History teaches us that during national emergencies, when nine- tenths of government administrative duties pass to civilians without experience in government administration, there is usually a serious and costly loss of time, efforts, and materials, unless there are provided clear, brief outlines of essential facts to guide the newcomers.
The purposes of this summary of “United States Naval Aeronautic Policies, 1904-42” has been prepared to provide:
(1) A chronologic outline of the outstanding factors in the evolution of the naval aeronautic policy of the United States since 1904, to facilitate the consideration of policies and principles of strategy, tactics, and logistics.
(2) A check list of the pioneer contributions made by the United States Navy to the art and science upon which air power is founded, to avert the loss of time and efforts from the confusion and uncertainty that usually prevails when it is thought that action depends on factors controlled by others.
(3) To show that there is no foundation for the popular notion that there is no definite naval aeronautic policy and billions of dollars may be wasted as a result.
(4) To make available documentary evidence that the “Deliver the Goods” policy is not a foreign policy, adopted as an expedient in connection with the 1941 Lease-Lend program, but was first expressed in 1915 by the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt—our present President—and became the national policy in World War I, though it was originally stated as a naval aeronautic policy.
I found the need for such an outline when I proceeded to write the article on the new principles of strategy, tactics, and logistics outlined in the closing paragraph of my article on “The Torpedoplane in World War I,” Naval Institute Proceedings, December, 1941, p. 1750.
What follows represents the essence of about 5,000 pages of records, from which it appears that there never was a time since 1904 when the United States Navy did not have an aeronautic policy. The shortcomings were largely due to lack of appropriations and shortage of personnel.
United States National Policies and Position in World . Affairs in 1904
The naval aeronautic policies of the United States have been largely the outcome of (a) inherent progressive American spirit; (b) the naval policies, dominated by the expansion and improvements initiated first by President Theodore Roosevelt and implemented by successive administrations, with the greatest developments under President Franklin D. Roosevelt; (c) the substantial development of aeronautics for civilian purposes in the pioneer days and for aerial transportation in the past decade; (d) the liberal appropriations made by Congress on the advent of World War I and World War II; (e) armament limitation treaties; (f) economic depressions.
In 1904 the United States was just beginning to assume the important position among the nations which was defined at the turn of the century in President Theodore Roosevelt’s message to Congress of December 3, 1901. But the naval program outlined in that message had been partly delayed through the belief that wars had been made unlikely by the general acceptance of the principles of international arbitration and the work of the International Arbitration Court, opened at The Hague in October, 1902.
The Russo-Japanese War, in 1904, with the swift reduction of Russian power by the comparatively small Japan, stimulated renewed interest in national defense. An outcome was the completion of plans for building the Panama Canal, for which the United States had bought the French rights and franchise in 1902.
Aeronautically the United States was below zero, due to the mistaken public conclusion that the accidents to Professor Samuel P. Langley’s flying machine, in October and December, 1903, were evidence that flying was beyond the reach of man. The reports that the Wright Brothers had made flights were generally disbelieved, except by a few persons.
Navy Department's Interest in the Louisiana Purchase Centenary Aerial Contests, 1904
The Navy Department of the United States first expressed a policy regarding aeronautics in 1904, in connection with the aeronautic activities planned for the celebration of the centenary of the purchase of the Louisiana Territory.
Congress had authorized the celebration for the year 1903. But it was postponed until 1904, when the World’s Fair was held at St. Louis. Prizes of $100,000 were announced for airship demonstrations and the Brazilian millionaire sportsman-engineer, Alberto Santos-Dumont, was invited to fly the dirigible with which he had won world fame by accomplishing the first successful navigation of the air on October 19,1901.
Among the outstanding invitations received by Santos-Dumont on his arrival to the United States were invitations from President Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of the Navy Paul Morton, Admiral George Dewey, president of the General Board, Professor Samuel P. Langley, and Rear Admiral Colby M. Chester, then Superintendent of the Naval Observatory. Santos- Dumont’s airship was still the pioneer craft. The attempt of the Brazilian engineer Augusto Severe to fly his dirigible had ended on May 12, 1902, in an explosion in mid-air. Severe and his mechanic, Sache, fell 2,000 feet and were killed. Four months later, on September 13, 1903, De Bradsky and Paul Morin were killed when the gas bag of their dirigible was torn from the fuselage in mid-air and they fell to to earth in the fuselage.
