United States and the War
Pressure on Eire.—In early March both the United States and Great Britain made strong representations to the Government of Eire urging that German, Japanese, and other Axis diplomatic and consular representatives be expelled from the country. It was pointed out that these agents were in an excellent position to gather and report information of United Nations military operations. The Irish Government refused the request on the ground that such expulsions would be a departure from neutrality, that similar demands had not been made of other European neutrals, and that Eire had taken effective measures to prevent espionage. Following upon this refusal the British Government practically halted travel between Eire and England and threatened other preventive measures such as the closing of the Ulster border and restrictions on trade. The United States Government announced on March 11 that it had refused the transfer of a merchant vessel to the De Valera Government, since the latter had made no protests to Germany after the torpedoing of two other ships, the Irish Pine and Irish Oak, while operating under charter to Eire. While the action of President De Valera was approved by his constituents, the American press expressed regret at this nice balancing of neutrality between Hitler and the free nations. The policy might work injury to several hundred thousands of soldiers of Irish citizenship or descent now fighting in the United Nations cause.
Third Year of Lend-Lease.—Early March marked the third anniversary of the adoption of Lend-Lease. Speaking for its renewal, government representatives stated that lend-lease expenditures now total about $20,000,000,000; that shipments to Russia have exceeded quotas by 33 per cent and have included 8,300 airplanes and 220,000 motor vehicles; that counter lend-lease from Britain now runs to about $2,000,000,000 a year and that Britain has expended about $10,000,000,000 in financial aid and supply to associated nations.
Palestine Resolution Deferred.—In deference to objections by the War and State Departments, both the House and Senate in March deferred action on resolutions which would have put Congress on record as favoring continued Jewish immigration to Palestine. The War Department objections, as stated by General Marshall, stressed the unfortunate effect which such action might have upon the Arabs in Palestine and throughout the Moslem world. President Roosevelt stated that in the final peace settlements “full justice would be done to those who seek a Jewish national home.” A British White Paper of 1939 set March 31, 1944, as a date for the end of Jewish entry into Palestine, though the immigration is now 27,000 short of the 75,000 quota set, and may continue until it is filled.
Persian Pipe Line Issue.—On March 9 Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox before the House Foreign Affairs Committee gave further government endorsement to the proposed trans-Arabian oil pipe line, on the grounds that it was a military necessity and would reduce the drain on American oil reserves. He put the plan on the same basis as the pipe line into China. Opposition to the proposal is based on the arguments: (1) that the oil can be brought more cheaply by tankers from the Persian Gulf, (2) that the project would not stimulate production, (3) that it would involve the United States in the tangled political problems of the Middle East, and (4) that it would be an entering wedge for the intrusion of the government into the oil business. On these grounds the scheme was hotly opposed by 55 oil companies not directly benefited. Reports from England indicated that the British Government had been consulted and had no objections to the plan.
Post-War Planning.—During March the European Advisory Committee set up by the Allies at the Moscow conference undertook a preliminary exchange of news on the economic and territorial problems of post-war Germany. There has been some talk pro and con regarding the “dismemberment” of Germany and regarding a transfer of German minorities into the smaller Reich that may survive the war. Plans have also been exchanged with the Norwegian, Netherlands, and Belgian Governments in Exile for the control of civil affairs in their lands after their liberation from German occupation. No doubt the United States would share further in these discussions after the arrival in London of Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and a staff of State Department experts, who on March 17 were about to leave Washington. Subjects for discussion in London would no doubt include the status of the Badoglio Government in Italy, the relations with the French National Committee, and the Polish frontier issue. On these and other matters it has been held that our Government might well adopt more definite policies and pursue them more vigorously, though it must always be borne in mind that, before entanglement in controversies over the peace, the first essential job is to win the war.
Latin America
Shifts in Argentina.—At the close of February further strife developed in the military junta which has taken charge in Argentina, as a result of which General Ramirez was forced to turn over the Presidency to his former Vice-President, General Edelmiro Farrell. General Ramirez’ withdrawal was at first attributed to illness, but in a statement on March 11, accompanying his final resignation, the General declared that it was due to a mistaken belief among his associates that his diplomatic break with the Axis in February was to be followed by an aggressive anti-Axis policy and a declaration of war. Nationalist and pro-Axis influence in the junta proved strong enough to push him out of office. There was another abortive attempt at a military coup on March 1, directed against Farrell, which fizzled out when Colonel Duco’s Third Infantry regiment revolted prematurely and then quickly surrendered. General Farrell was formally installed on March 11 by a decree signed by all seven members of his Cabinet.
