In a previous issue of the Proceedings we discussed the methods and procedures of naval courts. This concerned only fhat phase of our discipline problem embodIed in the system of dealing with those ^a-rged with the commission of offenses. There are two other phases of the problem, Namely, the causation of offenses and the treatment of convicted offenders, the first of which is herein discussed.
During the quarter ending March 31, 1944, '■he number of records of proceedings of c°urts reviewed in the Judge Advocate Genial’s Office was:
General Courts-Martial.............. 1,991
Summary Courts-Martial........ 22,70S
Deck Courts-Martial............... 26,434
Total.................................... 51,130
At this rate the total cases for the year "’ill be 204,520, which, in comparison with 166,957 for the year ending February 29, 1944, will show an increase of 22.5 per cent. This is not unduly large in view of the numerical increase in the total enlisted strength °f Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
can find something encouraging in the comparison, as the ratio of cases to total pop- nation has actually shown a slight decrease.
Approximately two-thirds of all disciplinary cases have their genesis in unauthorized absence. The remaining cases consist principally of other military offenses. A small percentage of cases relates to offenses which 'v°uld constitute crimes of varying degrees °f gravity in civilian life. We are most concerned with the absence cases, because of Ibeir numerical importance and because tbeir frequency of occurrence is most susceptible of being reduced by remedial measures.
The Secretary of the Navy, by precept, ^ated August 25, 1943, convened the Naval Clemency and Prison Inspection Board, of 'vbich the writer is the senior member. This
K. TAUSSIG, U. S. Navy
Board is directed to meet monthly, “for the purpose of considering applications of naval prisoners for clemency and making to the Secretary of the Navy recommendations for clemency and on other matters relating to the treatment of naval prisoners and to naval discipline.” The precept sets forth the general principles by which the Board is to be guided in considering clemency, and directs frequent inspections of naval prisons, detention barracks, and brigs within the continental United States.
Those composing the Board, in addition to the Senior Member, are:
The Judge Advocate General of the Navy;
A Captain, USN, Director of Welfare Division, BuPers;
A Captain, USN, Director of the Enlisted Performance Division, BuPers;
A Colonel, USMC, Head of the Prison Administration Section, BuPers;
A Commander, USN, Head of the Material Requirement Section, BuPers;
A Colonel, USMC, Head of the Discipline Division, Marine Corps;
A Captain (MC), USN, Head of the Neuropsychiatric Section, BuMed;
A Commander, USCG, Head of the Military Morale Division, Coast Guard;
A Lieutenant, USNR (lawyer by profession) Recorder.
Vice Admiral Taussig is one of the best-known contributors to the Proceedings. Retired after a lifetime of active service, he is back on active duty in the Navy Department. This is his second article on Naval Discipline in war time, and his next article will cover still another aspect of this vital military subject.
This membership constitutes a cross section of the officers in the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department concerned with disciplinary matters.
In the writer’s capacity as senior member of the Clemency Board, lexers were addressed to the commandj^ officers of many major activities in the continental United States, in which the situation was briefly stated and in which were requested opinions as to the causes of absence over leave, absence without leave, and desertion; and suggestions as to changes in or additions to the naval regulations, general orders, instructions, and letters, which might have a salutary effect. Replies to these letters were most enlightening and instructive.
An inspection trip was made embracing substantially all of the major enlisted personnel activities in the United States. These inspections, together with the information obtained from the aforementioned letters, indicated the necessity of securing the viewpoint of the seagoing personnel. Accordingly, letters were written to several fleet commanders and captains of ships, in which the viewpoint of officers in command ashore was briefly presented and the comments and suggestions of the addresses requested.
At the same time consultation was had with officers of the Army, who, since the operation of the selective service system, had had extensive experience in disciplinary matters and had accumulated a great deal of statistical information, much of which is of value to the Navy. Lastly, valuable contributions have been received from many officers, both line and staff, whose duties have primarily involved disciplinary matters.
Based on these sources, and on further personal observations, the following discussion on the causation of offenses is presented.
