The present global war, embracing a number of far-flung battlefronts, and involving millions of men in the field, has produced many notable events. By the very manner in which we were attacked, much of our most intense fighting has taken place in the Pacific. Pearl Harbor was a disaster which temporarily stunned the American nation and then caused an opposite reaction in that the United States plunged determinedly into the war effort with but one purpose in mind—a final and decisive victory. Bataan and Corregidor represented the courage and tenacity of embattled Americans in the face of overwhelming odds. At Midway and Coral Sea, the resurging naval strength of the United States checked and hurled back the Japanese who were bidding for additional conquests. The struggle for the Solomons, resulting in warmly contested land, sea, and air battles, saw the enemy fail in the attempt to dislodge the victorious Americans from the territory and surrounding waters dominated by them.
The conflict with Japan has been spread out over one of the most expansive theaters of war in the history of naval combat, and the United States Navy has been called upon to perform herculean tasks. Many outstanding performances have been turned in by our men at sea, but for sheer bravery, no action by the naval forces of the United Nations takes precedence over the Battle of the Java Sea, February 27 to March 1, 1942. A recapitulation of this important battle, and the events which formed its immediate background, constitutes a tribute to the difficulties mastered by us in the past and a grim reminder of the serious tasks still lying ahead.
Earlier Japanese successes in the Pacific made possible the enemy’s conquest of Java. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Thailand submitted peaceably, Hongkong fell following a brief siege, and British-controlled Sarawak was quickly overrun. The British retreated in Burma and MacArthur, in an outstanding execution of defensive strategy, fought a gallant but losing battle in the Philippines. More Japanese victories were in the offing. Celebes, a key point in the Dutch East Indies, was invaded on January 12, and New Britain, a vital outpost of Australia, suffered a similar fate less than two weeks later. The complete conquest of Malaya, which was achieved by the end of January, was separated by a week from the Japanese occupation of Amboina, a secondary but strategic naval base belonging to the Dutch. These dark days were climaxed by the capitulation of the great fortress of Singapore on February 15, a high-water mark for the surprisingly effective offensive of the Japanese Empire against formidable opposition.
The fall of Singapore signalized additional thrusts by the Japanese into the territories owned by the United Nations. A symbolic gesture of Japan’s unfolding strategy was the seizure of the tiny Anambas Islands, located between Malaya and Borneo in the South China Sea. These rocky isles, of little military importance in themselves, were probably seized by the Japanese in order to safeguard their sea lanes from the north to Singapore and the upper portions of the East Indian Archipelago. One day before the British troops defending Singapore surrendered unconditionally, the Asiatic enemy effected a landing on the adjoining island of Sumatra, one of the links in the Great Sundas of the Dutch East Indies. Sumatra, 1,000 miles long, 260 miles wide, and populated by 7,000,000 inhabitants, is only 50 miles from Singapore at its nearest point. Simultaneously with the capitulation of the British base, the Netherlands Government announced that Japanese parachute troops had landed in southern Sumatra at Palembang, which is only 270 miles from Batavia, the capital of the Dutch East Indies. After seizing the airdrome and other strategic places in the Palembang area, the Japanese struck to the west and south. By capturing the railroad across the lower end of the long island, they cut off the troops which the Dutch had maintained in central Sumatra to cope with an invasion from Malaya, via the Strait of Malacca.
Entrenched in Sumatra, the Japanese were now athwart the water route from Singapore to Batavia. Moreover, from the standpoint of the invaders, the control of Palembang had additional significance. It isolated the United Nations from their main supply of oil in the Southwest Pacific, which was located in that region, and enabled the Japanese Navy to raid more effectively our supply lines to China, Suez, and the Persian Gulf. Sumatra, too, provided its conquerors with an overland approach to Java, their ultimate objective in the Dutch East Indies. Java, inhabited by 45,000,000 natives, is the most densely populated land mass in the world. Endowed with an abundant natural wealth, it made a rich prize for a predatory nation. Its chief products were rice, rubber, tobacco, sugar, kapok, some oil, and fruits. For 300 years it was the main center of Netherlands colonization and the most highly developed of the East Indies, with populous modem cities, an extensive highway and railway system, hydro-electric power plants, and the beginning of an industrial establishment.
