Future Naval Forces

"But the whole naval art has suffered a revolution beyond all previous experience, and it is possible the old practice is no longer a safe guide."—Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.

From May 10, 1940 until July 10, 1940, an infinitesimal two months as compared to the tens of centuries during which man has waged warfare, the established concepts of land warfare were overthrown by the victorious German Army in its conquest of the Low Countries. The unprecedented thrusts of the German land and air forces into Northern France by way of Holland and Belgium clearly demonstrated the success attainable by the thorough development of new weapons of warfare and by the timely co-ordination of their use in the new "streamlined" German Army. Battles involving the employment of millions of men have been conducted in the past but none was terminated so successfully as the battle of 1940, thanks to the efficiency of attack by the novel panzer or armored divisions.

The success of the German Army has undoubtedly greatly influenced the conduct of land warfare and the organization of armies by other nations. The introduction and use of the new armored divisions has altered military concepts of warfare by substituting a mechanized and comprehensive force capable of conducting a war of movement for the old-fashioned army made up of independent forces of arms and formerly resigned to a stationary or trench warfare. Land warfare in turn has had its effect on naval warfare. The tactics, as well as the weapons, employed in the recent invasion of the Lowlands may be expected to have a great influence on the methods of conducting naval warfare since the development of arms and conduct of warfare ashore have their counterpart in naval forces afloat.

The elements of surprise and deception along with that of the application of striking power in attack are applicable to both land and naval warfare. The introduction of new artillery ashore in turn has its influence on the development of batteries afloat. Fire-control systems; methods of communications; armored gun emplacements for the protection of personnel and material; the use of aircraft; mining operations; submarine warfare afloat along with underground tunneling and attack ashore; and logistics all are interwoven in the same fabric of warfare, whether on the land or at sea. Just as the lessons learned from old wars bear their imprint on the conduct of future wars, the tactics employed during the battle of 1940 for the control of the Low Countries and the English Channel can be expected to have a decided influence on the conduct of future warfare and on the organization of units to carry on such warfare. Careful consideration must be given to the most recent results of warfare as well as to the lessons learned from the history of wars of the past as "the unresting progress of mankind causes a continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting."¹

The concept of defensive or attritional warfare adhered to by the allied forces was proved to be inconclusive by the tactics employed by the Germans. The latter made use of a war of movement and the forces organized for such a mode of warfare also demonstrated that the old concept of dependence upon the infantry units as the firing power of land forces was also obsolete in view of the introduction of the newly developed armored divisions. The place of the infantry as the backbone of the army in bearing the brunt of battle was taken over by the Nazi armored divisions which were composed of tank brigades, rifle regiments, battalions of artillery, and supplementary troops; all of the forces being motorized.

Although no decisive major naval engagements have been fought during the present war and no new changes in naval warfare can be effected accordingly, the expected influence of land warfare successes on future naval activities can be anticipated. As the formerly accepted concept of the infantry unit being the nucleus around which all other forces were organized has been relegated to the past, may we also hazard a guess into the future and expect to see the position of the battleship force as the impregnable unit of the fleet give way to an organization which is analogous to the German armored division ashore?

Since its advent at the beginning of the century, the battleship has been considered as the counterpart of the infantry of the army with reference to containing the firing power necessary for success in battle. As far as bearing the brunt in battle was concerned, the similarity between the battleship and infantry unit was probably correct but as far as taking the knocks in the latest European campaign were concerned, it was changed.

The former function of the infantry for initiating thrusts against the opponents was taken over by the new armored division. Perhaps our former analogy was also incorrect regarding the composition of the fighting powers of the infantry regiment and the battleship. The former was a lightly armed unit and generally depended, for protection and support, on separate heavy gun, howitzer, machine gun, grenade thrower, anti-tank, chemical warfare, and anti-aircraft companies. For communications and supplies it also was dependent on signal, intelligence, and supply companies. The battleship on the other hand did not depend on such a varied assortment of units for protection or support as it was both heavily and lightly armed; it had its own anti-aircraft defense; and it was practically self-sufficient in battle as far as communications and supplies were concerned. The battleship depended to some extent upon light forces such as destroyers for spearhead attacks against the opposition. Was the lightly armed and quick moving destroyer then the naval counterpart of the infantry? These light naval craft in turn were dependent for support and protection to some extent upon the heavier units such as cruisers as well as battleships. Although the composition with reference to fighting power was such that no direct similarity existed between the battleship and the infantry regiment, there was such between the latter and the destroyers. In the present war, the operation of the German division has taken over the task of bearing the brunt of an offensive and of initiating thrusts against the enemy.