The majority of the offenses which by civil criminal laws would be classified as serious misdemeanors or felonies are attributable to a relatively small number of men who would normally be found in the criminal population. It is estimated that not more than 3 per cent of all naval offenders are within this group. These men, generally received through the operation of selective service, cannot be prevented from committing offenses. Our only recourse is to hold the discredit they bring to the Navy to a minimum by pursuing a policy of effective detection, prompt trial, and adequate sentence which will provide for discharge after a suitable period of confinement.
A few may be rehabilitated while in confinement, but this is their only hope.
There is a second group of offenders for whom no corrective action is feasible because their difficulties are attributable entirely to mental deficiencies. They are mental defectives, who, even with good intentions, will never be of any use in military service, and whose enlistment or induction is due occasionally to inadequate screening techniques under press of war-time conditions. Separation from the service, by administrative discharge or otherwise, is the only recourse.
There are other minor categories of offenders, which in general are subject to the same considerations as those described above. There remains the major group, approximately 90 per cent of all offenders, not fundamentally criminals, and of adequate intelligence, who for one reason or another do not conform to our standards of discipline. Broadly speaking, these are our absentees. They are made up of casual offenders, of willful evaders, and of the erratic and irresponsible, classified by psychiatrists and psychologists as psychopathic personalities. This section of our naval population presents a real disciplinary problem but is subject, in a large part, to solution if we will determine the underlying causes for their offenses and take appropriate countermeasures.
The major reasons for the commission of offenses are here presented, generally in order of their estimated importance.
(1) Inadequate indoctrination.—In peace times the normal training for recruits before assigning them to general service was twelve weeks. War-time necessity resulted in cutting this period to an average of five weeks, and for short times at certain stations, as low as four weeks. Brevity of the training period is the most obvious reason for inadequate indoctrination. It is apparent that with a lowering of standards in quality and character of the average recruit, it would have been better were it possible to increase, than to reduce, the length of the training period.
There are other important but less obvious reasons for inadequate indoctrination. In peace time the officers and chief petty officers assigned to duty at the training stations were all more or less expert in their lines. Nearly all of these regular officers and petty
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°fficers have been replaced with naval reserves, who, through no fault of their own, acked background in naval procedure and knowledge of the art of instructing recruits 111 their obligations to the service and of the Seriousness and consequences of infractions against naval discipline.
Officers at other shore stations and at sea ]ay great stress on the lack of thoroughness ln this early training as one of the chief rea- s°ns for breaches in discipline after the men are assigned to general duties. The writer, r°m investigation, experience, and studies during the past ten months is convinced that ’-his criticism is not entirely justified, and that in many cases it is made as an excuse for the shortcomings of the service in general in handling these important disciplinary matters. The commanding officers of the Training stations, and, for the most part, the officers under them, have done an excellent job under the existing conditions. In so far as the tremendous number of recruits, the available time, and the qualifications of the instructors Permit, instruction has been thorough. It is, however, perhaps true that training along technical lines has, of necessity, been stressed at the expense of indoctrination in the fundamental duties and obligations of naval serv- lce, the standards of discipline required, and the penalties for infractions.
The situation with respect to indoctrination of recruits is undoubtedly improving as those who are assigned as instructors become more familiar with their duties and responsibilities. Further advancement can be expected, especially if the intent to increase the training period is realized. Recommendation has been made by the Bureau of Naval Personnel and by the Board to produce a number of educational films dealing with disciplinary matters. The Army has done this t° good advantage. This recommendation is awaiting Departmental approval which it is hoped will be forthcoming, as practically all officers charged with the training of enlisted men consider audio-visual programs the most effective means of instruction.
Officers would do well to remember that training is a continuous process in the service. Boot camps are merely a foundation, and even the best of foundations require frequent inspection and some maintenance work.
There appears to be a substantial unanimity of opinion in the service that there has been a serious lack of home training which is responsible for the lack of respect for authority and for the irresponsibility of many of the youths in service. While the Navy can do nothing to improve these home conditions, the fact that they are assumed to have existed is all the more reason that the naval training should be pointed towards overcoming this initial handicap. The obligation of the Service in this respect was not at first recognized at the Training Stations or elsewhere. Although there were chaplains at all stations to look out for the spiritual welfare of these young men, and to give them advice when needed, there was often a lack of instruction as to the availability and advisability of using these and other similar services. There was also a failure on the part of the chief petty officers and others to understand the necessity for “wet nursing” some of the young recruits. On the contrary, there was a tendency on the part of some of the instructors to disregard personal factors and to consider vigor invective as a measure of the efficacy of educational methods. It is natural that these conditions were not always apparent to the commanding officers, as such complaints were not brought to their attention. The situation was brought to light through inspections, and remedial action has been taken, where necessary, with results that are gratifying.
