“Be Prepared”
The most pressing problems before the people, the nation, and the armed forces at the present time are connected with the prosecution of the great struggle in which we are engaged. This tremendous conflict which involves almost the entire civilized world has already caused more destruction, suffering, political disunity, hatred and confusion than any war in the history of mankind. Unfortunately the end is not yet in sight and no one can predict when our enemies will have been beaten to the point of giving in. If we can judge by the apparent strength of their positions in Asia, in Europe, and even in Africa it is clear that many battles must be won and many difficult tasks accomplished before we shall gain the victory that we are determined to win. However, no one who has seen the accomplishments of the last year, or who knows the temper of the American people can have any doubt in regard to the final outcome. It has been said that we could lose the war—but we are not going to. After a discouraging year of preparations, during which time we have suffered many reverses on the home front as well as in the field, we have taken the offensive; and in all of the important sectors are more than holding our own. We are taking an ever increasing share of the total war effort of the United Nations, and as the days and months pass this will have a telling effect. We are going to win the war.
In spite of the fact that the end is not in sight and the certainty that difficult times lie ahead, it is still not too early to make preparations and lay plans for the solution of certain problems which will face us at the end of the war, and which are as important as, and scarcely less difficult of solution than, the winning of the war—although it is perfectly clear that if we do not win the war we cannot win the peace. Most Americans are agreed that no matter how great the costs the war must be won, and at the same time the feeling that this time we must win the peace is just as strong and just as widespread. It is also obvious that just as the winning of the war will depend to a large extent on America’s efforts, the winning of the peace will, in the same way, depend largely on the part Americans are willing to play.
Thus even during the progress of the war, the problems of the peace—of the reconstruction period as well as the long-range problems of erecting permanent institutions of international order—must be studied. As has been pointed out, World War II involves more nations, more area, and more people than any previous war in history and has been more destructive in a political, material, and spiritual sense. Not only will the final toll of war dead be much greater, but the starvation, unemployment, and suffering have already created conditions which endanger the very foundations of human life. The American people, along with the peoples of all the nations of the world, neutral as well as belligerent, must be prepared to assume a larger part of the responsibility of the reconstruction. It is already apparent that this must be on an international basis.
The peace aims of the United Nations have been set forth in the splendid statements of principles by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. In brief these are:
- No aggrandizement, territorial or other.
- No territorial changes that do not accord with the wishes of the people concerned.
- The right of all peoples to choose their own form of government. Sovereign rights and self-government to be restored to those who have been deprived of them.
- All nations, on equal terms, to have access to the trade and raw materials needed for their economic prosperity.
- All nations to collaborate in the economic field, to secure improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security.
- The firm establishment of peace so that all nations can live in safety within their own boundaries, in freedom from fear and want.
- Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.
- All nations to abandon the use of force. Pending the establishment of a wide and permanent system of general security, the disarmament of aggressive nations is essential. All practical measures to lighten the crushing burden of armaments must be encouraged.
These are, of course, only general principles, and it is necessary to work out and plan for, as definitely as possible, practical means to realize these principles. This must be done now, even while the war is at its height. Also we must not lose sight of the fact that this war differs from all previous wars both in character and in scope, and there is a possibility that peace, when it comes, may differ from the peace which we enjoyed before 1939. It may be that this war will not end at all in the former sense of a formal peace. It may well be that it will end on one front or in one theater before it does in another—at different times in different places.
Be that as it may, the general problems of post-war reconstruction fall into two classes: those connected with the immediate solution of pressing problems of the transitional period from war to peace, and those related problems of long-range political and economic international relationships. Neither of these periods can be I defined exactly nor is it possible to foresee all of the complications which may arise, but it is obvious that methods and procedures can be considered, so that plans do not have to be improvised at the last minute. If the problems of the transitional period are met successfully, many of the difficulties which may tend to prevent the erection of a permanent peaceful international society may be overcome. Much the same problems faced the Allies in 1919, and it must be admitted that the methods used at that time were inadequate. While the statesmen of the victorious nations were arranging the armistice terms and preparing for the peace conference to consider what to do about national boundaries, how to prevent new aggression, and what to do about the world’s armies, it was regarded as necessary to leave the conquered nations in disorder, and even under a strict blockade. This delay had far- reaching consequences, and most of these were detrimental to the future peace which was the apparent and avowed goal of the conference. It would be a very great error to repeat those mistakes, certain tasks must be undertaken as soon as hostilities cease, and the sooner these are begun the better it will be for all of the nations concerned.
