“The Board of Admiralty regrets to announce that His Majesty’s Submarine is overdue and must be considered lost. The next of kin have been informed.”
Thus reads the terse official communiqué by which the British people learn that another of their submarines has been lost, frequently with her entire company, in the Empire’s heroic struggle for existence. Many times since the outbreak of war has the Admiralty made this melancholy announcement, for the Royal Navy’s intrepid submarine service has suffered cruel losses in its unceasing campaign against Axis warships, supply vessels, and troop transports. In the first two years and three months of hostilities no fewer than 31 British submarines were lost. In many cases a boat simply failed to return to her base and the manner in which she came to grief is unknown. Even years later it will very likely prove impossible to establish the precise fate of certain submarines. Such, at least, was the case with a number of those lost in World War I.
The accomplishments of His Majesty’s submarines in the present war have already surpassed the splendid work they did in 1914-18. Moreover, considering the relatively few British undersea craft in service and the comparative paucity of targets, His Majesty’s submarines have compiled a far more impressive record than the numerically superior German and Italian undersea flotillas. Their fine work has established a standard of performance which our own submarines, striking at Japan’s vital lines of communication in the Southwestern Pacific, may well attempt to equal.
Before recounting some of the accomplishments and sacrifices of “The Trade,” as Britain’s submarine service is known to its own personnel, it would seem of interest to present a brief description of the undersea craft with which the Royal Navy entered the war. This submarine force was the smallest possessed by any of the major sea powers, and prior to hostilities was regarded with contempt by Germany and Italy. The Axis naval staffs soon altered their views, however, for “The Trade” required only a few months to demonstrate that its numerical inferiority was largely offset by the sound design of its boats and the thorough training and excellent morale of its personnel.
In September, 1939, a total of 57 British submarines were ready for service. Eleven new ones were under construction, while a twelfth, the unfortunate Thetis, was being salvaged, having foundered several months earlier during the course of her acceptance trials. The construction of four additional submarines was authorized. Twenty-four of Britain’s submarines were of the coastal type, 6 were mine layers, and the remainder, which included the 11 under construction, were large, ocean-going craft officially described as “patrol type” submarines. The coastal boats ranged in size from 410 to 670 tons surface displacement, the mine layers were just over 1,500 tons, and the patrol submarines displaced from 760 to 1,850 tons.
The oldest boats were the nine small units of the “H” class and the three larger ones of the “L” class. Sole survivors of once very numerous groups, they were launched in 1918-19 and consequently were ill suited for active operations. Their principal usefulness lay in training new personnel. They were Britain’s only unnamed submarines, being identified simply by letters and numbers: H-31, H-49, L-26, etc. The H-class boats displaced 410 tons, could attain a speed of 13 knots on the surface, and were armed with four 21-inch bow tubes and an anti-aircraft machine gun. The L-class submarines, of 760 tons, had a surface speed of 17.5 knots and an armament of four bow tubes and one 4- inch gun.
Of the remaining coastal submarines, four were of the Swordfish class, eight of the Shark class, and three of the Undine class. The first-named boats were launched in 1931-33, displaced 640 tons, had a speed of 13.75 knots, and were armed with six 21-inch bow torpedo tubes and a 3-inch gun. The Shark class boats, launched in 1934-37, were simply improvements on the Swordfish design. A trifle larger (670 tons), they had the same armament and speed. These 12 submarines were very popular and handy craft, capable of making a “crash” dive in 30 seconds.
The Undine, Unity, and Ursula, launched in 1937-38, were the Royal Navy’s smallest modern submarines. They displaced 540 tons, had a surface speed of only 11.25 knots and an armament of 6 bow tubes and one small gun. They, too, were regarded as most successful boats, and it is probable that Britain’s newest submarines, laid down since the outbreak of hostilities, follow their design.
Oldest of the large, patrol type submarines was the 1,311-ton Oberon, an experimental craft completed in 1926. Her speed was 15 knots and her armament comprised a 4-inch gun and 8 torpedo tubes (6 in the bow, 2 in the stern). Two slightly larger and faster boats, the Oxley and Otway, were completed the following year for Australia, which in 1931 presented them to the Royal Navy.
In the years 1928-30 Britain launched 16 submarines of the Odin, Parthian, and Rainbow classes. They were an enlargement of the Oxley design and, although differing in appearance and minor details, had a uniform displacement of 1,475 tons, an armament of one 4-inch gun and 8 torpedo tubes, and a surface speed of 17.5 knots. One of these boats, the Poseidon, was lost in collision in July, 1931.
Largest and fastest British submarines were the Thames, Severn, and Clyde. The Thames, launched in 1932, displaced 1,805 tons and had a designed speed of 21.75 knots. The others, launched two years later, were somewhat larger and swifter—1,850 tons and 22.25 knots. All three carried an armament of one 4-inch gun and 6 bow tubes.