(2) Incompetent and inexperienced officers. —Much of the excessive absenteeism is due to lack of experience and knowledge on the part of officers in the art of handling enlisted men. Our studies and investigations indicate conclusively that there has been, and still is, a great deal of incompetence among the younger officers in this respect. The inexperience of practically all the younger officers, time alone can remedy. The fact that many of them are not proficient in their duties and obligations with respect to men under them cannot be so lightly dismissed. We have from the very beginning gone to great lengths to instruct these thousands of young officers in the technical aspects of the naval profession and in the practical handling of the mechanical devices with which they must work. The most important of their duties—the proper
handling of enlisted men over whom they are placed—has not until recently been given sufficient attention. It is interesting to note that in a recent poll of a representative group of Army Company Officers, addressed to these officers requesting opinion of their own training, disclosed that seven out of every ten considered that they should have more training in the handling of personal problems of individual soldiers and in developing morale. Technical aspects of training were less frequently criticized. The writer ventures to suggest that a similar Navy poll would lead to a comparable result.
The fault has not lain entirely with the younger officers. Many of our older and experienced officers have been lax in observing the conditions which prevailed and in taking steps to correct them. It may be suggested that there were too many commanding officers of ships and units of the fleet who in their diligence to see that the material conditions of their commands were maintained in the most efficient order tended to neglect conditions of personnel, morale, and discipline. It should hardly be necessary to state that the captain of a ship with a very excessive absentee rate is unwarranted in assuming that a below-average crew is responsible.
It is a satisfaction to be able to state that positive steps have been taken to improve our officer training programs in this respect both in the indoctrination stage and in continuation of training in active service. The high command in the fleet has directed that senior officers give consideration to the education of junior officers in military leadership at least equal to that given to technical and operational fitness, and in particular that Captains, Executives, and Heads of Departments not only instruct inexperienced officers in the art of handling men but also maintain a close supervision in such matters.
It may be confidently said that strict compliance with these orders and follow-ups to insure continued observation will reduce disciplinary infractions as well as produce beneficial results in the form of improved morale.
(3) , Homesickness, marital and domestic dif- fictdties.—Many thousands of the recruits
. ave never before been away from home. It !s natural that a large percentage of these suffer from nostalgia, which in the case of the ''eaker ones, results in unauthorized absence. Unfortunately, in many cases, they are en- c°uraged in this by their mothers, wives, or °k^er rela^ves> wh°> lacking familarity with he difference between military absenteeism and industrial absenteeism, or scholastic ]ruancy, do not appreciate the seriousness r°m the military viewpoint, or realize the ^sequences which are sure to follow. There ls no question but that the strange environment, together with a sudden change in the mrode of life from individual irresponsibility to the rigors of naval discipline, is a jolt for ]nany, which makes them long for home. This ^ particularly true for those who, as occa- Sl°nally happens, have the misfortune to be assigned to a unit in charge of a chief petty officer who enjoys the reputation of being hard-boiled,” thinking this to be of great hffip in handling recruits. Domestic and Marital troubles, both real and imagined, are a not infrequent cause of unauthorized ahsences. Some of this cannot be helped. But there are things which can be done to alleviate the situation. This begins with a sympathetic attitude on the part of those ^mediately in charge of the recruits. It Is implemented by clear and repeated instructions covering the granting of leave and hberty, presentation of requests at mast, availability of officers for advice, the functions of chaplains and morale and welfare officers, scope of the legal assistance program, 'Vork done by various charitable and welfare organizations, and the like. It cannot be assumed that instruction in boot camp on these matters will suffice for all time. It must he reinforced at duty stations.
The writer has personally asked many men in confinement for absence over leave and absence without leave whether or not they asked for any leave or extra leave. The answer has frequently been, “no.” The officers in charge of these prisoners are of the opinion that lack of sufficient instruction in the presentation of leave requests together with the action of petty officers and office yeomen in preventing legitimate requests reaching the executive officer is responsible for a considerable amount of absenteeism.
