merciless propellers. When he capsizes, he comes up all snorts and grins, and with the aid of a bit of string or a few nails soon has his skiff frisking along again, as if nothing had happened.
This mixture of every nautical contrivance that science or instinct could evolve symbolizes Hongkong, for it is the meeting place of traffic from all over the world. The ignorance of the savage Polynesian, of the Philippine and Malayan merchant, contrasts with the activity and progress of the Chinese and of the Western races, and the boats that mingle at these crossroads reflect the stages of civilization which their owners have attained.
It was not unnatural that Great Britain, in pressing home her commercial expansion in the Far East, established the practice of maintaining strong naval squadrons in the western Pacific for the protection of British interests. Ideally situated for the purpose at hand, Hongkong served the enterprising Westerners well as their main naval base in that area. Units of the British Navy operating from the crown colony, aside from their ceaseless campaign against pirates in neighboring waters, played roles of some significance in the several armed clashes between Great Britain and China, and in the difficulties which arose between the Western powers and Japan subsequent to the latter’s abandonment of isolation. Moreover, prior to the construction of Singapore, the facilities at the crown colony for the servicing and repairing of ships were the only ones possessed by the British east of Suez. From the standpoint of sea power in the Far East, the use of Hongkong was not restricted entirely to the British. In the absence of similar naval stations of their own in the western Pacific, other nations, such as Germany and the United States, frequently sent their warships into Hongkong to be refitted and resupplied. In this sense, the British possession was the crossroads of all naval activity in that part of the world.
In its capacity as a naval station, Hongkong was not without influence upon the history of the United States, especially in connection with the Spanish-American War. During the first months of 1898, the American Navy contemplated offensive action in both the Atlantic and the Pacific if the then strained relations with Spain led to open hostilities. A reinforced squadron under Commodore George Dewey in the Far East was ordered to be ready for any eventuality. Dewey was confronted with a difficult tactical problem, for the United States possessed no base west of Hawaii, which was thousands of miles away. He realized that, once the war began, the logic of the situation would call for an attack upon the Spanish fleet which was present in Philippine waters, and at least a temporary seizure of a base in the Spanish colony. The American officer additionally comprehended that, besides the extensive preparations needed to put his squadron in battle condition, it would be necessary to concentrate his ships at a point not too far removed from the probable scene of action in the Philippines. Hongkong was able to fulfill this dual function, and Dewey assembled the Asiatic squadron at the British colony late in March, 1898. Coal and supplies of all kinds were readily procured at the busy port, and the facilities of the naval station were used to make the American warships more battle-worthy. By working feverishly, Dewey had his gray-painted ships ready for the contemplated test of strength when the British proclamation of neutrality at Hongkong followed the outbreak of war. The dependence of Dewey’s squadron upon the British crown colony during the final days of peace helped to emphasize the pressing need for an American naval base in the Far East.
The aid rendered by Hongkong to the war effort of the United States did not terminate with Dewey’s smashing victory at Manila on May 1, 1898. Not long after the din of the naval battle subsided, the American commander blockaded the Philippine capital and severed the cable connecting Manila with the outside world because the Spanish Captain-General refused to share it with him. The Americans were thus left without direct means of communication with the United States, and finally Dewey was compelled to send the official report of his victory to Washington via the Hongkong cable. Thereafter the British colonial possession became an indispensable communications center for the Americans in the Pacific theater of war. By a loose interpretation of the laws of neutrality, the British gave Dewey invaluable assistance in another direction. Being so far removed from a home base, the Americans’ limited food and other essential supplies dwindled rapidly. Confronted with a prospectively serious situation, he sent a dispatch boat to Hongkong to see what could be done to replenish them. Despite Spanish protests to the colonial authorities, on this and subsequent occasions, Dewey obtained sufficient quantities of supplies for the blockading forces at Manila until the war ended.
