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United States............................................................................................. 416
Manila—Macassar Straits—Joint Command—Down but Not “Out”
—Motor Torpedo Boat Strikes
Great Britain.......................................................................................................................... 422
Barham Sinking—Raid on Norway—Defense of Aerodromes—A.A. Gunnery in Merchant Navy
War Gas
Reorganization of Air Forces
China—India
Scientific Approach to Air Tactics—Jet Propulsion in Italy—Various Notes
Merchant Marine ..................................................................................... 439
Marine Highlights 1941
Miscellaneous............................................................................................ 442
Winter Weather Comparisons
UNITED STATES
Manila
New York Herald Tribune, January 3.— Manila, which recently fell to the Japanese invaders, had been severely battered by Japanese airmen who bombed the city even after it had been stripped of its guns and declared an undefended area, the Associated Press notes. Many historic edifices, including churches and colleges, were destroyed in the indiscriminate attacks. Clamped in a vise by the Japanese military machine pledged to wrest from the Americans their most distant Pacific outpost, Manila had been hit hard. Many of the ancient buildings, dating from the days when it was a Spanish colony, had been razed and many of its citizens killed or wounded. The city, which has a population of more than 620,000 and is one of the flourishing trade centers of the Orient, began to grow prosperous after the Spanish handed the Philippines over to the United States in 1898. The Japanese, at first timing their drive against Manila to celebrate its capture on the New Year’s holiday, were thrown off schedule by the valiant Filipino and American resistance which destroyed one landing party in the Lin- gayen Gulf during the first week of the war, repulsed others, and confined three to the areas around Vigan, 200 miles north of Manila; Aparri, 250 miles north; and Legaspi, 250 miles southeast.
The Japanese were slow—in comparison with the suddenness of the raids on December 7 against Hawaii—in opening up on Manila. They bombed military bases up and down the Philippines on the day after hostilities opened, but it was not until two days afterward—December 9— that the air-raid sirens sounded and it was not until the next day that bombs fell in the Manila area. From then on, while the Japanese worked to establish the landing bases they finally obtained, Japanese planes lashed at the Manila area and capped their work with twro mass assaults immediately after Manila was declared an open city and its defenses were removed.
After the first hard treatment at the hands of the Americans, the Japanese waited until they could send an expedition in force against Manila and on December 22 the defenders of the Philippines knew the hour had struck. Eighty transports crammed with soldiers and equipment steamed into Lingayen Gulf, 100 miles northwest of Manila, and the landing operations began. That offensive was developed fully despite the most bitter fighting.
On December 31 General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East, who has maintained that the Philippines could be defended, acknowledged that his men were being pushed back north and south of the capital by the hammer blows of Japanese infantrymen, tanks, armored units and dive bombers. But they fought doggedly on. The attack from the south was opened after the northern push got under way.
On Christmas Eve, with the northern fighting two days old, MacArthur’s headquarters announced the Japanese were landing men from 40 transports at Ati- monan, a deep-sea fishing rendezvous 75 miles southeast of Manila. Later more troops came ashore at Mauban, 20 miles up Lamon Bay from Atimonan. The aim of the two southeastern columns apparently was to join forces below the great Laguna de Bay, and then skirt that body of water to reach the capital on good, first- class highways.
On Tuesday, December 30, they were reported 45 airline miles across the lake from the capital—and how well they were advancing was seen in a report Wednesday, December 30, that the southern battle line was only 30 minutes by car from Manila. This indicated a fair advance around the lake. The Japanese were forced to revise their timetable. With the
new year approaching, a Tokyo spokesman broadcast on December 30 that the Japanese troops meant to take Manila “before January 10.”
On New Year’s Day it was announced that all American and Filipino troops on ■Luzon Island had been reunited in strong defense positions, despite Japanese attempts to prevent such a juncture, and ’"’ere engaged in a major battle which cost the invaders heavily. The announcement did not mention the battle area, although ^ said the defending forces in the north and southeast of Manila had been regrouped. The “island fortifications” near Ianila were said to be strongly held by the Arnerican-Filipino troops and there was the possibility that they would seek to Withstand a siege on the rocky island of orregidor, dominating Manila Bay. This ortress might be held for months, accord- lng to military experts.
In the Philippine capital the people kept UP their affairs as much as possible. Doubt- ess they recalled that in the city’s long istory it was looted by the British in 1762 and was torn by destructive earthquakes m 1645, 1863, and 1890. The earthquake 0 1863 killed several thousand persons.
Physically, Manila was not too attrac- 1Ve until recent years. It was built on ground almost on sea level at the mouth the Pasig River and for years it was nown as one of the most unsanitary cities the Orient. It was cleaned up when the rnericans took charge. It has one of the argest landlocked harbors in the world, Snarded by Corregidor, which the Japanese only recently attacked heavily from e air. Manila is the capital of a commonwealth made up of 7,083 islands with a Population of 16,356,000 persons living Principally upon eleven large islands.
Macassar Straits
The Baltimore Sun, February 1.—Full Jeturns on the continuing and wide-rang- lng battle of Macassar Straits are still
lacking, but already the number of ships involved mark it as the war’s heaviest naval engagement to date, and potentially the most important. The straits in question are some 500 miles long and at one point nearly 200 miles wide, roughly comparable in size to a swath of land the full width of Maryland stretching northward from here to Montreal. This is a large area of maneuver. The Indies as a whole, from Java to the east end of New Guinea (and fighting is going on at both ends of that sweep) if transplanted to the Atlantic Ocean would more than span it, from New York to Gibraltar.
That is quite a lot of water, and the comparison may help the impatient landsman to understand why the most aggressive navy cannot quickly pin down an elusive foe in any such vast expanse. The Dutch knew they could not hold out indefinitely against a major power, but they thought that with good management they could hold out against any attack long enough for aid to come from some friendly power.
In pursuit of that policy they built up their defenses to meet just the situation which has arisen. With a grasp of that basic policy, and a general awareness of Dutch planning to meet the inevitable (a deliberate planning in which we today are both allies and beneficiaries), one will better understand the action in Macassar Straits, which still roars on. The main treasure of the Indies is in Sumatra and Java. Before any foe from the north could sweep down on them, it would be necessary for him to sail past the northern fringe of the Indies, Borneo, Celebes, Halmahera, New Guinea, and the lesser islands. To get past that fringe with large vessels would almost necessitate passage of (1) the wide channel to the west of Borneo (on which Singapore frowns—if not too fiercely just now), or (2) the Torres Straits north of Australia (which, again, the British had been expected to control), or one of the mid-
way routes, i.e., (3) the Macassar Straits, (4) the Molucca passage, or (5) the less feasible route just to the east of Halma- hera.
In other words, sound strategy of pre- 1941 called for Holland to leave (1) and (2) to Britain and to concentrate her own strengthagainst approaches (3), (4),and (5). If one looks at the northeast tip of Celebes, he sees Manado. On Halmahera, opposite, is Ternate. Southeast is Amboina. Southwest, on Celebes’ other extremity, is Ken- dari. Far to the south is Timor. On every one of these sites long ago was built a naval or air base of major proportions, well developed, well equipped, and well armed. Besides these well-known major installations it can be assumed there were many small bases, not announced, and in many cases not even known, save to the Dutch services. Those installations were designed to block off Routes 4 and 5. With the British supposedly safeguarding 1 and 2, this left for the Dutch still to protect, only Route 3, Macassar Straits, the broad, immensely deep and inviting passage referred to. How was that done?
Well up in northeast Borneo is Tarakan. Further south on the east Borneo coast is Balik-Papan, and toward the west Banjer- masin. In Celebes are, again, Manado, and far to the south Macassar itself, and several intermediate points which, even now, it is not possible to identify. On Java itself is the great base of Surabaya, and several auxiliary bases to house planes and submarines and surface raiders. These and others were designed by the farseeing Dutch as the strong points from which to operate their fleets of sea and air against an invader. These sites, accordingly, it is safe to say, were Japan’s chief objectives for the giant assault force which poured into the northern Straits of Macassar ten days ago. That Japan knew in advance the locations of all these strong points is obvious. She must have known about how many planes and ships of all sorts the
Dutch had. Yet it seems that in one respect she miscalculated.
Perhaps it was assumed that the Dutch, alarmed by the present grave difficulties of their British ally in Singapore, would concentrate their strength off toward the west, thereby stripping the Macassar defenses of their normal strength. Perhaps the Japanese naval air force (which, in fact, has been extensively used in the Philippines and Malaya and elsewhere) has by this time been so seriously worn down that it could not be present everywhere in strength. For whatever cause, the great convoy of Japanese naval vessels, troop transports and supply ships which began pouring into the straits ten days ago was very weakly supported by fighter planes. It was a very bad mistake, from the Japanese viewpoint. From ours, it was very pleasant indeed.
The convoy had been assembled at some rendezvous just to the north—part of n off Davao, in the Philippines, where our own bombers had dropped a few greetings on it; part of it off Manado, which the Japanese had reduced and occupied, f°r that purpose; part of it off Tarakan, likewise captured some time ago. The troops possibly had been gathered up in many places—Formosa, Japan, China, and especially newly captured Hongkong. Once assembled, the outlook apparently clear, the great assembly of ships poured out of the Celebes sea’s 18,000-foot depths and into the straits’ northern gateway, southward bound. First the scouting airplanes overhead, then a few destroyers and Hg^ cruisers in case of need for heavy guns, then the main screen of destroyers in the van. Then the armada of transports and supply ships, flanked on each side by yet another column of destroyers, with the support of more light cruisers. Wei guarded, supposedly, was an aircraft carrier, from whose decks rose at intervals the clouds of scouting planes, scudding a hundred miles or more ahead to spot an
ambush along the coasts, flying far to right and left to spot Dutch planes lurking on Borneo or Celebes.
There may well have been one battleship also, or a heavy cruiser, for later reports were to include mention that such a vessel, probably, was hit and badly hurt, ^ote that there were no submarines. Convoy duty is not favored for submarines. A nervous gunner on a transport is too ikely to think it is an enemy submarine and blaze away. How a great convoy ftioves is a flexible matter. So large an assembly of ships is terribly vulnerable to enemy attack by air, surface or sub-surface °e> Particularly at dusk when spotting is micult, and so the convoy commander ®oves it with all possible speed to get the ifficult job over with quickly. He has a Particular horror of slow-moving cargo sillPs, for their slowness holds down the sPeed of the whole convoy and exposes it tnat much longer to attack. He must keep the vessels fairly well clustered, so that he can the better concentrate his watchful destroyers and cruisers, and thereby guard ls charges more efficiently. But he must separate the ships enough to avert collisions. And he must keep them all moving at almost exactly the same speed, and at he same intervals from ship to ship. Any 0rmation at all which will meet all these heeds, and which will take into consideration the width of the channel, will do.
There are all types of passenger and cargo ships in such a convoy, despite a c°mmander’s natural liking for swift modern vessels only. It is certain the Japanese convoy had some of the best type, for Japan for two decades has been building Merchant ships of this kind; large, high speed, readily converted into armed transports. Probably some of those 15,000-ton ^essels were in the group, each carrying >000 soldiers—for in those warm latitudes even civilians are piled on the upper deck, ^thout cover, as any reader of Joseph onrad knows. Certainly there were many slower vessels and smaller vessels, too, some of them troop and more of them cargo carriers. There might well have been 200 vessels altogether, a tempting target.