In 1932 the 1,500-ton Porpoise, first of a class of 6 mine layers, was launched. She had a speed of 15 knots and was armed with a 4-inch gun and 6 bow torpedo tubes. The mine-laying chutes were located in the stem, where the mines themselves were also stowed. The number of these which could be carried has never been revealed, but 40 would seem a good estimate. The five other units, launched in 1935-38, were a trifle bigger and faster—1,520 tons and 15.75 knots.
Britain’s newest submarines were the 15 boats of the Triton class, of which only three, the Triton, Triumph, and Thistle, were actually in service when war broke out. The Triton was launched in 1937 and the others followed in 1938-40. On a displacement of 1,090 tons they were notable for their powerful torpedo armament—6 bow and 4 stern tubes. They also carried a 4-inch gun and had a speed of 15.25 knots, which was rather slow for boats of their type. The unlucky Thetis was one of this class.
These, then, were the submarines with which Britain entered the war. They were organized into five flotillas, which were strategically disposed in three great danger zones—home waters, the Far East, and the Mediterranean. Five boats were attached to the 2d Submarine Flotilla, Home Fleet; 19, including 8 in reserve, comprised the 5th Flotilla, Portsmouth; 11 (three of them in reserve) formed the 6th Flotilla, Portland; 15 were serving in the 4th Flotilla on the China Station; and 7, constituting the 1st Flotilla, were operating with the Mediterranean Fleet.
Commanding His Majesty’s submarines in September, 1939, was Rear Admiral Bertram C. Watson. Sometime after hostilities commenced, however, he was succeeded by Vice Admiral Sir Max Kennedy Horton, a veteran submarine captain who had won great renown in the last war. In September, 1914, while commanding the little E-9, Horton torpedoed and sank the German light cruiser Hela in the Helgoland Bight, and the following July sent the armored cruiser Prinz Adalbert to the bottom of the Baltic. On other occasions he also accounted for three enemy destroyers, two transports, and several merchant vessels.
British submarine operations through November, 1941, may be divided into four distinct phases. The first of these, embracing the so-called “phoney war” period, lasted from September, 1939, through the following March. These months found “The Trade” principally employed in maintaining a constant vigil in the North Sea and the Skagerrak, ever ready to attack any German naval units which might venture forth from their bases. Such occasions were rare, but Britain’s “submariners” took full advantage of them and inflicted severe damage on a number of the enemy’s best cruisers and destroyed several of his U-boats. The second phase opened with the Nazi attack on Norway and closed two months later with the Allied evacuation from Narvik. During this period His Majesty’s submarines, presented with numerous opportunities for attack, took a heavy toll of German warships and supply vessels. In this work they were assisted by France’s splendid force of submarines and Poland’s Orzel and Wilk, which had escaped to England after their country’s fall.
The third phase began with Italy’s entry into the war and the French collapse. These developments added two new theaters of operations. In the Mediterranean the problem was one of attacking units of the Fascist Fleet and harassing Italy’s communications with her armies in North Africa and Albania, while at home a submarine patrol off the enemy-occupied French coast was a very necessary precaution against the threat of invasion.
The fourth phase, dating from the Nazis’ conquest of the Balkans, greatly intensified submarine operations in the sea which Premier Mussolini likes to call Mare Nostrum. Britain apparently concentrated the majority of her submarines in the Mediterranean, where during the second half of 1941 they sent countless Italian troopships, supply vessels, and tankers to the bottom. A considerable number of the enemy’s cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and other light warships were also sunk or badly damaged. A few British submarines were kept in home waters, where they attacked German convoys off the Norwegian coast, seriously interfering with the enemy’s efforts to supply his forces in conquered Norway and on the Russo-Finnish front. Valuable assistance in these intensive Atlantic and Mediterranean operations was given by “Free French,” Polish, Dutch, and Greek submarines, as well as by surface warships and Fleet Air Arm and Royal Air Force torpedo and bombing planes.
The first three months of war, though replete with arduous patrol duty, were very uneventful ones for Britain’s submarines; and little encouragement could be derived from the few happenings which did take place. Hostilities had scarcely begun when the 1,354-ton Oxley was destroyed in port by an accidental blast which claimed the lives of 4 officers and 49 ratings. The cause of the fatal blast has not been revealed, but it is probable that a torpedo exploded as it was being taken aboard the submarine. This grievous loss was withheld for some weeks, and Mr. Churchill, then the First Lord of the Admiralty, did not disclose it until the following November.