As has been stated, no formulas can be drawn up which will cover all possible Problems, but it is clear that some solution of what kind of political organization is desirable (or possible) in the various distributed areas is of the utmost importance. In fact this problem underlies all other problems—economic, social, spiritual—although these latter are very closely related to the political problem. The United Nations have solemnly pledged to defeat the aggressor nations, and it is believed that this defeat must be a thorough one in order to make it clear for all time that aggression does not pay, and can be restrained. The lesson of defeat—a severe one—must be taught, and this lesson must be impressed on the peoples of the aggressor nations. Some form of political control of these peoples would therefore appear to be necessary until they have signified and even demonstrated their desire and ability to take part in a permanent world political organization. Some machinery for exercising a strong political control during the transitional period would also appear to be vitally necessary. It may even be necessary to have this control take the form of a military occupation until the people of the aggressor nations are able to show that they are indeed willing to co-operate with the rest of the world to our mutual welfare. The political control as exercised, however, should without doubt be such as to make it clear that no special material or political advantage was being sought, and that, in accordance with democratic principles, it was the intention to turn over the control of the political institutions to the people of the communities as soon as practicable. In this connection the responsibilities of the victorious nations in setting up and organizing the necessary political machinery cannot be emphasized too strongly. They must exercise their authority to the end that political order within the disturbed areas as well as between these areas and other nations is quickly and effectively established. It has already been indicated that the form this control will take is difficult to determine now, but the necessary agencies must and should be brought into existence as far in advance of the termination of hostilities as possible. It would also appear advisable to let the peoples of the United Nations know to a considerable extent how great their share in these responsibilities is.
Closely allied to the political aspect of the immediate post-war period are the economic problems of the victorious as well as of the vanquished nations. While economists are not entirely agreed, the general belief appears to be that we need not have too great fears about a prolonged period of “economic exhaustion,” disastrous business slumps, and unemployment beginning immediately after the war is over. On the contrary, many are of the opinion that the nations which have not been devastated by the war are more likely to experience a boom period and a labor shortage, at least for a year or two after hostilities cease. They point out that as a result of doing without during the war, there will be a great demand for replacement of equipment and for durable consumers’ goods. After these immediate demands are met, however, there appears to be considerable danger of a “slump” unless plans are carefully laid for large-scale regional developments, new factories, new highways, new housing, and new capital equipment. The government through essential controls will no doubt be able to prevent violent fluctuations in our own economic system, employment, and living standards by continuing the planned industrializations of new areas, social security benefits, and wage-hour legislative measures which had made such progress before the war began.
The situation in the countries which have been the scene of hostilities will, however, be very different. In these areas, which include many of the United Nations, so much has been destroyed that these nations will have great difficulty in rebuilding their industries or changing these industries from a war- to a peace-time footing. Not only will the task of repairing the destruction be a vast one, requiring extensive financial restoration, but the problems of knowing what to repair and how to rebuild in the light of possible changed economic conditions throughout the world will be most perplexing. In many cases little will remain except the spirit and the desire to return to “normalcy” as soon as possible—a desire which may be doomed to disappointment, since it will probably be impossible to return to conditions which existed prior to the war. However, materials to rebuild the shattered organizations in some form or another must be found, and tools, money, workmen must be supplied. This work also must be done quickly, because in a vast project of this kind, charity or gifts, although necessary as temporary measures, will not be enough. Unless some rational economic order is constructed, and constructed rather quickly, there is danger of a complete collapse during which the world may well fall back into chaos and revolution. Among the numerous difficulties will be the fact that millions of people in these countries are now and will continue to be on the verge of starvation. As the war drags on, conditions will no doubt deteriorate even further, and actual starvation will face large sections of these peoples. The getting of food supplies to these areas—a vast problem requiring co-ordination of food procurement, food shipping facilities, and distribution facilities—will be one of the most immediate and acute problems. Another problem, almost equally acute, will be connected with the prevention of epidemics—plague, cholera, dysentery, typhus fever, malaria, etc.—which will threaten to sweep the world when the war ends. In past wars disease has caused as many casualties as have bullets and bombs, and there is every reason to believe that the unprecedented scale of this war with millions of people uprooted, widespread malnutrition, and the lack of medical facilities and medicines over great areas, will prove to be no exception. Supplies of all kinds and trained personnel must be prepared or at least earmarked for immediate transportation to the areas where organized community life has broken down.