Just when the watchful Dutch and their American allies first sighted that target is not yet known here, but one week ago last night came a Batavia dispatch announcing that Dutch bombers over the Macassar Straits had sighted a fleet of Japanese warships and transports, had attacked and had scored twelve hits, sinking 1 “large war vessel,” 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser, 1 destroyer and 3 transports. There were no Dutch losses whatever. The ball had begun. The next night came word that our American naval vessels were in action, had blown up one munitions ship, sunk another, sent a third away at a heavy list and hurt several others. None of our ships was hurt and only four men were wounded. The Dutch that day hit a liner, a destroyer, and a large transport.
The next day our American surface vessels sank five Japanese transports and hurt a sixth. Meanwhile,long-range army bombers soared into action and in three successive raids bagged a total of three transports, set two others afire, crippled a cruiser and knocked down seven enemy planes. Perhaps the most fruitful of all the individual jobs was that of an American submarine, which bagged the Japanese aircraft carrier, and thereby destroyed at one clip the bulk of the convoy’s air force, hampering the invader’s ability both to do the required long-range scouting of sea and jungle, and his ability to fight off the deadly American and Dutch bombing planes. Japanese planes remained available, to be sure, for each of the large vessels must have carried at least one plane, but that was not enough. The record shows that many of the Japanese interceptors were shot down and very few of the Americans or Dutch were lost.
Only when the full reports are at hand can there be a precise record of what the
Japanese armada lost. Washington goes to great pains to make sure that its official figures are verified, and as a result they often are delayed. Also ships reported “sunk” are known to have sunk; some reported “hit” may well have been sunk later, but no such official claim is made. However, it seems pretty clear that the assured toll of Japanese ships at the hands of American army and navy raiders went about like this:
Jan. 23—Two transports sunk, one left listing, several other direct hits.
Jan. 24—Six transports sunk, one probably sunk, one badly hurt. Five planes downed. Jan. 25—One aircraft carrier badly hit and believed sunk, heavy hits on several destroyers and transports.
Jan. 26—One transport sunk, one destroyer badly hurt.
Jan. 28—One transport sunk, one hurt. Two planes downed.
That 5-day total reaches ten transports surely sunk seven planes destroyed, an aircraft carrier put out of service and almost certainly sunk, and an unstated number of other vessels (including a cruiser and several destroyers) so seriously hurt that they were put out of action, perhaps permanently in some cases.
The score rolled up by the Dutch cannot at this time be divided into sinkings and hits, but on Friday Batavia claimed for Dutch and Americans combined a total of 46 Japanese vessels known to be “sunk or crippled.” The fight was still in progress in the south section of the straits, and it is quite possible in the north as well, against crippled Japanese vessels still trying to escape.
How the raids were conducted can be only surmised at this time, but any naval officer who knowTs those waters and who also knows the raiding tactics which they encourage, can make the surmise. Wide and deep as is the channel through the straits, the shores bristle with dangers. There are projecting coral reefs which form deep bights, well masked by the dense tangle of cocoa palms which come down to the water’s edge, both in Celebes and Borneo. Navigators who know those shores can hide their small gunboats or submarines and tenders in them, sure they will not be seen. Here, presumably, singly and in pairs lurked the surface and under-surface elements of Dutch and American fleets.
Back from the coasts, on the level plain which lies between the water and the lofty ranges of volcanic peaks, the alert Dutch air service almost certainly has hacked small landing fields out of the jungle. On these fields, in small units, lurked the aerial bombers, the Dutch sharing their secret rendezvous with the newly arrived Americans. No one here knows how numerous the Allied raiders were, nor is likely to know for a long time to come. Doubtless there were enough to justify letting the whole Japanese convoy into the straits before striking, in all three dimensions, with bomb, shell, and torpedo. However, there were not enough to destroy the whole convoy, or even to come near it. Yet destruction was so great, it appears, that the convoy, as soon as it was near the south end of the straits, rushed shoreward for protection and for quick unloading in at least three points. Around those landing places the fight continued whenever opportunity presented, and apparently still goes on.
The raider’s job is to raid and get away, not to exchange blows, for he must try to save himself for another day’s fighting- Hence it can be presumed that the Macassar fight was not a battering match at all but a series of adroit raids at dawn and dusk, when the convoy’s silhouette was easy to see, and the single raider’s silhouette difficult. Even the weather would aid the raider now, for of all that hot, wet region’s rainy months, January is the rainiest. In the southern Celebes its precipitation averages 28 inches, which wouldn’t be a bad total for nine months in Maryland. Between rain and darkness the submarine raiders could have had a very good time.
The Dutch have a small naval force, and because it is small they have learned how to use it most thriftily, doing the greatest Possible harm to Japan in the least possible time, and with the fewest possible losses to themselves. Their equipment and their tactics are perfectly designed for the exact Job they are performing. All of this their new companions of the United States Asiatic Fleet seem to have learned quickly—so quickly that the damage which the newcomers did, by air and sea alike, apparently compares very favorably with what the Dutch themselves did, with the Australians adding a few blows of their own ar_ to the east. There are other aspects which must be remembered, and with gratification. Here is not only the war’s first prolonged fight in the South Pacific, ^ith victory clearly that of the United Stations, it is the first systematically con- ucted fight which has taken place since America, Britain, Holland, and China Pooled their resources against Japan. It is the first since the sea command in those Raters was unified under the American, Admiral Hart. Altogether it is a most bappy augury for the future.
But it is not a whole victory. Many Japanese were lost, but enough of them sur- Vlved to make their landings in south Borneo and south Celebes. It now remains to destroy them there, in the hope of accomplishing it before they can rally strength to nnge over into Java. Unless that lunge can be stopped, our outlook in the South Pacific remains very alarming, indeed.
Joint Command
The Baltimore Sun, January 30.—No army-navy accomplishment since the beginning of the war exceeds in importance he agreement formally announced today y Secretary of War Stimson, whereby the responsibility for each joint army-navy °peration is definitely given to one designed commander, and only to one. It puts an end to the old punctilio whereby the army’s responsibilities have traditionally covered the land area, plus exactly so many miles off shore, and the navy’s official field of action has been at sea.
Specifically it puts an end to such a setup as obtained on December 7 in Hawaii, where the Army guarded the land plus the air for a certain distance to sea, yet the Navy (whose fleet’s security is the whole military reason for Hawaii’s existence) had merely the off shore patrol, which was supposed to co-operate fully with the army’s in shore patrol—but did not on that fatal occasion. Hereafter there is no doubt of who is in command. His is the undivided responsibility. Secretary Stimson announced that:
(1) The full command at Hawaii is in the hands of the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, i.e., Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, with all army elements, ground and air alike, under him.
(2) Full command at Panama is in the hands of Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews, with charge over his present army elements, and also over all naval installations adjacent to the Canal, on both Caribbean and Pacific coasts.
(3) Full command in the eastern Caribbean (the geographical line separating it from the Panama area is not announced) is hereafter in the hands of the naval commander of that area. Secretary Stimson did not know, and the Navy declined to state, whether that means Admiral Royal Ingersoll, of the Atlantic Fleet, or Rear Admiral J. H. Hoover, of the Tenth Naval District (Puerto Rico), commanding United States naval units in the Caribbean.
These three areas are typical, and were cited, along with the United Nations’ Far East command of General Sir Archibald Wavell, only because of their size and importance. There are others, the Secretary said, without enumerating them. The somewhat complicated situation in Iceland (where there are both British and American units), he preferred not to discuss at this time.
Down but Not “Out”
Washington Post, January 22.—Seven crew men of a United States Navy plane which was forced down at sea by motor trouble have been rescued and brought back to port after drifting for 7§ days, Navy headquarters announced today. The Navy said the heroic work of the crewmen made possible their rescue. The crew consisted of Lieutenant William Sutherland, Normal, HI.; Ensign William Lahodney, Milton, Pa.; Radioman First Class La- Veme Weiss, Watertown, S. Dak.; Aviation Machinist’s Mate Second Class Jesse Miller, Ashland, Ky.; Seaman First Class Harold Martin, Lynchburg, Va.; Radioman Third Class William Valyou, Burlington, Vt., and Radioman Second Class John Carlson, Olympia, Wash. On their arrival here, the men told a story of buffeting waves which kept the plane rolling, with wings slapping the sea, from the time it came down, January 9, until rescue was effected by a plane and ship, January 17. By the time they were picked up they had drifted 400 miles, they said, “after being forced down somewhere within 1,200 miles of Panama.” No more specific designation of the place where the plane came down was given, nor was it announced whether it was in the Pacific Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico. The men lost 12 to 18 pounds each. Otherwise they seemed in good health. Lieutenant Sutherland especially praised the work of Weiss and Valyou who, he said, patched together a workable radio from odds-and-ends of wiring and established communication which led to the rescue. Two other crew members were kept busy almost constantly bailing to keep the plane afloat, and two distilled water from the sea so the men could drink. They had three-quarters of a pint of drinking water a day, distilled by making over a windshield water pump.
Motor Torpedo Boat Strikes
New York Herald Tribune, January 21. —In a daring and brilliant night foray an American motor torpedo boat slipped into Binanga Bay, on the west coast of the Philippine Island of Luzon, and torpedoed a 5,000-ton Japanese vessel, the Navy Department announced tonight.
The successful mission carried out by the small motor torpedo boat, which nosed into Binanga Bay at dead of night to strike swiftly at an unidentified Japanese ship, was the first exploit credited to surface vessels since the consolidation of the Allied naval command in the southwest Pacific under Admiral Thomas C. Hart. The attack was made under great difficulties. Binanga Bay lies within the entrance of Subic Bay, to which the Japanese recently claimed control with the capture of Olon- gapo, a naval substation there. When the small motor craft felt its way down these dangerous waters it attracted Japanese attention. The enemy opened up with machine-gun fire and then turned his 3-inch shore batteries on the fragile American craft. But before their gunners found the range the job was done. The torpedoes had struck home, and the torpedo boat turned and roared out to sea at 40 knots with its engines full out. Its commander, Lieutenant John D. Bulkeley, was commended for his daring and successful mission, the Navy Department announced.
GREAT BRITAIN “Barham” Sinking
Baltimore Sun, January 30.—
Larry Allen, the AP’s veteran seagoing war correspondent attached to the British Mediterranean Fleet, got back to New York on furlough a jump ahead of the story he wrote weeks ago describing the sinking of H.M. battleship Barham last November 25 by torpedoes aimed at the battleship Queen Elizabeth, from which he witnessed the attack. Allen wrote his story aboard the Queen Elizabeth for transmission when the censor would permit. The British Admiralty then withheld their announcement of the Barham’s loss until last Tuesday for strategic reasons. By that time Allen was hitchhiking homeward by air to recuperate from injuries and near drowning.
By Larry Allen, Associated Press Correspondent. Aboard the British Mediterranean flagship Queen Elizabeth, No verm ber 25, 1941 (delayed by Censor).—The British battleship Barham, struck by four torpedoes from an enemy submarine, exploded and sank within five minutes today off the Libyan coast. I saw the Barham go down in a huge cloud of flame and smoke in one of the most spectacular scenes of the war. The blast was so great that it was believed the attacking submarine may well have been destroyed by concussion. The fleet was making a wide Westward sweep in search of Axis convoys when a single submarine made a daring daylight penetration of the line of destroyers screening the battleships.
