A Department of War
(See page 1099, August, 1943, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral W. D. Baker, U. S. Navy.—The development of total warfare in the present conflict has brought the thought of Admiral Yarnell’s article to the minds of many officers. Most officers agree with the concept of unified command as suggested in that article. The ways of accomplishment are not so thoroughly agreed upon and it is Probable that Admiral Yarnell’s article was Written in an effort to arouse discussion and unify thought on the subject.
Certainly the present method of organization for area conflict is that of unified command and it is working. We have a naval officer in one area, an air officer in another, and an army officer in still a third area, each in supreme command of all forces—both U. S. and Allied, air, ground, surface, subsurface, and amphibious—all working together on the same objective and pooling their various strengths for the attainment of that objective.
These area commanders are not fighting the war as Army, Navy, or Air officers, but as representatives of the High Command placed by the Constitution in the President of the United States and, during this war, effectuated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The fact that this task force organization is a going concern, and, at the moment, a successful one, is not an argument against a Department of War but an indication of the complete understanding by the military commanders involved of their duties and of the weapons placed at their disposal. What I mean is that properly selected officers do not have to be experts in all branches of warfare in order to command varied arms; they only have to understand the underlying principles of warfare. When these principles are understood, the methods of application by separate arms fall naturally into place. It may be granted that the more experience a commander has with all types the better he can decide details, which is a doubtful advantage, but for an individual to know enough of all branches is asking more than can be expected. His staff must be relied on for detailed work.
If this concept be accepted we can leave out the whole idea of interchange of service with the single academy and unified course of training, but only up to the point of the postgraduate schools or war colleges. At this point it is highly desirable to study mutual problems. To be an expert naval officer is about all that can be expected of one man. To add the experience necessary to be an artillery man, an infantry man, a fighter air officer, and a commander of a bomber group would spread the experience so thin that we would end up as jacks-of-all-trades and masters of none. There are but few area or combined task force commanders necessary compared with the vast numbers of competent experienced subordinate commanders required for the accomplishment of a mission—these few will always be found when the occasion arises. It is to be expected that Eisenhowers, Halseys, MacArthurs and Kinkaids will always be available.
There is still much talk of a “separate air force.” Separate from what? Why the Army and the Navy of course—but that is just as far from reality as would be a separate amphibious force. In this conflict we have had co-operation of forces, unified command, taught to us in the hard way. As a result we are all tending to become Commandos, combined operators, in thought. Does anyone think that the bombing of European cities is an operation separate and distinct from those of the ground forces or of the sea forces—of course it isn’t. Each city that is attacked must of necessity be chosen because of its relation to the picture as a whole. Can searches from advanced bases overseas be made without intimate co-ordination with the other branches of national arms in that area? No more can dive bombers nor pursuit squadrons be used independently than can infantry or PT boats. It takes years to gain the fine points of search, troop support, fighter support of and direction by surface forces, and the other details of close air coordination with surface forces, either ground or seaborne. If a separate air force were formed, these details of co-ordination would be entirely lost, as was found to be the case with the R.A.F. as quoted by Admiral Yarnell. Would it not be as logical to separate the artillery from the Army and the submarines from the Navy? What we need is closer co-operation not greater separation of arms.
When it comes to the Material Division as suggested by Admiral Yarnell, I think that the source of material officers must receive reconsideration. How many times has the seagoing officer cussed the naval constructor for his lack of seagoing experience as evidenced by some detail of ship construction! I firmly believe that we should have experts from civilian life, but they must be mixed with operational experience which can only be gained by service under the operating forces of the “Department of War.”
If the assumptions discussed above are accepted, then the organization of the Department of War will have to follow that make-up. I suggest the following:
This may not be the proper place for the suggestion, but it would be a great step in the proper direction if an Assistant Secretary of State sat on the Planning Board.