In time of war it is a regular practice for a nonbelligerent nation to send officers of its navy to act as observers in the navies of friendly nations that are engaged in hostilities.
The cost of the information thus acquired is negligible in spite of the fact that it is exceedingly beneficial if the neutral country—should she subsequently go to war—is able to fight without being severely handicapped by impractical and out- of-date methods and equipment. The knowledge thus gained most surely saves both lives and money.
Likewise, in the merchant service, pilots have an excellent opportunity to act as “observers” since they are continually going from ship to ship and are consequently in a unique position to compare one ship’s good points and faults with those of another. The following is a pilot’s observations and experiences pertaining to: the increase in safety and other advantages ships have that are well designed and equipped; and the handicaps and delays caused when ships are not adapted to the waters in which they ply.
Wheelhouses and Bridges
Many modern ships are built in such a manner that the very best kind of watch can be kept at sea; however some of these ships—in narrow waters—cannot, under frequently existing conditions, be handled as efficiently as would be the case if the wheelhouses and bridges were designed differently.
The grounds for making this assertion would seem to be considerably weakened when it is admitted that there are ships which were originally planned and equipped so they could be handled from the upper (or open) bridge, but since have had their extra gear disconnected and done away with.
Therefore, to counterbalance this evidence, consider the big fleet of ships that ply the waters of our Great Lakes. Almost without exception, these ships have big wide windows with a minimum of obstruction between them. These windows are not only in the forward part, but on both sides and in the after part of the wheel- house as well; thereby enabling the man handling the ship to get an unobstructed view ahead, astern, and abeam on both sides—all the while standing in one position.
It might be said that conditions on the Lakes are not the same as those that exist along the coast. It is true there is a great deal of dissimilarity, but with things as they now are along our Atlantic seaboard it is an extremely valuable asset to have a ship designed so that she can be efficiently handled in narrow waters; and with channels being extended farther inland and new inland waterways being planned and dug there will, in the near future, be still more of a need for adapting ocean steamers to inland waterways. Even at present there are many times when ships have been delayed by having to run slow instead of full speed, or have had to be put to anchor, or even have had accidents, simply because the officer in charge was handicapped by obstructed vision. On paper, delays caused by these faults cannot be detected. Even in case of an accident it is very seldom, if ever, that they are brought out.
War brings about the necessity of getting maximum results; for example, in peace time, traffic on the Burma Road was carried on in what was then considered a satisfactory manner. The war didn’t cause the faults in their traffic regulations; it simply made it necessary to rectify them. Traffic (just previous to Burma’s invasion) had been greatly speeded up and, in doing so, accidents, instead of increasing, decreased decidedly. This was brought about not by any radical departure from existing practices, but by a few simple corrections and changes.
This analogy can be applied to ocean steamers navigating narrow inland waterways. It is possible, after a fashion, to handle ships with poorly designed bridges, but their movements would be expedited and, in spite of making better time, the likelihood of mishaps would be greatly reduced if the officer handling the ship were not handicapped by obstructed vision.
There are ports where traffic is congested and it is “close work” going in and out of slips, etc.; in other words, where it takes precise handling. Ships trade successfully out of such ports for years with bridges that might be classified as having “obstructed vision.” So it might be properly asked: Where is there a need for anything different?
“Close work” because of congested traffic, having to make a course to within a fraction of a degree, or going in and out of slips is different, in one important respect, from “close work” in a narrow waterway, namely: In a narrow waterway where the ship “smells the banks” it is very essential to know just where the after part of the ship is. Because, at times, where the stem is governs where the bow goes. For example, if a ship going full speed ahead gets too close to, say, the starboard- bank, her bow will hit the port bank in spite of the fact that the rudder is put full right, even before the sheer starts.
Therefore if the officer in charge cannot see where the stem is, he has to resort to the next best thing. That is, let the ship “tell him” where the stern is. She does this by carrying rudder toward whichever bank she is closest to. This is a poor substitute for seeing because, of course, there are other things that can cause a ship to carry helm. And, furthermore, a big factor toward successfully handling a ship in any waters is to anticipate accurately what she is going to do—before she does it.
If, by getting too close to the bank a ship is so apt to take a sheer, it should be readily understood, when meeting another ship, that it is almost as important, if not equally so, to know just where the stern is as well as to see where the bow is heading.
In most narrow waterways there arc bends so sharp that the ship’s rudder power alone is not sufficient to enable her to swing fast enough to “make it.” However, in many such places by getting the stem into exactly the proper position, at the proper time, the suction that is created will cause the ship to swing so fast that it might not be necessary to assist her at all with the rudder. In fact it is a frequent occurrence to have to put the rudder “against her” in order to retard the swing. Stating it another way, suction—under conditions that frequently exist—has more effect on the ship than the rudder; it is a case of “the tail wagging the dog,” since instead of suction helping the rudder, it is the other way around because the rudder maneuvers the stem to where sufficient suction is created to produce more of a swing than the rudder is capable of causing. Therefore it is extremely important to fully make use of “suction” in such cases, and to do so it is essential to see astern and abeam as well as to see ahead.