Leaving these matters in the hands of division petty officers and office yeomen invites favoritism and makes possible petty graft, risk of which would be eliminated by better supervision.
Complaints and bad news in letters from home are responsible for much of the difficulty. In this respect we need a program of education for the general public. It is suggested that this is a matter which should receive the attention of our public relations experts. Short of that we can only take steps to warn men that home troubles should be discussed with officers and agencies who can render assistance, and that unauthorized absence will inevitably do no more than add to the difficulties in the long run.
(4) Liberty and leave system.—Improper administration of leave and liberty is one of the chief reasons for absenteeism. The service at large will probably be reluctant to accept this statement. Nevertheless, investigations and inspections clearly indicate that this contention is not exaggerated. Much of the administration of leave and liberty is linked with the questions of homesickness and marital or domestic difficulties, previously discussed. But this is only part of the story. A lack of appreciation on the part of many commanders, of high rank and low, past and present, of the basic importance of this question, has resulted, and is still resulting, in many infractions which are avoidable, this in spite of historical precedents, only two of the many examples of which are cited by way of illustration.
In our Civil War, the Army of the Potomac, stationed in and about Washington, on one or more occasions had as many as 25,000 absentees. This Army at one time almost disintegrated as a fighting organization because of lack of a systematic leave policy. For long periods, this Army was relatively idle, and encamped close to the homes of thousands of the men, who, having no hope of leave in regular courses, in large numbers, simply left.
During the World War I the French Army, which was encamped in various places in and near Paris, at one time had so many men absent without leave it became almost inoperative. It is reported that the situation amounted practically to a state of mutiny
owing to the leave restrictions placed on the men, thousands of whom were encamped within short distances of their homes. Marshal Petain, upon assuming command, recognized the source of the trouble and stopped all offensive action for a month in order to permit the soldiers to visit their families. This action practically rejuvenated the Army, and the beneficial results were well demonstrated in the fighting which followed.
Our investigations have disclosed many instances both at the shore stations and in the fleet where unnecessary and undesirable restrictions have been placed on leave and liberty for the enlisted men. At some of the receiving stations large numbers of men were required to remain at night even when they had no duties to perform. Many men who might reasonably have been allowed to go on leave, were prevented from doing so. These restrictions were due to several reasons. Among them was the uncertainty as to when there would be a sudden or unexpected call from the Bureau or from some ship for a draft of men; the secrecy which surrounded the movements of ships thereby preventing the dissemination of knowledge as to just when certain drafts would be required; the attitude of some commanding officers that too much liberty was bad even though the alternative was waiting in idleness. All of these conditions added to infractions, which might, with a little more foresight, have been lessened. Many of these unsatisfactory conditions, which, until comparatively recently had not been recognized as such, have been remedied, or improved, so from now on we can look forward optimistically for a reduction in absenteeism from these causes.
In so far as the fleets are concerned, investigations showed that on many ships men were unduly restricted either because of unnecessary secrecy with respect to ships movements or because they were required to stand sea and condition watches in ports where there could safely be relaxation in this respect. Men, many of long service and excellent records, absented themselves without authorization because after extended tours of duty at sea they came into ports of continental United States and were not given the opportunity to visit their families. On some ships the liberty hours were fixed without respect to the difficult transportation situation which existed in most of the places where the ships visit. On others, either the commanding officer, the executive officer, or perhaps some officer lower down in the echelon of command, caused great discontent owing to the manner in which the granting of leave and liberty was handled.
Our ships of the fleet when operating fa the various war zones attain a high state of efficiency as is amply proved by results- The men on these ships acquire an esprit dt corps and a high level of morale and discipline that is most gratifying. They realize and understand the necessity for restrictions in leave and liberty, and they accept with commendable forbearance the necessary separation from their families. But they cannot understand why, when their ships touch a home port, they are not given sufficient leave to spend at least a few days at home. As previously pointed out, much of the restrictions in this respect were due to the continued standing of condition watches and to secrecy with respect to the ships’ movements. Be that as it may, the fact that men have been denied leave under these conditions has caused many a good man of more or less lengthy service to go “over the hill.” From the standpoint of discipline it would be better if ships which have been long at sea did not touch at a port in the continental United States unless they are to remain sufficiently long to give the crew a reasonable amount of leave and liberty.
