Since the outbreak of the war, and its "proof by fire" of the many types of service aircraft, and related theories concerning their uses, a great many disputes have arisen involving the application of the lessons learned. Few of these have been more acute than that concerning the patrol plane. Discussions and opinion concerning other types have for the most part been reduced to the academic by the apparent similarity of opinion held by the "powers that be" and the man who flies one." This similarity of opinion is not apparent in the case of the patrol plane. The following are the main points of this apparent divergence of opinion. The word apparent is used because the pilots have no way of judging long time plans or policies of the bureau, except by planes built and being built. If the types being built are the result of necessity, and not of considered tactical uses, then there obviously is no disagreement. The necessities of war may cause even stranger uses of weapons at hand.
It is of great concern that, despite lessons of this war, the opinion is still held in some quarters that a patrol type seaplane may be made self-sufficient, as regards defense, and may be sent into combat zones to seek out positive information in the face of opposing aircraft. This opinion is manifest in the recent and continued construction of "Mariner" type aircraft. In an effort to support the contention that this type of plane is woefully un-self-sufficient, let us compare it with one which is foremost among large planes in self-sufficiency, namely the "Flying Fortress." First the "Fortress" carries, according to the latest available information, within two guns of double those of the latest “Mariner" type. The guns are all of the same caliber. Also the "Fortress" guns are so located as to eliminate all appreciable blind spots. The seaplane type on the other hand, due to its hull, has a very large and vulnerable blind area. In voiding this obvious disadvantage, theory calls for the seaplane to hug the water’s surface to prevent any runs on its blind spot, and to restrict the pullouts of diving fighters. This defense has severe disadvantages as will be attested by those pilots of Patwing 10 still alive. Enemy fighters may open fire at extreme range and use the water splashes to correct their point of aim, thereby gaining a great advantage in range and accuracy. Also, in order to efficiently carry out a great many missions, the patrol plane must hold an appreciable altitude until opposing aircraft are encountered. The resultant forced dive to low altitude is often more damaging than gunfire and frequently too late to accomplish its purpose. To return to our comparison: A great majority of the “Fortress” victories were by supported formation fire, a luxury which is denied the patrol plane by the very nature of its paramount mission. Even the “Fortress” crews do not view with equanimity an encounter with the enemy when acting singly. Another advantage enjoyed by the “Fortress” is its speed, which has the effect of restricting both the number of attacks an enemy may make in a given time and the efficiency of the attack itself. Against the slow patrol plane, just the reverse is true. The enemy has such a wide speed advantage that he may make successive attacks from any angle which he chooses. It permits long range sharpshooting by the fighter instead of limiting him to one attack in which he must come on into close range to be sure of capitalizing on his one opportunity. Still another advantage of the “Fortress” is that its normal operational level is at such a high altitude as to further restrict the fighters’ advantages in position recovery, etc. This comparison is not to advance the “Flying Fortress” as a possible patrol plane type but to demonstrate why a patrol seaplane acting singly would be, in the slang phrase, “cold turkey.” The “Fortress” type, with all its advantages not possessed by the seaplane, is still shot down all too frequently when acting singly. Our newer patrol plane type, the “Mariner,” will prove just as ineffective in combat areas as Patwing 10 found the “Catalinas” to be. The added guns are merely giving the crews a “shake for their money”—with loaded dice!
If we assume the “Mariner” type seaplane is not meant for combat areas, then we are guilty of a wasteful use of vital material. Is there any logical reason for carrying the added tons of turrets, men, ammunition, oxygen, equipment, torpedo gear, etc., when hunting submarines off Aruba or Freetown or Seattle or Honolulu? The penalty in weight and scarce materials is so great and the risk so slight as to become absurd. Granted, some guns are needed to strafe surfaced submarines when attacking, but not to the extent now installed. The older of our two types of patrol plane, the “Catalina,” is equally efficient, if not more so, for negative search and submarine warfare, with much more flexibility in basing and much less material and personnel involved. This is not advocating the return to “Catalinas,” but stressing the wastefulness of the newer type of plane, and our remarkable technical advance—rearward! Indeed both types have disadvantages in anti-submarine work, not the least of which is speed and range. Those that say speed is not essential for this work will admit, I am sure, that it is at least disheartening to sight a fully surfaced submarine, and then have it completely vanish beneath the surface before the dropping point can be reached.
The only other kind of use our “newest” type of patrol plane could conceivably have been designed for is “combat transport,” the carrying of vital supplies to the very outposts of our forces. Here again we have sacrificed “payload” or tactical efficiency immensely, without gaining that for which the sacrifice was made, namely the ability to get through in the face of aircraft opposition.
The conclusion drawn is this: turrets and excessive armament and armor on the patrol seaplane immensely restrict its efficiency without proportionately increasing its chances of survival. It might be added that due to the inherent restrictions of seaplanes (unbroken hull area; low landing speed for open sea landings, thereby restricting top speeds; wing floats, etc.), prohibitive technical difficulties are encountered in any endeavor to make a seaplane self-sufficient defensively. Therefore, it should be designed and used with these limitations in mind. It can be very efficiently designed for negative search, anti-sub patrol and convoy coverage, with its vulnerability to opposing aircraft a calculated risk.
In view of the many disadvantages of the patrol seaplane, a considerable number of patrol pilots are voicing the hope for a land type patrol plane. In some localities this “hope” bears a marked resemblance to a prayer for deliverance. The most frequently mentioned types are the “Liberators,” the “Mitchells,” and the “Venturis.” It is believed these are in the process of procurement. There are many pros and cons to the landplane versus seaplane argument which are too lengthy to permit discussion here. Strength is lent to the proponents of the land type, however, by the fact that so far in this global war very few instances have occurred or actions taken place where the much vaunted ability of the patrol seaplane to operate from an “advance base close to the enemy” was of any value. One of the first planes in Guadalcanal was a patrol seaplane, it is true—but it landed on its wheels on Henderson Field. The fact that most squadrons using the amphibious Catalinas prefer to use them as landplanes does nothing to further the cause of seaplanes. However, granting the victory of landplane proponents, the use of present land planes as patrol planes would merely be another “stopgap.” Eventually we shall be forced to design and build a long-range, high-speed, well-armed reconnaissance plane for the Navy. It must be capable of high altitude and able to go 3,000 miles (into the mandated islands for example), secure the information, and have a reasonable chance of returning. It will of necessity be a landplane. This type of plane cannot be possible until exceptions are permitted to be made to the policy of building multiple-purpose planes. Our present types of patrol planes are designed and equipped for: torpedo carrying, high- and low-altitude bombing, smoking, patrol, search, anti-submarine warfare, open sea landings, self-defense, and advance base operations. Needless to say they are “Jacks of all trades and masters of none.”