At a range of 700 yards, the submarine fired its salvos, apparently at the Queen Elizabeth. Just at that moment, this battleship made a quick zigzag, and the torpedoes sped on to strike the Barham, which Was following closely in battle formation. In the commander’s cabin I heard the successive clanging crash of the torpedoes and raced to the upper deck. The Barham, a 31,000-ton giant, already was listing heav- 1 y to port. As I watched, she wobbled over m°re heavily, like some punch-drunk Prizefighter. From quarter-deck to forecastle, all along her starboard side, hundreds of men began leaping into the calm blue water that contrasted with the ruddy rays of the setting sun. As the bodies struck the sea, they forced up little fountains which shone like diamonds.
Score after score of sailors plunged from the battleship. Soon I could see hundreds °I heads bobbing above the surface. Some sailors managed to throw rubber floats down from the ship, upon which clambered dozens of men soon after they hit the Water. That all happened between 4:25 and 4:30 p.m., November 25. Executive officers of the Barham ordered: “Abandon ship!” Immediately afterward a heavy list developed and the Barham blew up at 4’30. As the battleship Valiant veered a)vay from the Barham, this flagship continued moving slowly eastward. The Barham was violently shaken by a series of blasts and burst into a great mass of flame and then was enveloped by a huge cloud of black smoke.
The air reeked with cordite fumes. Immediately with the explosions I saw huge sheets of armor plating, whole sections of the battleship, and the Barham's big motor launch flung hundreds of feet into the air, falling with a loud smack into the sea dangerously near this battleship and the Valiant. The tremendous compression of the air seemed to muffle the explosion. All I felt aboard this battleship, which had pulled away about 1,000 yards distance, was a brisk gust of air.
Then black smoke spread over so wide an expanse of sea that I no longer could see the men or rafts in the water. From both sides of the Queen Elizabeth, destroyers steamed full speed into the smoke that was the funeral pyre of one of Britain’s greatest fighting ships. They started picking up survivors and hunting the submarine simultaneously. As the smoke drifted away, there was nothing to be seen of the Barham.
Within a few seconds of the explosion of her magazines, she had vanished. It had happened so quickly that it was difficult to believe what my own eyes had seen. Five minutes previously, the Barham had been steaming majestically behind this flagship. Now she didn’t exist. Scores of officers and seamen of the Queen Elizabeth who had rushed on deck from a tea-time snack stood helplessly as they watched the Barham die in a matter of moments.
The busy destroyers picked up about 500 of the Barham's 1,400 men, including Vice-Admiral Pridham Wippell, his secretary, and twelve other officers. The submarine apparently passed almost directly between the Barham and the battleship Valiant just after firing the torpedoes. It was so close inboard that the explosion of the torpedoes forced it momentarily to the surface. Some of the officers aboard this battleship said they saw the conning tower bob above water. Then came the tremendous explosion of the Barham’s magazines, and several officers expressed belief that the submarine, being so near, must have been crushed by the underwater concussion.
I was the only correspondent to witness the Barham’s finale. I shall never forget how bravely it seemed to fight to stay afloat with four gaping torpedo holes in her port side, but the great torrents of water pouring into her soon drew her over on her side. Then she blew to bits amid billows of smoke. It is also amazing, considering the explosion, that 500 men escaped death. Awed by this spectacle, many officers of this battleship like myself found it hard to believe the Barham was gone. When nothing but black smoke could be seen on the horizon, many of them remarked, “Well, we cannot win all the time.” “But it was tough to see the old Barham go that way,” they added, “she would rather have fought it out.” Two hours after the Barham was gone, Captain C. B. Barry of this battleship told the ship’s company over the loudspeaker, “You will all be glad to know that approximately 500 were saved from the Barham, including the vice-admiral and his secretary.”
Raid on Norway
London Times, December 30.—A full account was issued yesterday of the combined naval, military, and air operation carried out on Saturday against a German occupied port on the Norwegian coast. It is described in the following joint statement by the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry:
The following details have been received from Combined Operations headquarters in amplification of Sunday’s communique about the small raid carried out on Saturday, December 27.
The raid was directed mainly against enemy shipping anchored off Vaagso, an island situated in latitude 62 deg. N., off the Norwegian coast. Although only on a small scale, this raid was a good example of a combined operation in which the Royal Navy, the Army, and the Royal Air Force each played an equally important and interdependent part. Light forces of the Home Fleet arrived off Vaagso Island just before daylight at 8; 30 a.m. and under cover of a smoke screen laid by Hampden aircraft of Bomber Command, the military forces, consisting of commandos and some Norwegian troops, were landed 10 minutes later in naval assault landing craft. Rear Admiral H. M. Burrough, C.B., was in command of the naval forces and Brigadier J. C. Haydon, D.S.O., O.B.E., was in command of the military forces. Coast defense batteries, manned by Germans, opened fire on our ships but were silenced by bombardment from the warships and bombing by Hampden aircraft of Bomber Command. The latter also laid smoke screens to mask our ships and machine-gunned the batteries and near-by barracks on Rag- sundo Island.
There were two main military landings, one on the small island of Maaloy and the other at the southeastern extremity of the town of South Vaagso. The entire garrison of Maaloy were either killed or taken prisoner, and military store houses and ammunition dumps were blown up. A battery of four guns was destroyed. At South Vaagso the Germans put up a stiff resistance and in the street fighting we suffered some casualties before the town could be brought completely under our control. An enemy tank was put out of action and oil tanks and ammunition stores were destroyed. A wireless station and certain industrial plant, owned by a quisling and known to be operating for the Germans, were destroyed. A total of eight enemy ships, including 5 merchant vessels, 2 armed trawlers, and 1 armed tug, totalling 15,650 tons, were destroyed. The merchant vessels beached themselves to avoid cap- lure and were destroyed by our naval forces; the armed vessels were sunk. An offensive patrol in conjunction with this operation was carried out by Blenheim aircraft of Bomber Command. They encountered and attacked a convoy of enemy merchant ships. Many bombs fell among them and one ship was sunk.
While the operations were taking place at Vaagso, Blenheim aircraft of Bomber Command were attacking Herdla, the nearest enemy aerodrome, 100 miles down the coast. Direct hits from a height of 250 ft. were obtained on the wooden runways °f this aerodrome, and an Me 109 which ^ras taxiing at the time was destroyed. The huts and wireless station near by were nrachine-gunned. From all these Bomber Command operations eight of our aircraft are missing, but one member of a Hampden crew was rescued by our ships. The damage to the Herdla runways undoubtedly reduced the scale of air attack on our ships, which were protected by Beau- fighters and Blenheim fighters of Coastal Command. During a series of fights, which Went on throughout the day, they shot down four enemy He Ills and prevented any successful attack being made on our ships. Three of our fighters are missing. Cur ships suffered only very minor damage and all returned fit for immediate serv- lce. Our casualties were slight; the next- °f-kin are being informed. Over 120 Germans were killed, and 95 German naval uud military prisoners and 9 quislings have been brought back. The entire combined operation went exactly according to plan aud all objectives were attained within the Crne allowed, all forces withdrawing at 2^45 p.m.
defense of Aerodromes
London Times, December 31.—The defense of aerodromes has assumed an inleasing importance in warfare as their ■vulnerability has been proved in diverse Circumstances. The loss of Malene was perhaps the determining factor in the loss of Crete. The loss of Kota Bahru and other aerodromes in Malaya has had a most damaging effect upon the defense of Singapore. We for our part have recently displayed extreme boldness and skill in raids on two aerodromes in Libya. The site of the first has not been specified, but the fact that it lay 150 miles inside Tripolitania, the frontier of which had not then been closely approached by our main forces, is evidence of the scope of the raid. The enemy lost 24 aircraft and his stores of fuel and bombs, while—mark this especially— the whole garrison was “accounted for,” though it exceeded the attackers in numbers by six to one. Immediately afterwards the enemy lost no fewer than 37 aircraft on his landing ground at Jedabia. These two raids alone may have had an important effect upon the issue of the campaign.
The difference between the means by which all these aerodromes were captured could hardly be greater. Maleme was taken by parachutists; Kota Bahru by a landing from the sea; the two in Libya by highly mobile ground forces. The case of Maleme and the two cases in Libya are the results of recent developments in warfare which few could have foreseen at the outset of the war. The Kota Bahru incident is, however, one which might have occurred at any time since aircraft were first used for the purpose of warfare. To these forms of attack must of course be added one to which virtually any aerodrome, wherever situated, is always liable, that of bombing while the aircraft making use of it are in hangars or on the ground. All four methods may have to be faced in these islands and indeed in North Africa. The loss of an aerodrome, almost more than that of any other conceivable objective, simultaneously weakens its previous possessor and strengthens his foe. If its value be x the loss counts as 2x because the victor can generally very soon, and one may say always eventually, derive from it as much value as the loser could or should have derived previously. It is one of the most powerful aids to further success, one of the most valuable stepping stones on the road to victory.
It is also inevitably a matter of divided responsibility. In this country the R.A.F. makes a contribution to the defense of its own aerodromes and it might theoretically increase this until it became solely responsible for them. But even if this were so the Army with its armored fighting vehicles and artillery would still have to consider the problems of counterattacking aerodromes which the enemy had succeeded in overrunning. In some cases the Army would have to reckon that the loss of aerodromes would leave it to fight wholly without air support, a state of affairs of which it has had painful experience. The part to be played by the Home Guard could never be left out of account. Again, in the case of aerodromes and seaplane bases of the Fleet Air Arm the responsibility has to be divided between the Navy and the Army. And this responsibility is not only as regards action but also in the first place as regards classification; for in a considered defense scheme aerodromes must necessarily be, as they are, graded in degrees of importance which depend, broadly speaking, on four factors—their value to the R.A.F. and to the Army, their potential value to the enemy, and their natural vulnerability.
It would be idle to pretend that the public mind is not seriously concerned about this matter. The following are some of the questions which are constantly being asked. What provision was made for the defense of the aerodrome at Maleme? Was underground protection provided for machine-gunners, if not indeed for Bren-gun carriers, on the edges of the airfield? Could not better means have been devised for the protection of the Kota Bahru aerodrome— to take a much more extended period of responsibility—in view of the fact that it was isolated from our main ground forces and close to the sea on a coast where a Japanese landing had always been considered a possibility, granted that its site was determined by the necessity of providing a chain of air bases for the use of short-range aircraft flying from Burma to Singapore? Are we better prepared to face like onslaughts at this moment in North Africa? Is the co-ordination between the R.A.F., the Army, and the Home Guard in the United Kingdom as close and as well considered as it should be? Do recent exercises involving attacks on aerodromes by landing parties or air-borne troops disclose a satisfactory situation? The last question it may not be possible to answer publicly, but some replies could probably be given to the others.