With the turn of the present century, and the rise of Japan to the rank of a first-class military power, Hongkong was destined to become enmeshed in the turbulent difficulties of the Far East. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the European nations possessing territories and other vital interests in East Asia felt fairly certain of their positions there. The picture, however, was radically changed by the newly displayed strength of an aggressive Japan. Heretofore comparatively secure, Hongkong was now considered to be vulnerable to attack from the north. During World War I, the British weighed the advisability of building a much greater naval base in the western Pacific, more removed than Hongkong from Japanese aggression, and it was from this line of thought that the idea of Singapore was born. The results of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 convinced the British that Hongkong’s strategic position with reference to Japan had become hopeless, for the Five-Power Naval Treaty listed the crown colony among those British possessions in the Pacific where additional work on fortifications and naval bases was prohibited. With Hongkong left in a defenseless state, Great Britain went ahead determinedly to create an impregnable bastion of sea power at Singapore, which remained outside the restricted area set down by the Naval Treaty.
While the Singapore project got under way, still other events were taking place which injected an added element of uncertainty into the future of Hongkong. Ever since the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911, there was increasing agitation within Nationalist China for the return of those Chinese territories which had fallen under foreign domination. The colony of Hongkong, comprising the island itself, the Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories, fell within this category. Moreover, many Chinese nationalists resented the crown colony form of government which prevailed at Hongkong. Although the Chinese accounted for at least 97 per cent of the total population, they were given little voice in the colonial administration. Under the traditional arrangement, sweeping authority was vested in the governor and other high- ranking officials who were appointed by the British Government at London. But most irritating of all was the fact that the Chinese nation was compelled to watch a mere handful of foreigners from a distant land control the rich trade which passed through the duty-free port, whose geographical position made it an integral part of China proper. The British appeared determined, however, to retain the valuable little island, come what may.
Whereas the Japanese threat to the security of Hongkong was not far advanced at the time of the Washington Conference, one decade later the problem was more realistic. The peaceful atmosphere which had existed in the Pacific since the end of the great war of 1914-18 was rudely shattered by Japan’s Manchurian adventure in 1931. Bent upon the conquest of a far-flung empire, the Japanese now looked at the question of comparative naval strength from the standpoint of their aggressive ambitions. On December 31, 1936, the terms of the Washington treaties of 1921-22 expired; and Japan announced that she would not support their renewal. This abandonment by the Japanese of the principles of naval limitations which they had agreed to in common with the other major sea powers of the world was bound to have serious repercussions upon the future of Hongkong.
When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, it seemed that Japan had decided to devote her energies toward expansion on the mainland. In reality, the Asiatic power also intended to strike southward against the colonial possessions of the Western powers. But, before this could be done, extensive preparations had to be made to assure the success of the contemplated campaigns in the southern region of penetration. The land operations in China, forcing the Chiang Kaishek Government back into the interior, and the occupation of all Chinese coastal cities as far south as Canton, protected the Japanese flank from the continent. Successive advances in another direction, namely, the seizures of the island of Hainan, Indo-China, and the tiny Spratlys were intended to improve Japan’s tactical position with respect to the coming struggle for the mastery of Southeast Asia. Aside from their larger implications, these territorial acquisitions by Japan further undermined the British hold on Hongkong. The aggressive Asiatics also worked feverishly to convert Formosa into a key base for offensive thrusts against near-by territories. Much of the militarization of Formosa centered around the southern part of Takao, which was well-located for operations against Hongkong, and the British hastened to bolster the defenses of the crown colony.
The four and one-half years which elapsed between the Marco Polo bridge incident and the attack upon Pearl Harbor undoubtedly represented the most significant period during the century of British rule in Hongkong. Though isolated and cut off by the advance of the Japanese armed forces in the surrounding area, the crown colony, small as it was, remained as a symbol of the might of Great Britain and her allies which must be challenged someday if Japan carried through her program to dominate the Far East. Striving to find safety under the British flag, hundreds of thousands of Chinese from the mainland, in addition to many Europeans and Americans, took refuge on the rocky isle. Rents and prices skyrocketed as the swollen population caused an inflationary fever to sweep throughout the small colonial possession. Hongkong’s prosperity reached unprecedented heights, with money circulating freely among the cosmopolitan and heterogeneous peoples which crowded together there.
