FROM PERRY TO PEARL HARBOR.
By Edwin A. Falk.
New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc. 1943. 362 pages. $3.00.
Reviewed by Commander L. J. Gulliver, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Naval events in the Pacific, wherein the ships and naval personnel of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands have been fiercely engaged with the Navy of Japan during the months following Pearl Harbor, seem almost fantastic and equally unaccountable unless we have fully comprehended the significance of what the Japanese have relentlessly planned and executed in the period of years which Edwin A. Falk dramatically nominates as From Perry to Pearl Harbor. His book bearing this title narrates and pointedly comments on every event that has taken place in the Pacific since that unlucky day (for living Japanese) when our Commodore Perry in his black navy ships compelled the opening of Nipponese seaports.
The author, who is a World War I naval officer of distinction, has devoted a good part of his life’s work to intensive study of every phase of Japan’s naval plans. He makes it crystal clear that the pattern of Japanese grandiose yet dogged intent has been to eventually smash every nation that barred Japan’s aimed-for empire comprising every square foot of land in the Pacific extending from the northern tip of Siberia to the southern edge of Little America.
The events narrated in From Perry to Pearl Harbor seem to justify author Falk in saying: “How any foreign power has been able to feel secure in recent times against possible Japanese attack without warning remains a mystery.” He shows that before Pearl Harbor the Japanese opened fire first and declared war afterwards on China in 1894 and on Russia at Port Arthur in 1904.
Other evidence, comparable in kind, but voluminous in quantity has been adduced by Mr. Falk and in all truth he seems justified in writing that “the Western world failed to correctly interpret what it beheld.”
Unbelievable now to us, yet we are reminded in From Perry to Pearl Harbor that our people felt and expressed admiration for brave little Nippon in defiance of the bully Dragon (China) a half century ago and ten years later our hearts beat faster as we
Thus was the long-term pattern being woven while America shouted “banzai.” Yet in his chapter, “Japan the Ally,” 1914-18, the author reveals that the scales had not fallen from our eyes—Japan was steaming at full speed to seize all the islands in the Pacific while risking not a soldier for her Allies nor any principal part of her fleet.
Naval officers and all others will find in From Perry to Pearl Harbor the reading matter that will react in their consciousness—“We won’t let that happen again in the Pacific Ocean,” which is another way of expressing emphatic agreement with the recent pronouncement of the Secretary of the Navy that all the islands in the Pacific that matter to America must be brought under our control for keeps.
The author of From Perry to Pearl Harbor served throughout the last war at sea on the staff of Rear Admiral E. A. Anderson and has been chosen as literary executor of the late Commander Holloway H. Frost, U. S. Navy. He has also written Fighting Bob Evans and Togo and the Rise of Japanese Sea Power.
AIR NAVIGATION.
By Herbert S. Zim.
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1943. 324 pages. $3.00.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Russell G. Albright, U. S. Navy
Literally thousands of people each day are longingly lifting their interests skyward in hopes of escaping the fate of being earth- bound. To nourish the sprouted seeds of interest, Herbert S. Zim has assembled for digestion by the aviation enthusiast a not-too-technical introduction to “avigation.”
Air Navigation tends to impress the reader that everyone navigates in going from one place to another, whether they do it consciously or not, and in the transition to air navigation, attention to more details and employment of specialized instruments is all that is necessary. Throughout the pages of his book the author high lights the details and aerial signposts that guide the navigator, and strips the cloak of mystery from the instruments used in flying and aerial navigation. To round out the subject of avigation, the subjects of communication and weather are included to illustrate their relationship and influences upon air travel.
Conspicuously absent are the mathematical solutions to the problems of navigation. For this reason, the book is plainly not designed to teach navigation, but it will prove a source of interest to those who yearn for the freedom of flight as page by page it uncovers the “A, B, C’s” of avigation. The final chapter will be of special interest for the youth of high-school age. Containing intelligent advice and helpful suggestions, it will guide the fledglings of today to become the birdmen of tomorrow.
THE OCEANS: THEIR PHYSICS, CHEMISTRY, AND GENERAL BIOLOGY.