As was to be expected, the Farrell regime in Argentina was quickly recognized by the Villarroel Government of Bolivia. Chile and Paraguay also took the ground that the succession of General Farrell created no break in the continuity of diplomatic relations. Thus there appeared the beginnings of a small bloc of southern states opposed to United States leadership and inter-American solidarity. The United States and Britain, together with the remaining American republics, withheld recognition of the Farrell Government on the ground, as set forth by acting Secretary of State Stettinius on March 4, that “This Government has reason to believe that groups not in sympathy with the declared Argentine policy of joining the defense of the hemisphere were active in this turn of affairs.”
Articles of Naval Interest.—Among articles in the March Harper’s magazine is one on “Some Real Trouble in South America” by Ricardo Setaro, a former Argentine reporter. This article attempts, not altogether convincingly, to show that the anti-United States policy in Argentina is not chiefly German-inspired, but is due to British and oilier European capital interests in Argentina and other southern Latin American states. Recent arms imports from Spain to Argentina, it is alleged, have not had their origin in Germany. Argentina has strong economic ties with Paraguay and Bolivia, and hopes also to join up Chile, Uruguay, and Peru in a bloc of states opposed to “Yankee economic dominance.”
Other articles of naval and military interest in the March Harper's include an account of “Bougainville Landing” by Harold Azine, a combat correspondent for the Marine Corps, who was in the operation; “Target: Ploesti” by Captain William D. Banks of the Army Air Corps; and “The Campaign in the Solomons” by Fletcher Pratt, a continuation of his notable series on the naval war in the Pacific. In connection with United States naval and trade interests in South America, the Journal of Modern History for March has an excellent historical article by Seward W. Livermore on “Battleship Diplomacy in South America: 1905-1925.” This traces the strenuous and successful efforts of Taft- Knox “dollar diplomacy” in 1908-10 to secure contracts for the Argentine battleships Rivadavia and Moreno, and less successful efforts to secure naval contracts from other Latin American states.
West Indies Conference.—A conference of West Indies states and colonial governments was set to meet on March 21 at Barbados, for the purpose of dealing with political, economic, shipping, and other problems that are of long standing but have been made more acute by the war. The conference is notable as the first in which representatives of United States, British, Dutch, and independent islands of the Caribbean have met to deal with problems arising from their common geographical position. Most of these problems are shared also by the small states of Central America, which might well therefore have been included in this regional conference. The meeting had its origin in the very effective work that is being done by the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission.
Brazil-Soviet Rapprochement.—A step in the slow progress of Brazil and the Soviet Union toward a renewal of diplomatic relations was made when on February 23 Foreign Minister Aranha of Brazil spoke of the need of closer economic relations between the two countries and his own feeling in favor of an exchange of envoys. This was said to have been the first time in eight years that a Brazilian official had referred to the Soviet Government in friendly terms.
Northern Europe
Finns Reject Peace Terms.—The Soviet peace terms to Finland were presented by the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, Mme. Kolontay, to the Finnish representative, Dr. Paasikivi, at an informal meeting in Stockholm on February 16. As stated later by a Moscow official broadcast, they ran as follows:
- The rupture of relations with Germany and the internment of German troops and ships in Finland. And furthermore, should Finland consider this latter task beyond her powers, the Soviet Union is prepared to render her the necessary assistance with her troops and air force.
- Re-establishment of the Soviet-Finnish agreement of 1940 and withdrawal of Finnish troops to the 1940 boundaries.
- Immediate return of Soviet and Allied war prisoners as well as Soviet and Allied persons of the civilian population now being held in concentration camps or being used for labor.
- The question concerning part or complete demobilization of the Finnish Army to be left for negotiations in Moscow.
- The question concerning reparations of damage caused to the Soviet Union through military operations and occupation of Soviet territories to be left for negotiations in Moscow.
- The question concerning the Petsamo region to be left for negotiations in Moscow.
If the Finns found these terms acceptable they were invited to confer at Moscow. The Russian peace proposals had previously been approved by the British Government, which is also at war with Finland, and in both Britain and the United States, as well as in neutral Sweden, they were regarded as a reasonable basis for settlement. In the delay after their receipt both President Roosevelt and King Gustav of Sweden sent urgent messages to the Finns appealing against a rupture of negotiations and warning against the consequences of rejection. In the Soviet press Finland was told that the “liberal offers” were not to be mistaken for a sign of weakness and that later terms would be more severe. Finland’s reply, delayed until the third week of March and not immediately published, was conciliatory in tone but constituted a virtual rejection of three principal points—the internment of German forces, the withdrawal of Finnish troops to the 1940 borders, and the repatriation of civilian and war prisoners and other Soviet subjects in Finnish hands. It expressed a wish to go to Moscow for discussion on equal terms and not to receive an ultimatum. This reply was supported in the Diet by a vote of 160 to 40. A major difficulty for Finland was the danger that forced expulsion of German troops might turn her territory into a battleground like Italy.
