AMERICA AT WAR.
By Samuel Van Valkenburg (editor), Ellsworth Huntington, W. W. Atwood, Jr., W. Elmer Ekblaw, Clarence F. Jones, and Earl B. Shaw.
New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1942. 284 pages. $2.50.
Reviewed by Lieutenant E. B. Potter, U. S. Naval Reserve
In some contrast to the numerous recent books of geopolitical theory comes Valkenburg’s clear, succinct America at War. This is a book of facts. With the exception of a final chapter outlining the problems of political geography which the post-war peacemakers must face, it confines itself to an objective survey of the various geographical influences which have affected America’s preparedness for war and the chances of ourselves and our allies for victory. Samuel Van Valkenburg is editor, but the book is actually the work of six experts, each writing upon his specialty. It falls into five units: (1) the character of the warring peoples, as indicated by productivity, health records, and diet; (2) the influence of the physical environment of terrain and climate; (3) the economic problems of food, industrial assets and liabilities, and transportation; (4) defense of our ocean shorelines, and the strategic uses of our outlying possessions; and (5) the problems of a lasting world peace.
Much of the material in America at War will already be familiar to the alert reader, but the special value of this book lies in its scope, its detail, and the authority of its statements. The mere facts presented make it clear that a part of our enemies’ initial advantage in the present war lay in their skillful application of geographical knowledge—their use of terrain and climatic factors, their laying up of stock piles of strategic materials, and their preliminary researches leading to the manufacture of substitutes and synthetics. It is made equally obvious, however, that advantages of resources and, in general, of position are decidedly with the United Nations. Time is on our side.
Van Valkenburg’s plan for a world peace based upon economic blocs and, in the case of Europe, cultural units within the blocs, is the only part of the book which shifts from fact to theory. It is thus open to dispute, but as presented by the editor, the plan seems to flow so logically from economic and ethnic considerations that it is at least worthy of respectful attention.
A TREASURY OF BRITISH HUMOR.
Edited by Morris Bishop.
New York: Coward-McCann, Inc. 1942. 820 pp. $3.00.
Reviewed by Professor Royal S. Pease, U. S. Naval Academy
One type of “escape literature” that war promotes is humor, that temporary relief from the tensity of reality that preserves sanity and sound judgment. Streeter’s Here Mable in the last war served just such a purpose. In the present one, Phillips’s The Private Papers of Private Purkey and Hargroves’ See Here, Private Hargroves fulfill somewhat the same function. Similarly anthologies such as F. P. Adams’ Innocent Merriment (all verse), and E. B. and Katherine S. White’s A Subtreasury of American Humor (mostly prose) preserve something of the lightheartedness of less grim days. Now comes Morris Bishop’s A Treasury of British Humor, in plan and concept a close parallel to Mr. and Mrs. White’s collection.
Mr. Bishop, a well-known humorist in his own right, provides a wise and witty introduction to his book in which he states as his thesis that, essentially, humor is humor wherever you find it, and that people laugh at the same sort of things whether they live in England or America. Both Britons and Americans laugh at mother-in-law jokes, both relish overstatement and understatement, both have vogues in humor that pass with time and “date” their quips. Mr. Bishop’s point is well taken and amply supported by the 800 odd pages, mostly prose, that follow his statement of this thesis. The geography is different but the spirit is essentially the same; such differences as do exist are few indeed—such perhaps as the Briton’s tendency “to render the rational ridiculous, whereas the . . . American ... is to render the ridiculous rational.”
The selections begin with Geoffrey Chaucer and end with one dated February 22, 1941. They include a wide variety of writers throughout this long period. In making his choices, Mr. Bishop has shown a notable ability to avoid hackneyed selections and to keep the tone of the book fresh and varied. In common with practically all anthologists, he defends himself (quite unnecessarily it seems to me) from the charges of such critics as complain that some of their own favorites are omitted. If all such extracts were included, we should have not only a set of volumes equal in mass to the Encyclopaedia Britannica but a work too cumbersome to be of much use to anyone. Part of the charm of Mr. Bishop’s book lies in the glimpses we get of the merry character of the editor as shown by the choices he makes.
The book is an excellent picture, too, of the English character—as wholesome, healthy, and indomitable as is the American. But above all, it is a book for Americans and Britons in common to chuckle over even in these parlous times.
NONE MORE COURAGEOUS.
By Stewart H. Holbrook.
New York: The Macmillan Company. 1942. 245 pp. $2.50
Reviewed by Ensign William R. Mueller, U. S: Naval Reserve
In contrast to the numerous books, articles, and speeches on military and naval strategy, national ideologies, and post-war planning and freedom and federation, come tales of the men actually fighting the war. Mr. Holbrook’s None More Courageous convinces its readers that there are modern heroes equal to those of legend and epic. The author, a soldier of the last war, has interviewed some of the subjects of his book, and has derived other information from official sources and news correspondents.