There are certain factors which every one who follows intelligently the developments of warfare can comprehend without official guidance. No considerable proportion of the land forces can concentrate purely upon the defense of aerodromes. There are many other potential objectives of the enemy to be defended, and the essential feature of the defense is mobility for the purpose of meeting the enemy wherever he is most dangerous and of defeating him. Our object is to defend our territory first of all, its aerodromes incidentally. It is probably impossible to make any aerodrome inpregnable in itself without regard to the mobile forces which may be brought up to reinforce its defense or to retake it if it should be overrun. The most, therefore, which can in general be aimed at is an organization providing reasonable assurance that an aerodrome will not fan quickly into the enemy’s hands, that its static defense will procure time for the arrival of mobile forces, and inflict the maximum damage upon the enemy. Again by far the most effective defense against air-borne attack, and one extremely wj' portant against any form of attack, lS counterattack by fighter aircraft from the
aerodrome engaged or from others. In Practice it is impossible to provide an aerodrome with anti-aircraft weapons on a feale such as to render it self-sufficing, and d these weapons are not supported from the air they will be put out of action by °mbing, whereas in favorable circumstances defense by aircraft might suffice Without the aid of a single anti-aircraft Weapon other than the Bren gun. It was the withdrawal of our fighters which crippled the defense of Crete. Yet it is not Possible to bank upon the power of the -A.F. to prevent parachutists and troops aiided by troop-carriers and gliders from Caching individual aerodromes. Such attacks would be part of a general offensive 111 which attempts would be made to en- §age in the air or bomb on the ground every squadron at the disposal of the de- ense. The Germans, we know, possess great numbers of troop-carriers, and are elieved to be building thousands of gliders- If they attack at all they will attack many aerodromes simultaneously. We can- n°t count upon our fighters being able to Srnash all such attacks.
rhe only possible solution of this diffi- * Problem lies in the fullest co-operation etween all the arms and all the interests Evolved. But, while there could be noth- g rnore disastrous than to consider any actical problem in the light of the last > tnat is no reason for neglecting such ° its lessons as still hold good. For the ^ tlc side of aerodrome defense cover for ops, weapons, and ammunition appears c° he all-important. But it must be real jsVer 'from view and from fire—and this a(_a matter in which old soldiers, looking the exposed and flimsy posts some- mes to be found in this country, think at the last war has still some contribu- °ns to make. Half a dozen machine-gun ts m the dugouts shaped like cham- agne bottles which the Germans began to ^sc in 1917, with the team, the gun itself, 11 the ammunition safe at the bottom of
the steps till required, and only one man’s head—perhaps only a periscope-—exposed at the small and inconspicuous opening, might contribute more to the defense of an aerodrome than a battalion in the open.
A.A. Gunnery in Merchant Navy
London Times, December 6.:—From the outbreak of war the enemy has made his chief effort at sea in direct attack on merchant shipping, devoting all his ingenuity to devising fresh methods. U-boats have proved disappointing to him, except during the period in which we suffered from a grave deficiency of escort craft. The magnetic and acoustic mines have been mastered. Surface raiders have either met the fate of the Bismarck, Scharnhorst, or Kor- moran, or if they have evaded it, have done little destruction. But air attack proved more promising, and last April the merchant ship losses by that agency rose to a figure that was disquieting. But that threat too has now been mastered, and the average losses of the last five months caused by bombing have been no more than one-twelfth of those in April. This successful result has been brought about chiefly by the advanced training of merchant seamen in A.A. defense—an expression which includes not only the actual shooting, but also look-out, control of fire, and maintenance of A.A. weapons.
Merchant Navy A.A. schools have been set up at all British ports and at a great number abroad, and 17,000 merchant seamen have taken a training course at one or other of them. But it is not always easy to find time in a merchant seaman’s life—he, above most others, needs periods of leave between voyages—so in addition to these schools where actual shooting can be practiced, a number of 2-decked motorbusses have been fitted up as mobile A.A. schools —each with two classrooms, above and below—which run down to the docks and park alongside ships of which the companies are too busy to go elsewhere. Over 25,000 men have been through the skeleton course provided in the bus schools.
The system known as “eye-shooting”— the art of the game-shot—has proved most efficacious for ships’ guns against the enemy bomber. This is best taught by actual shooting, but an exceedingly ingenious method which employs a sound film has also been devised, and the men who have learned their shooting in the schools have many times proved its value within a few hours, almost, of putting to sea again. They do not always see their assailant crash in the sea; but time and again the enemy aircraft have limped off so badly mauled as to have little chance of reaching their base. The best proof of success is to be found in the drop in the curve of sinkings.
Every merchant seaman who qualifies satisfactorily in the A.A. course receives a certificate and a bonus of 10 s.; and he must requalify every four months.
GERMANY
War Gas
The Aeroplane (London), December 19.—“When a criminal feels a rope around his neck, no methods are too good or too bad for him to try to get his neck free,” stated a Nazi broadcaster on August 4, 1940. The organ of the Reichs Luftfahrt Ministerium Der Adler, in its issue of November 4, 1941, gave a timely reminder of one of the methods which a criminal might try to get his neck free. Under the title, “We Fly Against a New Enemy,” the work of a special unit of the Luftwaffe was described. This work is the destruction of insect pests in German forests by distributing the insecticide from the air. Since Germany introduced this method about 15 years ago, many countries have adopted it. Its working has often been described, but there are publications in Germany which have pointed out that in addition to its peaceful use it has a more serious side. The aircraft which can release large quantities of chemicals for killing insects can also, with almost equal ease, release chemicals that will kill human beings. As far back as 1929, Dr. Hugo Stoltzenberg, owner of a great chemical works in Hamburg and chemical adviser to the Reichs- wehr, published a small book, Die Ultra- gif te (the Super-Poisons). This book contained a selection of lectures which Stoltzenberg had given to officers of foreign armies. He outlined the various types of poison gases, and of bacteria, their usefulness and best method of employment in warfare. Finally, he described the apparatus which gives the best and most effective distribution of the “silent ammunition.’ Stoltzenberg devoted much space to the distribution of poison gas from the air. He is an ardent advocate of the air method which, he thinks, is more efficient than distribution by ground troops. When he dealt with the apparatus which had to be installed in aircraft, he informed his readers that he and the Junkers Aircraft Works had obtained a patent for a distributing device which had worked satisfactorily during exhaustive tests, supervised by the German authorities. A leaflet of the Junkers W 33 and 34 multi-purpose airplanes stated that both types could also be delivered with Dr. Stoltzenberg’s equipment installed.
The two best-known German experts of poison gas and bacteriological warfare, Professors Meyer and Hanslian, have described the two most efficient methods ot distributing gas or bacteria from the air- One is by dropping these materials packed either in many small or in a few big thm' walled glass containers from great heights- Both experts were unanimous that, because of the light weight of these “glass bombs” and their contents, great loads could be carried in each airplane. Claims have been made that these missiles, c°n sidered from a military point of vimv> would be more effective than ordinary high explosives or incendiary bombs-
Whether the case has been established or n°t is of secondary importance when it is remembered that the Germans believe in the Douhet doctrine, and that Douhet was °ne of the prominent advocates of gas air warfare. The other method is spraying Poison gases from the air. Opinion among experts regarding the usefulness of this rnethod is divided. The main objection was hat such a spray could only be released rom a few hundred feet above the ground 0r it would be largely ineffective. They argued—this was disputed by equally experienced chemists—that the small gas Particles deteriorated in contact with the atmosphere, and when they had to travel a long distance they lost their effectiveness- If airplanes flew low they wTould be exposed to the fire of the ground troops.
et what the experts did not seem to know ^hen they discussed this aspect before 13 was that the German High Command had developed an airplane which ?,as the ideal means for this work—the . uka. While the single-engined Ju 87S |S lar<% the right type of aircraft for such tl°rh, the twin-engined Ju 88S fulfils all ae conditions.
The German Army, Navy, and the mtwaffe have their “artificial fog” units. ^ °ubtless, these would be the units that ^ Quid be entrusted with the distribution SoP°‘s°n gas if the order to use it is given.
° far, in this war, that order has not been ered, but “When a criminal feels a rope r°und his neck. . . .”—h.j.a.w.
JAPAN
Organization of Air Forces
Aeroplane, December 12.—The ^any months of tension in the Far East at/6 en^ec^ when Japanese naval airplanes ba ac^e<^ important United States naval (H ^ in the Tai Hei Yo> Pearl Harbor p ,awaii), and in the Philippines. The j^rit*sh Empire, the United States, and the ,^e herlands East Indies had been expectS War in the Pacific for a long time and had taken appropriate measures to deal with the Japanese menace. In fact way back in 1923 a series of articles in The Aeroplane drew attention to the vital nature of the fortress of Singapore to the U.S. Navy operating in the Pacific. Since the beginning of this year great efforts have been made by the Japanese military and naval leaders to prepare for the fight against the Western powers. These efforts have been particularly strenuous where military aviation was concerned, but as an article on “Japan’s Air Strength” in The Aeroplane on March 7 showed, they had not then reached a standard where Japan could hope to fight her potential enemies successfully.
The reorganization of the Japanese Air Forces was directed from Berlin. Instructors and technicians, flying equipment and machinery were sent from Germany and Italy to the Far East. Officers of the Luftwaffe trained Japanese personnel in modern air warfare, while German engineers endeavored to organize aircraft production. They were probably unable to overcome all their difficulties with man power and raw materials in such a short time; even recently German papers have pointed out Japan’s deficiencies in raw materials.
Early in 1941 a delegation of prominent Japanese Army and Navy officers was invited to study the problems of modern air warfare in Germany. This delegation was accompanied by Japanese civil technicians. The military mission was headed by Lieutenant General Tomozuki Yamashita, the Inspector-General of Army Aviation, one of the ablest officers of the Imperial Army. Under him were more than 40 army and navy officers, among them Vice-Admiral Abe and Vice-Admiral Nomura, who was Japan’s Ambassador in Washington. Yamashita was chosen as head of this mission not only for his ability and his aeronautical experience, but because the operations of Japan’s tArmy Aviation in a war on the Asiatic Continent will be directed by him.
Furthermore, Yamashita is a recognized representative of the pro-German wing of the Japanese Army. Thus we can conclude that the Japanese consider their Army Air Force of primary importance in the war in the Far East.
Since the end of the last war, Yamashita has acted as a liaison officer between German and Japanese military aeronautics. In 1919-20 he brought to Japan ex-officers of the Imperial Luftwaffe as instructors, and a party of German aircraft engineers. Among others, Dr. Vogt, the chief designer of Blohm and Voss, and Franz Schneider, who died in the middle of this year, went as technical advisers to the Aichi Tokei Denki Kabushiki Kaisha. From 1927 to 1930 Yamashita was Military Attache in Vienna and became very friendly with the present Colonel General Lohr, the Commander in Chief of the Fourth German Air Fleet. During these years he was a frequent visitor to German aeronautical establishments.
The instruction of this delegation, which stayed about six months, was personally supervised by the heads of the three German services. Prominent German officers who had seen service in the Far East, including Vice-Admiral Grassmann of the German Navy and Colonel General Keller, the Commander in Chief of the First German Air Fleet, directed the instruction. The Japanese delegates spent several weeks in Northern France 'watching the work of the Luftwaffe Command in charge of the operations against this country, and there were rumors that several members of the delegation had taken part in raids on this country.
In Tokyo Lieutenant-Colonel Scholl represents the German Army, and Colonel von Gronau the Luftwaffe. Scholl, who acquired his first knowledge of Japan in the Library of the British Museum, is a typical example of an ambitious and efficient German General Staff Officer, and was a pupil of von Seeckt. Von Gronau, a more pleasant type than Scholl, is only the figurehead of the Luftwaffe mission to Japan—as General Wenninger was in London before the war.
Of the changes in Japanese military aviation which were the outcome of this collaboration few details are yet known- The First Army Air Corps, whose concern was the protection of the Japanese mainland, is no longer under the command of the War Office, but under a special command, the “Headquarters for the Defence of the Country.” It receives its orders direct from the Emperor through General Yamada, the former Inspector- General of Military Education. The strength of this unit has been increased by an unspecified number of fighters, but consists mainly of bomber units. Failure of this Air Defence might have widespread repercussion on Japanese morale because of the implicit belief in the infallibility of the Emperor. The equipment of the Japanese Air Force has been overhauled since it was discussed in the article of March 7. Severa modem German types have been put into service to replace obsolete airplanes ° French or American origin. Mitsubishi bought licenses to build the Junkers Stukas, the Ju 87 and 88; Aichi Tokei Denki Kabushiki Kaisha acquired licenses f°r the He 111 and 112, and Kawasaki obtained a license to build the BMW 132 ra dial motor. Patin and Telefunken, instrument and electrical manufacturers, ha'e also sold licenses to Japan.