More than ever before, Hongkong reverted to a traditional role as a center of intrigue and counter-intrigue in the Far East. In times past, the strategically situated insular territory harbored many types of individuals who had plotted with respect to political developments in adjoining countries. There was the instance during the period of the Spanish-American War when Filipino extremists took refuge at Hongkong and conducted a propaganda campaign against the United States in the Philippines. Somewhat later, it served a similar purpose for General Artemio Ricarte y Vibora, a leading native officer during the Aguinaldo insurrection, who remained irreconcilable to American rule in his native land. Long after peace was restored in the former Spanish colony, Ricarte took advantage of the political immunity offered by the British crown colony and tried to keep alive the revolutionary spirit among the Filipinos. Failing in his efforts, he shifted the scene of his operations to Tokyo and Yokohama where he schemed anew with the Japanese secret societies against the United States. Early in January, 1942, Ricarte returned to the Philippines aboard a Japanese warship, thus placing himself at the disposal of the invaders from the north.
From 1937 on, Hongkong, as the greatest sounding board of the Asiatic continent, swarmed with secret agents, representatives of international ammunition trusts and adventurers of various kinds. The feverish activity of such individuals, whose interests were often at cross-purposes, was unmistakable proof that the small outpost of empire was being drawn inevitably into the whirlpool of events in the Far East. An even more pronounced indication of what lay ahead was the active manner in which Hongkong aided the Chinese Government to resist Japanese aggression. In one of the principal steps taken to achieve her military objectives on the continent, Japan attempted to prevent the Chinese from securing external help. The invaders gradually seized all the key coastal cities of China from Shanghai south to Canton, and patrolled the adjacent waters with strong naval squadrons in order to maintain an effective blockade by sea. These measures by the enemy placed the Chinese in a serious situation, for in the absence of adequate war industries and a fully developed national economy of their own, they were dependent upon the United States, Great Britain, and other countries for supplies needed to carry on the armed struggle. Seeking relief from Japan’s strangulation process, the Chinese envisaged a partial remedy in the construction of the now famous Burma Road, since such an overland route was considered to be safe from attack by Japanese air and sea forces.
From the standpoint of the immediate problem, however, Hongkong assumed a unique position with respect to meeting China’s war needs. Despite the menacing ring of steel which the Japanese drew around the colonial port, it served as an indispensable link between China and the outside world. In this connection, the service rendered the Chinese cause by Hongkong bore a striking resemblance to the role enacted by the equally small island of Martinique in the American Revolution. In each of the two instances, the insular territory in question gave invaluable assistance to the contestant which was noticeably deficient in sea power as compared with its opponent. Like the Chinese and their recent experiences, the American colonists were particularly hard- pressed to hold their own at sea, and the presence of superior enemy squadrons made it difficult for Continental warships to operate from mainland ports. The long Atlantic seaboard, like the extended Chinese coastline, was exposed to the sea blockade of the enemy. It was a stroke of good fortune that our allies, the French, were numbered among the leading military and naval powers of the period. Resides the advantages derived from the powerful navy maintained by France, the latter’s insular bases in the Caribbean—of which the most important was Martinique— proved to be a major factor in the success of the American fight for freedom.