It is assumed, therefore, that there is no longer any direct analogy between the infantry regiment and the battleship or the destroyer division. A short survey of the composition of a Nazi armored division also shows that there is no direct analogy with reference to composition of fighting forces between it and the battleship. The structure of such a division has no direct counterpart among naval forces and it is of interest to learn just what units would make up such a naval force. If an analogy can be formulated between such an armored division and a similar naval force, it is of interest also to investigate the possibilities of using such a force in naval warfare.

A general view of the composition of a Nazi armored division, as gathered from press accounts since the beginning of the current war, shows that its general composition is:

1. Tank brigade of two regiments
2. Rifle regiment
3. Battalion of motorized artillery
4. Supplementary motorized troops

Although the German air force is a separate organization, in view of the close cooperation demonstrated during the invasion of the Low Countries, it is safe to assume that various aircraft units were assigned for operations to the divisions and these aircraft units should be added to the foregoing composition accordingly. Would a corresponding organization afloat be practical? For the purposes of a preliminary start toward the formation of such an organization let us assume that the tank brigade is represented by cruisers; the rifle regiment's counterpart is taken by destroyers; the battalion of motorized artillery is represented by battleships; the supplementary motorized troops have their place taken by units of the train, mine sweepers, and mine layers, as well as by various other lighter forces; and the air force units, which are considered to operate with the armored division, are similar to the aircraft carriers with their ship-based planes. So far no effort is made to assign the numbers of the various categories of naval craft to make up such a force afloat. Before doing so, the composition of the army organization must be considered further in detail.

As far as the tank brigades are concerned, press reports have varied all the way from 50 to several hundred tanks in each brigade. Such tank brigades are reported to comprise two tank regiments, each of which is made up of two light tank battalions and one heavy tank battalion. A light tank battalion by reason of its apparent impression of mobility appears to have its counterpart in a destroyer division afloat. Is it, therefore, reasonable to start building up the new force afloat by making such a representation? If so, then the tank brigade is represented by two destroyer squadrons. The heavy tank battalion in each of the two regiments, according to press reports, comprises several tanks varying in size from 7 tons to those of 30 tons. The development of the analogy between the land and sea forces is all a matter of conjecture pending further detailed studies on the game board and authentic reports on the land force's composition. For the purpose of creating interest, let it be assumed that each heavy tank battalion's place is taken by a division of light cruisers. So far, then, two destroyer squadrons and two light cruiser divisions make up the preliminary force of the armored division.

The next assignment for consideration is the one to correspond to the rifle regiment or the infantry component of the armored division. In the Nazi setup, a diversion is made from the long accepted premise that fire power is the keynote of an infantry organization. It is on this acceptance that the former analogy be tween the battleship and infantry regiment was based. The modern German organization has changed this concept as fire power now appears to be the keynote of the armored division as a whole. However, to find the naval counterpart of the new all-purpose infantry regiment is the next interesting assumption. The Nazi infantry regiment is reported as comprising an anti-tank company and a reserve battalion along with a heavy weapons company, which in turn has its heavy guns, howitzers, and grenade throwers; all of this conglomerate regiment being under the centralized command of one colonel.

The anti-tank company has about 20 guns, special anti-aircraft machine gun carts, and attached chemical units. These smaller caliber guns again invite the introduction of a destroyer division, this time to represent such an anti-tank company. The composition of the reserve battalion is not described completely in recent press reports but on the assumption that its purpose is one of support or relief for the anti-tank company, the liberty is taken of substituting in its place another destroyer division in the armored division being formed for services afloat. Another destroyer squadron is thereby taken into the organization.

The battalion of heavy weapons has in each of its two companies about a dozen heavy machine guns, several 80-millimeter heavy grenade throwers, and other similar lighter weapons. Fire power here for each company is slightly under that of a destroyer division but as the old adage of making things bigger and better is followed to assure even a slight advantage, another destroyer squadron is introduced for the heavy weapons company. So far for the infantry regiment, the armored division afloat has two destroyer squadrons and no battleships as previously accepted as the infantry regiment's opposite afloat.

