“E Pluribus Unum”
We expect all representatives of Navy Management to meet at all times representatives of labor on an all-out basis of open-mindedness, friendship, tolerance, and mutual good will. We believe such a working policy carried on by all concerned will further enhance the morale of our naval establishments and we call upon all in authority1 in all levels of management and upon labor spokesmen and labor itself, to adapt its thinking, its actions, and its sentiments to the end that the utmost co-operation may exist in all of the relationships within the Navy family.
These epochal words are from a declaration entitled “Labor Relations in the United States Navy,” prepared by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard and promulgated to all shore establishments of the Navy on August 6, 1942. That this declaration forms the cornerstone of an enlightened and far-reaching policy on employer-employee relations in naval shore establishments has been made clear by the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox in a letter to all shore establishments, in which he emphasized: “This is not a casual or a temporary effort to impress labor. It is based on the needs of the hour and the necessity for unity ...” And to confirm further the newly declared policy of the Navy Department on labor relations and dissipate misinterpretations and broad mental reservations with respect to the carrying out of this policy, Assistant Secretary Bard asserted vigorously:
There is no propaganda idea about this program and no buncombe of any nature. The Navy family must be welded together as never before in order to meet this terrific war menace . . .
1 Italics are author’s own.
The United States Navy is the largest single employer of labor in the United States. Most of this labor is engaged in the various navy yards located throughout the country. The close connection, therefore, between the enunciation of a labor policy that provides for the intelligent and cooperative handling of all matters affecting civilian employees in these navy yards and the successful operation of the fleet at sea is immediately apparent. Today we are engaged in a bitter struggle that will not end until one side is prostrate. To date this war, as far as the United States is concerned, has been largely a naval war; in addition, the logistical problems involved in the successful prosecution of the land warfare have placed a tremendous burden upon the naval facilities of our nation. The magnitude of this job, namely, the maintenance of a fleet adequate to engage the enemy and to convoy merchant ships, strains the imagination of anyone familiar with our pre-war equipment. While the building of naval vessels is of tremendous importance in the development of this fleet, the repair of these vessels is of even greater importance; and it is in the repair of naval vessels that the most planning and the most co-operation must be achieved between management and the employees because of the urgent need for these vessels for participation in plans that already have been made by Naval Operations.
The outcome of a naval engagement or the successful transportation of the men and materials of war to those theaters where they are most needed depends upon the number of ships of war available for effective action. The loss of a day in a navy yard can easily represent the difference between defeat and victory in such a naval engagement—between success and failure in a special convoying assignment.
Navy yard employees are in an excellent position to be impressed properly with the need for an all-out effort since they see ships come limping into the yard after furious engagements with the enemy; and they can also experience the thrill that comes when ships which they have helped to build are launched before their very eyes. These incidents certainly contribute to the morale of employees in the navy yards; but the drama of these incidents is a transient thing and cannot be expected to sustain and support the sacrifice and unselfish effort so necessary during the long hiatus between such launchings, or arrivals of battle-scarred ships.
Something more tangible, something more fixed, some point of orientation that would clearly establish the relationship of each and every navy yard employee to the job he is performing, was needed, something, in other words, that would elevate the employee from just so many “manhours” to an individual with a heart—to be put into his job; a mind—to understand that job; and a will—to carry out that job, come hell or high water. Only in a free nation composed of free citizens could a program be established that would have as its basis the full recognition of the existence of human relations with the rights and obligations that flow from these relations; only in a nation where the fruits of victory will be shared by all, or the annihilation and degradation of defeat will be visited upon all, could the intellectual and spiritual participation of all be invited.
