In the last war Germany discovered that 22 out of about 400 submarine captains scored over 60 per cent of her sinkings. In other words, one captain in the upper 5 1/2 per cent sank as many ships as 26 captains in the mediocre 94 1/2 per cent. The fact that the superior captain required only one submarine and one crew while the ordinary captains required 26 submarines and crews to achieve the same result means a sweeping economy of force. At the same time he offered only one target instead of 26 to the opposing antisubmarine flotillas. His performance, moreover, was not only an invaluable stimulant to morale but also a powerful incentive to emulation.
In this war unauthenticated figures indicate a small group of even more striking superiority as compared to the average among German submarine captains. Furthermore, a similar wide gap has been noted between the best pursuit pilots and the others in the Luftwaffe, in the R.A.F., and in our own air forces. Although we have long realized that such men as Porter, Luce, Mahan, and Fiske stood in ability head and shoulders above their contemporaries, this statistical evidence of the extent of the gap between the best men and the average in a given group is bound to amaze us. Perhaps the reason for our amazement is that submarines and pursuit planes afford a means of gauging one-man performances in war which had not existed since the days of armored knights. At any rate these outstanding men are the very heart and soul of a successful naval or military organization, just as an especially gifted player is the spark plug of a winning football team. Nobody denies the importance of quality in material, but it takes superior designers and craftsmen to turn out superior weapons, and it takes superior leadership to exploit fully those weapons. It is still men who fight, not ships. Consequently, if all immediate problems are excluded, the Navy's outstanding long-range problem is that of obtaining a consistently larger percentage of officers in the superior group, and a higher level of ability in the average group.
Little has been done about this problem, possibly because of the old idea that a brilliant officer was more likely to be deficient in character than one of average ability. Recent investigations, however, have shown that there is actually a high correlation between intelligence and character; the few geniuses who have been exceptions to the rule simply attracted more attention than the thousands of mediocre men who went astray and dropped out of sight. Those who doubt this should read "Do Brains and Character Go Together?" by Albert Edward Wiggam in the Reader's Digest for November, 1941.
In casting about for some method of obtaining a higher percentage of superior graduates from the Naval Academy, the first fact to be faced is that no possible improvements in education and training can ever make brilliant officers out of average material. The solution therefore lies in a more efficient method of selecting each new Fourth Class, a problem complicated by the necessity for pleasing not only the Navy but also the Administration and the Congress.
Fortunately this can be done, because of three related developments, none of which had even been dreamed of when present methods were established. These developments are:
(1) Intelligence tests enable candidates to be graded in the approximate order of their intellectual capacity.
(2) The rapid growth of aviation medicine has resulted in means for measuring positive physical fitness, and for selecting the best physical specimens in their approximate order of excellence.
(3) Psychological tests have been found valuable in selecting aviators as well as in the hiring and placing of employees. (See "Aviation Medicine," by Lieutenant Commander Eric Liljencranz in the Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS for December, 1938, and "Fitting the Worker to His Job" by Frank J. Taylor in Future for January, 1942.)
Although the value of the last group of tests has already been proved in many places, the Navy requires such a wide variety of special skills that its problem is unusually complicated. Furthermore, the probable resistance to drastic changes suggests an approach sufficiently conservative to meet the objections of even those who have no faith whatever in modern psychiatry.
The first step in the proposed solution is to widen the field of selection by doubling the number of appointments without increasing the number to be admitted to the Naval Academy each year. Next, eliminate from this enlarged group, all who cannot meet existing standards. Then give the surviving candidates intelligence tests, the physical examinations used in testing aviators, and individual interviews. The latter are conducted by a Personality Board composed of captains and commanders who are stationed at the Naval Academy and who are considered especially gifted at judging men. Each candidate furnishes such letters of recommendation and fills out such questionnaires as the Board requires. A questionnaire similar to that used by bonding companies in their investigations should prove helpful. Using this information and the impressions gained in the interview, the Board estimates the potential value to the Navy of each candidate and marks him accordingly. Call this a mark in Personality. Then assign to his Intelligence Quotient a weight of five, to his grade in the physical examination a weight of four, and to his mark in Personality a weight of one. His total score determines his place on the list of eligible candidates, who are then admitted, starting at the head of the list and going down as far as the number of vacancies permits.
At the outset this mark in Personality is used merely to tilt the scales slightly in favor of those candidates who are considered outstanding by the Board, and who also have good, but not greatly superior, grades in their physical and mental tests. When accurate methods for gauging Personality have been developed, tested, and proved, this factor will be assigned the weight which its importance deserves.