Mr. Holbrook presents a comprehensive picture of the various branches of modem warfare. We read of the daring exploits of Captain Arthur William Wermuth, the “One-Man Army of Bataan,” of the gallant aerial achievements of Captain Colin Kelly and Lieutenant Commander Edward O’Hare, of the prowess of the submarine Seawolf, and of the successful activities of Lieutenant John Bulkeley and his PT squadrons.
Perhaps most exciting is the cruise of the Marblehead, a cruise interrupted by heavy Japanese bombardment. There seemed little life remaining in the ship after the three-hour enemy attack. “The steam lines were disrupted, so was most of the electrical wiring. The rudder hung limp. The decks were pocked with bomb holes, some of them chasms. The cruiser’s sides were ripped, gutted. All sorts of necessary rigging had been shot away entire, or blown out of shape and out of use. The galleys now were gone. So was the sick bay, the hospital, and most of the medical supplies. But down in the hold, down there where tired, sweating men worked like red-faced gnomes to keep the wheels turning, the engines never stopped. They faltered now and then, while men held their breaths, but they never ceased to turn.” Despite her condition the ship reached the Java port of Tjilatjap, proceeded from there to Ceylon still rudderless, and finally completed her cruise at one of our east coast ports, where she is now undergoing over-all repairs.
None More Courageous is a tribute not only to those whose names appear within its pages. It is equally a tribute to all the courageous of our fighting forces, both to those who are decorated and to those who live a hero’s life or die a hero’s death unseen.
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY.
A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction.
By the Right Honourable Sir Halford J. Mackinder. Introduction by Edward Mead Earle. Foreword by Major George Fielding Eliot.
New York: Henry Holt and Co. 1942. 219 pages. $2.50.
Reviewed by Lieutenant (J.G.) Robert Liddell Lowe, U. S. Naval Reserve
First published in 1919, Democratic Ideals and Reality has been reissued because it was overlooked when it appeared 23 years ago, because it remains pertinent to our times, and because it influenced indirectly Hitler’s Mein Kampf. The volume, large in scope, considers the physical, economic, military, political, and psychological aspects of world strategy, each in its relation to the others. The purpose of the book, in the author’s words, is “to measure the relative significance of the great features of our globe as tested by the events of history . . . and then to consider how we may best adjust our ideals of freedom to these lasting realities of our earthly home.”
The main thesis of the volume is that sea power is fundamentally a matter of appropriate bases, productive and secure. Sir Halford begins by discussing historically important bases and their relation to land power. After pointing out that modern means of transportation and communication have reduced continents to islands, he shows that the joint continent of Europe, Asia, and Africa is now effectively an island, which he names the World-Island. The Americas and Australia, in area mere satellites of the old continent, are only lesser islands. In a world so tightly related, the danger is that the whole World-Island or a large part of it may at some time become a single, united base of sea power. If a predatory nation should attain such control, democracy would be destroyed. In time, even the Americas, inferior in man power and resources, would be reduced to tributaries.
Sir Halford then comes to one of his primary conceptions, the notion of the Heartland. The Heartland is the great central portion of Eurasia, which is of incalculable importance to world dominion. Economically it is significant because of its unexploited resources, and strategically because of its mountain passes that make China and India vulnerable and because of its waterways. A great military power in possession of the Heartland could easily take control of Arabia and the region of the Suez, which is the crossing point of the two most vital modern highways—the route between the Indies and Europe, and the route between the Northern Heartland (central Eurasia) and the Southern Heartland (the interior of South Africa).
Germany, he demonstrated in 1919, might easily become such a great military power. Situated on the frontier between the East and the West, she has been given a strategic and commanding position on the globe, contiguous as she is to the Heartland. From the point of view of world peace, her location is dangerous for two reasons: (1) the German claim to dominance over the Slavs and (2) German Kultur, which recognizes only the geographical and economic realities and is concerned only with them. Sir Halford points his warning summarily:
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.
The conclusions that Sir Halford reached at the end of the last war deserve careful attention today. As a thoughtful student of government, who was a supporter of the League of Nations, he maintained two decades ago that, if world peace is to exist, the question between the Germans and the Slavs must be settled. East Europe, like West Europe, he believed, must be divided into self-contained nations; a Middle Tier of really independent states between Germany and Russia was necessary. Certain strategical positions in the Heartland and Arabia must be treated as of world importance, for their possession may facilitate or prevent a world domination. Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, the Bosporus, the Dardanelles, and the outlets from the Baltic must be internationalized. After considering the realities presented by the geography of the globe, he came to the conclusion that if the freedom of nations is to be secure, it must rest on a reasonable approach to equality of resources among a certain number of the larger nations; otherwise, we may become the mere slaves of the world’s geography exploited by materialistic organizers.