Significance can be attached to the fnc that the Japanese acquired the Stuka b censes, as it indicates not only a changelD Japanese air policy, but also that she i tends to conduct air warfare mainly °n land. When Yamashita began his organ! zation of Japan’s military aviation in 193 ) heavy, long-distance bombers and recon naissance airplanes were ordered by bu11' Range was also of great importance i ^ fighters. Japan’s Air Staff dreamed of con ducting a war “a la Douhet,” and the firS years of the campaign in China have shown that the Japanese airmen had at least learned, but not digested, the teachings of the Italian master. The inability of the Japanese Air Force to smash even the weak resistance of the Chinese forces and the experience of the Germans appears to have influenced the Imperial General Staff and turned its attention to the German theory °f army-air force co-operation. The outcome of their studies was the adoption of the Stuka. Stuka bombing technique appeals to the Japanese airmen, whose courage is great, but whose technical skill is much below the standard of the British, American, and Dutch airmen flying in the Far East.
There is no doubt that the enormous area which the air forces of the Allied powers have to protect will bring the Japanese air force some initial successes. Yet the reorganization of Japan’s air forces is un- ikely to have reached a stage where all its deficiencies have been remedied. Japan’s small raw materials basis forces her to conduct a blitzkrieg in a southerly direction. *et, history has taught that blitzkriegs seldom succeed when they are directed against powers stronger economically than the aggressor. The Japanese Premier, General Tojo, seems to have learned noth- lng from the sad experience of his colleague, Mussolini.
OTHER COUNTRIES
China
Changsha—the Chinese Verdun—chalks up •mother victory and tightens its helmet straps for he next battle. The score to date: Four major on- oughts by Japan. Four major victories for *-hina.
And while the democratic world applauds, and says the tide of war in China has turned, it only '’aguely comprehends the story of blood and ears and clever strategy that lies behind it all.
fhe story of Changsha is a story of courage Versus guns. It is the story of an ancient city that Was never intended to be a fortress, but one that Mature has so situated that it has served as the strongest bulwark of embattled China. It is the story of a city that no longer exists—a city lost to both of the warring parties. China lost it in 1938 when her own soldiers burned it to the ground in an overzealous application of the scorched-earth policy.
Japan lost it after fleeting victories in 1939 and 1941. And in view of the disaster which is now being recorded at Changsha, it appears that the Mikado’s army has lost the city for keeps unless it can develop considerably more “staying” power than it has shown in the past. Changsha is, indeed, “nobody’s city.” But its venerable ashes—still in Chinese hands—have seen the bloodiest defeats in 2,600 years of Japanese military history. Whatever fortunes the future may bring, Changsha is assured a brilliant page in the story of Tokyo’s downfall.
Two of the four Changsha battles cost Japan 150,000 casualties, according to official Chinese sources. More than half of these, they say, were counted on the field. And in one of the battles the fleeing invader was pushed back 90 miles in a clash that lasted only a matter of hours. Foreign observers watched this rout and testify to the truth of the story.
And now, as the fourth major battle for Changsha enters its final stage, Chungking reports 60,000 Japanese killed, injured or cut off south of Tungting Lake. And this week most of the world again is wondering why Japan is willing to pay so high a price for Changsha, and why —after paying the price—she cannot hold the city. A study of the map answers the first question. Changsha is the focal point of all communications in a vast area of Central China. It sits astride the ancient overland and river routes and is the midway stop on the Hankow-Canton railway.
Changsha is, therefore, the center of supply for all the Chinese armies of the Central front, south of the Yangtze. Into the city of redistribution are poured men and arms from Chungking; gasoline and supplies from the Burma road, and food from the neighboring rice country. With Changsha in Japanese hands, the future would be dark for Chungking’s armies to the north and east of the city. Their arms supply would be cut off. They would have to live on the land. It is even possible that, with Changsha in her hands, Japan might find it practicable to withdraw part of her army from Central China to fight against the Allies elsewhere.
In any event, occupation of the city would reduce the drain on Japanese military stores by reducing China’s ability to fight back. Failure in repeated attempts to take Changsha is having the opposite effect. It is using up Japanese supplies and tying up an army of at least 70,000. Thus, in continuing to hold out at Changsha, the Chinese defenders are dealing a blow at Japan on every front that has been invaded. They are fighting for a greater purpose than merely to hold a city.
It is clear that Changsha’s strategic location is the prime Japanese military objective in Central China. The city itself is of little economic importance to the invader because it is so far from the coast. Nor is annihilation of the Chinese forces defending it of any great importance, for these forces are not large, as Chinese armies go. To know these facts is to discount Tokyo’s stock alibi, to the effect that its armies retreat from Changsha “only after accomplishing their mission, which is complete annihilation of China’s forces in that sector.”
This alibi, twice repeated in the past, is heard again as the Chinese mop up enemy stragglers south of Yochow. The second question—why Japan has not been able to hold the city—also can be answered, in part, by (a) terrain at Changsha lends itself to defense and counterattack rather than to offensive operations; (6) roads leading to Changsha from the north are poor; the railway has been destroyed by the Chinese, and the Siang River is too shallow for anything larger than a gunboat even in the rainy season (and the Japanese usually attack in the dry season); (c) the city is so far inland that the Japs must extend their supply lines beyond the danger point to get there.
The Japs first marched on Changsha in September, 1938. By early October they had reached a point midway between Yochow—their base of operations—and their objective (about 45 miles north of Changsha). It was at this juncture that panic swept the Chinese defenders and they burned the city to the ground. But the Japanese were beaten back, and at no time in 1938 were they closer than 40 miles to the city. In 1939 the Japs again descended from the north. This time they reached the city of shacks the Chinese had built on the ruins of the city they had burned. Then came disaster—the worst in the annals of the Japanese Army. .
The Chinese struck in force to the rear of the Japanese main body. They burned bridges and destroyed roads; encircled most of the Japanese troops and forced the rest into a costly retreat to Yochow, 90 miles northward. After the 1939 rout Japan steered clear of Changsha for nearly two years. Not until September 18, 1941, the anniversary of the Mukden incident, did she strike again. Then, protected by 200 planes and considerable artillery, five full divisions of Japanese pushed southward into Hunan.
On October 1 they claimed that Changsha had fallen. To prove it—in the face of Chinese denials—they flew a few American newspapermen over the city’s outskirts low enough for them to see Japanese uniforms in the streets. But on October 2 the Japs admitted they had withdrawn from the city, “having completed their mission, which was the annihilation of four Chinese armies, comprising 200,000 men.” Having learned their lesson in the disaster of 1939, the Japanese brought six regiments of engineers to keep communications open for their 1941 try. Late m December, 1941, Japan began its fourth assault on Changsha. But today, after a month of fighting, the Japanese are right back at their base m Yochow, where the Chinese forces are still pressing them. Changsha has been strategically i®' portant since ancient days. The city stands in the southern neck of the broad Yangtze plain. To the north the plain widens rapidly and there are only low hills. But to the south is only the narrow valley of the Siang River.
The Japanese approach Changsha from the north. They must pass along the eastern shore ot Tungting Lake, parallel with the Siang River. In the rainy season the lake is a real barrier. It fills to the brim and floods much of the surrounding country. So the Japanese have consistently attacked in the dry season, which is the fall and winter. From Yochow, the southernmost Jap base in central China, to Changsha is 90 miles. _
As the Japanese approach Changsha, the b®* close in on both sides, increasing the danger o Chinese attacks from the hills on supply hneS' Chinese strategy has been to withdraw a large part of their force to the hills as the invader ap' proached the city; march north about 40 miles behind a ridge, then pounce on the Japanese rear after the main Jap spearhead has passed south' ward in the valley toward Changsha. They have pulled this stunt successfully three times. T^6 Siang hills are ideal for guerilla operations. S°> even though the Japanese might seize the ®ty> they could be forced to keep a large garrison there. Changsha is the hub of a great circle of *® portant Central China cities. Both legend an modern history tell of the fierceness of the Hunan warrior (Changsha is the capital of Hunan province) and the hostility of the province t° foreign encroachment. So hostile was this tert tory, and so successfully did it back its host® 7 by armed force, that it was one of the last Chines® provinces to be opened to foreign residence an exploitation. In modern times Changsha has be come a rice, coal, and iron center. ,
Some of the most accessible and best coal fie* in all South China are near Changsha. There is a large quantity of the highest quality hard coal ®
when the British government granted
eposits on the surface, or very near it. The . an8sha sector also has huge reserves of lead, zmc, antimony, and tin. And two-thirds of China’s ea crops are planted in the rolling South Yangtze Wls behind the city.
p,The Japanese haven’t won a major victory in j-hma since June, 1939, when Ichang fell. So, to 0 ,er their prestige, as well as their strategical Position if they are to continue the war in China, p vjctory at Changsha seems imperative.— altimore Sun, January 25.
India
he might of India is mobilized for war. For ,e first time in her long history this great empire 389 million inhabitants—one-sixth of the orld’s population—finds herself on the active attlefront in a world conflict, with the enemy blrectly threatening her shores. This program em- races both her military and industrial resources nd is an essential part of Allied strategy in the ^acific and Indian Oceans. The impetus of India’s -effort has been ever quickened as the menace t I"*S a8gression approached nearer and nearer in, frontier. While the outbreak of the war in c 9 found many leaders of the All-India National ingress Party opposed to actively helping the vernment of India’s war effort, this sentiment and Wealiened as fh0 war drew closer to India, sv k moreover> their opposition was entirely 0y bolic. Whatever its attitude to Britain, the erwhelming mass of Indian opinion has always jj en ^90 per cent anti-Nazi, and the Germans ^Je never succeeded in getting a single line of 21 Propaganda published in an Indian news- as?er'-iHdia’s strategy aims at keeping the war ar from her own shores as possible, th ^la *S divided into four military commands, eadquarters of which are located as follows: No1 *7eni Command at Rawalpindi, in the ruaHW6St frontier Province; Southern Comat at,hoona, near Bombay; Eastern Command and *n f°°fhills of the Himalayas,
. . Western Command, at Quetta, near the
to I an*stan border, and one of the supply routes w The chief naval ports are Bombay on the shi an^ F^lcutta on the east, but as most of the Ps of the Indian Navy are of coastal size, they yuse many small harbors, tin ^ fridian Army, which has already dis- an?Ulf^ed itself in Egypt, Somaliland, Abyssinia,
. he Sudan, is winning added glory with the on-* - Libya and in the Burmese-Malayan f «atlonS- This army is a first-class, modern cbl.nS force, well trained, well equipped me- tio n‘Cally and °f high morale. The mechaniza- jga °f the Indian Army took definite form in
$2,400,000 to India for that purpose. The prewar Indian Army of 160,000 was expanded to 500,000 in 1940, and topped one million in 1941; more than 200,000 of these forces are now serving overseas. This army is increasingly staffed by Indian officers, most of whom were trained at the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun, and in the recently established schools at Mhow and Bangalore, where British and Indian cadets work side by side. Those three centers now graduate about 2,000 Indian commissioned officers yearly.