One of the paradoxes which has developed with respect to absenteeism concerns those ships which, having received damage in battle, return to one of the home navy yards for a more or less lengthy repair period. In general, the crews of such ships are well disciplined, are proud to belong to their ships, and show a great affection for them- But we have discovered by experience that, in spite of outward signs to the contrary, there are on board each of these ships a certain element, small in percentage but quite large in total numbers, who do not intend immediately to return to the war zone if they can help it. These men remain with the ship and take all the leave coming to them while the repairs are being made; and then, just prior to sailing, go absent over leave. A
dumber of these men are legitimate combat a igue cases, while some are just simply ye ow, and some, seeing the large numbers of !®en at receiving stations who have not been 0 sea,^ feel there is no immediate obligation ?n ^ir part again to undergo the hazard of attle until these others have been through e ordeal. It would be well if a satisfactory Way could be found to screen the crews of ®jjch of these battle-scarred ships as soon as reach the repair yard, so as to assign to her duty those men who wish to be and Should be transferred. It would be much bet- er to have them go at the expiration of the rst leave period and get their relief on board at the beginning of the ship’s stay at the ase. instead of having to make the replace- rrient as the ship is about to sail. Apart from ^uch a screening process, the new announced Policy with respect to rotation of service hould do much to improve conditions.
(5) Defects in punishment.—There has J^en much complaint throughout the service 'v*th respect to the inadequacy and inap- Pr°priateness of the punishments meted out 0r the commission of military offenses, specially that of absenteeism. Many officers ln command of ships and fleet units place ^Uch of the blame for our troubles in this Aspect on reduction of sentences of courts by ^viewing authorities. They contend that the Jad situation rests on the shoulders of the foregoing personnel, who generally are resPonsible for the disciplinary process in the Case of absentees. These seagoing officers delight and with some cause, it must be admitted, in bringing to the attention of the epartment isolated cases in which offenders aave escaped punishment or received obvi- °usly inadequate penalties. It is conceded hat these instances have a far-reaching deleterious effect, especially on that 5 per Cent of the enlisted men who are prone to commit offenses involving absence from their uty and station. There have been very few reeent cases in which offenders have received punishment, since the policy which formerly permitted that result has been superseded. Complaints of inadequacy of Punishment may at times have some justification, but much of the complaint is caused oy lack of knowledge of the entire problem, which is one of many complexities and ramifications presenting a number of vicious circles not understood except by those who have been concerned with and have had extensive experience with all phases of the subject. It might be well for some officers to remember the fact, established by the experience of centuries, that severity of punishment alone has never provided an answer to penal and disciplinary problems.
It has been recognized that much of our court-martial procedure which is regulated by statute, orders, and naval customs requires to some extent the awarding of what are now considered inappropriate sentences. It cannot be held, however, that courts in general award inadequate sentences. Complaints of inadequacy of sentences lodge primarily with reviewing authorities, who, in conformity or supposed conformity with guides issued by the Department, mitigate more than 75 per cent of the sentences imposed by the courts.
There has been complaint from various sources that missing ship by remaining absent at the time of sailing has become a “racket” owing to the inadequate punishment for this very serious offense. The blame for this is laid to the departmental guide which indicated the number of days of absence that should be the basis for trial by each type of court. However, the provision in the directive which states that the recommended punishments do not apply to flagrant cases such as missing ship has either been overlooked or ignored by many commands. In these instances the offenders were meted out the same mast punishments or awarded the same kind of court as if they had not missed the sailing of their ships. This news, like all news which has to do with punishments, spread rapidly through the ships of the fleet with the result that many men, who might not have taken the risk of a severe punishment, remained absent and reported in shortly after their ship had sailed. This was a fault in administration by the commanders of the stations involved. Action has now been taken by the Bureau of Naval Personnel in an effort to combat the missing ship racket. It has been unequivocally stated that a general court-martial should try all such offenses, except in most unusual circumstances.
