In December of 1941, Japan began her campaign of conquest in the Far East. Her eager armies moved through the Philippines, pausing only to trap and contain the American and Philippine armies on Bataan and Corregidor. Hongkong then fell and was followed by Malaya, and finally Singapore lay in defeat.
During this major thrust in the Southwest, large Japanese forces had gathered in the Southeast at Davao, located in the Southern Philippines, and in January, 1942, this force began the conquest of the Netherlands East Indies. Its first objectives were Tarakan in Northern Celebes, and Sarawak, in Northern Borneo. Both fell after brief struggles by small garrisons. Next came Balik-papen, which was taken on January 25 in spite of valiant efforts by Allied forces to destroy a huge convoy carrying occupying troops. Allied submarines and aircraft harassed the convoy by day and by night. On the night of January 24, four U. S. destroyers took a heavy toll of ships and men during a daring torpedo and gun attack now known as the Battle of Macassar Straits. These efforts were in vain.
In early February the Japanese made preparations to move farther south to the Malay Barrier. Borneo and Celebes had been mostly trackless jungles and were of little value, either strategically or industrially except for their petroleum. The Allies could well afford to lose them if necessary, but not so the Malay Barrier. The Malay Barrier was a belt of islands stretching from Sumatra, close to Singapore in the west, to Timor and New Guinea, near Australia in the east. This belt of islands contained most of the population, wealth, and strategic resources of the Netherlands East Indies. Java, in the middle of the belt, held about 90 per cent of the population of the Barrier and was the seat of government of the Indies. On Java was the bulk of the small Netherlands East Indies Army and Air Force. Java had two valuable naval bases, Surabaya on its northeast coast, and Tandjung Priok on its northwest coast, from which the small Allied Fleet could operate. Java was thus the key to control of the Malay Barrier. The Allies made every effort to reinforce Java while the Japanese prepared to attack, but were only able to fly in a few fighter planes from Australia via Timor and Bali and to add a few British warships left from the shambles of Singapore to the small naval force already in Java.
On February 19, the Japanese occupied Bali and its important airfield. This move successfully interrupted the ferrying of fighter planes to Java. It was now obvious that the Japanese were about to attack Java. If they could take Java they would control the Barrier and the remainder of the Netherlands East Indies. The Allies’ only hope of defending Java was to be able to control the sea north of Java. The decisive battle for control of this sea area was fought in the Java Sea off Surabaya on February 27 and 28, 1942.
The Allied naval force which fought this battle was under the tactical command of Admiral Doorman of the Royal Netherlands Navy. Admiral Doorman’s force and the other components of the Allied Fleet were under the command of Admiral Helfrich, also of the Royal Netherlands Navy, whose headquarters were at Lembang, in the mountains of Java. Admiral Doorman’s force was a conglomeration of ships furnished by four nations. Most were damaged, or overage, or were badly in need of overhaul. Keeping them supplied and maintained was difficult and complex, since each nation used its own kind of ammunition, and such items as British pipe fittings and American boiler tubes could not be supplied by the Dutch naval bases. Nevertheless, a sizable portion of the total Allied naval force was ready for action under the command of Admiral Doorman.
Admiral Doorman’s force consisted of the Dutch light cruisers DeRuyter and Java, the American heavy cruiser Houston, with her after turret out of commission, the British heavy cruiser Exeter, and the Australian light cruiser Perth. Also in this force were the American destroyers John D. Ford, aboard which I was the Gunnery Officer, John D. Edwards, Alden, and Paul Jones, the Dutch destroyers Kortenaer and Witte de With, and the British destroyers Encounter, Jupiter, and Electra. The Dutch and British destroyers were modern, powerful craft, but the American ships were old four-stackers, good in their day, but no match for their modern sisters, although so far they had done most of the fighting in the Java campaign, including the action in Macassar Straits. Communication between these ships was almost impossible. Finally a makeshift means was devised whereby American and British signalmen were placed on the DeRuyter, from which they passed the Admiral’s commands to their own ships. Each nation had its own tactics and maneuvering instructions and its own way of doing things. Surprisingly though, this heterogeneous force grew more unified every hour it steamed together.
The end of the Java Campaign began about February 24. Doorman’s squadron was then gathered in Surabaya where his ships made what preparations they could for coming actions, after the daily Japanese bombing raid and before the following day’s raid. This was wearing work, fueling and repairing by night, and dodging bombs by day, but we thought little of it. Our minds were on the struggle we knew was coming. We had always counted on reinforcements from our Pacific Fleet. December ended, January slipped by, then February; we knew now that they were probably busy elsewhere, and that we were left there to do the best we could with what we had.
