THE PRIMITIVE form of warfare had a very simple pattern; readily comprehended in its entirety, by even the limited understanding of prehistoric man. When another human made a hostile gesture, one merely grabbed a club and rushed at him, with the single purpose of bashing his brains out as rapidly as possible. The first complication in the structure of war was coincident with the initial appearance of that primary requisite of civilization—property. The Have-Nots saw, and envied, the abundance of the Haves; and the raid was the inevitable result. This appearance of a warfare with a limited objective fostered the development of various types of protective devices, which, in turn, resulted in the evolution of tactics and implements designed to overcome those defenses. Thus the factor of material was added to the problems of the war-time commander, although the primary tactical objective continued to be the killing of the maximum number of the enemy as rapidly as possible.
The development of civilization's second basic necessity—transportation—naturally resulted in attempts to apply its media to the exigencies of warfare. With each new step in the development of transportation came the inevitable adaptation of the new vehicles to the grim business of war. The Egyptian chariot, the elephant of the Carthaginians, and even the cavalry of Genghis Khan, were the direct, if remote, ancestors of modern mechanized warfare. The designed purpose of each vehicle was to increase the fighting efficiency of the individual warrior; not only by accelerating the speed he could make in endeavoring to get into contact with the enemy, but also by reason of the fact that the vehicle itself rendered him less accessible to the weapons employed by his adversary.
While the comparative importance of the vehicle in combat was obviously at a maximum in maritime warfare, the tactical objective, in the early examples of this type of fighting was still the killing of the men in the ship, rather than the destruction of the vehicle which carried them. It is true that there were some instances of successful employment of the ram; but victories at sea were won, on the whole—not by sinking vessels of the enemy—but by killing off their crews in order to gain physical possession of the hostile fleet. The age of land warfare on the high seas did not approach its inevitable end until about the time of the Battle of Lepanto, when, in the cannon, there appeared for the first time a weapon sufficiently powerful to insure destruction of the contemporaneous warships. From that moment on, despite occasional anachronistic reversions to the past, the primary objective of naval commanders has always been the destruction of the hostile fleet. And here we have the primary differential between combat at sea and that on land in previous wars—in maritime warfare the primary objective was the destruction of the vehicle employed by the enemy; in terrestrial warfare it was the killing of hostile personnel. This difference in the primary objective, in turn, caused the development of two different types of tactics; which, although derived from identical basic principles, became so differentiated in application and so encrusted with the jargon of technical minutiae, that officers of one service ceased to “speak the language” of the other.
Prior to 1914 only two varieties of warfare were universally recognized or discussed—naval warfare and land warfare; the first utilizing the tactics designed to destroy the vehicle, and the latter those for the killing of men. It is true that, in war colleges and similar organizations, the term amphibious warfare was occasionally employed; but, to the general public, the use of even this adjective connoted a discussion far too technical to be of general interest. However, with the universal impact of the present war upon the nation, such a multiplicity of descriptive terms depicting various phases of warfare are encountered daily that the general public is confused by their constant usage on the part of those whom that public generally regards as authorities. Technically speaking, war is armed conflict, and its different varieties normally derive their names from the media in which the fighting takes place. But purely naval, terrestrial, or aerial combat are now usually occurrent only as phases of larger battles or campaigns in which forces designed for all three types of fighting are employed. Hence there are, strictly speaking, seven different kinds of fighting to be encountered in modern warfare—terrestrial, aero-terrestrial, naval, aero-naval, aerial, amphibious, and aero-amphibious. Of these, any senior officer—regardless of whether his primary affiliation is with the Army, Navy, or the Air Force—must be prepared to engage in four of the seven possible varieties; and hence must have at least a working knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the forces employed by each of the other two services.