Java’s importance in the Pacific war was clearly recognized by the military strategists of the United Nations. If the valuable colony remained in friendly hands, it was felt that the United Nations would always have the opportunity to regain the initiative in the Southwest Pacific. On the other hand, if the Dutch citadel fell, we and our allies would not only have difficulty in re-winning a foothold in Malaysia, but the defense of Australia might become impossible as well. The occupation of Java would assure Japan’s control of the four main straits through the Dutch East Indies, namely, Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Torres. The domination of them, in turn, would contribute to the effectiveness of an attack by the aggressors against such remote points as the Fiji Islands and New Caledonia, both having become key places in the supply route from the United States to Australia. Java also provided the United Nations with their last source of readily available fuel in East Asia, and this fuel was essential to any future offensive operations against the Japanese. Although the Java oil did not compare in quality with that of Sumatra, it could have been used, and if it fell into the hands of the enemy, a serious supply problem would make its appearance, compelling the United Nations to transport fuel across the Indian Ocean or to bring it some 12,000 miles by way of the Pacific. Besides the much-needed oil, the loss of Java would work even greater hardships, for the rich island exported large quantities of other strategic materials which were badly needed by the United States and her allies in the conduct of the war effort.
No one better understood the importance of warding off the Japanese attack against Java than the Dutch themselves. Eighty per cent of the armed forces of the Netherlands East Indies and a similar proportion of military equipment were concentrated there. Equally appreciative of the value of Java, the United States, Australia, and other nations associated with them rushed reinforcements to the threatened insular territory. This attempt to bolster the Dutch defenses was a race against time, for the prongs of the great Japanese pincers movement through Malaya and the outer Indies was rapidly closing in on the heart of the Netherlands colonial domain. While consolidating their position in southern Sumatra, the Japanese made bombing attacks against the Lesser Sundas, a string of islands east of Java in the direction of Australia, which include Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Sumba, and Timor. Three days afterward, they landed on Timor, one half of which was owned by Portugal, and the other half by the Netherlands. A small garrison of Australian soldiers in the Dutch portion put up a spirited but futile resistance, and Japan’s occupation of the island helped to complete the isolation of Java from Australia and other Allied bases.
Capturing Telok Betong to the south of Palembang, the Japanese were poised for a thrust across the narrow Strait of Sunda to the northern tip of Java. As a prelude to the subsequent invasion of the rich insular territory, the Japanese initiated heavy aerial bombardments against Batavia and other important points. On February 21, the Japanese sent troops ashore on the small island of Bali, known the world over for its beauty and hospitality. This flanked the Dutch and Allied forces from the east, for Bali is separated from the southern end of Java by little more than a mile of water. At this time, an event occurred which indicated that the United States Navy had been assigned a responsible role in the defense of the Dutch colonial possession. The Navy Department at Washington announced that six American destroyers accompanied by Netherlands warships engaged Japanese naval forces near Bali and sank several enemy destroyers. The battle actually consisted of two separate contests, the first off the southeastern shore of Bali, and the second, in Lombok Strait between Bali and the island of Lombok. Hurling themselves recklessly at the numerically superior enemy, the American destroyers suffered only slight damage in the action.
As Japan expanded her control over the Southwest Pacific, that, nation’s Navy was realizing an ambition of long standing. For many years, extremists among the Japanese naval officers had advocated the establishment of a great insular empire in the southern region of penetration. When the Japanese launched their surprise attack, initially in Malaya and the Philippines, and then throughout the entire surrounding area, the brunt of the campaign was borne by the Japanese Navy, which dominated the extended amphibious operations. Enjoying an overwhelming preponderance of surface craft and aerial support, the Japanese went ahead virtually unchallenged, forcing the British and American naval forces in East Asia to fall back upon Java where one desperate stand was to be made with the Dutch.
Much of the original strategy for a defense of Java was based on the premise that Singapore would be able to hold out indefinitely against an attacking foe, but with the fall of that stronghold and the neutralization of American strength in the Philippines, the problem became more complex. The Dutch were forced to realize that they would have to depend largely upon their own resources for the security of the East Indies. Moreover, the naval resources at the disposal of the United Nations in the Southwest Pacific were limited. At Hongkong, the British lost a number of small naval craft and auxiliaries. Singapore witnessed the sinking of the two capital ships which they possessed in East Asia, the battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse. The British Navy was spread thin over vast expanses of ocean, and this fact plus the great distance between the British Isles and the Far East made immediate reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific impossible. Nevertheless, the remaining British warships in that area and several units of the Australian Navy took up positions in the Sea of Java.