Woodrow Wilson was faced with a similar although perhaps smaller problem in 1917 and 1918 with respect to enlisting the full energies of war workers through their co-operative effort. Fortunately he had given unmistakable proof, prior to the out-break of war, of his genuine interest in the development of a greater sense of social responsibility among employers of labor; and on many occasions his enlightened social philosophy was appealed to by groups in and out of Congress who wished to further movements that would widen the application of democratic principles. This philosophy, plus the exigencies of dealing effectively with large groups of employees during war, produced a modus operandi that not only met the criticism of special groups but contributed in a positive way to the solution of problems which otherwise would have seriously impeded the war effort. The modus operandi represented a formula worked out by the National War Labor Board, which formula called for the establishment of shop committees. These shop committees were to be established in plants which had war contracts and where there were no recognized labor organizations. The Government realized that there would undoubtedly be grievances and problems arising where large numbers of human beings were working in the same plants or factories under the supervision of other human beings; and further realized that if a vehicle were not furnished whereby such grievances and problems could be carried through and adjusted there would be serious impairment of the productive efforts of these employees.
On October 1, 1918; the Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, following the pattern laid down by the National War Labor Board, rendered a decision on “wages, hours, and other conditions” which provided for the inauguration of shop committees in shipyards. Shortly after this the Secretary of the Navy instructed the commandants of the various navy yards to provide machinery for the establishment of such shop committees in the industrial departments of these yards.
Further confirmation of the position of the Navy Department in this matter of shop committees was furnished by Franklin D. Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, in a letter dated December 10, 1918, in answer to a question concerning the type of employees to be covered by the instructions with respect to the establishment of shop committees. Mr. Roosevelt said, “There is no objection to the formation of shop committees representing clerical, office, and messenger forces for presentation and adjustment of grievances.” The shop committee system was continued in navy yards during the post-war period and its purposes were spelled out clearly in the recommendations of the Departmental Wage Board of Review which in its report of August 31, 1921, in paragraphs 12, 14, 18, and 19 explained the functions of shop committees.
These shop committees did not represent the individual trades as such. They represented the employees of particular shops since it was argued the shop was the place of employment of large numbers of employees and it was in the shops that their grievances and problems were bound to develop. Furthermore, as a matter of convenience and logical arrangement the shops appeared to those who instituted the shop committees in the navy yard to be a more satisfactory method of setting up this system of employee representation. On the other hand, there never was any intention that the shop committee should supersede any outside labor organization which might exist and on several occasions the Navy Department made clear that the shop committees were intended to protect the interests of all concerned without invading in any way the private rights of any individuals or groups of individuals. In some yards outside labor organizations worked through the existing shop committees; in others they did not.
During the years following the war the number of employees in navy yards declined sharply; and at times there was talk of closing some of the yards entirely. Paralleling this decline in the number of employees in the yards there was a similar decline in the activity of the shop committees. However, in most of the yards the framework of the shop committee was maintained; elections for new representatives were held each year and those problems which did arise and which the employees wished discussed with the management were for the most part discussed through the medium of the shop committees. After 1932 the Navy began to receive more consideration from Congress and more funds were provided for the building of ships and for improving and maintaining navy yard facilities. The process, however, was a slow one.
From 1933 to 1938 the entire nation was embraced by waves of unionism. The natural rights of employees to form associations or unions of their own choosing and to bargain collectively with their employers were implemented by national legislation and the generally favorable atmosphere toward unionism during this period provided stimulation for their rapid growth.
In 1935 a split took place in the American Federation of Labor when ten major unions formerly affiliated with the American Federation of Labor were suspended by the A. F. of L. and formed themselves into the Committee for Industrial Organization. Both groups, together with hundreds of small independent unions, proceeded to organize as many employees in the country as they could. Although employees of navy yards had civil service status, they were not entirely unaffected by these developments. Opinion in the country was sharply divided on the matter of labor unions during this period and it is reasonable to assume that this division of opinion was also reflected in the attitude of employees and supervisors in the navy yards. The Navy Department took official cognizance of the matter in the form of a letter from Charles Edison, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, to the various navy yards, wherein he stated:
(1) The Navy Department hereby reiterates its disapproval of discrimination or prejudice against its employees because of their union or non-union affiliations or activities . . .
(2) All civilian employees of naval establishments are free to join this or that labor union or organization—or no union or organization at all—without influence or persuasion on the part of anyone in the Naval Service or the civilian supervisors.