Up north, our submarines and patrol planes kept spotting concentrations of Japanese ships. We couldn’t prevent them from gathering, but we hoped to prevent them from carrying out their plan. The distance from Borneo to Java was only a night’s run at high speed. Since they could reach Java in this single night, and could leave to do it after our planes had come home for the night, we had to scout along the northern coasts of Java and Madura nightly to prevent being surprised. This we did the 25th, and again the 26th. This was tiring work. Our crews had to be at battle stations each night for the entire period. We were expecting to encounter the enemy, and we had to be ready. After return to port each day our crews worked steadily, ignoring the Japanese bombing attacks, fueling their ships for the following night’s run.
After the sweep of the night of February 26, we continued westward along the coast of Java after dawn instead of entering Surabaya Harbor as before. Admiral Doorman evidently had expected that the Japs would attack that night. Later we learned one of our planes had actually sighted a large convoy heading toward Java the afternoon before, and that Admiral Doorman believed he had missed contact with this force. However, we turned back toward Surabaya about noon without contact and started to enter the Surabaya mine fields. Halfway in the fields we received a report from a patrol plane that a Japanese force of several cruisers and destroyers and a large number of transports had been sighted standing toward Java. Immediately all ships reversed course and stood back out of the mine fields. After clearing the fields we worked up speed to 20 knots and commenced forming our battle disposition. From my position up on the fire control platform of the John D. Ford, my station in battle as Gunnery Officer, 1 could see that our cruisers were in column, order of ships De- Ruyter, Exeter, Houston, Perth, and Java. The Jupiter was taking position well ahead of formation, and the Electra and Encounter were steaming ahead and to starboard of the main body. The Dutch destroyers Kortenaer and Witte de With were taking corresponding positions on the port bow of the formation. The four American destroyers, under the command of Commander T. H. Binford, U. S. Navy, were taking position on the port quarter of the main body to act as an attack force.
The resultant disposition was a compromise, with our heaviest gun power centered in the formation, and with the light cruisers on both ends of the formation. This disposition had numerous drawbacks. The heavy ships were not grouped by types. Consequently, no maneuvering could be done to seek the most favorable range for either the heavy or light cruisers. The U. S. destroyers were kept on the disengaged flank where they could not be used offensively, and the British and Dutch destroyers were not concentrated. Admiral Doorman’s reasons for assuming this disposition may never be known. Possibly he had counted on making contact after dark. Unfortunately such was not the case.
For two hours we steamed northwest toward the Bawean Islands. Occasionally a trailing Japanese plane would dart out °f the clouds, hastily drop a stick of bombs at the nearest ship, and then beat a rapid retreat as our anti-aircraft fire poured up at him. We were tired and weary from almost two days and nights without sleep and with little food. Our crews had been at their battle stations during most of this period. They were dead on their feet, yet each man somehow became alert and ready as we made last minute preparations for battle.
At exactly 4:15 that afternoon there began the first full- scale, formal naval battle since Jutland. Perhaps there will never be another. Our first indication that we had made contact with the enemy was the sight of the Jupiter, headed back toward our formation, surrounded by leaping splashes. She turned and dodged as she withdrew from heavy enemy fire. Still the only actual evidence of the enemy we could see, from our position in the rear of our formation, were the puffs of light brown smoke that were rising each time the Japs fired a salvo. From the Jupiter we received a report of contact with two large heavy cruisers or battle cruisers, several light cruisers, and many destroyers. Soon the tops of the larger ships appeared over the horizon. Without hesitation, the Houston and Exeter opened fire at the extreme range of 24,000 yards. (See sketch of first phase.) The Japanese rapidly shifted their fire from the Jupiter to our battle line. Their first salvos were close, their succeeding salvos straddled the Houston and DeRuyter. For the Japs this was easy. Although barely 40 miles off the shore of Java, they had air superiority and were able to maintain spotting planes over our formation. The ships of our battle line were able to throw off many salvos by weaving back and forth. Still a great number of salvos straddled.
Our division of U. S. destroyers was maintaining station on the disengaged flank of our main body. We were at that time out of gun range. Consequently, I had a seldom equaled opportunity to observe the battle. I could see the changing dispositions of both forces, and the positions of our ships and the enemy’s ships in formation. I was reminded vaguely of my classroom days at Annapolis where the fleets of Germany and England had battled on our blackboards. This scene in the Java Sea was similar, but there were sinister differences. Here was no chalk dust, but powder smoke and flying spray. Salvos of 8 to 15 shots were rising about our ships. In the distance I could see the tops of similar splashes temporarily blotting out the enemy. The formation of these splashes was impressive. They rose slowly, remained suspended for seconds, and then collapsed. Between them our ships drove without slowing, and apparently without injury. The Houston seemed to dominate our battle line. Her two forward turrets belched forth salvos without hesitation, but her after turret remained motionless and silent. This turret had been put out of action earlier in the Java campaign by a Japanese bomb. With only six guns, the Houston was still able to throw more steel in faster time than any of her opponents. Her silhouette was larger and higher than those of the Dutch and British ships, and she seemed to be a tower of strength in our battle line.