The political, economic, and social problems which have been outlined in the foregoing paragraphs will be made especially difficult of solution due to the fact that millions of people, both in Asia and in Europe, have left their homes, either voluntarily or through force, and are now living as refugees or working as virtual slaves in alien countries. As soon as the war is over large numbers of these people will try to find their way to their former homes, and unless they are helped in their desires, or unless they are relocated, instability and confusion will continue for years after the war. Not the least of the problems of the transition period will be to try to have these numerous people regain as quickly as possible their sense of security. Unless people realize that the future holds a strong measure of security, there is little possibility of allaying discontent and disorder, and one of the greatest factors in reconstructing the world into a co-operative contented community of nations is to insure “freedom from fear and freedom from want.”
The vast problems of the transition period have been touched on very briefly in the above paragraphs, in an attempt to outline certain fundamentals of reconstruction. What part will our Navy be called upon to play in this great and important work? That of course is difficult if not impossible to answer specifically since the Navy’s part in the determination of political, economic, and social policies is necessarily small. Depending on the situation as it develops, however, the Navy may be called upon to undertake numerous and varied tasks, and should be prepared to the fullest possible extent to carry out the policies which are decided upon. It is not at all unlikely that once hostilities cease, civil disorders of a very violent form will break out in many parts of Europe and Asia. When the aggressor nations have been completely and thoroughly defeated, and the military control which they have set up in occupied territories ceases, conditions approaching the chaotic may prevail. There has been so much hatred engendered, such a great division in political beliefs, so much human suffering, and above all such a lowering in the standards during the past few years that forces of revenge, of hunger, and of ambition will strive to take matters into their own hands if they are given a chance to do so. It will be necessary to maintain order by force, and the Navy, together with the Army, will very likely be called upon to police large sections of occupied territory, until normal police services can be restored. Other areas may be occupied for indefinite periods. It will be impossible to lay down any rules in advance for this type of duty because the areas which are likely to be affected have so many different peoples, are of such a diverse nature and character, and the political and military problems presented will be so varied. However, the maintenance of peace and order will in many cases call for no great military effort—especially in areas where American ideals and purposes are understood and where it will be necessary to do little more than to indicate that the sole purpose of the occupying force is to assume temporary control for police purposes to assist as much as possible in the work of reconstruction. In other areas, especially if parts of the aggressor nations are occupied, the duties of the occupation forces may be arduous and dangerous, especially in the beginning, and great care in the selection, organization, and indoctrination of these forces is indicated. Only well-disciplined, experienced units under extremely capable leaders should be considered for this duty, which may have political results of a far-reaching nature, out of all proportion to the military aspects of the operation.
The transporting of relief supplies, foodstuffs, medicines, and relief personnel will also probably be under naval supervision and control, although in all probability when these problems are compared to the present difficulties of handling war-time shipping against active enemy opposition this should prove to be a comparatively simple task. Nevertheless, plans for the collection, transportation, and distribution of vast quantities of supplies in an efficient manner should be ready, so that when the time comes the plans can be put into effect without confusion and delay. In the same way naval medical personnel will no doubt be called upon to assist other governmental and civilian medical services in the humane work of helping the millions of undernourished, wounded, and diseased peoples to regain their health. The Navy must be prepared for this work also, although it is impossible to forecast the details of the demands which will be made. In all of these matters it would appear necessary for the Navy to maintain the closest possible liaison with other governmental agencies to the end that our plans and efforts are co-ordinated with theirs and we are not caught unprepared.
The Navy’s part in the economic reconstruction of our own country will also be important. There are at the present time thousands of factories, including great numbers of shipyards, which are concentrating on work for the Navy. There is almost no part of the nation’s economic system, almost none of our industries, which are not engaged in one way or another in supplying materials for our ships afloat, for naval aviation, for our shore establishments, or for the personnel of the Navy. The Navy must be prepared to assist our industrialists in their plans and efforts to return the factories to a peace-time footing in the way best calculated to cause the least disruption to our national economy, and at the same time to the ultimate benefit of the Navy itself. Work on Navy orders should not be stopped immediately, especially if these orders are nearing completion. Work must not be stopped on ships which have already cost millions of dollars in money and millions of man hours of labor, just because there is no immediate prospect of the ships being used. Naturally there will be an immediate cancellation of contracts for deliveries of ships, planes, ammunition, etc., in the distant future, but the whole program should be carefully examined in the light of ultimate economy in governmental expenditures as well as the probable future needs for the Navy in the post-war world. It is true that the American people will have spent billions of dollars on winning the war, and that the utmost economy must be exercised, but in many instances it will not be “economical” to scrap partially completed programs. This is a matter which will require very careful study after all the political as well as the economic sides of the problem have been considered.