In many places, even in daylight, there are reaches where there is nothing ahead to steer for, whereas by looking astern landmarks or ranges are visible.
Ortz Rudder
There is an improvement that has been made recently on many ships that has, to a great extent, offset the handicap of not being able to see astern. It is the Ortz Rudder. This rudder deserves extensive praise, so a contrast of the effect on—not just one but many—ships “before and after taking” (to use the patent medicine slogan) will be made.
Innumerable ships originally had the conventional blade rudder and subsequently were equipped with Ortz Rudders. Since the effect of the change was practically the same in every case, reference will be made to all of them as though they were a single ship.
Where with the blade rudder, to keep from losing control, the engine’s speed must first be reduced from full to half in slowing down, with an Ortz Rudder, speed can be reduced from full to slow and still not lose control.
With a blade rudder, after getting the ship’s headway reduced to slow speed, the engine can be stopped only a very short time, if at all, without the ship taking a sheer. With the Ortz Rudder she will almost always answer her helm for a considerable distance with the engine stopped.
With a blade rudder, although at reduced headway, when only slightly closer to one bank than the other, the ship will run away from the nearest bank in spite of the fact that the rudder is put hard over in anticipation of the sheer even before it starts. With an Ortz Rudder she can be gotten still closer to the bank without her running away from it.
There are sharp bends where putting the blade rudder hard over will not cause the ship to swing fast enough to “make it.” With an Ortz Rudder she will make it easily.
Telegraph
When a deep-loaded, single-screw ship is under way in a narrow and shallow waterway, to slow her down sometimes brings about a condition that borders on the ironical. To wit: although the engine has been working no stronger than slow ahead for a considerable period of time, when it is stopped, for the purpose of reducing headway, say, in order to more safely pass an approaching vessel, the ship is very apt to take a sheer. Then in order to break this sheer, it quite often requires not just slow but full speed ahead on the engine. In other words, while endeavoring to reduce the ship’s headway it has, on the contrary, been accelerated.
This very serious hazard can be almost entirely eliminated by simply having a “dead slow” on the telegraph, because then the headway can be reduced to the minimum before having to stop the engine; and the slower the ship is going when the engine is stopped the less apt she is to “go wild.” Furthermore if the headway can be sufficiently reduced with the engine still working ahead—then there might be no need to stop at all.
Various ships have various “codes” to indicate dead slow, none of which is entirely satisfactory. Probably the most common custom is to ring slow, twice. This practice quite often is the cause of a misunderstanding and even though the signal is correctly interpreted it always consumes a little extra and, on occasions, extremely valuable time, in getting the desired action on the engine.
Chocks and Bills
Chocks are of more importance than it would seem they are sometimes given credit for being. For example, to have a tug tow a ship stern first, it can be done with much less difficulty if the tow line leads through a chock directly over the stem. But strange to say, very few ships have one placed there. However, fortunately, a great many do have chocks near enough over the stern so as not to cause much difficulty. But if the chock farthest aft is nearly in line with the ship’s side— and quite often this is the case—then, for a tug to tow the ship stern first is just about as awkward and slow a job as steering a twin screw ship—going ahead with only one propeller working.
It might be said that the proper thing for the tug to do is to take two stem lines, one from each quarter. Theoretically, this is correct. But in practice it is many times a dangerous, and sometimes an impossible, thing to do, because (to give just one example) if the ship is under way when a line is being taken, to take a second one would greatly increase the danger (1) of the tug getting under the ship’s counter, (2) of the bight of the line leading from the farthest quarter getting in the ship’s propeller, (3) of losing control of the ship because of the necessity of keeping the propeller stopped too long while the second line is being put out.
And then the chocks along the ship’s side should be given more consideration. On the conventional type well-deck freighter (and in relatively the same location on other types of ships) there should be on the fore well-deck chocks (or pipes in case the ship has bulwarks) as here enumerated: one just abaft the forecastle- head, another just forward of the fore rigging. This will make a spread of, roughly, 20 or 30 feet between them. About midway between these two chocks there should be a set of bitts.
Then a chock should be just abaft the fore rigging and another just forward of the bridge deck. This again will make a spread of 20 or 30 feet between these two chocks; and a set of bitts should be placed about midway between them. The after well-deck should be similarly laid out.
This arrangement—by making one set of bitts (the thing that takes up deck space and is of considerable weight and expense) serve for two chocks—would on some ships make it possible to eliminate some of the bitts without loss of mooring facilities.
There are ships that have two chocks for every set of bitts but, by having the chocks too close together, the benefit of the second chock is lost or at least considerably lessened.
The lack of sufficient chocks makes it very difficult, and sometimes impossible, to properly make a tug fast, when she comes alongside of a ship for the purpose of rendering assistance. Because of this deficiency it is a common occurrence to have to put some of a tug’s lines around the rigging or through the scuppers. Then, as in the saying, “For the want of a nail the shoe was lost,” and so on till finally, “the rider was lost, all for the want of a horseshoe nail,” so in a somewhat similar manner: for the want of a chock, the line was stranded (and then broken); for the want of a line, the assistance of the tug was lost; for the want of a tug, an accident occurred, causing extensive damage. All for the want of a chock.