A short time after the Oxley's loss, the 670-ton Spearfish found herself in serious difficulties in the Kattegat, where on September 25 she was depth charged and badly damaged by German destroyers. She lay on the bottom all day and only after darkness did she come to the surface and radio her plight, requesting that an escort be sent. Destroyers were promptly dispatched to her assistance and joined her the following midnight in the Skagerrak. The Home Fleet put to sea to cover the operation and on the 26th was ineffectually attacked about 150 miles off Norway by some 20 German dive bombers, two of which were shot down. This was the occasion on which the Nazis made the first of their many claims to have sunk the aircraft carrier Ark Royal. The Spearfish, meanwhile, reached port in safety and was at once taken in hand for repairs. Her commanding officer, Lieutenant John H. Eaden, was awarded the D.S.C. (Distinguished Service Cross) for “courage, seamanship, and resolution in bringing his ship safe home after many prolonged and violent enemy attacks, which almost put her out of action.”
October and November passed with little noteworthy activity on the part of His Majesty’s submarines, which in vain looked for the enemy’s surface ships. One of his U-boats, however, was destroyed during this period by the 640-ton Sturgeon, whose commanding officer, Lieutenant G. D. A. Gregory, was awarded the D.S.C. for his successful action. The last day of November one of the Triton class boats, her rudder badly damaged by heavy seas, arrived in Mastra Fjord, near Stavanger, Norway, in tow of a destroyer. She remained several days for emergency repairs, as permitted by international law, and then put to sea.
The following month Britain’s submarines at last went into intensive action. One day in the second week of December the Salmon (Lieutenant Commander Edward 0. Bickford), while on patrol in the North Sea, sighted a large German U-boat running fast on the surface. The British submarine was submerged at the time and coolly fired several torpedoes, at least one of which struck the enemy craft, literally blowing her into small bits. The explosions were of such violence that two lights in the Salmon's control-room were put out. When the Salmon came to the surface to look for survivors, all she could find was a large patch of oil fuel, a quantity of nondescript wreckage, and the dead body of a German sailor.
Several days later, on December 12, the Salmon was forced to submerge by the approach of enemy aircraft. About an hour later she heard the propellers of a large ship and, coming up to periscope depth, saw the huge German liner Bremen, which a few months before had left New York and, successfully eluding British warships in the Atlantic, arrived at the Soviet port of Murmansk. The Salmon at once surfaced and from a position well within torpedo range signaled the Bremen to stop. No heed was paid her signal, however, and before she could fire a shot across the liner’s bow to draw attention to it, enemy aircraft again appeared and forced her to dive. Thus did the Salmon deliberately refrain from sinking one of Germany’s finest ocean liners. Her reasons for so doing were of an entirely humanitarian nature: the Bremen was unarmed and carried a large crew, whose safety would have been gravely endangered had their ship been torpedoed without warning, and to jeopardize the lives of noncombatants is something a British naval man will not do.
Twenty-four hours later the Salmon's captain was amply rewarded for his restraint of the previous day. Looking through his periscope he beheld the British submarine officer’s “dream”—practically the entire German surface fleet, which was at sea to cover the Bremen’s return. There they were—the 26,000-ton battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the 10,000-ton “pocket battleship” Deutschland, three cruisers, and numerous destroyers. Truly a wonderful target! At first the enemy was out of range but he suddenly made a large alteration of course, bringing his cruiser division just close enough to make a long shot possible. The Salmon emptied all six of her bow tubes and a few minutes later heard three loud explosions, indicating an equal number of hits. Destroyers promptly depth charged the Salmon and she was consequently unable to observe the results of her attack, but it is now known that serious damage was inflicted on two cruisers—the 10,000-ton Blücher and the 6,000-ton Leipzig. Two torpedoes hit the former, while a third blew a large hole in the Leipzig's side and it was only with great difficulty that the Germans got her home. For this brilliant success the Salmon’s captain was decorated with the D.S.O. (Distinguished Service Order) and promoted to the grade of commander.
This blow at the enemy was followed within 24 hours by another. On December 14 the tiny Ursula (Lieutenant Commander G. C. Phillips), patrolling off the mouth of the Elbe, successfully attacked a 6,000-ton Köln class cruiser despite her screen of six destroyers. Diving under the latter, the Ursula approached to within several hundred yards of her quarry and discharged her torpedoes. Two loud explosions were heard, followed by a grinding noise such as would be made by a ship breaking up. The enemy’s destroyers at once commenced dropping depth charges and these forced the Ursula to remain submerged for some minutes. When, after about a quarter of an hour, she was able to rise to periscope depth, all she could see was two destroyers circling the spot in which the cruiser had been torpedoed. It would seem, therefore, very possible that the enemy cruiser sank. If such was the case she must have been the Köln herself, for the other units of the class, the Karlsruhe and Königsberg, went down the following April in the savage fighting off Norway. The exploits of the Salmon and Ursula brought this comment from Winston Churchill: “In the North Sea British submarines have had the best week I can remember in this or the last war.”