The United States was in a somewhat similar predicament. Pearl Harbor had struck a heavy blow at the available offensive power of the United States Pacific Fleet, particularly with reference to capital ships. For its contribution to the defense of Java, the United States Navy relied mainly upon the remaining seaworthy units of our Far Eastern Fleet. On December 10, but three days after the outbreak of the war, the Japanese destroyed the American naval base at Cavite in a single bombing attack from the air. Faced with this sudden turn of events, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, senior officer of the United States Navy in the Philippine theater of war, ordered the Far Eastern Fleet, which was in reality little more than a squadron, to rendezvous in the Dutch East Indies. In its entirety, this force was hardly large enough to challenge the enemy in a pitched battle. Several months before the war began, it consisted of the cruisers Houston and Marblehead, 13 aged destroyers, about 18 submarines, 2 mine layers, the aircraft tender Langley with two squadrons of patrol planes, the small aircraft tender Heron, 3 patrol vessels, and 2 auxiliaries. Although the Far Eastern Fleet probably received some reinforcements prior to December 7, 1941, it was designed primarily to harass and to hinder the progress of the enemy.
By the time that the approaching storm neared Java, Vice Admiral William A. Glassford, Jr., had succeeded Hart as chief of the Far Eastern Fleet, and all of the Allied naval forces concentrated in the Sea of Java were placed under the direct command of the Dutch Vice Admiral, C. E. L. Helfrich. Despite the trying ordeal ahead, the United Nations intended to resist the Japanese enveloping movement with every means of defense at their disposal. The chief purpose of their hastily assembled naval forces was to inflict as much damage as possible upon an invading armada in 519 order to blunt the enemy’s striking power before it reached the Java mainland. Helfrich made his headquarters at Surabaya, former capital, now the second city of Java and the Netherlands East Indies. Surabaya, the remaining naval base of the United Nations in the Southwest Pacific, and located only 140 miles from enemy- occupied Bali, was already menaced by the flanking tactics of the Japanese.
With a population of 350,000 and built on yellow mud flats about 425 miles from Batavia, Surabaya, like Suez and Singapore, was the home of many races, including Chinese, Arabs, Indonesians, and Europeans. There the Dutch had worked hard to develop a first-class naval station, with shipyards for the construction of light warships and facilities for the servicing of a considerable fleet. Extensive fuel depots and supply centers were constructed near by. Surabaya was essential to the defense of Java, for once its use was denied to the United Nations, the position of the Allied naval forces in the adjacent waters would become untenable. The Japanese realized this fact, and early during the invasion of the Dutch East Indies, they heavily bombed the vital point.
After mustering their strength at captured bases in the north, the Japanese soon struck directly at Java. The first indication of a huge invasion thrust at the strategic island, accompanied by the beginning of a three-day naval battle in the Sea of Java, came from a Batavia news dispatch dated February 28, which stated, “A thunderous naval engagement between United Nations and Japanese warships broke out in full fury in the Java Sea last night and presumably raged on today in what may be the first major clash of an attempted Japanese invasion of Java, the last United Nations bastion in the Netherlands Indies.” A brief announcement by the Dutch Government said only that the opposing naval forces had come to grips during the night in the Sea of Java and that “no details are yet known.’’ The Japanese radio claimed sweeping successes, but Washington sources had little to say. It was pointed out, however, that the Sea of Java, located south of Borneo and north of Java, would be the waters through which a Japanese invasion fleet could be expected to move against the Dutch possession.
A short time later, the Navy Department at Washington issued a communiqué, confirming the battle with the Japanese: Far East: On Feb. 27 a major action occurred in which combined Dutch, British, Australian and United States naval forces engaged a much larger enemy force of combatant vessels covering forty transports attempting a landing on the north coast of Java.
From fragmentary reports received in the Navy Department, American naval forces participating in this action consisted of one heavy cruiser and five destroyers. A landing on Java by the enemy was not effected.
The Japanese heavy cruiser Mogami and three enemy destroyers were put out of action in the attempt. When last seen, transports were retiring to the northward.
None of our vessels suffered heavy damage in the initial phase of this battle for Java, and our forces are still intact despite the overwhelming superiority in numbers of the enemy naval forces.
Further action can be expected in this area.