Bitts
The design of bitts, too, should be given more consideration. They should not be cylindrical but should be decidedly inverted cone-shaped so as to prevent the turns of a line, when it is being snubbed or surged, from working to the top and jumping off, thereby endangering life and also losing the effectiveness of the line.
Wire Springs
There is another thing, although it does not exactly come within the scope of this article, that is nevertheless so closely related and is of so much importance it will be commented on. This is the disapproval of using wires for springs. The objection to them can be summed up by saying: To call a wire a spring is a misnomer, because (practically speaking) there is no spring in it. And the result nearly always is, when a wire is used in docking or undocking, that a bollard, a chock or bitt, or the wire itself carries away if an effective strain is put on it.
Mooring Winches
When large vessels trade in narrow inland waters they must frequently be handled in other than a conventional manner. For instance, it is frequently necessary to dock a steamer with a strong fair tide, instead of against the tide. In addition to this unfavorable condition, there might be a strong wind blowing off the dock. Under such circumstances if the slack of the stern line—after it has been run to a mooring (and incidentally it is a common occurrence to have to run a stem line a considerable distance)—can be hove in quickly the ship can be successfully docked. However, if it takes too long to heave in the slack, then the ship will drift and blow entirely out of position and the attempt to dock her will be a failure. Hence it is extremely beneficial to have mooring winches on the stern that can heave rapidly. Ships should be equipped so as to be able to heave on two stern (or after) lines at the same time.
Then there are numerous other instances when it is equally important that the after winches be capable of heaving rapidly. For example, in undocking when there is a strong fair tide running. In such cases a ship is almost entirely out of control, or helpless—because the propeller cannot be worked—from the time the stern lines are let go till they are hove in.
A Follow-up of the Foregoing Comments
Some years ago the automobile industry carried out a correction program (probably the proper way to term it) because of accidents caused by obstructed vision. The outcome gave the driver a better view not only ahead and on the sides but (by the installation of a mirror) “astern” as well. Just now, one of the country’s leading railroads is putting in service locomotives with the call in front; simply in order to get better vision.
For ocean steamers navigating narrow inland waterways unobstructed vision is even more important than for automobiles and locomotives. To substantiate this opinion consider the words of Lieutenant Percival when he said, “If it were possible to trace the unusual number of collisions in which our destroyers were involved in 1917-18, it would probably be found that poor observation facilities were a prominent factor. The British evidently drew some such conclusions from their many wartime collisions; for from 1917 on, they built destroyers with small box-like open bridges having practically unobstructed vision.”*
Illustrations
A jockey, no matter how good he is, cannot win the race if the horse he is riding doesn’t “have it in him.” Likewise an officer cannot get the best results if the ship he is handling is poorly designed and equipped. To give a specific example: Suppose it is necessary to dock where there is very little room ahead and where conditions make it imperative to come alongside with considerable headway; and a spring line must be relied on to help in stopping. If, because of improper design, the turns of the spring on the bitts jump off, or, because of a wire being used for a spring, it is too awkward and dangerous to use efficiently and an accident occurs; the man doing the handling must shoulder the blame, whereas in reality (to use the gangster’s expression) he is simply “taking the rap.”
The Log Abstract might read, “Anchored because of darkness and strong winds”; but between the lines it will often say, “anchored because of obstructed vision.”
Then again the Log might state, “Delay and accident in docking caused by tug’s failure to give proper assistance”; whereas between the lines can be discerned, “delay and accident caused by ill-arranged and inadequate mooring facilities.”
Sir Launcelot went afar seeking the Holy Grail, only to find that he had passed it up at his front gate. Likewise much attention is given and much money is spent to avoid accidents and make ships more efficient and speed up their turnaround. In doing so, things that are simple and easily available are apt to be overlooked.
It is a popular, but nevertheless frequently mistaken, opinion to assume that ordinary luck prevents accidents . . . that just luck is instrumental in a quick turnaround ... or that a seemingly impossible undertaking, or maneuver, turns out successfully simply because of luck. As in the early days of steam, the ships of the old American Line were called lucky. But one of the secrets of their luck was their outstanding construction and design.
And in building today’s ships it would be well worth while to be mindful of that kind of “luck.” To accomplish this end it might be helpful to include the aforementioned recommendations.
In conclusion, consider the soup-fin shark on the west coast. Until recently it was considered practically worthless, but now, to everyone’s surprise, its vitamins give the aviator superior vision. And it is said there are air fighters alive today simply because the super-vision derived from the soup-fin shark’s vitamins made them see well enough to get in the first shot.
Likewise many potential accidents can be avoided by adapting ocean steamers to inland waterways. In other words, unobstructed vision, well-designed bitts, a sufficient number of properly placed chocks, and a few other apparently unimportant details, if given due consideration, can improve the efficiency of a ship as effectively as vitamins improve the efficiency of the aviator.
* Lt. Franklin G. Percival, U.S.N. (Retired), “The Future Fleet,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August, 1941, page 1084.