The Japanese salvos continued to fall with little success. We hoped our gunnery was better. At least it looked good from our position. The Houston continued shooting magnificently, pouring out two salvos to every salvo fired by the other ships. The Houston and Exeter were concentrating on the two large Jap ships. The Allied light cruisers were engaging the Japanese light ships now that the range had closed to 20,000 yards. The Japanese formation was now fairly well developed, and appeared to be a column of 7 light cruisers followed by 2 heavy cruisers and screened by a division of destroyers on the port bow and two divisions of destroyers on the starboard bow- Both forces had worked around to westerly courses at speeds of about 25 knots, and were roughly parallel. The Japanese were obviously trying to protect a convoy to the north of them. Admiral Doorman was just as obviously trying to close the Japanese and work northward toward that convoy. Gradually he closed the range, turning slightly toward the Japs. The Allied battle line followed in column. At about this time the DeRuyter and Java appeared to be hit, but neither faltered nor slowed in the slightest. The furious exchange of salvos continued. Soon something had to give; it was the Exeter. Clouds of black smoke and white steam rolled upwards, temporarily engulfing her battle flags. She slowed slightly, one of her boiler rooms having been hit. The Perth and Java swung out and passed her, leaving the Exeter to limp off to the southwest. (See sketch of second phase.) The remaining Allied ships continued the battle, closing slowly. One Japanese heavy cruiser appeared to be hit and was burning heavily. At least one Jap destroyer was hit and sunk. Just as we seemed to be drawing ahead of the Japanese force, another Japanese force was sighted coming over the horizon from the northwest. (See sketch of third phase.) This force consisted of one or two cruisers and several destroyers. This force closed us rapidly, obviously intent on delivering a torpedo attack. After closing to about 15,000 yards, this force and the destroyers with the main body launched a simultaneous torpedo attack on our main body. To close through this attack would have been suicide. Consequently, Doorman turned his force away, hoping the Jap torpedoes would pass ahead. All ships turned away and paralleled the movements of the De Ruyter, the large ships continuing to exchange fire with the Jap main body. Some torpedoes were observed by the Houston to pass between the ships of the main body. Luckily none hit. The Kortenaer was not so fortunate, however. She was hit on the starboard quarter at 5:14. She broke in two and sank in less than 30 seconds. The swiftness of her going was incredible. When hit, she was about 300 yards abreast our bow. When we had left her no more than 200 yards astern, she was under.
At the same time a torpedo was sighted approaching our port quarter. We swung slightly and let it pass harmlessly ahead of us. Many heavy explosions now began appearing in the distance ahead, indicating that the Jap torpedoes were destroying themselves at the ends of their runs. Safe from them now, Doorman turned his fleet back to parallel the course of the enemy. (See sketch of fourth phase.) The forces against him now were overwhelming. He could not hope to break through them by day, but he was apparently intent on holding the Japs off long enough to allow the Exeter to escape. Accordingly, he turned north, firing as he went. The Encounter, Jupiter, and Electra then delivered a torpedo attack which caused the Jap main body to reverse course to avoid it. This attack was partially successful. It diverted the Jap force temporarily and did some damage, probably sinking at least one Japanese destroyer. British destroyers then commenced retiring under their own smokescreen. During this period the Electra was badly damaged and subsequently sunk, and the Jupiter was never seen after she delivered her attack. The Allied battle line re-formed rapidly and turned to an easterly course, gradually turning south as the Japs tried to close the range.
The diversion caused by the British destroyer torpedo attack was not sufficient to cause the Jap force to turn away. The U. S. Destroyer Division was therefore ordered to attack with torpedoes. We turned directly toward the Jap main body and closed at high speed, at one point passing under the trajectories of the Allied and Japanese salvos. The Japanese force made no attempt to repel us, or possibly did not discover our approach amidst the smoke and gathering dusk. In a few minutes we had closed sufficiently to attack. Then came the order, and 24 torpedoes started on their runs. We turned in column and let go a second broadside. Only then did we retire, following behind our main body. The Japanese main body was forced to turn away. In the distance we could see the flames on the burning Japanese cruiser burst out with renewed vigor, but we couldn’t ascertain definitely whether hits were made. This attack gained enough time for the Exeter to disappear into the increasing darkness escorted by the Encounter. (See sketch of fifth phase.)
The battle had now been decided. It was unfortunate that Admiral Doorman had been forced to fight a day action against superior forces. However, it was obvious that no matter how successful he might have been, the Japanese could have concentrated a much superior force against him. He might have closed the convoy by night and turned it away, but success would only have delayed slightly the Japanese attack.