The Royal Indian Navy is fully equipped for its primary task of coastal defense. It has, however, also proved its worth at Massawa in the Red Sea, Mogadishu in Italian Somaliland and on the Persian Gulf, and would play an important part in defending Indian ports against possible Japanese raiders. The Indian Navy is under constant expansion, both in India-made ships and in personnel. Indian officer personnel has increased 50 per cent, enlisted personnel 100 per cent in the last year.
Public interest in aviation in India has been widespread for some years. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, Indian sportsmen formed many flying clubs, which now have important military value. The Indian air force was organized in 1932, but grew slowly, being handicapped by lack of planes; this problem was particularly acute in 1939, the planes being badly wanted elsewhere. However, the force has been greatly expanded in the past two years; many of its units are now defending her strategic frontiers in Egypt and Malaya. The recent construction of a number of assembly plants, where American-type planes are put together by Indian personnel under supervision of American technicians, has facilitated extension of India’s air service.
The importance of India’s place in the war economy may be gauged by the fact that the International Labor Office has rated her among the world’s eight leading industrial nations. Stimulated by a recognition of India’s danger from Axis aggression, the nation has developed its war industries to a point where they not only equip her own troops with most of their needs, but also supply many essentials to the British, American, and other Allies. The Indian is traditionally a competent craftsman, and has been quick to master the techniques of munitions manufacture. In June, 1940, the government of India introduced compulsory national service for skilled labor, calling up for war work all Indian technicians not already engaged in such service. This call brought in 10,000 men; subsequently a program of training technicians was undertaken which is expected shortly to make available an additional 15,000 skilled operatives. It is indicative of the growing war-consciousness of India that this conscription of technicians—the first conscriptive measure ever promulgated in India— was greeted with universal approval. India’s war industry plans were integrated to world strategy at a conference at Delhi during October-Novem- ber, 1940. This historic gathering, under the chairmanship of an Indian, Sir Muhammed Zafrullah, Khan, brought together delegates of all members of the British Commonwealth situated between Africa and Australia, inclusive, to form the Eastern Group supply council. The council developed a co-ordinated program for pooling war supplies in their respective countries. Delhi thus has become the capital for Allied war supply effort in India and the southwest Pacific, making India a focal point of Allied supply strategy. Rich in natural resources, developing steadily in manufacturing facilities and with an almost inexhaustible man power to draw upon, India today constitutes an industrial asset of real magnitude to the Allies. Indian products service Axis enemies on all continents. Among the most important of them are cotton and jute, which, manufactured into many vital war articles, are exported to all members of the commonwealth. America’s defense program calls for manganese ore and mica from India’s mines. Indian kyanite, sillimanite, and magnesite provide furnace linings in many of the world’s great industrial plants.
India was industry-conscious even before the war started, and new Indian-owned manufacturing projects were being constantly introduced. These projects supplied the nucleus for the big expansion which has taken place in the past two years, and has a long-term significance, assuring India a more important place in the post-war economy. Her war output covers a wide range of manufactures. Producing annually millions of yards of textiles, she clothes her own army, supplying textiles for many other needs of India’s forces, as well as exporting these products to the Allies. Her steel industry, the capital, management, and labor of which are all Indian, plays a vital part in the war effort. The Tata Iron and Steel plant, largest in the British Empire, is only one unit of India’s steel industry. Within the past two years the steel industry has increased its output, especially of armor plate, by nearly 33£ per cent. Today India’s ordnance factories make 4 times as many guns and 24 times as many filled shells as in 1939. These ordnance factories, supplemented by 250 “trade” workshops and 23 railroad workshops, now are making 700 different items of munitions. At the beginning of 1942 the output of fuses, tungsten, and high speed tool steels, as well as all types of guns and accessories, was greatly accelerated and expanded.
But small arms are only a part of the picture. India is now producing armored fighting vehicles, aircraft, and ships on a substantial scale. In 1941 she turned out 3,000 armored vehicles. In her aircraft factories, supervised by American technicians, American-type warplanes are assembled. Some of these planes are understood to be already in action in Burma and Malaya. Small war- craft, from mine sweepers to lifeboats, are being manufactured in large numbers in India’s shipyards. India is one of the world’s chief sources of hides, with an extensive leather industry, and most of the soldiers in the British Middle Eastern armies wear India-made shoes. She is also increasing in importance as a food supply source for the Allies; her shipments of dried potatoes, cereals, and other foods rose appreciably in 1941In wood products, too, India plays an important role. Her abundant forestry contributes timber which serves many military uses, including packing cases, ammunition boxes, telegraph poles, jetty piles, railway ties and hutting. The lack oi machine tools is a problem, and the maximum exploitation of India’s Industrial resources will not be attained until Britain and America are able to increase their shipments of machine tools to fill her needs in this direction. However, her railway tool shops now produce 1,000 gauges a week, and 54 firms have been licensed to make machine tools under direction of the Machine Tool Control.—The Washington Post, January 25-
AVIATION
Scientific Approach to Air Tactics
The Aeroplane, December 26 (Major Oliver Stewart, M.C., A.F.C.)—Sensibly as I am of the honor done me by the Editor’s invitation to contribute this guest editorial article to The Aeroplane, I must firs1 voice the good wishes of all who are interested in aviation for the speedy recovery of Mr. E. C. Shepherd from his present iff' disposition so that he may return at the earliest moment to the editorial chair he occupies with such distinction.
My theme is the application of scientih0 methods to air tactics, or, rather, the scientific approach to tactical problem3. Scientific workers (for I learn that the more elevated among them dislike beinf? called “scientists”) are sometimes remarkably unscientific. Outside their own relatively small fields of activity they sometimes show an attitude of mind which is foreign to scientific thought and method. The scientific outlook, in fact, is not confined to the scientific worker and is sometimes to be found in more marked degree ln the practicing engineer or the business executive. It is not often found in high ranking officers of the services. In the study of aerial tactics the scientific method ls exceedingly rare.
Some of the great air fighters do undoubtedly exhibit this attitude to their task. They do undoubtedly use scientific Methods in devising their plans of attack and in determining their maneuvers in combat. They analyze, measure, experiment, calculate, test, and again measure. Measurement is, I suppose, the basis of the scientific method and some noted Pilots have employed it to the fullest ex- lent. But the great majority of pilots do not receive any particular instruction or encouragement in the scientific approach to their tactical problems. They are left to s°rt out for themselves in mock combat he best methods for overcoming the enemy. They are left to discover by trial and error what to do in those complex ^’eavings which constitute aerial battle. Ifiey have no precise and tried and tested guidance.
It is my view—which I have held for a garter of a century—that measurement ^ould form the foundation of air tactics, fivery form of attack should be measured; every kind of turn should be measured, aud part of the pilot’s operational training sfi°uld be designed to imprint upon his uund what are the experimentally and matfiematically established facts about the ehavior of airplanes when maneuvering, fiat is the fighter pilot’s side. There is also the scientific approach to bombing. , erhaps somewhere a statistical survey as been made of the relative vulnerability 0 the various kinds of target which may be attacked by bombs. Take a simple and somewhat crude example. Is the enemy’s war effort more damaged by destroying by bombs ten machine tools or the ten operatives who work them? It is impossible to give a positive answer without considerable research; without a great deal of measurement and calculation. Is the answer known? If it is, then the fact has been carefully concealed.
The bombing of the sea of railway lines called the marshaling yards at Hamm, for instance, is bombing of things and not people. The chances of large casualties to Germans are small, for the area has few people in it. Has it been positively shown by any statistical survey that the destruction of those railway lines is indeed more damaging to the German war effort than would be the destruction of German lives which might result from the use of the same weight of bombs on a residential district? I have noticed that when the Soviet Air Force, in its brilliant low-level attacks, has destroyed a number of lorry loads of German infantry, and when the fact has been stated in the official communiques there has been more satisfaction than if it had destroyed an equal number of tanks. The instinct points to the human being as being the supreme value in war and not the machine—however elaborate and however expensive. My belief is that if a scientific study were to be made of a number of bombing targets, it would confirm the instinctive view and would, in all cases, put the human being at the top of the scale of priorities. In mechanized war we still fight with human beings.
It may be said that if you destroy a man you do less than if you destroy a machine, because the machine represents the work of many men during much time. But our own bombing experiences have demonstrated that the destruction of a human being does not end there; it has far-reaching repercussions. Thus, if a workman is killed it may well be that his brother will find it necessary to absent himself from his work and possibly also his father or son. There is a chain in the human family which is in the last analysis far longer than that of the largest and most complicated machine.
I know, of course, that there are ethical objections to the attack on civilians, but I am not here concerned with them. I am concerned merely with pointing out that the selection of bomb targets should, first of all, be based on measurement and calculation of the effects that can be achieved. If it be shown by convincing survey that the killing of a child does, in fact, do more harm to the enemy’s war effort than the destruction of a machine tool, then the fact should be noted, and one can proceed to other and ethical aspects of the matter. I complain that we are not certain if it is more damaging to the enemy’s war effort to destroy a German or a German machine. I complain that there has been no really scientific study of this primary question.
In air fighting, as I have mentioned, there has been a certain amount of study, but the results are not widely known or assimilated by those to whom they would be the greatest value. Let me present a harshly practical example. Two formations of fighters clash and two aircraft are flung off the wheeling groups, one British and one enemy. They whirl round one another in the circular chase which is, and always has been, the basis of the aerial “dog fight.” Now the objective of both those pilots is plain. It is to point his airplane at his antagonist, or, as it is said, to “get on his tail.” The entire will power, the entire manual dexterity, the entire visual judgment, and the entire determination of those two highly trained, selected, and physically fit youths are aimed at that one end. But what is the best method? We enter here a complicated field, but I will confine myself to a relatively simple case based on the assumption that both airplanes are working at their operational height. There are two broad alternatives; either the pilot can throttle down and curve in on the smallest radius he can use without stalling, or he can turn all the taps on and swing out on a huge, highspeed turn on big radius. Obviously, the ideal would be to make a small- radius turn at high speed and to get the best of both worlds. But quite apart from the high accelerations involved and their effects on the pilot himself, it is impossible to combine high speed and small radius beyond a certain point, which varies with the machine. Here is the problem, then, at first sight simple, but on closer inspection extraordinarily intricate. Yet it is a problem that has been the subject of a good deal of research and measurement. 1° 1914-18 I was impressed by the fact that many of our greatest fighting pilots—with some of whom I was on intimate terms'" held different views on the matter, even when like conditions were postulated as to height and aircraft and the speed at which the combat began. So later, when I was at an experimental station working as a test pilot, I sought to begin a research for the purpose of measuring turns and providing pilots with tables of positive, proved UJ' formation on which they might base theb tactical maneuvering.
My researches were not pursued; but there have been since then many interesting and important measurements and calculations on this subject. Especially valu' able were the experiments made with the Schneider Trophy racing seaplanes, an subsequently published, I think, in the form of a paper before the Royal Aer° nautical Society or else as a research memorandum. These tended to supp°r the belief that the fastest turn, wheI1 speeds between 300 and 400 miles an hoUr are concerned, is made on a great radiuS and high forward speed. They tended tjj show that if the pilot pulled into a sina radius (pushing up the effective wing l°aCl ing thereby) he not only subjected his ov’jj body to higher strains, but also reduce the rate at which he would get round tbe turn. When it is remembered that this kind of turning is fundamental to all air fighting, 1 is clear that no time or trouble spent uPon elucidating the problems and setting °ut the measurements clearly and concisely would be wasted. I am impressed by f e fact that knowledge on the subject is still limited and that many pilots seem still f° work by guess rather than by measurement. It is a case where scientific method should be called in to the aid of the fighting P1 °t, and where he should have the posi- ive information made available to him Uring his operational training.