There is a wide divergence in viewpoint with respect to the relative appropriateness of various punishment such as bad conduct discharge, confinement, disrating, and fines. An attempt has been made to regulate and standardize these differences through departmental directives. These directives do not always meet with compliance, and in a number of instances are ignored where the commanding officers happen not to agree with the departmental guide, but are able to keep within the provisions of the governing laws. This causes variations in punishment for the same offenses, which procedure is not conducive to discipline. To cite a few examples:
(a) The Service has been informed that a bad conduct discharge is not considered appropriate for absenteeism in time of war. Yet some commanding officers have intimated to the summary courts convened by them that the sentence in all such cases should include a bad conduct discharge.
(b) The Service has been informed that solitary confinement on bread and water is not looked on with favor. Nevertheless some courts consistently award this punishment, apparently influenced by the attitudes of
convening authorities.
(c) Some commanding officers are convinced that prompt transfer to sea or foreign duty without court-martial procedure is the most effective means of dealing with absentees, and have attempted to practice this policy despite departmental disapproval.
These variations in punishments are sooner or later caught up with in the Department and corrective measures taken when deemed appropriate. They are discussed here because they indicate a wide variance of opinion by the senior officers of the Navy as to just what are appropriate punishments.
It is the writer’s view that many of the complaints and suggestions tend to show that those making them have been too much influenced by a few isolated cases and are unfamiliar with or have failed to consider in proper perspective the many phases of the disciplinary problem. No one line of approach will provide a universal panacea for our ills. We will be successful only as we make intelligent disposition of individual cases, with due consideration for varied and sometime conflicting factors such as the particular offense, the particular offender,
fae,f05ce of example to others, the available til ities for confinement and rehabilitation, e need for minimizing the loss of man sWer> and the advisability of maintaining n>e degree of uniformity.
ful • ^ePartment has been extremely care- a ,ln. formulating guides for convening ji . 0cities and commanding officers to avoid Wh •1]tat^on uP°n the exercise of discretion, u 1 e setting forth general principles which frVe been found by experience to be practical pop11- aH standpoints. That these general t1Cles bave been successful is attested by ^ 0 facts. First, the percentage of offenders fa Sf S^0Wn a decrease, notwithstanding the
siv lt,lat the caliber of recruits was progres- §ee y inferior during the period involved. hac°nd, over 85 per cent of the probationers j, Ve made good upon restoration to duty. ^Ven assuming that longer confinement and °re fully executed sentences would reduce tj 6 number of offenses, a doubtful assump- w°n at best, it is apparent that such a step °uld decrease the eventual salvage, j °rtunately, brig and prison spaces and ]g ^ personnel to man them are becoming anH a Problem- 11 ab commanding officers ec reviewing authorities will consistently .Xercise, as many already do, the utmost care evaluating offenders, in awarding courts v- in taking mitigating action, all with a o>e\v to maintaining discipline but without Verlooking the maximum potential useful- eess of the offender, we can confidently exPect marked improvement.
There has been in the past one pronounced efect in punishment, frequently criticized now being cured. In many, but by no cans all, of our places of confinement, risoners were held in comparative idle- ess. There are not many who would profit r°m such confinement, but aside from that aere is a class of offenders by whom con- nement of such a character, far from having Lenitive effect, is preferred to combat duty.
!. chronic liberty breakers who seek to be | ‘^charged, preferably without confinement, .Jut with confinement under a regimen lack- lng rigor if need be, are not deterred by the bcospect of a period of restricted inactivity. Hard labor and intensive military training a]id exercise would combine the advantages °f improving the casual offenders and permanently discouraging the confirmed gold
brickers. Every effort is being made to put in operation such programs at the major places of confinement. At the smaller brigs, where organized activities administered by permanent complements are not possible, we must depend upon the interest and co-operation of commanding officers to see that the men there confined do not enjoy a daily schedule less taxing than that to which duty personnel are subject.
The suggestion has frequently been made that our brigs might be cleared and discipline improved by the organization of labor battalions to be assigned duty in less desirable forward areas. It has been proposed that offenders be placed in such battalions, either following trial by court-martial or by administrative action without court-martial procedure. This plan, although superficially attractive, presents many difficulties. Moreover, it is vigorously opposed by the great majority of the officers in command in the forward areas.
