UNITED STATES AND THE WAR
Hull on War Aims.—On July 23 Secretary of State Cordell Hull delivered over the radio an address dealing chiefly with American war aims and with American policy in the post-war world. Notable in his speech was his statement that “professions of neutrality in the face of a worldwide movement to subjugate all nations and all peoples are as absurd and suicidal as are such professions on the part of a citizen of a peaceful community attacked by a band of confessed outlaws.” Notable also, in view of the attitude of India, was his statement that this nation would use “the full measure of its influence to support attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy and ready for it.” Among other measures advocated were the following:
(1) Immediate relief for distressed peoples when fighting ends; (2) a “cooling-off period” after the war, during which the United Nations must continue in close co-operation; (3) “an international agency which can, by force if necessary, keep the peace among nations in the future”; (4) “adjustment of national armaments in such a manner that the rule of law cannot be successfully challenged and that the burden of armaments may be reduced”; (5) establishment of an international court of justice; (6) "surveillance over aggressor nations until such time as the latter demonstrate their willingness and ability to live at peace”; (7) reduction of excessive trade barriers and in general a more equitable distribution of the world’s resources.
Finland Consulates Closed.—Without formally breaking off relations with Finland, the State Department in Washington in July closed all its consular offices in Finland and in a note delivered at Helsinki on July 16 requested the government of Finland to close all its consular activities in the United States and other American possessions by August 1. As a matter of fact American consular operations in Finland had already been much restricted by action of the Finnish government and the State Department took this final step to end what it described as “an untenable situation.” It is well understood that the Soviet Republic has pressed the United States for a complete rupture with Finland and has expressed concern over Finnish military operations threatening Russia’s northern communications with the sea. According to statements of Field Marshal Mannerheim, Finland includes in its war aims the acquisition of the border province of Karelia, now held by Russia and regarded as essential to the defense of Leningrad.
Return of Envoys.—At the close of July, the port of Lourenco Marques in Portuguese East Africa was the scene of a transfer of Japanese diplomats and nationals, sent home from the United States, and of 1,510 Americans released from Japan and occupied China. It was stated that at the time of the exchange of passengers between the Japanese liner Asama Maru and the Swedish liner Grisholm, Ambassador Joseph C. Grew declined informal proposals for a conference with Admiral Nomura, the returning Japanese envoy. Reports made by the New York Times correspondent, Otto Tolischus, revealed more fully the manner in which Japan was pushed into the war by the violent measures of military extremists. According to his report,
Japan was plunged into the war because a virtual revolt of military extremists and Nazified ultranationalist organizations had swept out civilian control by the threat of mass assassinations of the third Konoye Cabinet and even resorted to veiled hints that if the Emperor opposed the war he would be immured at Kyoto as the spiritual head of the nation, as were the emperors before the Meiji restoration.
However grave the situation appeared before the Pearl Harbor raid, the actual outbreak of hostilities took the entire Japanese nation by surprise and caused a shock that was tempered only by the initial Japanese victories.
Articles of Naval Interest.—The leading article in the American quarterly Foreign Affairs for July is a survey by Hanson Baldwin on “America at War,” concerned with both military and naval operations through March, April, and May. Since December 7, as Baldwin puts it, “the strategic situation of the United Nations has steady deteriorated,” though Japan received a definite check in the Coral Sea action, which was the only naval action to that date which had “resulted in a clear-cut American victory.” Other articles of naval and military interest include an excellent study of “Policy and Strategy in the War in Russia” (anonymous), an article on “South American Perplexities” by former Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando de los Rios, an account of “Strategic Communications in the Middle East” by Grayson Kirk, and an article on “Newfoundland in North Atlantic Strategy” by A. R. M. Lower. The last named article concludes as follows:
From Montreal to St. John’s by the St. Lawrence is about 1,050 miles; from New York to St. John’s by the Atlantic is about the same. The two routes and their lengths emphasize Newfoundland’s strategic position: it lies across the entrance to the St. Lawrence, it flanks northern oceanic routes from the United States, and it advances the outposts of North America 1,000 miles eastward. At present this is clear gain. American bombers, flying the Atlantic can refuel en route in Newfoundland. Bases on the island make it possible to protect convoys for almost a third of their journey to England and for one-half of that to Iceland.
Newfoundland thus provides all the advantages of a secure advanced base. But the island would be just as useful to the enemy if ever he should be able to capture it. He then could close the St. Lawrence completely. His planes could harass the shipping leaving every Atlantic port as far west as New York. His submarines, based in Newfoundland, could threaten the whole Atlantic coast.