Such audacious operations right in enemy waters could not be carried out without losses, however, and a month later came sad news. On January 16 the Admiralty announced that during the past week three of His Majesty’s submarines, the Seahorse, Starfish, and Undine, had failed to return to their bases or report. The communiqué added that they had been engaged on “particularly hazardous service.” Next day the German radio declared that the Starfish and Undine had been destroyed in the Helgoland Bight and that part of their crews had been made prisoner. Nothing was said about the Seahorse, and she must have been lost with her entire company, possibly after striking a mine. It will be interesting to learn, after the war, whether these submarines inflicted any losses on the enemy before they were destroyed.
A week or so before these boats were lost, another submarine, the Triumph (Lieutenant Commander John W. McCoy), had a narrow escape from destruction. She was on the surface, patrolling in the Skagerrak, when, on the night of December 26, she struck an enemy mine. The explosion blew off 18 feet of her bow and caused a 12-foot split in the hull, but fortunately did not set off any of the torpedoes ready in her bow tubes. Despite severe injuries, the Triumph made her way home, where she was at once taken in hand for extensive repairs. Her captain deservedly received the Distinguished Service Cross.
February and March witnessed little activity of importance aside from the sinking of two Nazi supply ships by the submarines Ursula and Truant. The former on March 21 halted the 4,947-ton iron ore ship Hedderheim 8 miles off northern Denmark, allowed the crew 15 minutes to get into the lifeboats, and then sank her with gunfire. Two nights later, off the Danish west coast, the Truant intercepted the 2,189-ton collier Edmund Hugo Stinnes IV, which was promptly scuttled by her crew.
April was by far the busiest month which British submarines have experienced in this war. Germany launched her invasion of Norway on the 8th, and for the next several weeks His Majesty’s submarines were continually attacking Nazi convoys in the Skagerrak and off the Norwegian fjords. About 30 of the enemy’s troopships and supply vessels, as well as several of his finest warships, were sunk or seriously damaged in the course of these highly successful operations. The threat of air attack dissuaded the Admiralty from sending powerful surface forces into the Skagerrak, and the task of smashing the German convoys fell, therefore, almost entirely upon “The Trade.”
The first blows at Germany’s invading armada were struck April 8 in the Skagerrak by the Polish submarine Orzel and H.M.S. Trident. The former, which had made an adventurous escape from the Baltic early in the war, sent the 5,261-ton troopship Rio dc Janeiro to the bottom with heavy loss of life, while the Trident sank the 3,911-ton Posidonia at the entrance to Oslo Fjord. The Posidonia, making her maiden voyage, was carrying 7,000 tons of oil fuel for the German forces.
The following day H.M.S. Truant (Lieutenant Commander Christopher H. Hutchinson) torpedoed and sank the 6,000-ton German cruiser Karlsruhe off Kristiansand, some 200 miles southwest of Oslo. That morning the Karlsruhe had supported a successful landing by Nazi troops, but had suffered considerable damage from the fire of Norwegian coastal batteries. Screened by light forces she put to sea in the late afternoon and was zigzagging at high speed when the Truant attacked. Two torpedoes struck the Karlsruhe, smashing her rudder and both propellers, and she went down during the night.
At least two German supply ships were also attacked on the 9th by British submarines. The 2,359-ton Kreta was torpedoed by the Trident in the Kattegat and damaged so severely that she had to be beached to prevent her foundering, while an unidentified vessel was sent to the bottom of the Skagerrak by H.M.S. Sunfish (Lieutenant Commander J. E. Slaughter).
On the 10th the Triton (Lieutenant Commander Edward F. Pizey) attacked a large, heavily escorted convoy. She sank two transports outright, seriously damaged two others, and forced the remaining ones to scatter and seek shelter in neighboring fjords. The Triton then lay on the bottom for an hour while Nazi warships dropped depth charges uncomfortably close. This same day the Sunfish sank her second victim, a 3,000-ton supply ship, in the Skagerrak.
Early the following morning the Speafish, now under Lieutenant Commander John H. Forbes, sighted the 10,000-ton pocket battleship Admiral Scheer steaming at high speed off the Norwegian coast. Skillful handling enabled the submarine to send two torpedoes crashing into the Scheer, which, although badly damaged, was able to reach port.
Two other submarines, the Sealion and Triad, also scored on this date. The former sank the 2,593-ton August Leonhardt, while the latter boldly made her way into Oslo Fjord and sank a 4,000-ton supply ship. To achieve this success the Triad first had to penetrate the enemy mine fields guarding the entrance to the fjord.