These are, however, merely examples. I only refer to them because they illustrate e main point, which is that air tactics s ould be regarded as a subject for the apP 1 cation of scientific methods just as much as the design and construction of an air- P ane. It is really extraordinary that the n?0st scientific of all fighting machines, the uirplane, should be used in a manner which
"^partly, at any rate—highly unscientific.
Royal Air Force pilots, in so far as my Perience of them goes, are anxious to ob- um all the positive information they can.
ey are avid of those experimentally de- ermined facts which help them in their Operational duties. More attention should e Paid to their needs.
Jet Propulsion in Italy
The Aeroplane, December 26.—On Janu- Uty 31, 1941, nearly 12 months ago, we re- Pprted f°r the first time the first test cguts of the Italian Caproni-Campini •'-.-I jet propulsion airplane which were ade in August, 1940, at Taliedo aero- ronie, near Milan. Colonel Mario de Ber- ^ardi, the Italian Schneider Trophy pilot, tfi^ uRplane for about 10 minutes on q occasion. Since then Signor Secondo ^Umpim has designed and built a new and ^ger jet-propulsion airplane, the C.C.-2. jo ls a two-seat tandem, enclosed-cockpit -Wing monoplane with large single fin and rudder and outwards retracting undercarriage, and is apparently a great improvement on the earlier machine, which was a single-seater. The C.C.-l weighed 8,800 lb. and took off with a normal airscrew before switching over to jet propulsion. The new jet-propulsion airplane, which weighs about 11,000 lb., has no airscrew. It is now undergoing extended flying trials. On December 1, Colonel de Ber- nardi flew it from Taliedo aerodrome to Linate aerodrome, Guidonia, near Rome. He covered the 168 miles in 2\ hours, including a stop at Pisa. Captain Pedace, of the Regia Aeronautica, and a small mailbag accompanied de Bernardi. When he arrived at Guidonia, Colonel de Bernardi said that the average flying speed for the journey was not high—about 130 m.p.h.— but that no efforts had been made to attain high speed. The cross-country journey was a delivery flight to bring the C.C.-2 to the Guidonia Research Station for tests.
Colonel de Bernardi claimed, with justice, that the flight proved that the jet- propulsion airplane was no longer a dream but a practical proposition. He suggested that the speed of the conventional airscrew propelled airplane was reaching its upper limit. Still faster speeds could be attained only by fundamentally new designs, of which the Caproni-Campini airplane was one example.
In view of recent developments in the war, the desire of the Italians to possess means of attaining still higher speeds is in keeping with our experience of them during the past 18 months.
The principle of the Caproni-Campini design is simple. Air enters a circular duct in the nose, is expanded and passes into a compressor, which may be a normal aero- motor or an internal-combustion turbine. It is then ejected through a smaller duct with a controlled outlet behind the tail. The hot exhaust gases of the motor which drives the compressor are ejected in the same duct and aid the propulsion which
comes from the kinetic energy in the jet.
Jet propulsion should not be confused with rocket propulsion. Presumably jet propulsion should afford its highest speeds low down, where the compressor motor is delivering its highest power, whereas rocket propulsion should afford its highest speed high up, where the reaction propulsion is not affected but the resistance is reduced.
water. The only damage, apart from that caused by the Heinkel’s machine-gun bullets, was to the windscreen, which was somewhat buckled by the air pressure during the dive. The distorted windscreen is now one of Captain Flowerday’s most treasured possessions.
The Heinkel went on its way, either realizing its mistake, or thinking that the precipitate dive could only have a fatal ending. When base was reached, the crew expressed their relief by some strenuous work on the hydraulic hand pump to get the massive undercarriage down. With their
COMPRESSOR
2P/iV
HOW IT WORKS
The principle whereby the Caproni-Campini jet-propelled airplane flies without any form of airscrew is shown in this drawing, which is purely diagrammatic. Air enters the circular intake in the nose and passes through a expansion chamber where its velocity is reduced and its pressure increased before it enters the motor-driven compre sor. This compressor heats the air and propels it backwards into a convergent tunnel. The air goes out of the com pressor with increased velocity and temperature. The exhaust helps in heating it down the tunnel, and theai1" finally ejected from the tail at normal atmospheric pressure with increased temperature and velocity. The kmeu energy thus induced gives an extremely powerful thrust. The throttle control is by a cone which enlarges or reduc the area of the outlet. The drawing shows the principle but not the actual details. The figures for Pressure, Veloci y> and Temperature in the formulas are presented, not to be taken literally, but to indicate the type of variatio through the duct.
Various Notes
One of British Airways’ larger and much- publicized airliners was flying on a civil and peaceful mission which took it off some part of the British coast about three weeks ago when it was attacked by a Heinkel He 111K on less civil business. The Heinkel fired one burst from its machine guns and the bullets punctured the main spar and the hydraulic piping, and made holes in the covering. There were no passengers on board and, apart from surprise and shock at the behavior of the airliner immediately afterwards, the crew were unharmed. Captain A. P. Flowerday, who was in command, at once dived in an attempt to evade further molestation, and the erstwhile sedate and elongated airliner made the flight of its life—reaching a speed of 325 miles an hour before it flattened out 5 feet above the confidence in the structural integrity of their machine more than doubled, the crew were m good spirits after the adventure. The machine will probably resume its checkered flying career within the next fortnight or three weeks. Tht Aeroplane, December 12.
The United States must prosecute scientific research in aeronautics “with vigor and imaging tion” to win the war because vast quantities o aircraft alone are insufficient, the National A ^ visory Committee of Aeronautics warned Mon day in a report submitted to Congress throug^ President Roosevelt. Warplane speeds in e^ceS„ of 400 miles an hour are “an obvious necessity* it was said by the committee, headed by ' Jerome C. Hunsacker. The report asserted t ^ the outstanding British pursuit planes of the a-
goods.
erican shipping—notably the inter- c°astal trade—have suffered by reason of government acquisition of privately owned nips. But for many years the industry has c°-operated with the government. Some Actions have operated under government egulation, others under what almost
Ann
two years, the Spitfire and the Hurricane, as well as the latest of the German Luftwaffe’s Messer- schmitt 109 series had maximum speeds “of the order of 360 miles an hour” and added that it would not be enough for American engineers to increase the horsepower and smooth the surfaces” as a means of gaining higher speeds during 1942. The National Advisory Committee members, who include some of the nation’s outstanding aeronautical engineers and scientists, noted that, with the exception of dive-bombing problems and certain projects relating to aircraft armaments, “practically all of the research of the committee is directly applicable to civil types of aircraft.”
“Only continued scientific research can give the nation assurance that its aircraft will be kept at least the equal of those of any other nation,” the report said.—New York Herald Tribune, January 14.
MERCHANT MARINE Marine Highlights 1941
Marine Progress, January.—When the Japanese carried out the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, t941, no American industry was better Prepared for war-time operations than the Marine industry. For two years it had figured largely in the defense effort. The Mature of shipping itself, involving contact ^tth every part of the globe, the apprecia- tt°n on the part of shipping men of the Importance of the American Merchant marine as the nation’s second line of de- ense, the constantly increasing tempo of ^9 ship construction program—all these
^ere factors which helped place the industry
in a position of preparedness for the greatly intensified emergency. True, there *s hardly an American shipping company °uay which does not find a need for more °nnage, more space in which to carry American goods. Certain branches of amounted to government supervision. Thus the commencement of hostilities found American marine interests prepared to render an all-out effort in the prosecution of total warfare.
When the war came, the wisdom of the government’s policy and the foresightedness of the Maritime Commission in accelerating its shipbuilding programs were apparent even to those who had been most vociferous in their demands for isolationism. In 1940, the Commission had stepped up its “long range” program to the point that by January 1, 1941, contracts had been awarded for the construction of 182 vessels. Nineteen forty-one was still new when the Commission, acting on President Roosevelt’s order, announced that it would shortly place contracts for 200 emergency type cargo vessels—referred to by the President as “ugly ducklings” but quickly christened “Liberty Ships” by the Commission. This was in addition to the 60 ships for Britain, contracted for with American yards late in 1940. But that was only the beginning! Before the year had run its course, the Commission had ordered 582 more vessels of various types, principally ocean-going cargo carriers and tankers, bringing the total Maritine Commission’s programs up to 968 vessels. Of these, keels had been laid for 308 ships by December 31, 1941 (184 in 1941); 178 ships had been launched (87 in 1941); and 129 delivered (67 in 1941). The big splash came on “Liberty Fleet Day,” September 27, 1941, when 14 ships were launched by American shipyards on the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Gulf coasts. In the month of December, 26 ships slid down the ways. In between, wherever private shipowners could find an opening, contracts were placed for additional tonnage. Complete details will be found elsewhere in this issue of Marine Progress.
As the war in Europe continued and conditions became more acute, American ship repair companies found themselves pressed more and more for the use of their facilities. Foreign ships, principally British, were sent to American yards and ports for repairs, because shipyards of their home countries were unable to keep up with the demand. No longer did the shipowner haggle with the ship repairer over prices. Competitive bids for repair work went out the window. The problem was to get vessels repaired and overhauled—not how much the work would cost. The problem was solved by the establishment of an agency, with offices in principal ship repair centers, to co-ordinate ship repair activities. This organization, a joint operation of the Navy Department, the Maritime Commission, and the ship repair industry, co-ordinate all effort, allocates the work to the yards best fitted to do it, assists in obtaining priorities on materials and equipment, insures the smooth working of the entire industry so far as vessels needed in the defense effort are concerned, and saves money for everyone involved.
Equally important as the shipbuilders and repairers have been the ship operators. Speaking at the American Merchant Marine Conference held in San Francisco in October, Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, Chairman of the Maritime Commission, summed up as follows:
The shipbuilding industry of the nation has accorded the Maritime Commission splendid cooperation. Otherwise the accomplishments thus far made would not have been possible. The same fine patriotic attitude has been displayed by the ship operators, with the result that the serious problem of tonnage shortage has been minimized as much as humanly possible.
And the American shipowners have done all of that and more. Those who were forced out of European trade routes by the Neutrality Act of 1939 turned to other trades which had been deserted by European shipping lines. But due to the needs of the Army and the Navy, most American lines have had to (1) concentrate on the transportation of defense materials at the expense of usual service to their regular customers, and (2) surrender ships to the government which were sorely needed for the carrying of American commerce. In many instances, vessels were acquired by the government before they were completed; in others, new vessels made but one or two voyages before being taken over by the Navy or the War Department.
Topping the list of erstwhile privately owned ships which are now in government service is the America, now the West Point, completed in 1940, employed in the West Indies cruise trade, and requisitioned in the middle of a cruise last May. Also included in a list announced on June 4 were the Washington and Manhattan of the United States Lines, the President Coolidge and six other “President” ships of the American President Lines, the Oriente ol the Cuba Mail Line, six Moore-McCor- mack Line freighters, and 11 others a total of 28 at a clip! Even old ships, long laid up, were pressed into service after reconditioning. The old George Washingt°n and the old America, ex-German liners tied up for years in the Patuxent at Solomon s Island, Maryland, were broken out an fitted up as transports. The laid-up fleet’ quite diminished at the beginning of I94l> and long a source of controversy, is prac' tically gone.