This rocky northern island, then, which lies across the seaways to North America like a great ship moored in a strategic waterway, must be held safe at all costs. As long as the ship is staunch and the crew alert no strange craft can pass it by. If it were captured, those who did so could blockade Canada and a large part of one coast of the United States. The island therefore should be prepared for defense as a ship is prepared, with adequate internal communications, provisions for a long voyage, and one captain. Newfoundland and its defenses must be stripped for action, ready to hit back hard if attacked.
LATIN AMERICA
Argentine Foreign Policy.—Following his succession to full control in Argentina President Ramon S. Castillo in a speech on July 11 made it abundantly evident that he would maintain Argentina’s neutral position and would tolerate no agitation of “war mongers” for concerted action with the 19 other American republics who have broken relations with the Axis. This meant a continuation also of the state of siege which has put a curb on the press and on political activities. From the Argentine policy, Germany and Italy may continue to profit by employing their diplomatic and consular offices in Argentina as centers for propaganda and espionage throughout Latin America. Speaking later in July in a secret session of the Chamber of Deputies, Foreign Minister Guinazu was said to have declared that the expansion of United States military, economic, and political strength in South America constituted in his view a greater menace than the possibilities of German victory in the war. He resented also the failure of the Argentine military mission to purchase arms in the United States, since sales, he said, were made contingent on the requirement that Argentina protect her shipping in the South Atlantic. On August 1, the American writer Waldo Frank was declared persona non grata in Argentina because in a parting message he had contrasted the high moral principles of the founders of Argentina with the “wavering timidity” of its policy today.
Explaining the present Argentine policy in an article in Foreign Affairs for July, Senor Fernando de los Rios, former Spanish Foreign Minister, declared the government’s neutral attitude was contrary to popular feeling, and was due not to the influence of German and Italian elements in the population, and not primarily to the military risks involved in an opposite course, but rather to causes he listed as follows:
(1) It is manifestly sympathetic to military régimes as such.
(2) It felt that, in choosing its present attitude, it was following the historic policy of Argentina —namely, to oppose the United States and to assume the leadership of the Hispanic-American countries.
(3) It was influenced by a fear which exists, openly or latently, in all the countries of Ibero-America. This is the fear which asks: “After the war, will the loans, credits, purchases and investments, obtainable today only in the United States, be converted into bonds of political subjugation?” In other words, will the Good Neighbor Policy last? This was, perhaps the biggest factor in the attitude of the Argentine Government.
Meantime leadership in Hispanic-America, according to Senor de los Rios, has passed to Mexico, Colombia, and Chile, and “the Argentine people are conscious of their psychological isolation.”
American League Advocated.—During his official visit to Washington in July, President Alfonso Lopez of Colombia in a press interview warmly advocated the development of present inter-American relationships into a Pan-American League of Nations. Such a regional league, he believed, would bring about regular meetings of delegates of the various states, and closer co-ordination of policies for mutual benefit. He indicated that Colombia was considering a declaration of war on the Axis nations, and that his conferences in Washington and New York dealt not only with trade exchanges but also with war problems. In a telegram on President Lopez’s departure, Secretary Hull spoke of his leadership as “indispensable in reaching the degree of inter-American solidarity which now characterizes the relations between the American countries.”
Pacts with Brazil.—In July the United States signed agreements with Brazil for the purchase over a four-year period of six important Brazilian exports, including barbassu oil and nuts, castor beans and oil, cotton lintels and fiber, and ipecac. Payments by the United States will amount to’ about $32,000,000 in the first year. Agreements pending signature cover also coffee and cocao exports and arrangements for pooling of Brazilian ships with those of the United States in South American trade.
BRITAIN AND THE WAR
French Warships at Alexandria.— At the height of Marshal Rommel’s threat to Egypt a new rift in Vichy French relations with the United Nations arose over the possible disposition of the French naval vessels held in British custody at Alexandria. It was held certain that, if Egypt fell, the British would sink the ships or take them through the Suez rather than allow them to get into the hands of France or the Axis.
In this situation the United States as intermediary proposed that the French squadron be placed in the custody of the United States for the duration of the war, either in an American port or with the French ships now at Martinique. The reply of M. Laval, made public on July 16, was a flat rejection of the American proposal. Furthermore, the United States was warned against a second destruction such as occurred at Mers-el-Kebir (Oran) and was told that by disregarding the French right to take over the vessels, President Roosevelt assumed “a responsibility the gravity of which the French Government again desires to stress.” The Vichy orders to Admiral Godroy were under no circumstances to follow the British retreat. He was to sail for a French port, or if not allowed to do so, to remain at Alexandria. There was no guarantee, however, that, even if Italy and Germany observed their armistice pledges not to use the French Navy, the Vichy government might not itself employ its naval forces against France’s former allies.