In order to establish a basis for a more scientific method of marking in Personality, an experienced psychiatrist is also assigned to duty at the Naval Academy. His task is to devise tests for character, aptitudes, skills, drive, originality, disposition, and outlook—all the factors which may be lumped under the heading of Personality. He gives these tests to all candidates interviewed by the Board, but his marks are not used for selecting candidates until time has proved their value beyond any doubt.
Although several years will be required for a conclusive check on the relative accuracy of the marks assigned by the Board and the psychiatrist, some pertinent information should appear during the first year through observation of the new Fourth Class at drills, social functions, and athletic contests. By the time this class graduates a still better idea of the accuracy of the tests and of needed changes will be had.
In the course of 15 or 20 years the service reputations and the special gifts of the members of the first few classes chosen by the new method will be fairly well established. This will afford a more solid basis for checking the value of the tests, and for improving them. It will also yield definite information as to the kinds of men who excel in the various kinds of duty. The Navy should eventually be able to select future submarine captains, gunnery officers, navigators, etc., with at least as much accuracy as it now selects future pursuit pilots. Special aptitudes for design, research, planning, and administration should become equally apparent. The result will be less waste in both the selection and the utilization of personnel.
Eventually, the system should produce dependable answers to such questions as these:
(1) What special skills and aptitudes does the candidate possess?
(2) How does he compare with the average in unselfishness, in soundness of judgment and in energy?
(3) What is his basic attitude toward other people? toward his job? toward criticism? toward authority? and toward responsibility?
(4) What does he really want most to get out of life? Will the attainment of his real ambitions coincide with the best interests of the Navy?
(5) Is he observant, systematic, courteous, dependable, forceful, tactful, self-controlled, friendly, alert, imaginative but not impractical, decisive but not impulsive, and determined but not stubborn?
(6) Is he most interested in people? in machinery? in action? or in ideas?
(7) Does he accept full responsibility for his own acts? freely acknowledge his mistakes? earnestly avoid self-deception? Discriminate between facts and opinions? impress others with his sincerity? concentrate on whatever he is doing? have the courage of his convictions? profit by the mistakes of others? And finish what he starts?
Such information will take most of the guesswork out of selecting officer material. As confidence grows in the validity of the Personality Test, its weight will be gradually increased until the candidate's score is eventually worked out with the weights altered as follows: Personality, five; I.Q., (5) three; and Physical Examination, two.
Personality tests would have to be changed each year to prevent candidates from being coached as to answers. This would involve considerable ingenuity on the part of the psychiatrist. Obviously, the success or failure of the plan would hinge largely upon getting the right man to initiate it. He should be not only gifted and experienced in such work but also endowed with the true scientific spirit—a man interested solely in getting the facts, not in obtaining evidence to substantiate some pet theory of his own. Furthermore, he should be thorough, not inclined to snap judgments or over-simplification. For example, he would make a great mistake to assume that the possession of certain traits by one expert submarine captain meant that only those who possessed that same combination of traits could hope for similar success. We all have seen men who had different combinations of traits, and who employed different methods, yet who were highly successful in the same field. The analysis must be thorough enough to discover what is behind the traits and the methods. This is no job for amateurs.
Since the choice of a psychiatrist to initiate the tests is so important, the present is an unusually favorable time to adopt the new system of selection. The reason is that the Navy can now command the services of the ablest men in the country, men who have already established reputations in such work, and who probably would not be available in peace time.
Still another reason for prompt action is that this war will afford invaluable checks on the Personality Test in that the grueling competition of the next few years will inevitably bring to the top those most skilled in each kind of actual combat operations. Such men do not always shine in peace time, but they are exactly the sort the Navy wants. If at the close of the war these gifted men would submit to the personality tests given candidates for the Naval Academy, and would also allow the psychiatrist figuratively to take them apart and find out what makes them tick—then priceless information could be gained. It would establish authentic standards for the Personality Test, would entirely remove this crucial point from the realm of individual judgment, and would clearly outline the goal to be attained. Unless it is so outlined, there will inevitably be much wasted time and effort. Consequently, we must be prepared to exploit the opportunities available at the close of this war. In order to do so, the new system should have been established and in operation for at least two years. In other words, the new system should be installed immediately in order to seize opportunities which may not recur in a hundred years—never, we hope.