As in the case of Nationalist China, the thirteen Colonies were desperately in need of help from the outside to prosecute the war against Great Britain. There was a marked lack of munitions and military supplies of all kinds in North America, and it was not unnatural that many of these supplies should have been imported by the Colonists from Europe via the West Indian islands. In the latter group, the Dutch possession of St. Eustacia and French-owned Martinique operated as important depots for the transshipment of goods to the mainland. Britain attacked and occupied St. Eustacia shortly after the Netherlands openly entered the war against her, and it was of great significance to the rebellious Americans that Martinique remained in friendly hands throughout the entire Revolution, for if this supply and communications base had fallen to the British, it would have represented a serious setback to the struggling Colonists.
Just as the continued availability of Martinique represented a considerable contribution to the American cause, the defiance of Japanese aggression by Hongkong netted China impressive gains. Contrary to their previous displeasure over British control of Hongkong, the Chinese were now quick to realize the attractions offered by the insular possession as neutral territory in the war. The numerous official and semiofficial representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek Government which took up their posts at Hongkong had the practical effect of transforming the crown colony into a second capital of unconquered China. Most of the great Chinese newspapers, in an attempt to escape Japanese domination, resumed publication there under the protection of the British flag. Even the famous Eighth Route Army of China made its intellectual headquarters on the small island. Alarmed over the possibility that the activities of such groups might lead to an open break with Japan, the British made some efforts to tone down the anti-Japanese activities of the Chinese nationals. Curbs were also imposed upon the dissemination of inflammatory literature by Chinese Communists among the impoverished masses of the colony.
These attempts to preserve some semblance of neutrality were only surface measures, however, for Hongkong continued to keep intact an effective lifeline which brought the material resources of the outside world to the embattled Chinese. Besides the undeniable importance of the small island as an intermediate shipping point between distant ports and the continental areas which were not controlled by the Japanese, it also became a financial center of Free China. In this connection it was proposed to transact for much-needed war supplies at Hongkong, with the final delivery of the goods to be made from there to near-by cities along the Chinese coast, whenever possible. The crown colony’s banking institutions, cable offices, sea and air travel facilities, and other existing assets of a similar character created an ideal situation for the Chinese in this respect. As before, Hongkong was the scene of great activity, with an endless stream of merchant vessels traveling to and from its busy harbor and huge transpacific clippers stopping regularly at the municipal airport. For all practical purposes, the British possession seemed totally oblivious to any potential danger from the armed forces of Japan, and the commercial intercourse with China proceeded at an unabated pace.
Hongkong’s proximity to the Chinese coast contributed immeasurably to its success in helping to stem the advance of Japanese aggression in East Asia. For a number of months after the beginning of hostilities in China, with Canton and the adjoining sector remaining in the defenders’ hands, supplies were shipped directly from the British colony to receiving stations in the interior. During this period, which terminated with the fall of Canton in October, 1938, the railway between Hongkong and Hankow—completed but a short time before the holocaust of war swept over the Chinese countryside—comprised the most important supply line in the possession of the Nationalist Government of China. Large quantities of arms and ammunition for the fighting forces of Chiang Kaishek which arrived at Hongkong aboard oceangoing cargo vessels were subsequently transported to the unconquered provinces of China via this vital railway. It was not uncommon for trains, loaded with war materials, to start out on their trips late in the afternoon and then travel several nights in order to reach their destinations. Night schedules were safest, and the trains were halted during the hours of daylight and camouflaged to avoid detection by Japanese bombers.
Another transportation route of comparable significance was the highway which ran from Hongkong through Canton toward Hankow and the Yangtze. Long lines of imported trucks which constantly used this road constituted one factor in the never ending battle of supply waged by the indomitable Chinese. Since it was illegal to assemble China’s warplanes in the British crown colony, it became a fixed practice to ship them in their crates to Canton, where they were taken to the city’s outskirts, put together, and flown to the front. The airplane made possible a third means of physical contact between Hongkong and China proper. Every week British and American flying boats left the Hongkong airport for Europe and America, with London and New York but a week away, in contrast to the month of travel needed to traverse the same distance by boat. In turn, their schedules were co-ordinated with those of feeder or auxiliary lines which operated between the British crown colony and China. Planes flew daily from Hongkong to Hankow, the provisional capital of Nationalist China, and twice a week to Chengtu and Chungking in Szechuan province. Journeys which formerly consumed many days’ travel were reduced to a few hours by air. As time passed, these air routes assumed greater significance, particularly after the rail and highway links on the mainland were severed by the Japanese. Down to the very moment of the enemy’s attack against Hongkong, the commercial planes openly defied the Japanese in adhering to their fixed schedules. Even after the British territory became actively engaged in the war, they made one last effective contribution to the cause of the United Nations. During the early stages of the siege of Hongkong, the unarmed planes transported many outstanding citizens of China, Great Britain, and the United States to places of safety on the continent.