The supplementary equipment of each heavy weapons company comprises several 150-millimeter howitzers, lighter cannon, 75-millimeter howitzers, as well as heavy and light grenade throwers, heavy machine guns, and dozens of motorcycle runners. Mention is also made in reports from the European front of 105-millimeter dual-purpose fieldpiece howitzers among the supplementary equipment companies. A flat trajectory is used for field work while a high angle of fire with altered powder charge is reported for howitzer use. Although no such dual-purpose gun is accepted for general use afloat, the caliber closely resembles that as used in light cruisers. For one of the supplementary equipment companies a light cruiser division is therefore introduced and to strike a balancing medium to take care of the larger guns in these companies, one heavy cruiser division is utilized. The new German infantry regiment is now represented by its naval opposite of two destroyer squadrons, one light cruiser division, and one heavy cruiser division.

The next major division of the Nazi panzer division to be considered is the battalion of motorized artillery. If recent news reports are to be accepted, this battalion has 210-millimeter howitzers, 40- centimeter howitzers, and guns of a size heretofore mounted solely on railway carriages. Guns of such a size immediately bring to mind those found on battleships and so here at last a battleship division is introduced, not as the replacement of an infantry unit but for a battalion of heavy artillery in the armored division.

The supplementary motorized troops of the Nazi streamlined armored division are undoubtedly represented, as far as equipment and services are concerned, in the repair, communication, and supply facilities already contained in the naval units designated. As they are what their name implies, supplementary to the initially offensive units, it is assumed that the vessels of the train, mine-laying, and mine-sweeping forces are representative of these supplementary troops. The latter do not take part in the initial spearhead thrusts of the armored division and so their opposites as represented by the supplementary naval units mentioned are not to be included in the offensive naval armored division.

As for aircraft required for the support of and services to the armored division afloat, it is safe to assume that a minimum requirement is one aircraft carrier. In view of the successful varied operations of aircraft during the recent German campaign and the great use to which they were put for attack, bombing, fire control, troop transportation, and reconnaissance, this minimum requirement should be raised by the introduction of two carriers. Perhaps one carrier can be used for landing parachute marines ashore with their equipment to take over beach heads, landing fields, or for containing communications behind the lines of attack.

The summation of the units comprising the armored division afloat, in view of the representations made above by naval units for units in the German armored division, totals: one battleship division; one heavy cruiser division; three light cruiser divisions; four destroyer squadrons; two aircraft carriers; one submarine squadron. The foregoing represents a formidable offensive force under one centralized control and it is assumed that the fighting power of this seagoing armored division is analogous to its contemporary in the Nazi army's streamlined panzer division. In connection with the foregoing organization it is to be noted that a submarine squadron is added. Although the submarine does not have its counterpart in land forces, the squadron is added here to complete the demands of the armored division afloat and to enable it to carry out offensive operations in a complete naval manner.

Before going further in considering the establishment of such an armored division, the reasons for its desirability should be surveyed. Is there any use for such an organization in the naval forces of today? Is such an organization more efficient, powerful, and flexible than the separate forces which make up our fighting fleet? In the light of naval operations in the present war, is such an organization necessary for our Navy to carry out its mission of attaining and maintaining control of the sea; preventing the enemy from obtaining the means to carry on war; and to protect and safeguard our coast and communications?

As for the use to which such an armored division can be put in naval warfare, the following may be considered: defense of coast and communications; destruction of commerce raiders; blockade; attack against shore establishment; convoy; striking force.

The composition of the mythical armored division is well adapted for carrying out any of the above missions. The aircraft, submarine units, and destroyers are readily available for the scouting or searching activities requisite for initiating any of the first three of the above missions while the reserve power represented by the battleships and cruisers should be sufficient to complete the successful accomplishment of such missions. As for the three latter missions as listed, the size of the campaign or the strength of the opposition expected will determine the number of armored divisions required.