(6) Discriminatory treatment.—Some of the men who are returned to service on probation after completing a part of their sentences and some men, not in probationary status, but having a record of one or more previous convictions, again become involved on account of the discriminatory treatment they receive on arrival at their new stations. Instead of being encouraged to conduct themselves in a befitting manner, many cases have been reported where the men have been discouraged by being openly called and treated as “brig rats” and “jail birds,” and subjected to discrimination in duty and privileges. These men when released from confinement feel that they have at least partially atoned for their past offenses and that they should be allowed to start over with a clean slate. When they find, as they do in some commands, that they are to constitute a more or less permanently underprivileged group, they become discouraged. Some fall by the wayside who otherwise would not, if treated with fairness and normal consideration.
(7) Low standards of discipline.—There is general agreement that low standards of discipline in more serious matters are caused in part by what to many seem trivialities, such as exchange of salutes, military courtesy, wearing of the uniform, and the like.
Here again an undesirable situation was reached because of the attitude of many older officers that, with so many more important matters to worry about, no time could be given to such minor things.
A failure to salute a superior, does not, in itself, matter very much. What does matter is that tolerating or encouraging its omission breeds a lack of respect for authority, which in turn has serious repercussions in general discipline. We have two clear examples by which to profit. The Russians, apparently in accord with the early communistic ideal, tried to eliminate distinctions in rank and uniform and to abolish the salute. The experiment was far from a success. It was found necessary to revert to all the traditional requirements of a military organization. Our Army not long ago tried relaxation of the regulations on salutes. It learned that this tended to produce a breakdown in discipline.
The writer, from personal experience, on visits made to naval activities and metropolitan centers throughout the United States has observed, as have nearly all officers, that the naval regulations covering the salutes are not infrequently ignored both by officers and enlisted men. There is no doubt that the great variety of uniforms, some of which lack distinctive rank markings—admiral and chief boatswain wearing raincoats and plain visored caps are indistinguishable—and the perhaps unfortunate frequency of changes in uniform regulations have tended to promote laxness. The situation has been further aggravated by the fact that the naval uniform has been so closely imitated by organizations which are not purely naval or military, such as the Merchant Marine. The complaint of lack of indoctrination, although heard not infrequently, does not seem well taken since training stations invariably set a high standard in such matters. The writer is convinced that the degree of compliance with saluting and uniform regulations, and, in fact, general standards of conduct in any area, are in direct proportion to the interest taken by the high command in such matters in that area.
(8) Miscellaneous causes— Of the less important causes for absenteeism, all of which taken together result in a goodly number of offenses, may be cited chronic seasickness, dislike for the service, dislike for the imme-
diate duty to which assigned, failure to get expected rating or desired duty, poor transportation facilities, oversleeping, overindulgence in liquor, and fondness for women; and various minor reasons which are not of sufficient importance to enumerate, and which are thoroughly understandable without any discussion and explanation. A bad feature of absenteeism resulting from some of these causes is that the offenders, leaving their ships or stations without any intention of overstaying liberty, are overtaken by temp' tation, and finding they will be late in returning they fail to consider that the magnitude of the offense increases with the length of absence. Hence, they decide to make a day of it and extend their time on shore, not only for hours, but often for days. Proper instruction and avoidance of overly harsh penalties for those who have not erred too far would do much to combat this.
It has been suggested by some that restrictions such as curfews, limiting the hours when drinking is permitted, or by prohibiting service men from drinking at any time while in uniform would reduce absenteeism attributable to liquor and women. The writer is convinced that history indicates it is generally both unfair and inadvisable to treat men in uniform differently from the general public in these matters and that any efforts to do so will result in hundreds of men accomplishing surreptitiously, and with much more dire results, that which they now do more or less above board. There is a growing conviction that contentment would be increased among a large percentage of the enlisted men by allowing beer on board our ships and that the right to indulge in good beer in a limited way would prevent many men from going ashore to indulge in stronger stuff without restraint. This is but one aspect of the more general proposition that opportunity and facilities for recreation aboard ships and stations promote morale and decrease absenteeism.
We have here dealt in general terms with the causation of offenses. The following chapter will deal primarily with the rehabilitation of offenders, and the problems which confront those who are in charge of the naval prisons, disciplinary barracks, and brigs where large numbers of men are confined.