Practically speaking, the British had been resigned to a relatively quick loss of Hongkong in the event of war with Japan. They fully appreciated that the outlying outpost could not stand alone for long against a determined attack by the Japanese from occupied China. As in the case of Britain’s grand strategy for the entire Far Eastern area, the eventual fate of the insular territory was dependent upon the practical application of battle plans envisaged for the great fortress of Singapore. Although the British admitted that the Japanese could swiftly overrun Hongkong, they believed that counterattacking forces from Singapore—itself being considered impregnable—would eventually wrest the occupied island from the aggressors. Some optimistic observers went so far as to assert that it might be possible for the insular possession to hold out until British reinforcements from the Malayan base swept northward and hurled back the enemy. The international pattern of political and military developments, however, ruined these theories. Notwithstanding the recognized ability of Singapore to resist a frontal assault from the sea, the famed British stronghold was found to be vulnerable to attack from land and air forces striking at the rear of the city. Following a surprisingly short period of 70 days’ fighting subsequent to Pearl Harbor, Singapore fell to the Japanese and any hope of immediate relief for Hongkong disappeared.
There were other factors present which contributed to the dilemma of Hongkong when Japan threw aside all caution and invaded the colonial possessions of the Western powers in East Asia. Prior to December 7, 1941, the British had fought a life and death struggle with the Germans in Europe and, by necessity, an element of expediency was injected into Britain’s Far Eastern policies. This fact was clearly demonstrated by Britain’s closure of the Burma Road—a step taken to avoid an open conflict with Japan at a time when the British military situation was so serious in Europe. Until events took a more favorable turn in the war with Germany, the British were handicapped in any attempt to bolster their strength in the Pacific. Moreover, it was unfortunately true that the British—like other Westerners— generally underestimated the striking power of their potential antagonist in the Far East. Some were even misled into thinking that the British position was still too strong to warrant an overt challenge from the Japanese. The sum total of these facts was that Great Britain allocated relatively weak forces— especially in the air and on the sea—to defend Hongkong, Singapore, and other points in the western Pacific from the acts of aggression which materialized late in 1941. This condition was not unknown to the Japanese whose intelligence agents swarmed everywhere.
Paralleling the experiences of the United States in the defense of the Philippines, Great Britain was in the midst of hurried efforts to strengthen Hongkong when the Japanese struck at the small island. Pressed for time, the Government at London had decided to reinforce the Far Eastern outpost with men and equipment from Canada which, as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, was vitally interested in the Pacific area. By selecting North America rather than the British Isles as a jumping-off place for these reinforcements, a comparatively short route was made available for the dispatch of sea-borne troops from western Canada to Hongkong. On September 19, 1941, a formal proposal for such a step was forwarded to the Ottawa Government, and the latter agreed that two battalions of the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers should be sent to strengthen the Hongkong garrison. These troops, which included 1,985 men of all ranks, sailed from Vancouver on October 27 and reached their destination just a few days before the full fury of the Japanese attack descended upon them.