The primary reason for the existence of our fleet is its probable use in the future as a striking force. To advocate the formation of our fleet into armored divisions as previously discussed will surely arouse plenty of objection. A fleet composed of the above armored divisions will destroy the feature of concentration of our fighting forces, it will be claimed. But will such concentration be destroyed? If the new divisions are assembled to form the fleet, the fighting power is still present even though it is distributed along the battle front in a more homogeneous manner. Instead of having the battleship as the backbone of the fleet with all its heaviest guns at one spot and the light forces located elsewhere for parrying the thrusts directed at the battleships, the assembly of the armored divisions has distributed guns of all calibers, light to heavy, all along the front for a more equally balanced gunfire.

In considering the subject of the tentative or possible armored divisions, it must be remembered that the latter are the outgrowth of our consideration of the Nazi divisions, units designed for a warfare of movement and rapid spearhead thrusts, the same kind of warfare to which attention is directed in the Navy. Consider also the theater of operations in which our fleet may be called upon to do battle. Will the occasion for battle present us with conditions favorable for employing our whole battle line as a unit in conjunction with the other forces of our fleet or will the employment of powerful striking units similar to the aforementioned armored divisions be more feasible? Instead of basing their operations on the capacity of the infantry to absorb the shock of battle, the Germans made use of the coordinated relentless attacks of their armored divisions to achieve success over the Dutch, Belgian, British, and French forces. This unprecedented method of land warfare may influence activity at sea to such an extent that instead of the battle fleet of the future going into action with the battleship force as its basis for operations, several co-ordinated armored divisions will concentrate and act as conditions for battle permit.

Another consideration in connection with the formation of armored divisions afloat is that of strategical operations. The strategic employment of such naval armored divisions may be the solution for the adequate protection of the boundaries of our sphere of influence.

The feasibility of the use of such divisions as striking forces is closely connected with the question of the efficiency, power, and flexibility of the armored divisions. The efficiency must be dependent in naval warfare solely on the outcome of battle and prior to that can be determined only by the results of peace-time inspections, maneuvers, and gunnery practices. The power is a characteristic which is to be determined by the results of the game board and here also the flexibility feature can be decided upon to a great extent.

The argument can be advanced that separate units are not as flexible as a single unit. That is true, but in view of what has been mentioned briefly in the foregoing discussion, does it not appear acceptable that several such divisions after preliminary maneuvering can drive in their attacks against an opposing battle force as effectively as an extensive battle line and its attendant forces? Our fleet must exist for attack when conditions for the same present themselves. With a large fleet deployed over a large theater of operations, it appears plausible that several smaller units, the armored divisions, would be more capable of attacking than would the larger battle line or its supporting forces. Opportunity for such attacks would be more readily available for the armored division and success could be expected as "the numerically inferior must not shirk an attack if the will to conquer is supported by a devoted staff, confidence in material, and a firm conviction in perfect training."²

Is the control of command simplified in the employment of the armored divisions? Is there more opportunity offered for the display of initiative by more force commanders in such a naval organization? The employment of armored divisions offers more openings for offensive action and "it is only the offensive that can produce positive results."³ Are the requirements for co-ordination between the various forces in battle reduced? As stated before, there are questions which must be answered by the game board, but recent naval activity in the present war shows that there are uses to which these divisions can be put and these are the same uses as listed in this discussion.

Future developments in warfare as in every pursuit depend upon past experiences and vision. This discussion is presented on the premise that future organizations for carrying out warfare are dependent upon the lessons to be learned from the present war, as "theories about the naval warfare of the future are almost wholly presumptive."⁴ The fighting organization to come must change in accordance with new methods of warfare which can be expected along with new and improved implements of war. The naval concept of war is one of movement and that is the same on which the organization of the Nazi panzer division is based. By the same token the successful and conclusive results obtained by such an organization may have some effect upon the formation of naval forces. As a general rule, fighting forces ashore have their counterparts in navies just as army methods of warfare are somewhat analogous to those of the Navy. While the keynote of fire power was formerly invested in the infantry regiment, it is now contained in the Nazi streamlined armored division and likewise it may be shifted in the Navy from the battleship to the armored division afloat.

The former Nazi version of land warfare of position versus position is changed to the streamlined one of movement. Position versus position in land warfare is akin to that of ship against ship in naval warfare. Naval warfare is one of movement but as our ships of the future are to be bigger, better, and faster, are we to streamline our fleet into armored divisions afloat as has been done ashore? Break out the game board!