Polish Frontier Issue.—British policy in the Polish-Soviet frontier controversy was best indicated in Prime Minister Churchill’s speech of February 22. In it he spoke of Russia’s “right of assurance against future attacks from the west,” of the British view “expressed in the so-called Curzon line,” of the possibilities of Polish “compensation at the expense of Germany,” and of Marshal Stalin’s desire for a “strong independent Poland.” In brief, it appeared essential to Allied solidarity that England and the United States accept not only the Curzon line in Poland but the reincorporation of the Baltic states in the Soviet Union. As Leland Stowe has stated in his recent book They Shall Not Sleep, “it is no longer so much a question whether we can live with Soviet Russia as it is a dead certainty that we've got to try." On the other hand, the Polish Government in Exile, in conferences with the British Foreign Office, reiterated its determination to reject the Curzon line. A sense of realities might dictate a more practical policy.
Bombed out of Berlin.—According to news reports of early March, the Hitler Government in Germany has been forced to move practically all its government offices and machinery from Berlin to Breslau, the Silesian city 175 miles southeast of Berlin. Breslau is 680 miles from England, 670 miles from Foggia airfields in Italy, and about 425 miles from the advancing Russian front in Poland.
Southern Europe
French Recognition Plan.—In mid-March President Roosevelt confirmed a report that he had prepared a formula for partial recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation, and that this formula was under consideration by the War and State Departments and also by military and foreign office authorities in London. It appeared likely that final action might await the March visit of Under Secretary of State Stetlinius to the British capital. The plan, though not fully revealed, was said to grant only limited recognition of the committee’s authority within metropolitan France, the extent of its control being left largely to the discretion of the military leaders following the Allied invasion. In a speech on March 18 General de Gaulle said the committee had already made its plans for the administration of freed territory and would not tolerate cither a “foreign regime” or continuance of Vichy authority after the liberation.
Vichy Minister Convicted.—The first trial of a former Vichy official before a military tribunal in Algiers resulted on March 11 in the conviction for treason and sentence to death of Pierre Pucheu, former Minister of the Interior in the Government of Marshal Petain. He was convicted of malfeasance in office and collaboration with the enemy, but the court did not pass on the question whether membership in the Vichy Cabinet constituted in itself a conspiracy against the state. The trial and its outcome indicated a trend toward severe penalties for former collaborators with the enemy, and it was generally held that pressure from the underground within France was overwhelmingly in favor of such a course. To some observers outside France, however, it appeared that these retributory punishments might well be avoided or postponed at a time when France stood in need of every supporter now ready to join the national cause. Pucheu in the course of the trial put in a vigorous defense of Marshal Petain, though not of Pierre Laval. He declared at the end that his conviction “planted the first stake for a civil war in France.” On March 17 Pucheu’s plea to the Military Court of Appeals was denied, and after a vain appeal to General dc Gaulle he was put to death.
Soviet-Italian Relations.—Both the British and the United States Governments in mid-March sent inquiries to the Soviet Government regarding its announced intention to grant full recognition to the Badoglio Government in Italy. The matter was not perhaps of major consequence, but it would be a departure from the well-defined policy of united action if in a case of this kind the decisions of the Allied powers were not based on common agreement. Such was the primary purpose in establishing the Allied Control Commission in Italy and the Allied Advisory Council. Aside from the question of Allied relations, there was occasion for surprise in this Soviet decision to recognize a government hotly opposed by liberal and radical parties in Italy.
Another .aspect of Soviet-Italian relations calling for clarification developed from a report in February that the Soviet Government had requested and was to be granted one-third of the surrendered Italian fleet. This report arose from a misinterpretation of a statement by President Roosevelt in which he had said that Russia would be given naval aid, consisting of either Italian vessels or their equivalent. There were protests from Italy, and on March 9 Prime Minister Churchill gave assurances that the final disposition of the Italian fleet would await the termination of the war. It appeared that at one time there had been some talk of sending Italian or other naval vessels into the Black Sea, in the event that Turkey entered the war on the side of the Allies. But with Turkey’s continued neutrality, it became more likely that any naval aid for Russia would consist of American-built craft which could be employed on the Murmansk supply route.