By H. U. Sverdrup, Martin W. Johnson, and Richard H. Fleming.
New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1942. 1060 pages. $10.00. To schools $8.00.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral G. S. Bryan, U. S. Navy (Retired), Hydrographer of the Navy
The Oceans, written as a survey of well-established oceanographic knowledge, will probably be the last attempt to record in one volume all outstanding facts and theories about oceans. This volume on oceanography, the most comprehensive ever written, is an excellent textbook which includes enough detailed oceanographic data to be of great value to other natural sciences.
Author-date entries in the text, detailed bibliographies at the ends of chapters, graphs, line drawings, small scale maps, and some photographs, make this volume an excellent reference book. Goode’s Homolosine equal-area projection, which depicts relative areas of the oceans rather accurately, is used as the base for generalized small scale world charts showing bottom topography, surface temperature, subsurface temperature, surface salinity, and surface currents. The mathematical development of formulae in the evolution of theories from scattered physical and chemical data is carefully made.
While many references are made to the work of individuals and organizations who have contributed data of value to the study of oceanography, it is regretted that very little credit has been given the U. S. Navy and the Hydrographic Office for the original development of sonic sounding, for their major contribution of deep-sea soundings throughout the world, and for their comprehensive data on ocean currents. The reviewer has also looked in vain for even a mention of the name of the man who was practically the first to focus attention of the scientific world on the study of the oceans—Matthew Fontaine Maury.
ECONOMICS IN UNIFORM:
Military Economy and Social Structure.
By Albert T. Lauterbach.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1943. 282 pages. $3.00.
Reviewed by Lieutenant T. F. McManus, U. S. Naval Reserve
This is another book on the Nazi economic system, including discussions of democracy versus totalitarianism and the effects of military economy upon social structure. Its purpose is “to derive from the experience of Europe, and that of its Nazi oppressors, certain lessons in military economy and social adjustment which the democratic world must understand if it is to survive the present struggle. . . .”
The underlying theme is the exposition of Wehrwirtschaft as developed and applied by the Nazis. Wehrwirtschaft is translated as “preparedness economy,” but is used most frequently in the sense of “military economy”—it includes both war economy proper and economic mobilization for war during peace time. Wehrwirtschaft and totalitarianism are not Hitlerian inventions, but are deeply rooted in German history and German militarism. Walther Rathenau, however, the Bernard Baruch of World War Germany, is regarded as more important to the present German military system than Clausewitz. The essence of the modern German war machine is not Blitzkrieg, but Wehrwirtschaft. Hitler’s real “secret weapon” is simply more than six years of undisturbed economic mobilization prior to the actual declaration of war. Invasion is the last step of Hitler’s warfare, a necessary evil to be avoided if at all possible.
The blindness of the democracies in failing to recognize preparation for war in the Four-Year Plan, and their naive beliefs in appeasement and “business as usual,” are roundly castigated. Industrial mobilization at the outbreak of war and Wehrwirtschaft are .fundamentally incompatible; when the democracies were ready to proclaim “M-Day,” it was only necessary for the Germans to druck auf den knopf (press the starter button). Industrial mobilization was for the Nazis a planned permanent policy. The war really began in 1933.
Like so many refugee German scholars, the author, while decrying totalitarianism in Nazi Germany, prescribes economic planning as the “wave of the future” for the United States. He declines to see the fundamental similarities in economic planning and totalitarianism, both of which require force, compulsion, coercion, to succeed. In the international sphere, whether there is to be a Pan-Europa, a Union Now, or some form of League of Nations, he insists upon a larger role for the United States in shaping the post-war world.
COMBINED OPERATIONS: THE OFFICIAL STORY OF THE COMMANDOS.
New York: Macmillan Company. 1943. 155 pages, 39 illustrations, and 9 maps. $2.00.
Reviewed by Commander C. B. Judge, U. S. Naval Reserve
The appearance of an official account of the Commandos is bound to be an important event in the history of World War II, largely because a good deal of misinformation has been printed with regard to the spectacular nature of their activities. The book very properly emphasizes the fact that aside from their special accomplishments the Commandos are basically trained in the old- fashioned principles of firm discipline, physical fitness, efficiency in marching and digging, and in skill in arms. Assault is their primary function; but they are not shock troops, nor are they organized to engage in extended operations. Their usefulness in connection with the British Navy lies in the fact that they are an amphibious military force, formed explicitly to take advantage of Britain’s superior sea power.