During the age of sail and steam a knowledge of the traditional tactics employed in land warfare was sufficient equipment for a General; but, with the advent of the internal-combustion engine, a new situation arose. Simultaneously with the development of the airplane, vehicles for warfare on land became of increasing importance. The combined effect of these two innovations was to produce a metamorphosis in terrestrial warfare to a point where an understanding of the strategy and tactics of the vehicle became of equal importance to a similar knowledge of the old rules concerning land warfare. This increasing tendency towards mechanization on land has enhanced the tactical importance of the vehicle to a point where it may very well be argued that against hostile forces containing substantial mechanized units, the destruction of these vehicles is the primary tactical objective, rather than the traditional man-killing methods of land warfare. We have recently seen in North Africa an example of the proof of this thesis. Once Rommel lost the major portion of his tanks, prime movers, and aircraft, the position of his troops1 became untenable. This development of mechanization on land, together with the prior mechanization on sea, in the air, and under the water, has a marked tendency to necessitate, for successful leadership in modern warfare, a type of strategical and tactical knowledge which has hitherto been considered necessary only to a commander of naval forces. A modern commander, regardless of the service to which he belongs, has under his command, at least during the initial stages of a campaign, a force in which the primary elements are vehicular. While he still has to deal with the vital elements of men and morale, his primary concern, in initially engaging the enemy, will be the effective employment of these vehicles, whether they are airplanes, warships, submarines, or tanks; singly, or in combination. The older tactics cannot be discarded as, although in strictly aerial or purely naval combat the destruction of the vehicle connotes the inability to fight any further, in terrestrial combat the traditional methods must be available. For, as the number and efficiency of the vehicles diminish with the wastage of war, the tactics of the vehicle become gradually supplanted by the old rules of terrestrial warfare, at a rate directly commensurate with the decrease in vehicular strength.
1 Written shortly after Rommel’s defeat at El Alamein.
But, just as the one-eyed man is king in the land of the blind, the commander possessing even limited vehicular forces has a marked advantage over an adversary with none at his disposal. Hence it appears logical to conclude that, in all forms of modern warfare, the primary and paramount tactical objective is the destruction of the hostile vehicles; and that only after this is accomplished does it change to the primeval task of killing men, assuming the enemy is still able or willing to continue fighting. The natural corollary of this thesis is that the conception there are several distinct kinds of warfare is no longer tenable. Instead, there is only one species of war, even though it may be characterized by fighting on land, sea, and in the air, with various types of vehicles carrying many kinds of weapons.
To illustrate, let us consider the present war. In both the European and Pacific theaters, the only adjective sufficiently comprehensive to describe the warfare now being waged is the compound term—aero-amphibious. In each area the fighting was originally aero-terrestrial with some aero- amphibious trimmings, such as the conquests of Norway and the Malay Peninsula. With the fall of France and Singapore this phase ended. The United Nations were forced into geographical positions where their major land forces could not be used against the enemy. In each theater it is the immediate objective of the United Nations to gain, maintain, and exercise command of the sea sufficiently to enable their forces to change and limit the fighting to aero-terrestrial combat by bringing the land forces again into action. The difference in the situation in the two areas is that, in the European theater, the initiation of the aero-terrestrial phase may mean merely the beginning of the most bitter fighting of the whole war; while in the Pacific, that stage will be reached only when the final goal of victory should be just ahead.
While much hard and costly fighting will remain after the aero-terrestrial phase is reached in each theater of the war, the real danger of a United Nations defeat will cease to exist after that condition is achieved. Hence the truly decisive phase of this war is the current one, where the fighting is still aero-amphibious, and while the Axis powers are still able to contest the command of the sea, or to interfere seriously with the exercise of that command by the United Nations. Even the vastly superior potential resources of those powers may be frittered away uselessly if we fail to devote balanced proportions of our productive capacity to the necessities of the several services and Allies until we have definitely won at sea, and thus terminated the current aero-amphibious phase of the war.
The foregoing is no plea for increased naval power per se, the building of additional warships, or greater recognition of the part the United States and British navies are playing in the conduct of the war. It is intended as a statement that, in the enthusiasm over the opening of the African front, the campaign just beginning in Burma, and that about to end in New Guinea, it must not be forgotten that the basic support of these and other campaigns to be undertaken in the future, requires, and will continue to require, extensive naval operations. And such naval support cannot be afforded unless an adequate supply of aircraft, shipping, and troops and guns for the defense of naval bases—both those now in use and those yet to be captured—is forthcoming to permit the naval forces to operate efficiently during the aero-amphibious fighting now in progress.
No truly intelligent person can logically object to the principle just enunciated, yet certain very definite, although not obvious, menaces to its fulfillment exist. One is the tacit and widespread misconception that the war in the European theater is that phase of the present conflict in which the United States Army is primarily interested, while the war in the Pacific is an affair for Admirals only. Another is the possibility that, among rapidly expanding organizations, the one which first achieves a certain size is able to make its demands in a more effective manner; just as the cuckoo’s changeling is able to monopolize the food supply by evidencing the loudest and most conspicuous signs of hunger, or even by shoving the other fledglings out of the nest.