The outstanding feature of this proposed system is, of course, that it gives tardy recognition to the fact that a candidate's potential value to the Navy depends far more upon his character, his special skills, his real ambitions, his sense of values, his attitudes, and his energy than upon his intellect or his physique. Nevertheless, the probable resultant improvement in both intellectual and physical standards is not to be despised. For example, raising the mental standards will permit needed additions to the course of study. These, in turn, will reduce any tendency for those at the head of the class to loaf, or to get the unfortunate idea that they can make good without half trying. In the course of time this narrowed intellectual gap between the head and foot of each class will tend to produce a greater and more soundly based unanimity of service opinion. A final advantage will be a lower average age at admission, and a resultant training of the midshipman during his more formative years. In The Psychology of Adolescence, Frederick Tracy gives these advantages of earlier training:
Habits are formed, broken, and modified almost wholly in pre-adult days. Then the whole psychophysical system is plastic and susceptible; whereas in later years the. . . whole being is fast settling into grooves from which it will not again wholly escape. . . .
Character betrays itself in physical bearing, and physical bearing, when it has become habitual, reacts upon character. Attitudes suggest ideas, and ideas find vent in attitudes. . . . in the heart of youth the love of goodness for its own sake may become a deep passion, capable of moving to noble deeds utterly regardless of personal gain or loss. . . . And the true end of moral education could not perhaps be better stated than in some formula that means the maintenance of this high and unselfish moral idealism unimpaired to the end of life.
Getting the graduate out in the Fleet and under a load of responsibility at an earlier age would be equally advantageous. The sooner he begins to build character and mentality by facing difficult practical problems, the better for him and for the Navy. That "it is good for a man to bear the yoke in his youth" is shown by the careers of most great admirals, notably Farragut and David D. Porter in our own Navy.
Incidentally, the foregoing shows clearly why it would be a basic mistake to select all officer material from college graduates, and to convert the Naval Academy into a postgraduate technical school.
Higher physical standards are also necessary to enable personnel, especially senior officers, to hold up under the conditions of modern war. Any man who has borne the strain of several weeks of intermittent air attacks, and the ordeal of a fleet engagement, requires almost superhuman mental and physical vigor, if he is to press on and exploit a victory; yet he must hurry on relentlessly to achieve maximum results. Furthermore, the promptness with which he initiates the next phase of the campaign will have much to do with its success. These protracted periods of strain make physical fitness just as important in war as in athletics.
Several minor advantages of higher physical standards follow: more officers could qualify for aviation; fewer of them would be retired for physical disability; their better health would mean more energy, mental as well as physical; and the Naval Academy would have better athletic teams. This last may seem trivial, but it affects the morale of midshipmen and adds to the appeal of the school for the average American boy. The higher the standards of health, intellect, and character are raised at the Naval Academy, the greater becomes the honor of wearing its uniform, and the keener becomes the competition for appointments. The effect, moreover, will be cumulative.
The final requirement is that the new method of selection must be approved by the Administration and by the Congress. It should appeal to both, because it will produce better naval officers, because it will make available about three times as many appointments each year, and because the patronage value of each appointment will become increasingly greater. The civil side of the Government, like the Navy, has everything to gain and nothing to lose by the proposed change.
The advantages from the Navy's viewpoint are worth reviewing. They follow:
(1) The new method provides an enlarged field of selection and takes only the best.
(2) It recognizes that physical and mental tests alone are an inadequate index of the candidate's probable value.
(3) It substitutes well-rounded and positive standards for one-sided and negative standards; it should not only increase the percentage of officers in the Superior group but also raise the level of ability in the average group; and it contains the vital germ of constant self-improvement.
(4) The proposed psychological tests involve no element of risk, for each step is tested before a further change is made.
(5) The likelihood of selecting erratic geniuses is greatly reduced, if not eliminated.
(6) Waste will be reduced in both the selection and the utilization of personnel.
(7) The raising of mental standards will permit needed additions to the course of study, compel more uniformly wholehearted efforts, result in training during the more formative years, and tend toward a greater and more soundly based unanimity of service opinion.
(8) The raising of physical standards will better enable future officers to stand the increasing strain of war, permit more officers to qualify as pilots, reduce retirements for physical disability, result in a more energetic personnel, improve morale at the Naval Academy, and increase competition for appointments.
(9) Congress and the Administration would probably approve of the proposed changes.
(10) The advantages are cumulative.
The Navy is not merely the first line of defense; it is the spearhead of the offensive; it is the force without which there can be no offensive. As such, it is entitled to the cream of the nation's youth. Here is a common-sense method for getting them, and this is an uniquely favorable moment for adopting it.