Perhaps the hardest hit have been the intercoastal and coastwise lines. Demand for “pools” to provide tonnage for tbe transportation of munitions and suppheS to the British have depleted the domesti0 fleet. Requisition by government depart ments has also taken many ships of tb1® class. The Southern Pacific fleet, consisting of the passenger ship Dixie and ten freighters, was acquired by the govern ment by purchase, and the famous Morgan Line houseflag has disappeared from seas. The Eastern Steamship Lines’ coas wise passenger vessels George Washing and Robert E. Lee are all that remain d_ that company’s extensive fleet of passeng
ships still in regular service. The Acadia, John, Yarmouth and Evangeline have been “called to the colors,” and the Eastern Lines’ New York to Boston service suspended—at least until next spring when the “summer boats” named for these two cities return to that run.
The Clyde-Mallory Line has surrendered, among others, the Shawnee and the Iroquois, popular New York-Florida passenger ships. The latter, after extensive conversion, is now the Solace, world’s most uiodern hospital ship. The Borinquen of the New York and Puerto Rico Line was recently requisitioned. The privately owned tanker fleet has been depleted too, because °[ the needs of the government—first by direct requisition of the Navy Department, <]ud second by the call for ships to carry 4^1 oil and gasoline for the use of the British. However, the plight of the American Merchant Marine is not so bad as one Unagines from the foregoing. There is an- °ther side to the picture. Not all of the 67 ships completed by American shipyards in y4l, have been requisitioned by the government. Added to our facilities, though operating under the American flag, are he Axis and other alien ships in American P°rts seized and otherwise acquired. In a Surprise move in late April, 18 Axis ships ^ ere seized by the Coast Guard, but not . e*°re several had been severely sabotaged 111 an effort to render them useless in the ^ent of just such a happening. The first of ese ships was repaired and in service y July 30—the others have long since een put to work. As the year drew to a c 0se, the United States added to its rolls yue of the world’s three largest ships—the rench Liner Normandie. Today, thou- fands of workmen are engaged in convert- *ng the Normandie, rechristened the La- ayette, into a troop ship. Another recent Requisition is the Swedish liner Kungs- 0 m, last of the foreign flag cruise liners to Ruter to Americans desirous of West Indies acations. It is entirely unlikely, however,
that the Kungsholm could have continued to run in that trade once America entered the war.
Despite the demand for cargo space, freight rates have not skyrocketed as they did in the days of World War I. Early in the year, the Maritime Commission issued a warning to conference carriers in trade routes outside of the war zones that unduly high rate increases would not be tolerated, that notice of all proposed increases must be filed with the Commission, and complete justification be given for each increase.
Late in February, the Maritime Commission created the Division of Emergency Shipping to handle all emergency water transportation problems, maintain liaison with the Navy Department, War Department, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Office of Production Management, State Department, and other government agencies, with supervision over sales, charters, transfers, reallocations, reassignments and requisitions of all vessel tonnage in connection with emergency transportation. H. Harris Robson was appointed director, and M. L. Wilcox, assistant director. Both are well-known former United Fruit Company executives.
On March 1, American lines in trades where defense materials figured importantly entered into a voluntary system of cargo priorities, thus offering the new Division of Emergency Shipping complete cooperation in attaining its objectives so far as American ships were concerned. On the same date, the Transportation Act of 1940 became fully operative, with domestic ship operators filing rates with the Maritime Commission in the past having their tariffs transferred to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Certificates of convenience and necessity became effective on March 1. Intercoastal and coastwise lines filed new transshipment agreements with the I. C. C. Under the act, the Maritime Commission retained jurisdiction over Puerto Rican,
Hawaiian, and Alaskan trades—otherwise its tenure over domestic lines ended on that date, with the construction of new vessels for domestic trade or the transfer of such ships to foreign registry.
In April the ship warrants bill was introduced. It was enacted into law, and went into effect on September 25. The act provides for priorities in the use of such shore facilities as stevedoring, towing, overhauling, and the procurement of fuel for those vessels, whether they be American or foreign flag, which co-operate with defense by carrying approved cargos at reasonable rates. Under the act, the Maritime Commission established maximum time charter rates for both American and foreign vessels, ranging from $4.50 a dead-weight ton a month on freighters of 10,000 deadweight tons or more, up to $6.50 a ton on vessels from 2,500 to 2,999 dead weight. The basic speed in this rate scale was 12 knots; an additional charge of ten cents a ton per month was permitted for each one- half knot in excess of twelve. As 1942 came into being, the Commission ordered a reduction in these rates, effective January 20, requiring adherence, on pain of refusal to grant warrants, to a new level of maximum charter rates based on $3.25 a deadweight ton per month for 10,000 ton ships. The rate scales upward to $6.05 on vessels of the 1,000 to 1,499 ton class. It is plain that no shipowner operating vessels out of American ports is going to get rich from the present emergency. Yet none is complaining.
One seemingly insurmountable difficulty which it is hoped will be dissipated by the entry of the United States into the war is the matter of labor strikes, mostly of the jurisdictional character. Throughout the year, despite agreements prohibiting labor stoppages, both shipowners and shipbuilders—in common with many other industries—were bedevilled with strikes. It was estimated that 15,750,000 man-days were lost through strikes in American in-
dustry during the first seven months of 1941. The marine industry got its share. Demands for war bonuses by ships’ officers and unlicensed crew members resulted in innumerable delayed sailings even though the ships in question were going no nearer the European war zone than the West Indies. The most notorious case of all) however, occurred in the shipbuilding in' dustry, when a strike for so-called “union security” at the plant of the Federal Ship' building and Dry Dock Co. stopped work for some 20 days on 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 3 tankers and 2 cargo ships. At the end of this period, the Navy Department seized the plant on an executive order of the President and proceeded to operate it' Early in January, 1942, the plant was restored to its rightful owners after months of government operation. So far as is known, the owners of the federal plant have not agreed to any change in their former attitude that compulsory membership in any labor union is a requisite to employment on national defense work.
The American marine industry continues to forge ahead. Occupying a position of importance second to no other industry) it is supplying ships and services without which the war in defense of the American way of living could not be prosecuted- Those who have preached a strong American Merchant Marine and a strong American marine industry received complete vindication in the year which has just ended. We may see even more active years in marine affairs, but none more important-
MISCELLANEOUS Winter Weather Comparisons
New York Herald Tribune, January ll- —Many misconceptions of weather conditions in various parts of the world are held by the public, especially since “General Winter” has become an important factor in war news generally and the cold season has set in at the European arena- The cold on the Russian front is particu-
tarly stressed in dispatches, and there need be no doubt in any one’s mind that the leather does get cold in Russia—but how cold, with what other places does Russia compare?
News of current weather throughout the Northern Hemisphere is suppressed by War censorship, but information as to general climatic conditions over many years is available for almost all areas and 11 is possible to compare the climates of Many countries.
European Russia extends north and south approximately as does the United States, but lies much farther north. If Russia were shifted around the globe, but Maintained its latitude, it would, if super- 'mposed on the North American Continent, occupy much the same position as Canada. The southern border of Russia and the northern border of the United States would overlap slightly. Despite this More northerly position, Russia has a cli- JUate comparable to that of more southerly latitudes on the North American Continent. Climatic conditions in the southern z°ne in Russia are comparable to those in a band running east and west across the nnd-section of the United States from the Carolinas to northern California. The cli- niate in the Moscow zone corresponds to Ibat in a zone embracing the southern Canadian and the northern United States boundary.
A line passing through Moscow and through all places having the same annual average temperature would pass very close t° Stockholm, Sweden; southern Iceland; bhe southern tip of Newfoundland; the Thousand Islands, in New York State; Montreal, Canada; Duluth, Minn.; Sitka, •Maska; the Aleutian Islands, and the Northern tip of Japan. Archangel, the Northern near-arctic port in Russia, has a atitude comparable to that of Baffin Land M Arctic Canada but its climate is that of Callender, Canada, where the Dionne Quintuplets were bom. The Crimea in
Southern Russia is in the latitude of Nova Scotia, but its climate is that of New York City.
Every large area, however, has its own peculiarities in climate that cannot be described under annual temperatures. Helena, Mont., for example, has about the same annual average temperature as New York City, but the Western city has a continental climate in which the temperature goes far below average in winter and far above in summer. In New York the temperature has the ocean as a balance wheel and this acts to prevent wide variations in either direction.
All of Europe has a climate modified by marine factors. Norway has the same latitude as Greenland but the climate of New England, thanks to the warm waters of the Gulf Stream that sweeps northeast past the British Isles and raises the temperature of Scandinavia and the whole Baltic region. The Mediterranean also is a powerful factor in moderating the climate of Europe. The Dardanelles are on the same latitude as New York but have the temperature of South Carolina. Leningrad, as far north as the tip of Greenland, has about the same climate as Eastport, Me.
Central Europe, benefiting from marine factors, has less of the Continental type of climate than central North America. Moscow, on the basis of latitude alone, would have the climate of the uninhabited regions of central Labrador, but instead has the average temperature of northern New England. The average annual temperature at Moscow is 37 degrees Fahrenheit. It has a range of 50 degrees in its monthly average temperatures. The coldest month is January, which has an average temperature of 14 degrees, and the warmest is July, 64 degrees. The average temperatures of its winter months are: November, 27; December, 17; January, 14, and February, 16 degrees.
The cold wave of the last week in New York is typical of Moscow January temperatures. In these months it has an average snowfall of 6.5 inches, a little less than half of the average for these months in New York. The average January and February temperatures in Montreal are a little more than a degree colder than those of Moscow. New York temperatures in the winter months average 16 degrees warmer than those of Moscow. In Winnipeg, Canada, where the average temperature is 4 degrees below zero, the winter season is 10 degrees colder than in Moscow.
The average annual temperature in eastern Germany is 10 degrees warmer than that around Moscow, and the winter temperatures 14 degrees warmer than those in the Russian area. The Russian winters therefore are about 4 degrees colder than the German, and the Russian summers about 2 degrees cooler. London’s average annual temperature, 49.6 degrees, is 13 degrees higher than that of Moscow, but London winters are 24 degrees warmer, and the summer temperatures of both places are about the same. New York City’s annual average temperature is 52 degrees. Our winters are 6 degrees cooler than those of London, 2 degrees warmer than those of Berlin, and 16 warmer than the Moscow winters.
The principal islands of the Japanese Empire lie between the same parallels of latitude as Cape Hatteras and Newfoundland. The annual average temperatures range from 60 degrees in the south to 30 degrees in the north, and it has the same range of climate as is found between Cape Hatteras and southern Labrador. The Japanese islands, entirely surrounded by ocean, have a very narrow temperature range.
The climate of Libya, on the north coast of Africa, is almost the same as that of southern Florida.
In winter, land masses become very cold and in summer very warm with respect to a uniform seasonal trend. The reverse is true of ocean areas, which in winter are unseasonably warm and in summer unseasonably cool.
In any one year the weather can vary widely from the annual average. The average for the earth as a whole remains the same from year to year and a cold winter in one section means a warm winter in some other area. The reason for these variations is unknown, but they appear to result from the shifting of the coldest air mass that results over the Arctic Ocean between western Canada and eastern Siberia, or from greater instability on one edge than the other. Cold waves result from fragments breaking off this mass and spilling over the land masses to the south.
This splitting-off process seems to stick to a single area during a whole season. The cold wave of the last week was due to this process, so there is a possibility that the North American Continent may get most of the cold waves and Europe have a relatively mild winter. However, weather statistics are so hard to obtain that all guesses are unreliable.