Another post-war problem which may have perplexing angles is that of demobilizing the thousands of men who have been called to the colors during the war. After the last war, this was a very difficult problem, in that it was necessary to keep hundreds of discontented men in service for considerable periods, and it was at this time that the morale of the Fleet fell to its lowest point in the history of our modern Navy. This was due to a large extent to the feeling that the war which had just been won was a “war to end wars,” and as a result both officers and men wanted to leave the service and get back to “normal” as quickly as possible. Very likely the same difficulties will not arise at the end of the present war, especially if officers and men of all ranks can be impressed with the idea that the need for a strong, efficient, and effective Navy will probably continue for many years. It is already apparent that the role our Navy must play in the post-war settlement and readjustment is of tremendous importance, and therefore it is probable that long and honorable careers lie ahead of any officer or man who is willing to serve. This should be fully explained so that there will be no rush to leave the service the minute hostilities cease. In connection with the demobilization, however, the Navy should have a clear-cut, long- range personnel program carefully planned, so that the Fleet will be ready for instant service in any part of the world, and at the same time morale problems of both the regular and reserve personnel will be taken into consideration. It will be neither necessary nor desirable to keep the Navy at war-time strength for a prolonged period, but it will probably be a number of years before it can safely be reduced to its prewar level.
As has been indicated, one important decision which must be made by the Executive and Legislative branches of our government has to do with the size of the naval establishment during this transition period from war to peace. This is admittedly a controversial subject, and is one concerning which much can be said on both sides. It will, of course, be imperative that the most rigid economy be exercised in all governmental expenditures after the war is over. Heavy government borrowing to finance the war and the great shifts in our national economy combined with the great loss and destruction of public and private property have all increased the dangers of inflation and a “post-war depression.” Those dangers are real and grave, and as a result there will be a genuine desire on the part of many to cut naval appropriations to the bone and to reduce the Navy to a skeleton of its present size. On the other side of the picture are a number of even more important considerations. First is the fact that vast sums of money will have already been spent in winning the war, and compared to these sums, the maintaining of an adequate peace-time naval establishment will be relatively insignificant. Second is the fact that the United Nations are pledged to bring about an honorable and equitable peace and this pledge will without doubt be fulfilled. This may require, even after the war, a considerable economic and military effort. Third is the fact that during the difficult days of the transition period, this peace must be enforced to no small extent by the United States Navy. In view of these considerations it is believed that the government and the people will hesitate to follow a "penny-wise pound-foolish" policy, because after all, the most important post-war problem will be to "win the peace." It should be quite apparent that the war effort will be largely wasted unless we do. Would it not, therefore, be a good plan to adopt a "wait and see policy," to let the transition period serve as a testing period, and in the meantime to be ready for any eventuality by keeping the Navy at an adequate level? The United States has at various times in her history found herself unprepared to assume international responsibilities and at times unprepared to wage wars that have been thrust upon her. It would seem most undesirable to be unprepared to win the peace, and one of the best ways to avoid this appears to be in keeping the Navy ready for any situation which may arise during this critical period in the world's history.
Either during the transition period or in the final settlements at the end of that period there is almost certain to be a move to call another "disarmament conference," or "naval limitations conference." There will be, of course, numerous excellent reasons why the navies of the world powers should not be a source of international rivalry and contention. There are equally good reasons for not desiring to maintain naval forces which constitute a huge drain on the public treasuries. It is to be hoped, however, that future naval limitations conferences are called after the political accords have been reached and after the naval powers are in such close harmony on political and economic matters that the size of their respective navies is no longer a controversial subject. The history of the attempts to regulate the size of the world’s navies by treaty during the period 1921-36 is sufficient proof that without the proper political accords and lacking an adequate and lasting economic basis, such attempts are almost certain to end in failure.