As the Exeter retired, escorted by the 25w* counter, Admiral Doorman found that he had a much weakened force under his command. The Houston, DeRuyter, Java, and Perth were still without major damage, but were low on ammunition. He had a screening force of four U. S. destroyers and one Dutch destroyer. All destroyers were without torpedoes. With this force, A would still have been possible for him to inflict heavy damage if he could have closed the Japanese convoy at night.
Admiral Doorman formed his remaining ships in column and set course south toward the coast of Java. For some unknown reason, the U. S. destroyers were still left trailing astern where their screening ability was completely lost. As his force approached the coast of Java, Japanese planes shadowed him doggedly, dropping flares at frequent intervals to mark his course. A few miles from the coast of Java he turned west to skirt the coast of Java. His intention was unknown, but he probably expected to intercept the Japanese convoy as it neared the Javanese coast.
As Admiral Doorman made this last turn, the U. S. destroyers became separated from the cruisers and were unable to rejoin them. Commander Binford then retired to Surabaya where he hoped to replenish the U. S. destroyers’ low fuel supplies.
The DeRuyter and Java were sunk later that night, probably by Japanese torpedoes. The Houston and Perth reached Tandjung Priok safely, but the Dutch destroyer, Witte de With, disappeared in the night and was never heard from.
The Allied Naval Force was so reduced that it could offer no further effective resistance. The wisest course now was to salvage the remnants of this force. The Houston and Perth were ordered to run through Sunda Straits. They were accompanied by the Evertsen, a Dutch destroyer which had been at Tandjung Priok. Late the night of the 28th, the Perth reported contact with Japanese destroyers. Violent explosions and flashes were observed by sailors aboard a Dutch merchant ship passing through the Sunda Straits. It is probable that the Houston and Perth were sunk by a Japanese force. The Evertsen was beached on the coast of Java.
At the other end of Java at Surabaya, the Exeter made emergency repairs on the 28th. That night she attempted to go north around the Island of Madura and then south through Lombok Straits. She was escorted by the Encounter and the U. S. destroyer Pope. The Pope had been kept out of the Java Sea battle by an engineering casualty which was repaired in time to permit her to leave with the Exeter. As this group of ships turned south to run through Lombok Straits, they made contact with a Japanese force. The Exeter and Encounter were sunk. The Pope retired northeast, and was probably sunk by aircraft, since she reported being shadowed by aircraft during this retirement.
The four U. S. destroyers under Commander Binford were more fortunate. Because of our shallow draft, we could negotiate the shorter route south from Surabaya through Madura and Bali Straits. We could made this entire run during the period from dusk to dawn. However, we would have the handicap of a bright, full tropical moon.
Throughout the day of the 28th we worked at top speed fueling our ships. The decks were so hot that water had to be played on them before they could be walked on. All the native laborers had fled from the city of Surabaya. Our exhausted men, now three nights without sleep, were forced to go ashore and drag the heavy fuel hoses aboard and to fuel the ship themselves. This operation was completed by dusk in spite of a series of vicious air raids. At dark we slipped out the southern passage from Surabaya and down through Madura Strait. At midnight we worked up to 30 knots and commenced the most critical part of our escape, our passage through the 3-mile-wide portion of Bali Strait. This we accomplished without incident and were just congratulating ourselves when we made contact with a Japanese destroyer. This lone ship beat a hasty retreat at the sight of four of us, but was soon joined by two of its mates. This group opened fire on us at a range of about 6,000 yards. We returned their fire, putting out a tremendous volume, but doing little damage in the darkness. Back aft our torpedomen fired blank torpedo impulse charges in their empty tubes, hoping to lead the Japs into thinking we were making a torpedo attack. We might have been able to inflict damage on this group since it was inferior to us, but to dose them and attempt to do so might have led us into a superior force. We knew that there were other forces in this area. We therefore continued to carry out our plan of retirement and steamed on at full speed. The Japanese destroyers remained in Bali Strait. Gradually we opened the range and finally firing by both sides ceased. We continued south to the open sea and set course for Australia.
Every hour that passed put 30 miles between us and the nightmare on Java. We had done all we could. Now we could only hope to escape to fight another day. Dawn found us 120 miles south of Java still racing southward. Anxiously we searched the sky for aircraft. Down below in the radio shack, reports were coming in of attacks by Jap carrier aircraft on other ships fleeing from Java. Somehow they missed us, as we steamed on and on without slowing. All that day and night and the next day we kept going until we knew that we were safe. Then and only then did we sleep—for the first time in five nights.
Sleep seemed the most important thing in the world that day. Since then we have slept enough, and have returned to whatever the war may bring. The old U. S. destroyers which fought so well will probably never fight again. They have since been retired to pasture, to honorable retirement to a job they are capable of doing, even in this day of high speed war. The officers and men who fought on them have gone to other duties on other ships where they will someday help to avenge their comrades who were less fortunate during those last fateful days of February, 1942. They fought a losing campaign but not a lost cause.