A companion announcement by the Netherlands East Indies Navy repeated news of the engagement, and asserted further, “In the course of the fighting, which continued after darkness had fallen, losses were sustained on both sides.” Several hours following the issuance of these communiques, word came from Batavia that the enemy returned to the attack and managed to reach land at several points in Java. The Japanese invasion forces, running a gauntlet of United Nations warships and planes, put troops ashore in the northwestern part of Bantam Province, opposite Sumatra, and in the Indramayu Bay area, which was only 60 miles northeast of Bandung, headquarters of the Netherlands East Indies Army.
On March 2, the picture was clarified somewhat when it was learned that the initial phase of the Battle of the Java Sea had been precipitated by the approach of 40 Japanese transports moving from the north in the wake of 20 escorting warships. A United Nations squadron set out, probably from the vicinity of Surabaya, with orders to attack at all costs. The main engagement took place west of Bawean Island, after which the enemy temporarily retired, regrouped his forces, and made a second, and this time successful, sortie through the units of the defending squadron which were still in the battle line. Scattered reports indicated that neither side had escaped unscathed. The Dutch admitted the destruction of one destroyer and two cruisers, the latter sinking from torpedo hits in night fighting. They in turn claimed that a heavy Japanese cruiser was sunk, another badly damaged, and a third set afire. Imperial Headquarters at Tokyo asserted that 5 cruisers, including one of the United States Navy, and 6 destroyers of the United Nations were sunk during two different actions in the Sea of Java. The Japanese additionally proclaimed that the United Nations fleet was “virtually annihilated,” with their naval forces “engaged in mopping up remnants.”
The serious character of the struggle for Java was recognized everywhere. A typical comment was that expressed in an editorial of the New York Times,
Unless the enemy is expelled from Java, Japan will have gained an immense treasure and a completely protected flank in the Indian Ocean. The China Seas will be hers without dispute, the Philippines will be lost and Australia will be exposed to dire peril by concentrated attack from the whole Dutch archipelago.
Although fierce fighting continued on Java, subsequent communiques of the United Nations did not list further combat between the opposing naval forces. A war bulletin from Batavia on March 2 stated, “In the present phase of the battle against the Japanese troops no particulars can be given about the development of the action.” Twenty-four hours later, the Dutch authorities referred to the approach of a new invasion flotilla, but there was no mention of the possibility that it had been engaged by the defending fleet. Another brief interval passed, and it was announced that Admiral Helfrich had relinquished the command of the Allied naval forces in the Southwest Pacific so that he could go upon a special mission for the Dutch Government. The Japanese, despite desperate resistance on the mainland, quickly overran Java, capturing both Batavia and Surabaya without a prolonged struggle.
For obvious reasons dictated by the conditions of war, several weeks elapsed before the United Nations published a detailed account of the Battle of Java Sea. One indication of the tragic nature of the encounter was the revelation by Prime Minister John Curtin of Australia on March 13 that two Australian warships, the 6,980-ton cruiser Perth and the 1,060-ton sloop Yarra, were overdue on their return from Java and must be considered lost. On March 14, a joint United States-British communiqué described more completely what had occurred in the Java Sea action. This battle, memorable for its tragedy, its grim reality, the heroism and unflinching sense of duty exhibited by the Allied naval personnel against an overwhelmingly superior enemy, will be given an honored place in the annals of naval warfare:
Far East: Joint British Admiralty and United States Navy Department communiqué:
Although full information is not yet available, it is now possible to give some account of events in the Java Sea on February 28 and subsequent days during the Japanese invasion of Java.
On the afternoon of Friday, February 27, an Allied force consisting of H.M.A.S. Perth, H.M.S. Exeter, the U.S.S. Houston and Dutch cruisers De Ruyter and Java were at sea north of Surabaya. The Allied cruisers were accompanied by a group of British, Dutch and United States destroyers.
This force was under the sea command of Rear Admiral Deoorman of the Dutch Navy, whose flag was flying in the De Ruyter. The whole naval force in the area was under the strategic control of Vice Admiral Helfrich of the Royal Netherlands Navy.
At 4:14 p.m. on February 27 this Allied force made contact with a Japanese force about half way between Bawean Island and Surabaya. The Japanese force consisted of at least nine cruisers, of which two were of the Nati class of 10,000 tons armed with ten 8-inch guns. The Japanese cruisers had with them two flotillas of destroyers.