As circumstances would have it, the newly arrived Canadians, who comprised a large part of all the forces defending Hongkong, were without their heavy equipment when the enemy surged across the narrow strip of water which separated the island from the mainland. The troops themselves had been dispatched on a fast transport, whereas most of their mechanical equipment and other supplies were placed aboard a second vessel —a steamer which made only 8½ knots. Among the valuable cargo were 212 tanks and armored vehicles which would have added much to the defensive power of the Canadians. This supply vessel was still at sea when the Japanese attacked, and for a time its fate remained a mystery. The following month, Colonel James L. Ralston, Canadian Minister of Defense, informed the House of Commons at Ottawa that the vessel reached Manila on December 12, where its cargo was unloaded and “remained under the direction of the United States naval authorities.” This fact probably accounted for the somewhat mystifying report, made earlier by General MacArthur, that he was using Canadian materials in the defense of the Philippines.
From the standpoint of the Japanese, the desirability of capturing Hongkong went far beyond the mere seizure of a strategically located island off the southern coast of China. The small insular territory symbolized the resistance of the Western powers to Japan’s imperialistic expansion in the Far East, and for more than four years the British crown colony remained a thorn in the side of the Japanese with respect to their attempt to crush the Chinese. As one part of the larger picture, the Japanese noticed with grave apprehension that Hongkong was fast replacing occupied Shanghai as the most important transshipment center for the Chinese market, with the metropolis at the mouth of the Yangtze—which traditionally financed about three-fourths of the entire trade of China— receding into the background. Reacting strongly to the deterring influence of Hongkong upon their plans, the Japanese would have gladly established a blockade around the colonial possession or taken some other equally harsh action against it, but circumstances did not as yet favor an open conflict with the British Empire.
Although the Japanese, by seizing Canton and other key ports along the Chinese coast, did finally succeed in partially stopping the flow of goods from Hongkong to China, the tiny island continued to aid the Chinese war effort. Small vessels sailing from the British territory constantly eluded the Japanese naval cordon and deposited their cargoes on isolated portions of the mainland which were held by the Chinese. Subsequent to the seizure of Canton, the Government of Free China was still able to order their supplies through Hongkong, making out drafts on the banks there, with the cargoes either transshipped at the colonial port for Indo-China, or directed to British Burma, where they found their way into China proper over the Burma-Yunnan highway. This failure to check Hongkong’s activities infuriated the Japanese which may explain, in part, why they vented their savage rage upon helpless captives taken in the storming of Hongkong.
When the Japanese struck at the British crown colony, they enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in men and equipment. The initial attack was launched from behind the ridge of hills which surrounded the mainland section of the British territory, and the invaders, two divisions strong, brushed aside the light opposition and burst through to Kowloon. Seeking an easy victory, the Japanese presented the defending forces with an ultimatum to surrender, which was promptly rejected, and several days later an all-out assault against the island was begun. Possessing but very little naval strength there at the time of this crisis, the British had no chance to intercept the Japanese land troops which were ferried across the narrow and ineffective water barrier between Kowloon and Hongkong. A number of British gunboats and other small craft were either sunk or severely damaged in the ensuing action. In defending Hongkong, the British placed great reliance upon minefields in the adjoining waters and well-concealed gun batteries on the island, some of which were composed of large naval rifles embedded in the solid rock. Japanese minesweepers, however, swept clear the sea approaches to the colony and the gun emplacements were rendered useless by aerial bombardment and artillery fire from the adjacent shore. Hongkong was especially vulnerable to air attack and it was protected by a few warplanes based upon a single military flying field. Its weak anti-aircraft batteries failed to hinder the Japanese operations, with the enemy employing aircraft on a large scale from occupied China without the presence of any opposition.