Whether it was due to the activity of outside labor organizations or just apathy toward the shop committees, interest in these in some of the yards began to wane. Again official recognition of this attitude may be noted from the statement of June 1,1938, of Charles Edison, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, that: “Elections of shop committees may include all or part of the shops or only those shops where specific requests for election are made by a sufficient number of the employees as determined by the local authorities. Elections will be held at the discretion of commandants and commanding officers of shore stations.” In some yards this was the beginning of the end of the shop committee as an instrument for the discussion and settlement of grievances and other matters affecting the conditions of employment of navy yard employees.
The Navy Department continued further to encourage harmonious labor relations among its employees and on January 13, 1940, issued a directive regarding the handling of grievances to all Marine Corps and Naval Activities, in which it stated in part that,
The access of committees and individuals to officials in the first instance, or to those having reviewing authority in the case of appeals, shall not be impeded ... A uniform procedure shall be maintained which will permit the frank presentation of difficulties in such a way as to allow reasonably prompt consideration and decision by the officials concerned.
The necessity for issuing such a directive regarding the handling of grievances may be accepted as testimony that shop committees were no longer effectively operating as instruments for the handling of grievances. This is highly significant since from their inception one of their primary functions was to handle and settle where possible any grievance that was brought to their attention.
As the dark clouds of war began to rise over the horizon in Europe, navy yards stepped up their activity and when war finally came to Europe in September, 1939, these activities were further accelerated. Rapid as was the growth in the number of employees in navy yards between September, 1939 and December 7, 1941, it was rapid only in comparison to the previous insignificant number of employees in the yards prior to September, 1939. The real increase in the number of employees in navy yards began on December 7, 1941, and it has not stopped yet.
This terrific growth in personnel in all of the navy yards throughout the country brought with it a number of knotty personnel and industrial relations problems—problems of up-grading employees, problems of obtaining skilled employees, problems of training supervisory forces, and problems of employer-employee relations.
Navy yards are identical with private shipyards in that their purpose is to build and repair ships. Navy yards are different from private shipyards in that employees of the navy yard are government employees working under civil service rules and regulations. In addition, a navy yard is primarily a military establishment, managed and operated by the military. And while the overwhelming majority of those who work in a navy yard are civilian employees, and although the shop master and his status are similar to that of a plant manager in a civilian industrial organization, all of these civilian employees necessarily work under the direction and under the supervision of the commissioned officer personnel of the Navy. The problem, therefore, of labor relations in a navy yard is not as simple as that in a private shipyard where only the desire of the employees bargaining collectively must be adjusted to the successful operation of that yard
How to bring all of the elements and characteristics of a navy yard into harmony in order that efficient production would result and the rights and prerogatives of the representative groups would be maintained—and do this in the midst of ever increasing personnel and the ever increasing demands of an all-out war upon the facilities of navy yards—was a task for a Solomon. The Shore Establishments Division of the Navy, manned by individuals with a knowledge and understanding of the importance of the human factor, realized that while navy yards in a few short months, like Topsy “just growed,” the resulting cacophony could be developed into a tremendous symphony.
The first step in the direction of harnessing these huge energies was taken on April 20, 1942, when the Navy Department, taking its cue from the War Production Board, directed that labor management committees be created in all naval industrial establishments for the purpose of speeding up production. The function of these labor management committees was limited strictly to the handling of suggestions that were calculated to increase production. They were not grievance committees nor labor relations committees in the normally accepted sense of these terms. There was still no accepted and recognized method for the holding of discussions or meetings on employer-employee problems between the management and the employees represented collectively.
That the Navy Department was acutely conscious of the existing deficiencies in the relations between management and employees in navy yards and other shore establishments is brought out in the August 6 declaration on labor relations wherein it was stated,
It is apparent that we have not yet attained that measure of co-operation which is possible and vital in this all-out war; and we in the management end of the Navy admit our share of the responsibility for this lack of unity and express our determination, with the co-operation of labor, to rectify this situation in every way possible.