On the 12th H.M.S. Snapper (Lieutenant W. D. A. King) sank the small tanker Moonsund (321 tons) by gunfire. The Moonsund was carrying 400 tons of gasoline for the Nazi air force. Four of her crew were picked up and made prisoners. Next day the Sunfish sank her third victim—a 3,000-ton supply vessel.
The Snapper and Sunfish again scored on the 14th. The former torpedoed a large ship in convoy and the latter hit a 6,000- ton transport with two torpedoes, but could not observe the full result of her attack.
On the 15th the Snapper, attacking another or possibly the same convoy as the day before, scored four torpedo hits with unknown results. Three days later the Seawolf, in a most daring attack on a convoy, torpedoed one ship and set another on fire with shells from her 3-inch deck gun. On the 20th the Triad also attacked a convoy and scored two torpedo hits.
Britain’s submarines continued their successful attacks on the enemy’s convoys for the next week or two, sinking or seriously damaging at least 15 troopships and supply vessels. Most of these attacks were summarized in the following Admiralty communiqué, dated May 9:
His Majesty’s submarines have had further successes in their operations against enemy transports and supply vessels. In an attack on a convoy of ten enemy ships six torpedoes found their marks. Three hits were made on another convoy and two on a third. One ship sailing independently was torpedoed and sunk. Another was driven ashore and destroyed by gunfire and torpedo.
Four submarines, the Thistle, Tarpon, Sterlet, and Seal, failed to return from these operations. The Thistle, reported overdue April 17, and the Tarpon and Sterlet, missing on the 30th, were almost certainly destroyed by Nazi warships or aircraft escorting convoys which they attempted to attack. As for the mine-layer Seal, she was captured May 5 by German air and naval forces in the Skagerrak. She had been seriously damaged by a mine when enemy aircraft sighted her in a helpless condition. Alighting in the water near by, a Nazi plane took off her captain and another officer and then summoned naval craft, which formally captured the Seal and towed her into a German port. Here, according to enemy claims, she was first studied, then taken in hand for repairs and alterations, and finally commissioned as a unit of the Reich Navy.
Something of a lull in British submarine operations followed the German Blitzkreig in France, and it was not until after Italy’s declaration of war that anything of real importance was accomplished. On the evening of June 20 the 1,850-ton Clyde, one of Britain’s two largest and fastest undersea craft, sighted the Nazi battleship Scharnhorst, heavily escorted by destroyers and aircraft, moving south along the Norwegian coast. The Scharnhorst was obviously on her way to a safe port to repair the damage inflicted on her the previous week at Trondheim by Royal Air Force bombing planes. Despite very poor visibility and the enemy’s strong anti-submarine screen, the Clyde attacked, scoring one torpedo hit. Then, coming to the surface as soon as possible, she radioed a report of her attack, giving the enemy’s position and course. Fleet Air Arm torpedo planes and Coastal Command bombers at once flew to the scene and pressed home determined attacks on the hostile naval formation. The torpedo planes failed in their efforts to hit the Scharnhorst, but succeeded in badly damaging one of the destroyers. The bombing planes, however, claimed three direct hits on the battleship. Five British and two German aircraft were lost in these attacks.
About a week later the Admiralty issued a communiqué describing how the Tetrarch had recently torpedoed and sunk a large transport in the Skagerrak. The text of this communiqué follows:
Off the south coast of Norway one of our submarines, H.M.S. Tetrarch (Lieutenant Commandcr R. G. Mills) has sunk a deeply laden enemy transport of about 8,000 tons. This transport was hit by two torpedoes. The transport was escorted by four motor torpedo boats. These unsuccessfully counterattacked the submarine with depth charges. Enemy aircraft which appeared on the scene were eluded.
On July 7 the Admiralty issued another communiqué describing how, in the course of a recent patrol, the Snapper had inflicted serious losses on two German convoys en route to Norway. The first convoy, consisting of several supply ships escorted by an armed trawler and aircraft, was attacked by the Snapper, which hit two ships with torpedoes, whereupon the remaining vessels scattered and made off in disorder for the shelter of a fjord. A few days later the Snapper sighted the second convoy, larger than the first and more heavily escorted, and again carried out a most successful attack, scoring torpedo hits on three ships.
Meanwhile, in the Mediterranean, Britain’s submarines were vainly looking for the Italian Fleet, which had prudently adopted a “fleet in being” policy and was remaining close to its war harbors. The enemy’s submarines were out in large numbers, however, and early in July one of them had the misfortune to encounter H.M.S. Parthian (Lieutenant Commander M. G. Rimmington). The two undersea craft met at close range on the surface and the Parthian, maneuvering into a favorable position, sent her adversary to the bottom with a well-aimed torpedo. The enemy boat sank stern first, her bows rising up at an angle of 70 degrees. One British submarine, the mine-layer Grampus, failed to return to her base during June. It is probable that she was sunk by an Italian submarine.