Democratic Ideals and Reality manifestly remains a timely book. One misses, however, what Sir Halford would have to say about air power, the potentialities of which he was aware. He mentions Russia less than he would today because at that time she was in a state of reorganization. But, as Professor Early points out, it is obvious that Russia and Germany are so situated that if they were to combine, they would control the world jointly, or if either should subdue the other, the victor would control the world alone. This is a book conspicuous for what it has to say, for its admirable expository style, and for its tight organization, co-ordinating, as it does, various and difficult materials. Only an extraordinarily clear thinker, a distinguished student of grand strategy, and a great geographer could be capable of such a performance. It is meant for anyone, citizen or specialist, who is in need of a concise and lucid statement of how geography shapes the destiny of the world.
REPORT FROM TOKYO—A MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
By Joseph C. Grew.
New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc. 1942. 88 pages. $1.00.
Reviewed by Cecelia M. Fahy
This thoroughly honest report by our former ambassador to Japan offers valuable and enlightening information to our allies everywhere, particularly to the layman whose casual observation of the Japanese race may not have introduced him to the treacherous and fanatical temperament of our Pacific enemy.
To those of us who have lived in Japanese occupied areas, Mr. Grew’s words come not as a surprise but as a worthily repeated warning—the Japanese are trained —they are formidable—they are united— they are frugal—they are fanatical—and in war, they are totalitarian. The author’s ten years in Japan have offered him countless opportunities to substantiate these words, and he does so, graphically, in this decidedly readable message.
There is an excellent chapter called “Why We Can No Longer Do Business with Japan,” which takes us through the years of Japan’s furtive preparations for this tremendous military campaign, informing us not only of her mechanical and technical developments even in the face of financial ruin, but also of the importance that has always been attached to “warping,” as it were, the mind of Japanese youth from the earliest years, with the result, temporary though it may be, that in terms of dishonest finance Japan is a flourishing nation indeed.
The book is addressed to all of us, and should be placed on compulsory college reading lists, but to the naval officer about to face, not the Japanese nation but her military machine, it will provide more than informative reading—it will provide a background and a broader understanding of the raison d’etre of the Japanese soldier and sailor with whom he will come in contact, an understanding of the problems we face in fighting these little men, the puppets of the Japanese High Command.
Thumbnail Reviews
Songs of American Sailormen (with music). By Joanna C. Colcord. Drawings by Gordon Grant. Enlarged and Revised Edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 212 pages. $4.50. A favorable review of the 1938 edition of this book appeared in the Proceedings for June, 1939.
White Ensigns. By Taffrail (Captain Taprell Dorling. D.S.O., R.N.). New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. 1943. 280 pages. $2.50.
A fictional presentation of Britain’s war at sea, including the fighting in Norway, the achievements at Dunkirk, and, in thin disguise, the heroic struggle of the Jervis Bay. Told by a writer whose narrative skill and expert professional background are well known.
Firedrake. By A. D. Divine. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. 1943. 251 pages. $2.75.
The true story, yet thrilling as fiction, of two years’ service of a British destroyer—in the North Sea, at Narvik, eight months based at Gibraltar, and at last in Boston, “being completely overhauled and repaired.” Honestly and expertly told.
Fighter Facts and Fallacies. By John G. Lee. New York: William Morrow and Co. 1942. 63 pages. $1.25.
Not a study of actual types but of the fundamentals of pursuit plane design as seen by an expert—the Assistant Director of Research for United Aircraft Corporation. Gives in clear terms what the military pilot needs to know about the effects on performance of wing loading, power loading, weight increase, streamlining, span-loading, and propeller design.
Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries. By Sylvester John Hemleben. University of Chicago Press. 1943. 227 pages. $2.50.
A scholarly study by a professor at Fordham University, giving a digest of peace plans from Dante’s De Monarchia to the League of Nations of 1919.
With Perry to Japan: the Diary of Edward Yorke McCauley. Edited by Allan A. Cole. Princeton University Press. 1942. 126 pages. $2.50.
The writer of the diary was an acting master of 26 who later rose to rear admiral. Though his story adds only minor sidelights on Perry’s mission, it gives a frank picture of navy life, foreign ports, and of Japan as seen by “a brash young officer [according to the editor] who reflected the feeling of racial and cultural superiority so characteristic of his exuberant republic.” The 30-page introduction is of special value on Perry and early American interests in the Pacific.