But the greatest hazard to the fulfillment of this vital necessity lies in the urgency of demands by all possible sources for increased allocations from our aircraft production. The nicest consideration must be given to each of these demands, whether from the different branches of our own armed services, or from those of our Allies. From time to time the exigencies of high policy may override temporarily the demands of military necessity; and policy can be, and often has been, in world history, profoundly influenced by public opinion. When an influential national publication2 publishes an article “Prepared in collaboration with a well-known authority on air power,” purporting to “present an orthodox airman’s view of the role air power can play in winning the war,” which is “neither the air extremist’s view nor the conservative Army view,” its influence on public opinion and the consequent repercussions on national policy deserve consideration. Concisely this particular article contains the following statements:
(1) Air power is the strategical weapon needed to strike the enemy directly through the air without the aid of surface arms; (2) Air power aims at knocking out the industrial basis of the enemy’s war machine; (3) We cannot compromise on this strategy; (4) We must concentrate our air power. We cannot afford to fritter it away on half a dozen fronts, especially we cannot afford to use it up in support of indecisive surface actions. We must concentrate it at the bases where it can deliver the most deadly thrust against the enemy.
2 Life, December 14, 1942.
This, and similar expositions of the role that “air power” is to play have been constantly assailing the American public, and a by no means negligible portion of public opinion is convinced that the war could be won very quickly and readily if the Army and the Navy would turn “air men” free to fight as they saw fit. Other articles by self-elected authorities on air power have decried the utility of the aircraft carrier, and still others endeavor to keep alive the long since settled controversy as to whether bombs can sink battleships. A detailed refutation of these and other specious theses would be profitless, and far exceed the limitations of space in this paper. Instead, a positive declaration of what is considered to be the true condition will be made.
Even granting the thesis of those who maintain that the quickest way to defeat the Axis powers is by long range aerial bombardment of the industrial areas of Germany, Italy, and Japan, it must be admitted that the bombers currently in service, as well as the more improved types which can be placed in quantity production in time to exert a ponderable influence upon the present war, have a relatively limited radius of action with an adequate bomb load. Objectives in Axis territory cannot be reached regularly, constantly, and on an adequate scale by these planes from bases now in our possession. Other bases must be captured from the enemy, and operations of this character must be planned on the basis of full scale, aero- amphibious fighting. Further, the maintenance, defense, and supply of these bases after their capture cannot be conducted without active and thorough exercise of command of the sea. In the purely naval phases of such operations, aero-naval activity is the rule. It has been definitely proved time and time again during the present war, in the Arctic, the Mediterranean, as well as in the Pacific, that the weapons of “air power” can be, and frequently are, used to obtain command of the sea. The German conquest of Norway and the Japanese conquests of the Philippines, Malay Peninsula, and Dutch East Indies, are all examples. They indicate the speed with which adequately conducted aero-amphibious operations can defeat an enemy who, by reason of inadequacy in either naval, air, or land forces, or by lack of adequate liaison between them, is not prepared to counter effectively in kind. It is true that we can and have seized advance bases while the enemy is still in a position to contend for the command of the sea; whether that contention is made through the medium of strictly naval or aerial forces, or a combination of the two. However, in all such cases, the importance of maintaining our command of the sea by any and all means available becomes, in such instances, of increased importance, because if such command is lost, even for a brief while, the forces ashore at the advanced base are placed in a most hazardous position. For example, had the naval battles off the Solomon Islands during November 13-15 ended disastrously for our Navy, it is highly probable that our forces on Guadalcanal would have been in imminent danger of destruction or capture by the Japanese. Similarly, command of the eastern portion of the central Atlantic, and the western end of the Mediterranean are currently essential to the cause of the United Nations, if our forces in North Africa are to be maintained. A commander, regardless of his ability, is almost certainly doomed to defeat in an advanced area if his vital sea lines of communication are severed by an enemy able to gain and exercise command of the pertinent sea areas; as witness Rommel in Egypt and MacArthur on Bataan.