July and August were very unsuccessful months for “The Trade.” At least one German supply ship was destroyed and one Italian cruiser was damaged, but these achievements, notable as they were, scarcely compensated for the loss of seven of His Majesty’s submarines. The supply ship, a 3,000-tonner, was sunk off Norway by the Sealion, which also engaged a U- boat in a brief, inconclusive surface action; the German took fright and dived after only a few shots had been exchanged. A short time later, as the Sealion was about to attack a convoy, one of her intended victims, making a sudden alteration of course, rammed her, smashing both periscopes and inflicting other injuries.
The Italian cruiser was torpedoed the last day of August by the Parthian. When attacked she was in company with several other cruisers and a number of destroyers. Two of the Parthian's torpedoes were heard to explode, but it is uncertain whether they both struck the same cruiser.
The 670-ton Shark and Salmon were lost during July in home waters. Most of the former’s company of 5 officers and 35 ratings are understood to be prisoners of war, so it is likely that the Shark was forced to the surface by depth bombs and surrendered. As for the famous Salmon, she is believed to have been lost with all hands after being torpedoed by a German U-boat.
On August 1 in the Central Mediterranean, the 1,475-ton Oswald was depth charged and sunk by the Italian destroyer Ugolino Vivaldi. The submarine surfaced in a sinking condition and all save 3 of her company of 55 were rescued by the enemy. The Odin, Orpheus, and Phoenix were subsequently reported missing in the Mediterranean, while at home the Spearfish failed to return from patrol.
Throughout the closing months of 1940 Britain’s submarines continued to harass the enemy’s communications with his armies overseas, sinking at least a score of German and Italian supply vessels and damaging many others. “The Trade” also sent an Italian submarine and two Axis torpedo craft to the bottom. These operations cost Britain seven more submarines.
On the evening of September 2 the Sturgeon, patrolling off the northern tip of Denmark, made out a large Nazi transport crowded with troops and escorted by a torpedo boat, two armed trawlers, and aircraft. Despite adverse conditions of light and a rough sea, the Sturgeon sent several torpedoes crashing into the transport which at once emitted brilliant flashes of flame, followed by dense columns of black smoke. When the submarine came to the surface some minutes later, the enemy ship had disappeared and the escort vessels, aided by their searchlights, were picking up survivors. Reports from Sweden stated that not more than 100 Nazi soldiers, of some 4,000 on board, were saved.
The Taku, Tuna, Sunfish, and H-49 also scored successes against enemy shipping in home waters, while the Swordfish sank a German torpedo boat off the French coast. The Swordfish and H-49, together with the mine-layer Narwhal, were subsequently listed as lost.
In the Mediterranean, meanwhile, “The Trade” was fast becoming a thorn in the side of the Italian High Command, which was frantically trying to reinforce its hard- pressed armies in Albania and Libya. The largest Italian ship lost at this time was the 20,000-ton Lombardia, formerly the luxury liner Resolute. The Lombardia may have been sunk the night of December 13-14 by H.M.S. Truant. In any case the Truant on that date attacked a strongly escorted convoy off Cape Spartivento, on the toe of the Italian boot, and sank one transport and damaged another. Two nights later, off the Calabrian coast, the Truant torpedoed and sank a deeply laden tanker which was steering south.
Other submarines with one or more Italian supply vessels to their credit were the 1,475-ton Osiris and Regent and the 1,520-ton mine layer Rorqual. On September 22 the Osiris, on patrol in the Straits of Otranto, also sent the 842-ton torpedo boat Palestro to the bottom. Early in October another submarine, suddenly appearing on the surface off Savona, shelled military objectives in the port. A short time afterwards, off Genoa, she sank a 5,000-ton supply vessel escorted by motor torpedo boats and, still later, a 3,000-ton armed merchant ship in Vado Roads. Yet another submarine sank a small supply ship off Benghazi. In December the Thunderbolt (ex-Thetis) sank an Italian submarine proceeding on the surface off the Albanian coast. Submarines lost in the Mediterranean during this period were the 1,805-ton Thames, the 1,475-ton Rainbow and Regulus, and the 1,090-ton Triad. The Rainbow may have been sunk the night of October 15 in a surface duel with the 1,368-ton Italian submarine Enrico Toti.