On September 1, 1942, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy notified all naval shore establishments that a conference of employee delegates would be held in Washington in the latter part of October. The announcement of this conference and the instructions regarding the selection of the employee delegates followed closely upon the August 6 declaration “Labor Relations in the United States Navy.” In his announcement the Assistant Secretary emphasized the objectives of unity and cooperation which were being sought and which it was hoped the Washington conference would do much to achieve. He stated,
. . . the purpose of the conference is to bring representative employees of Naval Establishments into closer touch with high officials of the Navy in Washington, including those officers of the Navy in charge of the operation of our armed forces; to concretely recognize the importance of the work of employees in our field establishments and the importance of the things they produce as a contribution to the war effort of the Navy; and to make us realize that all of us in the Navy are working together for the same purpose and with the same objective in view, viz., the preservation of all the principles, rights, and privileges now enjoyed by the people of this country.
The specific method of choosing the employee delegates to this conference in Washington was left to the commandants and commanding officers of the various navy yards and other shore establishments, except (1) that those representatives selected to be present at the conference were to be employees of the Navy Department; (2) that their selection was to be by employees of the Navy Department; (3) that supervisory employees were not to be participants either as employee delegates or in the selection of such employee delegates; (4) that the employee representatives be so apportioned as to satisfy the various groups in each particular naval establishment. Other than these restrictions, or guides as they really were, the selection of the employee delegates was left entirely in the hands of the respective commandants and commanding officers of the individual naval establishments ashore.
In addition to the employee representatives the management was to arrange for the selection of two civilian supervisory representatives and two commissioned officers to the Washington conference.
The planning that was necessary to insure the success of this historic Washington conference encompassed not merely the selection of the various representatives (a job which was left almost entirely to the individual shore establishments) but the transportation of these delegates, in time of war, from as far west as Puget Sound and as far south as Corpus Christi, Texas; to make arrangements for housing them in the most crowded city in the country; and last but not least, to arrange that type of program covering two days, that would maintain their interest, be sufficiently close to the purpose for which the conference was called, and permit the employee delegates that degree of participation in the conference which they had every right to expect. The accomplishment of this threefold duty was a credit to Rear Admiral C. W. Fisher, Jr., U. S. Navy, Director of the Shore Establishments Division. Personal invitations, signed by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and Admiral Ernest J. King, U. S. Navy, were sent to each of the representatives attending the conference. Nothing was left undone or unsaid that would have contributed towards impressing these representatives with the tremendous job ahead and their responsibility for developing the co-operation necessary to complete the job.
Here, then, in common conference in the capital of a great nation at war met employee representatives chosen by their fellow employees, management representatives and high naval and government officials, to discuss jointly the common end in view. Four meetings were scheduled; the first two were held on Thursday, August 22, during the day; the third, a dinner meeting, was arranged for the evening of the 22d; the closing session took place Friday morning, August 23. At all of these meetings the array of distinguished speakers was without parallel; only the top-notch individuals in their particular activities were to be seen and heard. The list read like a Who’s Who of the country’s war leaders—political, military, economic, labor, and business. In additon to these leaders there were some of the heroes of our recent naval engagements, such as Lieutenant Commander John Bulkeley of torpedo-boat fame; and Lieutenant (j.g.) Ann Agnes Bernatitus, the Nurse of Bataan.
In his talk to the assembled representatives Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, said in part:
The purpose of this whole affair—the meetings which have preceded this little dinner and the meeting which will follow tomorrow morning—the purpose of all this is to implement a policy and understanding supported most wholeheartedly by both Admiral King and myself and other civilian leaders in the whole Navy leadership. This group here is thoroughly representative, not of the top but of all cuts all the way down. Most of these men who are here are the chosen representatives of their associates and their respective yards or stations. They have come here—man to man fashion—to sit down together and counsel together as to how and in what way they can increase the output of our shore establishments, of our navy yards—and other shore stations. No men ever gathered at any time on any other subject for a more patriotic purpose than that.
The support of this policy by the Navy Department was made crystal clear; that it would be followed through with the same courage and conviction reponsible for its inauguration was voiced by Assistant Secretary Ralph Bard when he stated:
Tonight we are taking a practical application of the new labor relations policy of the Navy. It is my sincere hope, above all else, that you will be convinced that the Navy means just what it says in connection with this labor relations policy. If we can accomplish that, this conference will be successful.