The situation of the defenders was made more desperate by the swollen population which engulfed the insular territory. In terms of a long siege, the problem of providing food, water, and shelter for these people would become a pressing one. Soon after the fighting began, it was reported that an important reservoir impounded by dams had been destroyed by Japanese bombs. On the other side of the ledger, there was some hope that Chinese armies might strike at the rear of the attacking forces and relieve Hongkong. The Chungking Government announced that a strong force under the famed commander who had held the Japanese at bay in the Shanghai hostilities of 1932 was in the midst of such operations against the common enemy. A Chinese column fought its way to Tamshui, 28 miles north of Hongkong’s border, but could not get beyond that point. At the most, this effort was chiefly an annoying diversion which had the practical effect of harassing the Japanese line of communications along the railway from Kowloon to Canton. Following the rejection of additional ultimata calling upon the battered garrison to capitulate, the defending forces, which had put up a heroic resistance against impossible odds, grudgingly surrendered the beleagured island to the invaders on Christmas day, less than three weeks after Japan launched her assault in the Pacific. For the first time in a century, British control of Hongkong was replaced by that of another power.
With Japan undertaking major strokes against Malaya and the Philippines, Hongkong’s plight had been overshadowed by the details of the fighting elsewhere in the Pacific. Because of the part played by the insular territory in the history of the Far East, it was not entirely forgotten, however. From the outset, the London press and spokesmen for the Government, in mentioning the attack against the crown colony, prepared the British public for its early loss to the Japanese. These quarters argued that the fall of Hongkong should not greatly change the general strategic situation in Southeastern Asia, for so long as the Philippines and Singapore held out, the way would be blocked for a major Japanese attack on the Dutch East Indies, which constituted a major objective in their desperate bid for empire. In this connection, Hongkong’s resistance had not been in vain, for in the words of the British Government, it had been “of the utmost value in preventing the enemy from diverting men, ships and equipment to other areas.”
The Japanese, for their part, lost no time in utilizing Hongkong to its fullest advantage. Besides their use of the shipbuilding and repairing facilities there, which has been mentioned previously, they intended to give the conquered territory a key position in the entire communications system between Japan proper and the far-flung empire which they were constructing in the South Pacific. This program was substantiated by a short-wave foreign broadcast from Japanese-controlled Hongkong on June 22, 1942. At that time, it was announced that the conquered island was to be converted into a great sea and air center. In conformity with its favorable geographical location, Hongkong would thus become the radiating point of many transportation and communications services sponsored by the Japanese. One indication of the former British colony’s importance in this development was the fact that it became a key station in the mail service which was extended southward from the Japanese Archipelago and Formosa to the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies.
In view of Hongkong’s strategic location, it would not be surprising if its recapture is destined to be the offshoot of a major offensive which must eventually come against the Japanese in China. Such a thrust, if successful, would drive a dangerous wedge between the heart of the Japanese Empire and the rich territories which have been conquered and occupied in the South Pacific. A glance at a war map of the Far East will show that the Japanese hold but a narrow strip of land on the mainland adjoining the tiny island. Chinese guerrillas operate at will in the immediate neighborhood, and not so far to the west, the armies of Chiang Kai-shek and the ever expanding expeditionary force of the United States wait for an opportune moment to attack. A somewhat prophetic note has been struck by the recent bombings of Hongkong by the American air force now operating from Chinese bases. Military installations, docks and wharves, storehouses, and ships at anchor in the harbor there have received heavy blows from our aerial assaults. Although Hongkong is occupied by the enemy, this initial counteraction against the colonial territory proved that it is still very much within the zone of active combat in the Pacific.
The future undoubtedly holds additional developments in store for Hongkong. On several occasions, Prime Minister Churchill and other responsible officials at London have staled that the British Empire is to be kept intact after the Axis is beaten into submission. This intended policy means, by implication, that the British are determined, among other things, to reassert their control over Hongkong. Such a desire, if put into practice, may well lead to one of the many delicate problems which must be settled by the United Nations in the Pacific during the post-war period. Regardless of what turn this question of Hongkong as an imperial outpost may take, however, it is quite possible, once peace is restored, that we shall see the small island, with its splendid anchorage and central location, made available for the use of the British and American navies in their discharge of security measures in the western Pacific.