In a series of accurate and dramatic pictures the anonymous author (Hilary St. George Saunders, assistant librarian of the House of Commons) shows us the quality of the men who make up the Commando units. The book is filled with examples of individual and collective heroism. At first the smaller raids were made for the purpose of harassing the enemy and for keeping up the offensive spirit of the Army and the civilian population. Later the larger expeditions had important military objectives.
Of the many raids which continually harried the Germans, from the Lofoten Islands to the shores of Africa and beyond, perhaps the most heroic of all was the attack on St. Nazaire. The main objective was the destruction of the great 1,100-foot dry dock, the only one on the west coast of France capable of housing the Tirpitz, should she come out of hiding and make a dash for the Atlantic. To conduct a task force of at least 20 small vessels along the carefully guarded French coast for a distance of no less than 250 miles is a difficult assignment. To approach within 2 miles of the harbor of St. Nazaire without being discovered seems almost impossible. But this is just what Commander R. E. D. Ryder accomplished. His next move was to drive the former American flush-deck destroyer Buchanan against the outer lock gates of the dry dock and sink her there. The next morning a delayed charge set off the explosives with which she was filled, and the destruction was complete. Mr. Saunders reveals that an inspection party of some 40 senior German officers was aboard the destroyer when she blew up. They were all wiped out by the explosion, together with about 350 men engaged in repairing damage done by the Commandos. Panic immediately followed and the leaderless German soldiers, “imagining they saw British Commandos round every corner of the port area, joined in the general melee and were mown down by their own machine guns.” This engagement against an imaginary enemy kept up for 24 hours with the result that the German high authorities were compelled to close the whole harbor area for a week and to evacuate the entire population from the Old Town of St. Nazaire.
The history of the Commandos’ share in the seizure of North Africa brings the narrative up to date. The landing of Lieutenant General Clark, U. S. Army, by night on the shore of the African coast was merely another task assigned to Combined Operations. As all the world knows, it was completely successful; but the venture was not without its dramatic and dangerous moments, here completely revealed for the first time. No past war has produced so many fighters of this highly specialized type. That is why the Commandos are playing such an important role in the warfare of today. They are tough; they strike hard and suddenly—and in unexpected places. And they will continue to do so until the time comes for an all-out invasion of the Continent.
Thumbnail Reviews
We Cannot Escape History. By John T. Whitaker. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1943. 367 pages. $2.75.
There is much of value in this study of the war and its origins by a correspondent who for over ten years had most unusual experience and personal contacts in Moscow, Berlin, Rome, Madrid, and London. It is his well-sustained thesis that the Army, rather than Hitler, has guided German policy since the blood purge of 1934. There was, he holds, no conflict between the Army and Hitler over the continued Russian offensive in the fall of ’41, for this was needed to insure Japan’s entry into the war.
Fathoms Below: Under-Sea Salvage from Sailing Ships to the “Normandie.” By Frank Meier, Master Diver. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1943. 319 pages. $3.00.
Highly readable and informative tales of wrecks, salvage, and diving operations, by an expert with 38 years of service in the Navy and outside.
Glossary of Shipbuilding and Outfitting Terms. By Walter J. Eddington. New York: Cornell Maritime Press. 1943. 435 pages. $3.50.
In its fullness of information this book, by an official employed by the U. S. Maritime Commission, might almost be regarded as a concise encyclopedia of shipbuilding. In addition to the glossary, it has about 100 pages of tables, lists of tools, and other useful data.
Modern Conversational Japanese: A Textbook for Beginners. By Joseph K. Yamagiwa. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. 1942. 240 pages. $2.50.
Based on the course given by the author at the University of Michigan, this has 9 pages on pronunciation, 41 pages on grammar, and the rest on “Patterns of Japanese Speech.” It is referred to as “the most comprehensive textbook on spoken Japanese yet written by an American.” The author is a native born United States citizen.