Action was joined at extreme range. Almost at once one of the Japanese destroyer flotillas launched an attack, but this attack was driven off by the fire of the Allied cruisers, and one of the enemy destroyers was seen to be hit by shells from H.M.A.S. Perth. Soon afterward the other Japanese destroyer flotilla delivered a torpedo attack.
Three destroyers were ordered to counterattack the Japanese destroyers who were retiring under cover of a smoke screen. Very little information is available about the result of this counterattack. H.M.S. Jupiter reported seeing only two enemy destroyers, both of which were engaged with gunfire. H.M.S. Electra was not seen after she had disappeared into the smoke screen and it is presumed that she was sunk.
As soon as the Allied cruisers, including the Houston, but without the Exeter, which was unable to keep up, drew clear of the smoke they again engaged the enemy, this time at shorter range. Less than half an hour later the enemy cruisers turned away under cover of a smoke screen. It was seen that one of the enemy’s heavy 8-inch cruisers had been hit aft and was burning fiercely.
Admiral Deoorman led his force about and chased the enemy to the northeastward, but he failed to regain touch with the enemy in the fading light. After nightfall the Allied cruisers sighted four enemy ships to westward and engaged them, but without definite knowledge of the results.
Admiral Deoorman attempted to work around these enemy ships in order to locate the convoy, which was expected to the northward. This was found to be impossible owing to the high speed of the enemy, and Admiral Deoorman then turned his force to southward to approach the coast of Java, intending to sweep to the westward along the coast in an attempt to intercept the Japanese invasion convoys.
Half an hour after this Allied force had turned to westward along the Java coast H.M.S. Jupiter was disabled by an underwater explosion. She sank four hours later. H.M.S. Jupiter was not far from the mainland of Java and a number of survivors have already reached Australia. A United States submarine assisted in the rescue of fifty-three survivors. At 11:30 p.m., when the remaining Allied cruisers were about twelve miles north of Pembang two enemy cruisers were sighted between our ships and the coast. Our ships at once engaged and a number of hits were secured on the enemy.
The DeRuyter was hit by one shell. Afterward the DeRuyter made a large change of course, presumably in order to avoid torpedoes fired by the enemy. The other Allied cruisers were following the DeRuyter when underwater explosions occurred simultaneously in the cruisers DeRuyter and Java. Both these Dutch cruisers blew up and sank at once.
It is impossible to estimate with accuracy the damage inflicted upon the enemy during these actions of February 27. Observers in the Perth consider that one Japanese 8-inch gun cruiser was sunk, a second 8-inch cruiser damaged and a destroyer sunk. It has also been reported that a cruiser of the Mogami class was set on fire and three destroyers seriously damaged and left on fire or sinking.
H.M.A.S. Perth and U.S.S. Houston, which had received some damage in this action, reached Tanjong Priok at seven o’clock the morning of Saturday, February 28. Five United States destroyers reached Surabaya after the action.
With the enemy in command of sea and air north of Java in overwhelming force the Allied command was faced with the problem of extricating the remaining Allied ships from a dangerous situation. The way to Australia was barred by the 600-mile-long island of Java with the straits at either end of it under enemy control.
After dark on February 28 H.M.A.S. Perth and U.S.S. Houston left Tanjong Priok with the intention of passing through Sunda Strait during dark hours. During the night an enemy report from H.M.A.S. Perth was received which indicated that she and U.S.S. Houston had come into contact with a force of Japanese ships off St. Nicholas Point at about 11:30 p.m. Nothing, however, has been heard from H.M.A.S. Perth or the U.S.S. Houston since that time. The next of kin of the U.S.S. Houston are being informed.
The same night the Exeter, which was capable of only half speed, left Surabaya accompanied by M.S. Encounter and the United States destroyer Pope. On the forenoon of Sunday, March the Exeter reported that she had sighted three enemy cruisers steering toward her. No further word has been received from the Exeter, Encounter, or the U.S.S. Pope. The next of kin of the Pope are being informed accordingly.
The Dutch destroyer Evertsen encountered two Japanese cruisers in Sunda Strait. She was damaged and was beached.
The destroyer H.M.S. Stronghold and sloop H.M.A.S. Yarra are also missing and presumably lost. It has not been possible to form any accurate estimate of damage inflicted on the enemy by these ships during these actions.