Admiral Ernest King, in a fighting and vigorous speech, wholeheartedly endorsed this policy as a real aid to the fighting forces. He made clear the intimate relation between those on the laboring front and those on the fighting front, saying:
So, as far as I know, this is the first time a meeting of this sort has been held. It is significant in that it enables us two—you of the laboring front and we of the fighting front—to consider how each of us and all of us can do our utmost to win this war—this peoples’ war . . . We all know that our forces afloat cannot operate successfully without support from our shore establishments, and we all know that labor and management— working together—are essential to provide that support . . . We need damage repairs finished with the greatest possible speed and skill and we need the flow of supplies to continue in the greatest possible volume. Give us these and we’ll do the rest!
Speaking of the need for translating the story of the conference and its significance to the employees whom they represented, Admiral A. H. VanKeuren, Chief of the Bureau of Ships, stated:
They [the employees] must be made to understand that every joint they weld, every piece of shafting they line up, every hull plate that they fit, is one more blow struck for the side of our fighting forces just as effectively as if they were out there on the battlefront with them.
Rear Admiral James S. McCain, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, pleaded for speed, saying:
Speed is the essential in this war. A ship that arrives in the area a day after the battle may have lost the war. That is, had you gotten that ship off the ways or out of the yard forty-eight hours sooner, you may have won a battle. There is not a split second to spare in the Solomons area. The need is for haste in that battle area, and in all other areas where we come into physical contact with the enemies. If I could think of any more ways of urging speed, or any more words in the English language to express myself, I’d say, “Hell will break loose in the South Pacific at any moment,” and the need for speed and production extends all the way through—things both great and small, even to rivets.
That the representatives were impressed, not merely by the speeches and the personalities present, but by the grimness of the talks, by the need for eliminating from their thoughts all selfish and personal motives, was made abundantly clear during the final conference on Friday morning when spokesmen for the various groups of representatives rose individually and pledged their wholehearted support to help achieve the purposes of the labor relations policy of the Navy. Typical of the statements of these employee representatives was the simple, straightforward language of John C. Clark, one of the employee delegates from the Philadelphia Navy Yard:
We, the representatives of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, wish to take this opportunity to express our gratitude and appreciation for the privilege of being a part of this Navy Labor Relations Conference. We promise, not as an A. F. of L. group, a C.I.O. group, or the unorganized employees of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, but as a unified, compact and determined group of yard workmen to deliver to the utmost of our ability those essentials necessary to carry this war to a glorious and final victory. We do this, fully realizing that there can be no Rising Sun where there are Forty-eight Glorious Stars . . . The Philadelphia Delegation, realizing its important duty to convey to our fellow workmen in the yard the lessons learned at this conference of spirit, and cooperation and friendship, suggests that this delegation be authorized to assemble workmen at different intervals and explain to them, as it was to us, the necessity of united and uninterrupted action on the part of all the men; that our combined efforts may assist greatly in helping our armed forces to achieve victory. This Labor Relations Conference has lighted a beacon of co-operation and understanding. We, the delegates, pledge ourselves to keep that beacon glowing and lighted by pledging increased production in producing the implements of war that will bring that ultimate victory that we all desire.
Since the Washington conference many of these employee committees have been continued as advisory committees to the management in the various yards and other shore establishments. Regular meetings are held wherein there are discussed any and all employer-employee problems. The variety and scope of these problems is limitless, and the good that is being accomplished through the encouragement to these committees to bring their problems to the meetings with the management and solve these problems has been of untold value in the productive effort of the navy yards.
If this policy is responsible for the saving of one day’s labor, it will more than justify itself. Already, those who have talked to the employee representatives, who have seen the fine spirit that has animated their spokesmen in their meetings with the management, who have witnessed the co-operative efforts to produce more and more in less and less time, are convinced that the various navy yards in the execution of this proclaimed policy are performing a service to their country impossible to estimate. The varied minds, the fixed opinions, the human frailties, the slowness to learn, the tendency to give superficial treatment and lip service to this ideal, have all given way to an appreciation and understanding of these simple truths, stated with such earnestness and conviction by men in high places in the Navy. We may well be proud of the conduct of our Navy at sea; we can be no less proud of those who have enunciated and those who are carrying through the policy which will give more new ships to the Navy and repair more damaged ships in a shorter time than would have been possible without this policy.