The early months of 1941 witnessed a big increase in British submarine activity in the Mediterranean and a corresponding decrease at home, where the task of smashing the Nazi convoys was largely entrusted to the torpedo planes and bombers of the Fleet Air Arm and Royal Air Force. Between January and April, 1941, His Majesty’s submarines destroyed only three or four enemy vessels in home waters, but in the Mediterranean they sank at least 20 Italian supply ships as well as a light cruiser and a submarine. “The Trade’s” losses in these operations were trivial, amounting to only two boats. The 1,095- ton Triton was sunk in January by the Italians, while the 670-ton Snapper was lost two months later, probably off the French or Norwegian coast.
In home waters the Sealion, Sturgeon, and Tigres each accounted for a Nazi supply ship. The first two scored their successes off Norway, while the Tigres bagged her victim, a large tanker, off the French coast. In the Mediterranean, meanwhile, the Parthian, Regent, Rover, Tetrarch, Truant, Unique, and Urge sank one supply vessel apiece, while the Pandora, Triton, Triumph, and Upholder each sank two and the Utmost three. Other boats destroyed an Italian submarine, a troop transport, two large supply vessels, and the 3,645-ton tanker Laura Corrado.
Four of the above-mentioned submarines, the Unique, Upholder, Urge, and Utmost, are new boats, thought to be additional units of the 540-ton Undine class. Others built since the war, and subsequently lost, were the Undaunted, Union, and Usk. It is impossible to say how many new submarines Britain has commissioned, and doubtlessly the main reason for the Admiralty’s present policy of not disclosing the names of submarines which make successful attacks is to withhold such information from the enemy.
Early in March one of His Majesty’s submarines sighted the 5,000-ton Italian cruiser Armando Diaz with a screen of two destroyers. The submarine attacked and hit the cruiser with several torpedoes. She then remained submerged for several hours while her captain, peering intermittently through the periscope, watched the Armando Diaz slowly sink and the destroyers alternately circle around and stop, evidently to pick up survivors. Inasmuch as the enemy’s destroyers made no attempt to counterattack the submarine, it would appear that he was unaware of her presence and possibly thought his cruiser had blundered into a mine field.
On April 26 occurred one of the most bizarre naval exploits of the war. At dawn of that day H.M.S. Regent (Lieutenant Commander P. J. H. Bartlett), after safely wending her way through two mine fields, arrived at the enemy-occupied port of Kotor (Cattaro). Her mission was to find and embark Mr. Ronald Campbell, the British Minister to Belgrade, and his staff, following the collapse of organized Yugoslav resistance. The Regent put an officer ashore to confer with the senior Italian naval officer present, with the result that an Italian army officer boarded the Regent as a hostage, while the British officer went in search of Campbell. The Regent, meanwhile, lay in the harbor surrounded by large forces of the Italian Army. After nine hours of tense waiting, this farcical situation was brought to an end by two large enemy planes which attacked the Regent with bombs and machine-gun fire, slightly wounding her captain and two other crew members. The Regent thereupon dived and left the harbor, negotiated the mine fields a second time, and returned to her base with the Italian hostage still on board.
The fourth phase of Britain’s undersea warfare was the most intensive and successful of all. “The Trade” obviously sent nearly every available submarine to the Mediterranean in a supreme effort to sever the enemy’s communications to North Africa, Crete, and the islands of the Aegean. Between May and November, 1941, His Majesty’s submarines destroyed over 60 Italian troopships and supply vessels of all sizes, probably sank at least 15 more, and seriously damaged about 25 others. Surface warships and aircraft were also very active and took an additional toll of enemy shipping. It is estimated that British submarines, cruisers, destroyers, and planes sank about 25 per cent of the convoys leaving Italy for the Libyan ports of Benghazi and Tripoli. Another 20 per cent was damaged. Thus nearly half of the Axis supplies and reinforcements dispatched to North Africa never reached their destination intact. These losses caused Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Commander in Chief of Britain’s Mediterranean Fleet, to express his amazement that “the Italian merchant sailor still goes to sea.”
Among the Italian ships sunk by submarine attack were four large liners used as troop transports. They were the 17,879-ton Conte Rosso, the 11,398-ton Esperia, the 19,475-ton Neptunia, and the 19,507-ton Oceania. A fifth liner, believed to be the 23,635-ton Duilio, was hit by two torpedoes and almost certainly sank. Other enemy shipping destroyed included 21 supply vessels, 5 oil tankers, 13 large schooners, 14 smaller sailing vessels, and one supply lighter. Five more supply vessels, one tanker, and a schooner were probably sunk, and 3 troopships, 10 supply vessels, 6 tankers, 2 self-propelled lighters, and a floating dock were hit and damaged.
Italian warships likewise suffered from the activities of Britain’s submarines. Five modem cruisers were successfully attacked and one or two of them may have gone down, while an armed merchant cruiser, a destroyer, two torpedo boats, and two armed trawlers were certainly sent to the bottom. Another armed merchant cruiser, a destroyer, a small mine layer, and an armed trawler were probably sunk and three merchant cruisers and a destroyer were badly damaged.