The general public, and even those who are best informed, are frequently misled by the fact that command of the sea no longer includes automatic insurance that the power possessing it will enjoy undisturbed its vast concomitant privileges. It is true that this condition obtained prior to 1914, when the only practicable way to interfere substantially with the exercise of sea command was to wrest it from the enemy by success in a decisive battle. In that year the appearance of the long range submarine provided a means by which the inferior naval power could, and did, attempt to deny its stronger adversary the advantages naturally accruing from his command of the sea. The development of the long range aircraft provided another instrumentality capable of use in identical, and, in some ways, even more efficient fashion. The combination of airplane and submarine has converted the previously simple problem of exercising command of the sea into one of extreme complexity and great difficulty. Eternal vigilance, ceaseless patrolling, and disheartening losses from hostile attrition efforts must be expected. The surmounting of German submarine activity alone is a truly stupendous problem, and one that requires a vast expenditure in patrol vessels, escorts, seamen, and aircraft. When that is coupled with the necessity for guarding our convoys against attacks from hostile shore- based aircraft near the termini of such voyages, together with the necessity for precluding possible attacks from enemy carrier-based planes en route, the size of the aero-naval operations in support of our activities in this connection alone becomes gigantic. If it were possible today to eliminate every naval vessel, with the exception of aircraft carriers and submarines, now in service or under construction in Japan, Germany, and Italy, it still would not be possible to make any substantial reduction in the number of aircraft required by naval forces for adequate performance of their role in current and prospective aero-amphibious operations.
To preclude a challenge of the foregoing statement by those who have not examined the situation critically, the following discussion of the respective roles played by the land, sea, and aerial forces in this three-way, aero-amphibious warfare seems appropriate at this point. Basically, the existing situation may be approximated by the statement that in the Pacific theater the Japanese have captured, and now control, sources of vital raw materials for which the Germans and Italians are still contending. From the military standpoint, the immediate necessity of the United Nations in both theaters appears to be the capture of additional bases, as from those currently held, only a fraction of the full military power at the disposal of those nations may be exerted. These should be sufficiently close to Axis-held territory so that our full military strength may be used for leverage, from these bases as fulcrums, to pry the hostile military forces out of still other advanced strategic positions. Obviously, interim opportunities to destroy warships, aircraft, or troops of the enemy are not to be neglected; but, with only fractional components of our total strength as yet actually in play, vital impairment of the Axis military strength cannot be expected until the main battle is joined.
It is quite true that the enemy is suffering from the attrition of the fighting now in progress on the Russian, African, Chinese, and Southwestern Pacific fronts. Yet, in all probability, the effect of this attrition is not expected to be of sufficient magnitude to produce an early end to the war. Therefore, the capture and consolidation of additional advanced bases must be considered as an essential precursor to subsequent, full-scale, decisive fighting. The general locations of such bases are a matter of geography, and, in the European theater, they are to be found first in North Africa, and finally on the coast of Europe. Similarly, in the Pacific theater, they are in, immediately, the Pacific Islands, and ultimately on the mainland of Asia. In the capture of any such locations our forces must be transported largely by sea. Opposition will obviously be first encountered from shore-based aircraft and submarines operating against our convoys. Subsequent opposition, as our forces make a closer approach to their desired objective, will be found in the form of intensive aerial activity, and ultimately from coastal batteries and beach defenses. From the start of such expeditions until the objective has been captured and definitely consolidated, the primary responsibility for the success of our arms rests upon aerial and naval forces. Command of the sea must be gained in the appropriate areas, and exercised, not only during the period of capture and consolidation, but as well during the entire period the objective will be used as a base against the enemy. As the necessary aerial vehicles may be more quickly replaced than the corresponding naval units, their relative importance is, in this sense, less, even though their effectiveness may be greater. The value of an aircraft carrier, for example, is considerably greater than that of the number of planes it carries. It would appear logical, therefore, for the command of such expeditions to be vested in a naval officer; preferably one who has had considerable contact with, or experience in, aerial operations.