Turkey as “Neutral Ally.”—The British decision on March 2 that all further shipments of military supplies to Turkey would be halted served to emphasize the extreme reluctance of the Turkish Government to depart from neutrality. After the Teheran Conference considerable pressure was put upon the Turks, but they took the ground that unless supplies were forthcoming in much larger quantity they could not risk an attack. They claimed that of military aid to the value of £25,000,000 promised in the Anglo-Turkish alliance of 1939, only £19,000,000 had been delivered, and that of later aid promised by Prime Minister Churchill at Adana only 4 per cent had been received. The aid was to include a seemingly modest provision of 500 tanks and 300 planes.
Yugoslav Political Strike.—At the invitation of the British Government King Peter of Yugoslavia arrived in London from Egypt on March 11 to consider plans for ending the factional strife within his country. As representative of flic Tito Government, Foreign Minister Josip Smodlaka also came to London to join in the discussions. In preparation for the meeting, a plan of settlement had already been drafted by King Peter’s Cairo officials which proposed (1) limiting the sphere of action of General Mikhailovitch’s forces to Serbia proper and that of General Tito to the rest of the country, (2) establishment of a joint military committee under Allied supervision, (3) resignation of General Mikhailovitch from his office as Minister of War, and (4) postponement of all political settlements till after the war. As another kind of preparation for the conference, the Yugoslav Minister to Russia, Stanoye Simitch, on the same date publicly denounced the Yugoslav Government in Exile and transferred his allegiance to Tito’s National Committee of Liberation. He declared that the Puritch Cabinet did not truly represent the country and that it had refused whole-hearted co-operation with Tito’s forces in the field.
Spain Meets Demands.—Although still professing “strict neutrality” it appeared in March that the Franco Government in Spain would be forced by economic pressure to check or halt its direct and indirect aid to Germany. On March 7 Spain was reported as moving to close the German consulate in Tangier, which was established in 1940 and has since been an important center of espionage. On that date some of the 13 Italian ships held in Spain had also been released. Other Anglo-American demands on Spain call for an embargo on shipments of wolfram to Germany and a final dissolution of the Spanish Blue Division on the Russian front.
Far East
Japanese Cabinet Changes.—Early in March there was a further reorganization of the Tojo Cabinet in Japan. The object as stated was to add to the political strength of the cabinet and “promote a swift increase in the war fighting power.” New ministers were appointed to three posts—finance, agriculture, and transportation. Kieto Goto, appointed to the last-named office, had been president of the Yokohama Street Railway Company. This cabinet change was the second since the general reorganization made in April of last year.
India’s Post-Wak Plan.—The Far Eastern Survey for March 8 reported a noteworthy plan, originating among Bombay industrialists, for stepping up India’s industrial and general production in the period after the war. In some respects the scheme appears to be modeled on the Soviet “Five Year Plans” and, like those, not altogether beyond possible achievement. Its success, however, would no doubt be contingent on the establishment of a strong national government and assurance against internal or external strife. The Survey’s account reads:
The plan aims at doubling India’s per capita national income in fifteen years. Allowing for expected increase in population, this means a trebling of the present national income. It calls for the investment, over a fifteen-year period, of Rs. 100 billion (about $30 billion) in Indian economic development. Agricultural production is to be more than doubled by extending the sown area and by improving agricultural methods. The plan calls for greater use of irrigation, fertilizers, rotation of crops, better seeds and implements. Apparently it also contemplates the consolidation of small holdings into large co-operative farms.
Industrial output is to be quintupled. Attention is to be concentrated first on basic industries such as electric power, mining, engineering, chemicals, transportation, cement and armaments, and later on consumer goods industries such as textiles, glass, leather, paper, and tobacco, including cottage industries. India’s present 800,000 miles of highways arc to be doubled, and railway mileage is to be increased from 41,000 to 61,000.
Certain standards of consumption arc set, to be achieved in fifteen years, including, according to the Delhi Statesman, “30 yards of cloth per person per year; housing at the figure of 100 square feet of house room per person, with necessary conveniences and comforts; adequate medical facilities; universal primary education.” To meet these requirements the national income must be raised from the present estimate of Rs. 22 billion to Rs. 66 billion, or from $6.6 billion to $19.8 billion.
The plan appears to have been received with interest as a step in the right direction, although there was some criticism on the ground that it is more concerned with the needs of industry than with those of agriculture, and that it should consider not only the enlargement of the national income but also its fair distribution.