There is nothing to report from other areas.1
A careful examination of this communique leaves one with admiration for the gallant and heart-rending fashion in which the Allied naval forces carried out their mission against the Japanese. For example, there was the incident during the first portion of the battle when Admiral Deoorman, operational commander of the defending fleet, ordered three destroyers to attack a larger number of enemy warships which were retiring under cover of a smoke screen. This maneuver, effected unwaveringly by the trio of Allied vessels with decks cleared for action, caused the loss of the British destroyer Electra which did not reappear after she charged into the smoke screen. Equally dramatic was the end of the two Dutch cruisers, Java and DeRuyter, which “blew up and sank at once” as the result of “underwater explosions.” There was the ill-fated dash of the Australian cruiser Perth and the American cruiser Houston, the latter damaged, which, after reaching a Dutch port, attempted to pass through the Strait of Sunda during the night of February 28 in order to escape the Japanese enveloping movement. They encountered a force of enemy warships and were never heard from again. No less tragic was the experience of the British cruiser Exeter, damaged and capable of only half speed, which was accompanied by the British destroyer Encounter and the United States destroyer Pope. These three vessels also made a dash for freedom on the night of February 28. The following morning, they sighted a group of enemy cruisers in the distance. “No further word” was received from the Allied warships.
1 New York Times, March 15, 1942.
The losses suffered by the United Nations in the Battle of the Java Sea, larger than had been expected, made impossible any co-ordinated naval defense of Java subsequent to March 1. With two cruisers and two destroyers sunk or beached, the Dutch were particularly hard hit by the outcome of the action. The 9,050-ton Houston, the first cruiser lost by the United States in the war, equipped with nine 8-inch guns and carrying four planes launched from a pair of catapults, was well known to the American public because she had been one of President Roosevelt’s favorite naval vessels. Four trips totaling 25,445 miles were taken aboard her by the Chief Executive. The other American warship lost, the destroyer Pope, was an old craft of the four-stack “flush-deck” type completed in 1920. She was armed with four 4-inch guns and 12 torpedo tubes. The complements of both vessels numbered about 930 men altogether.
Perhaps the most famous warship lost by the United Nations in the Battle of the Java Sea was the British heavy cruiser Exeter of 8,390 tons. Completed in 1931, this ship played an outstanding part in the widely publicized naval engagement between three British cruisers and the German pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee off the mouth of the River Plate in December, 1940. She was badly damaged by her more formidable opponent, but after limping to a friendly base in the Falkland Islands, she was able to make temporary repairs, and then steamed home to the British Isles and was greeted with great acclaim. The sinking of the Exeter, along with three British destroyers, marked a serious blow to Britain’s naval force in the Pacific. Furthermore, the losses of the Empire, as a whole, were even greater, for the destruction of the Perth and the Yarra was felt keenly by the small Australian Navy. The Perth, in particular, had captured the imagination of the Australian People with her many exploits in the war. Her most notable achievement came in the Battle of Matapan in which a large Italian naval force was decimated and put to rout. She also saw service in operations off Libya, and assisted in the evacuation of Greece and Crete, where she suffered damage and casualties from heavy and prolonged bombing. The Yarra, whose only armament consisted of three 4-inch guns, likewise had become a veteran of overseas operations.
However tragic the losses of the United Nations in the Battle of the Java Sea may seem, the Allied naval forces had done what they could to stem the advance of the enemy. The Japanese themselves undoubtedly suffered severely in the action. Destroyers and submarines attached to the United States Far Eastern Fleet made their way to safety and continued the fight against the enemy. Looking to the future, when Japanese power has been swept from the seas, a study of the Battle of Java Sea will lend weight to the execution of certain realistic measures by the American Government in the Western Pacific. The struggle for Java indicated the importance of providing sufficiently large numbers of planes to co-operate with naval forces defending an insular territory. It also pointed to the indispensability of naval bases, without which a large fleet can neither operate nor exist in a theater of combat. Such fundamental problems of naval strategy cannot be overlooked by those who seek to bring peace and security to East Asia during the period of post-war reconstruction and thereafter.
In passing, it probably would not be inappropriate to quote the British Admiral, Sir William James, Chief of the Portsmouth Naval Base, who referred to the Battle of the Java Sea on March 14, 1942:
It was the most tremendous battle ever to take place against great odds. Always there are too few ships and too few of everything.
The Dutch, British and American sailors fought to the last gun against impossible odds.
Once we had to choose between guns and butter—we chose butter, but our enemies chose guns. Today we have to choose between ships and the shipwreck of everything we love.