It is difficult to estimate how long the transition period will last, and to say whether it will be a period of a few years or whether it will last for many years. Since it will be a period of world reconstruction (it must be considered to be a period affecting the entire world, not just a section of it) there will probably be little to indicate a definite end to this period and the beginning of whatever is to follow. However, it would seem that within five or six years, certainly after ten, if the nations of the world are blessed with wise leadership, if the tasks of reconstruction and reorganization are carried out wisely, and if foundations for the future are correctly laid, the world should be ready for a real international society—a democratic new order. The lessons of the past twenty years should be sufficient to prove for all time that disturbances in one part of the world have an important effect on the rest of it, and therefore they cannot be tolerated. For the first years, that is, during the transition period, this will have to be accomplished by force, but it is to be hoped that gradually the peoples of all nations will come to realize that it is to their great economic and social advantage to have set up not only certain international political organizations, but international economic organizations as well. It must be recognized sooner or later that the world is an economic unit, and in order to have it continue to function as it should, all nations must be ready and willing to take their full share in working together for a friendly organized international society. However, any plan or design for a more stable world will depend to a large extent on the quality and character of international co-operation and partnership, and all nations must participate. It is to be hoped, therefore, that during the transition period the people of all of the nations playing a leading part in the fight against the aggressor Axis powers can be made to see that they must assume the responsibility for directing the affairs of the world community. National, regional, and world institutions must be established and recognized—at first perhaps by force, but eventually by the peoples themselves, since only those governments and organizations which have the real support of all of the peoples concerned can be effective and lasting. It should be possible to utilize certain already existing international organizations such as the World Court, the League of Nations, and the International Labor Organization, and to re-establish or reorganize them so that their framework can be fitted into the international picture as it exists at that time. It may be premature to consider these institutions now, but it would appear that the regional institutions might consist of a Pan-American Union, a European Union, and an Asiatic Union, with some sort of World Union to co-ordinate the activities of the regional unions.
This, however, is looking into the distant future, and while the political aspects of world problems are being adjusted, it is every bit as important to establish sound economic international relationships. Problems involving raw materials, international markets, and currency cannot be solved by one nation or even a group of nations if other nations are excluded or discriminated against. Probably one of the fundamental causes of the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939 and of the spreading of the war to the Pacific area in 1941 was the economic maladjustment of the period from 1920 to 1939. In spite of the fact that there were in certain parts of the world abundant surpluses of wheat, cotton, sugar, coffee, rubber, steel, oil, etc., they were so poorly distributed that in other large areas, millions of people were suffering from the lack of them. Farmers in some countries were losing money because they produced too much, while in other countries a large part of the population was undernourished. Industrial products could not be sent from one country to another in spite of excellence of workmanship and cheapness in price because of tariff barriers. Numerous nations wanted to become “self-sufficient” in raw materials as well as industrial products, so that they could wage war successfully. It would seem that the international world order could provide a much higher standard of living for all concerned and could insure economic security and stability in all countries.
The vast political and economic problems of the post-war world will require immense efforts and wise leadership on the part of leaders of governments, of industry, of agriculture, and of labor, and will call for the co-operation of all the peoples of our own and of other nations. In the final analysis, however, political and economic power come mainly from three sources— public opinion, public co-operation, and military force. To gain the support of the peoples of the world, national, regional, and world political organizations must function adequately. Certain peoples must be reeducated and indoctrinated along democratic lines, but if they come to learn that their institutions are truly representative, responsible organizations, controlled by themselves and that these organizations are co-operating with the rest of the world for their own benefit, the necessary popular support should be forthcoming.
This again is looking into the distant future, at a situation which is unlikely to be realized for some years. In the meantime, while new governments and institutions are being set up, while the economic and physical ills of the world are being healed, and while whole continents are being reeducated to the principles of democratic government and the spirit of co-operation, what force is to maintain international order and act as an international police force? There can be no doubt about the answer to that question. Any world order which is to be maintained during the predictable future will be maintained by a combination of sea power and air power. Land power (armies) can be used to maintain national and regional governments, assisted as necessary by regional air forces, but as long as the greatest factor in world economy continues to be maritime commerce, and as long as “all men should be enabled to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance,” world peace and order must necessarily rest on sea power. Therefore it follows naturally that one of the greatest forces in the establishment of a real new order will be the United States Navy. Sea power will play the same important part in the coming period of transition from war to peace, and in the “New World” which is to be built on the ruins of the “Old World,” that it has played for centuries. The Navy will be called upon to take up new duties and will have great responsibilities in the establishment of a finer and better world. For these the Navy must be prepared.