Anyone who has read, with even cursory interest, published accounts of past expeditions of this sort, cannot help but be struck by the comparative vulnerability of naval units to full-scale aerial attacks when they lack the umbrella provided by an adequate number of defending aircraft. And aircraft carriers, though extremely valuable pieces in this game of aero-amphibious warfare, are so difficult to replace that no nation on earth, not even our own, can afford to expend them in unlimited quantities by continuous or extensive attacks on shore positions. Isolated raids on even important shore objectives may occasionally be conducted with gratifying results and negligible losses, as were the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and our own raid on the Gilbert and Marshalls. But, on the whole, if the plan calls for more than a sudden raid without previous warning to the objective, aircraft carriers attacking shore objectives place themselves in extreme hazard. The Battle of Midway provides a classic example proving the foregoing. There, the location of an occupation force, far to the westward, simply screamed a warning that a Japanese striking force—presumably with aircraft carriers as its Primary constituent—would attack; probably within the next 48 hours. Those who decry the utility of the aircraft carrier on the grounds of its vulnerability, carp upon this, and other instances, where this type of warship has been employed on missions alien to its proper role in naval tactics. For the aircraft carrier is designed primarily to strike a powerful blow, and then run to a safe distance before the counteraction against it can be started. The nation possessing a preponderance of aircraft carrier strength enjoys an extremely potent advantage, not only in gaining, but in subsequently exercising, command of the sea. If, then, we admit that the aircraft carrier is too valuable and too irreplaceable to be hazarded regularly in attacks against enemy positions defended by shore-based aircraft, it inevitably follows that the only means available for combating such hostile forces is shore-based aircraft of our own. This appears axiomatic; but the question as to which of the three services should control the activity of aircraft so employed is a highly controversial one. In some instances they have operated under Army control; in some, where our Allies are concerned, under the aegis of an Air Force; and, in still others, under naval command. When assigned the primary mission of eliminating hostile shore-based aircraft, pilots of such planes under Army control might attack, if no enemy aircraft were encountered, barracks and mess-halls where the majority of the flight personnel on the ground might be found concentrated. Those operating directly under the Air Force command would, under similar circumstances, probably attack hangars, gasoline dumps, and the runways of flying fields; while those under naval command would, in all probability, attempt to sink vessels in the harbor utilized as cargo carriers for the supply of the enemy base. The foregoing may be considered as an illustration of the varying results that might be expected under the three possible systems of control where the armed forces of a nation are, like Gaul, divided into three parts. Eliding the practical difficulties that would be encountered in the approach, capture, and subsequent consolidation of advanced bases, it would appear logical for land forces to take over and assume responsibility for the defense of the base immediately subsequent to the consolidation period. History in the current war clearly shows that such forces cannot perform their mission, either efficiently or with certainty, unless their efforts are complemented by extensive aerial forces, and supplemented by the efforts of the aero-naval forces at sea in exercising command of the appropriate sea areas. Here, again, the question of jurisdiction over the shore-based aircraft is controversial. At times, they must be employed in parrying hostile aerial attacks; at others, they must be utilized against enemy troops; and on still other occasions they may be expected to find employment against naval forces. In effect, the missions of naval and land forces are sharply defined and generally understood with precise clarity. Aerial forces, because of their versatility and effectiveness, are desired by everyone. Hence, unless the relative cogency of each request for their services is weighed with the nicest appreciation of the exigencies applicable to the problem as a whole, the end result is quite apt to be competition, rather than co-operation, between the two older arms.
It is profitless here to speculate upon the origins of this unfortunate situation. It may suffice to say that basically they have their origin in the fact that we have had two separate services, rather than a unified department of national defense; and that, as a result of peace-time economies, each service, in planning its training, has tended towards concentration upon the solution of its own problems and the indoctrination of its own officers in their appropriate tactics and strategy. This has resulted in a mutual lack of knowledge concerning the problems, potentialities, and limitations of the other service. Obviously, a reorganization of the entire structure of our armed forces in the most critical and decisive stage of an extremely grave national emergency is unthinkable. Instead, we apparently have endeavored to achieve, as far as practicable, the same result with a minimum of reorganizational difficulty by a judicious assignment of supreme command in the several theaters of war. As previously indicated, the aero-amphibious stage of this war in the Pacific theater will probably be of far greater duration, and its termination will be closer to the end of the conflict in that area than will be the case in the European theater. Consequently, it is appropriate that we find a naval officer holding the supreme command in the Pacific. Conversely, in the European theater the aero-terrestrial phase of the conflict will be of long duration and vital importance, and therefore it is logical for this supreme command to accrue to an officer trained primarily in land warfare.
These, however, are but expediencies, and while we may be convinced that they will be an adequate solution of our problems in the present war, we have no such assurance that similar improvisations may prove efficacious in some possible future war. Therefore, while the time may be considered premature for a discussion concerning the future reorganization of our armed forces, it would seem at this point highly appropriate for historians and strategists of the Army and the Navy, as well as those who feel their primary loyalty is owing to “Air Power,” to examine critically the events of the current conflict from the viewpoint of the following questions: Could our operations have been conducted, and the war won earlier, if we had had a separate air force? Was our old system of two services—Army and Navy—the most efficient possible? Or, would it have been better to have had a unified department of national defense?