The ships at Alexandria include the 23,000-ton Lorraine, the 10,000-ton cruisers Suffren, Tourville, and Duquesne, the 7,000-ton cruiser Duguay-Trouin, and the destroyers Basque, Fortuna, and Forbin. All have been partly dismantled.
Canadian Overseas Service.—Late in July the Canadian Parliament finally passed the new draft act, giving the government power to draft men for overseas service. The adoption of the bill was accompanied by Premier Mackenzie King’s pledge that the government would not use its new power unless necessary, and by a pledge from the Quebec leader P. J. A. Carden that his province would loyally observe the law after its adoption. Premier Mackenzie King declared that while Canada still had sufficient volunteers for service outside the country, the nation must face the fact that if the enemy were not defeated elsewhere, the last phase of the war would in all probability be fought out on Canadian soil.
Threats from India.—At a meeting of Mohandas Gandhi with the All-India Congress Working Committee in mid-July, a resolution was adopted calling for immediate withdrawal of British rule from India and threatening as an alternative “purely non-violent” measures of mass civil disobedience. Only on definite assurance of immediate freedom would the Indian leaders give approval to the presence of United Nations forces in India and to co-operation with then. It was expected that the resolution would be approved by the full committee at its meeting in the second week of August.
In the face of these threats, the British would go no further than the Cripps proposals for increased self-rule made last spring. It was pointed out that Mr. Gandhi did not speak for large sections of Indian opinion, nor for all members of his own party. It was pointed out further that, before the Committee resolution had been toned down by the influence of Pandit Nehru, it had suggested that the first step following freedom would be direct negotiations with the Japanese.
CONTINENTAL EUROPE
Warning to Axis Sought.—At the close of July the American State Department received a collective note from nine European governments in exile requesting that Germany and her allies be given a last warning against the “barbaric and inhuman cruelties” committed daily in the occupied regions. The note emanated from the Belgian, Norwegian, Czechoslovakian, Greek, Luxembourg, and Polish governments and the French National Committee in London. In a separate memorandum many of the more flagrant offenses were enumerated.
New Turkish Premier.—Following the death of Dr. Refik Saydam on July 7, President Inonu two days later named Foreign Minister Sukru Saracoglu to succeed him as Turkish Prime Minister. Saracoglu has conducted Turkish foreign policy since 1938 and has been chiefly responsible for Turkey’s neutral course in the war, which is likely to continue in the future unless the United Nations suffer decisive reverses in the Near East. On August 3 it was announced that Germany had offered the Turkish military mission in Berlin an immediate shipment of latest type Messerschmidt and Junker-88 planes, but with the condition attached that the aircraft be serviced in Turkey by a force of Nazi technicians. The Turks wanted the planes but objected to the experts. According to an article on “German Preparations in the Middle East,” by C. L. Sulzberger, in the July Foreign Affairs, the Oriental Department of the German Embassy at Ankara has been completely reorganized, with sections for each Middle Eastern country, and Germanophile refugees from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine have been placed in groups, each under a chosen Gauleiter. German liaison agents are provided with abundant funds for secret activities throughout the Middle East, collecting information and spreading pro-Axis propaganda. The article closes with eight points emphasizing the vital importance of the Middle East in the war on the Axis, as follows:
(1) The only point from which it is feasible to strike at Hitler’s rear.
(2) The seat of control over the Moslem world, ranging from Morocco, on the Atlantic Ocean, to India. The loss of it would probably mean the loss of the sympathies of almost all that world.
(3) A major and increasingly vital supply route to the U.S.S.R. Its loss would relegate the shipment of all Allied material to the vulnerable northern convoy route."
(4) The only functioning supply route to India and China by ship and by the ferry service across central Africa.
(5) The barrier to a fusion of Japanese and German forces. Should it be lost, the Mediterranean would be free to Axis shipping, releasing naval units for use in exterior waters; and eventually raw materials could be sent from East Asia to Europe in exchange for German arms and manufactured goods to Japan.
(6) The only active British lighting front against Germany. Loss of it would confine Britain’s role in Europe to the defense of United Kingdom air and naval bases.
(7) One of the most important United Nations oil centers.
(8) A powerful link in the wide chain about Germany which may some day be lightened to strangle her.
Spain Tied to Axis.—According to a recent article by the French commentator “Pertinax” in the New York Times, the Franco government in Spain is definitely committed to the policy of joining openly with the Axis whenever Egypt and the Suez are brought under Axis control. So long as this is not accomplished, Spain will stick to neutrality and to such advantages as may be gained from economic relations with Britain and the United States. Spain’s chief hope from an Axis victory is an accession of territory in Morocco. The very plausible interpretation of Spanish policy given by the French writer serves further to emphasize the far-reaching importance attached to the British defense in Egypt.