The Admiralty refrained from identifying the submarines making these highly successful attacks, but it is believed that the following boats particularly distinguished themselves: Parthian (Commander M. G. Rimmington), Rorqual (Commander R. H. Dewhurst), Taku (Lieutenant Commander E. C. F. Nicolay), Telrarch (Lieutenant Commander R. G. Mills), Torbay (Lieutenant Commander A. C. C. Miers), Upholder (Lieutenant Commander M. D. Wanklyn), Urge (Lieutenant Commander E. P. Tomkinson), and Utmost (Lieutenant Commander R. D. Caylay). In any case their commanding officers were appointed to the Distinguished Service Order “for courage, enterprise, and skill (or devotion to duty) during successful submarine patrols.” Moreover, one of them, Lieutenant Commander Wanklyn of the Upholder, was also awarded the Victoria Cross for “outstanding valor” during the Battle of Crete.
The first Italian cruiser to be torpedoed was the 10,000-ton Gorizia. Accompanied by another cruiser and screened by four destroyers, she was attacked on June 29, by one of His Majesty’s submarines. According to the original British version, two torpedoes struck the Gorizia in a vital spot and she sank. The Italians, however, while admitting the attack, claimed that all of their ships avoided the torpedoes and returned unharmed to their base. The British now concede that the Gorizia, although badly damaged, may have reached a home port.
The last week of July another British submarine attacked an enemy force consisting of a cruiser of the Garibaldi class, one of the Filiberlo class, and several destroyers. Two torpedo hits were obtained on one of the cruisers, either the 7,283-ton Eugenio di Savoia or her sister-ship Emanuele Filiberto Duca d’Aosta. When the submarine later returned to periscope depth her commanding officer could see the destroyers circling the position in which the cruiser had been hit, but smoke screens prevented him from ascertaining whether she was sinking. Considering the fragile construction of most Italian cruisers, it is quite possible that she sank, although the enemy vigorously denies this.
On the afternoon of August 24 a third Italian cruiser was torpedoed and, about a week later, yet a fourth. On neither of these occasions did “The Trade” claim more than serious damage. The first attack, made on a division of three light cruisers escorted by a half-dozen destroyers and a number of flying boats, resulted in at least one torpedo hit, but the severe counterattack which followed made it impossible for the submarine’s captain to observe the full extent of the damage his boat had inflicted. The second attack, carried out by a submarine operating close to the Strait of Messina, between Sicily and the Italian mainland, was directed against a group of heavy cruisers. Several torpedoes struck one cruiser, possibly the 10,000-ton Bolzano, damaging her severely.
Two and a half months later, on November 18, the British Army in Egypt opened the long-expected drive against the Axis forces in Libya. A day or so afterward one of His Majesty’s submarines attacked a formation of three Italian cruisers and three destroyers, scoring torpedo hits on one of the cruisers. Some hours later British aircraft sighted this force and reported seeing only two cruisers and a large patch of oil fuel in the vicinity. It would seem, therefore, very probable that the enemy cruiser sank.
On November 29 the Admiralty issued, for the first time in many months, a communiqué describing recent submarine operations off the Norwegian coast. Two boats, the Tigres (Commander H. F. Bone) and Trident (Commander G. M. Sladen), operating in arctic waters, were reported to have made successful attacks on enemy troopships and supply vessels carrying reinforcements of men and material to the German and Finnish armies battling the Russians on the Murmansk front. The Tigres was credited with sinking five ships and damaging a sixth. One of her attacks was on a heavily escorted convoy of three ships, two of which she sank. The Trident, for her part, successfully attacked seven enemy vessels, definitely sinking three of them and damaging the others so badly that their loss is probable. Two of the ships certainly sunk were transports laden with troops. The Trident damaged an eighth enemy vessel by gunfire.
Up to the end of November, six of His Majesty’s submarines had been lost in these successful operations. They were the new Usk and Undaunted, missing in May and June, respectively, and the Cachalot, Union, P-33, and P-32. The Usk is reported to have been mined. The Cachalot, a 1,520-ton mine layer, was sunk the first week of August by an Italian torpedo boat which rescued all or most of her company. Three weeks later the Admirality announced that the Union was overdue and presumably lost, while similar admissions concerning the P-33 and P-32 soon followed. These last are new boats whose specifications have not been revealed. They brought to 31 the number of British submarines lost since the outbreak of war.
With these 31 boats perished more than a thousand brave officers and men. May they not have died in vain! Meanwhile, their sacrifice should serve to remind us that, however little may appear in the daily papers, Britain’s “submariners” continue to carry out, day or night, “particularly hazardous service” in the valiant defense of their country against those who seek to destroy it.