Besides having made the first successful flights with his airship Santos-Dumont had demonstrated the possible use of dirigibles for naval purposes by flights over water, maneuvering with yachts. President Roosevelt told him that the Navy Department would gladly aid him in every way and provide a tender or other naval vessel for his experiments.
Annapolis and Quantico Selected For First Naval Air Experiments
Following President Roosevelt’s offer to Santos-Dumont, Secretary of the Navy Paul Morton and Acting Secretary Charles F. Darling arranged for inspection of possible sites for demonstration of the naval possibilities of the Santos-Dumont dirigible. As I had been with Santos-Dumont since 1900 and acted as his aide while he was in the United States, I went on the inspection trip and attended all the conferences.
Santos-Dumont was then only 31 years old and I was barely 20. We had a great deal to learn. But the Washington authorities made us feel that we could render valuable services and that the information we gave when they asked us questions about airships was valuable.
Finally it was decided that tests would be made at Annapolis and Quantico, the latter because Professor Langley had been making tests there with his heavier-than- air aerodrome, for which President Roosevelt had secured the funds granted by Congress.
In a way the Navy was to demonstrate that the funds spent on the Langley experiments had not been wasted, by showing that the Santos-Dumont airship was capable of rendering services of great naval importance. Professor Langley had visited Santos-Dumont in July, 1900, and after witnessing the tests had declared that San- tos-Dumont’s airship was practical. That was 15 months before Santos-Dumont actually made the half-hour cruise which won him world fame and half a million francs in prizes.
While Waiting For Demonstrations of Aircraft's Possible Usefulness, 1905-08
The slashing of the gas bag of the Santos-Dumont airship at St. Louis ended the plan to demonstrate the airship’s usefulness to the naval authorities. The parting message of Admiral Dewey had defined the Navy’s policy in these words:
We understand that you cannot capture or destroy a fleet with airships. Show us that you can fly higher than the crow’s nest and if you are on our side we’ll use you. If you are on the enemy’s side we’ll shoot you down . . . Keep Admiral Chester informed.
A trunkful of letters, articles, and records, mostly with Admiral Chester’s name or in his handwriting, evidence that Admiral Dewey and President Theodore Roosevelt and other high officials, including the present President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, considered Admiral Colby M. Chester a progressive officer and gave him broad assignments. His son, then Lieutenant Arthur T. Chester, was equally gifted. Official endorsements and commendations for his proposals to demonstrate the efficiency of oil and powdered coal as fuels for warships and his demonstrations1 give evidence that the Chesters were then, in 1904, admirably equipped to nurse the infant aeronautic activities on behalf of the Navy.
Conferences in Admiral Chester’s office at the Naval Observatory, visits to the navy yard and Annapolis, and the assignment of torpedo boats to pull motorless gliders helped the civilian pioneers and kept the Navy informed of aeronautic developments.
Having been Commandant of the Cadets at the Naval Academy in 1890-94, Admiral Chester never failed to go to Annapolis to tell of important developments —which often had to be followed with an explanation of why the expected demonstration had not taken place, or the experimenter had been hurt while demonstrating.
First Demonstration of Airplane to the Fleet, 1909
The first demonstration of the possibilities of the airplane for naval purposes took place in September and October, 1909, in connection with the naval parade of the Hudson-Fulton Celebration, in New York Harbor and the Hudson River.
The committee in charge of the celebration, of which President Franklin D. Roosevelt was a member, arranged to have the replicas of Henry Hudson’s Half Moon as she was when the gallant crew discovered the Hudson River, October, 1609, and of Robert Fulton’s Claremont as she was on the epoch-making trip in September, 1807, up and down the Hudson River.
The Navy Department sent the Atlantic Fleet, including many of the ships that had been on the historic world cruise. As the Fleet stayed from September 25 to October 9, 1909, and there were many receptions and parades in which participated the officers of the U. S. Fleet and of the visiting naval units of the nations that had accepted the State Department’s invitation, there were many opportunities for meetings with officers and exchanging views on such subjects as aeronautics.
Few of the officers had ever seen an aircraft. None had seen a plane fly over the water or over warships. Up to the last minute the committee hoped that we could arrange to have Santos-Dumont’s airship, or some other. I did my best to get Santos- Dumont’s famous airship reproduced, as the authorities were eager to have South America represented by the dirigible while North America was represented by the planes of the Wright Brothers and Glenn H. Curtiss. But it could not be accomplished.
The expectation created a subject for discussion in which participated President Roosevelt and a number of naval officers who later became his associates in policymaking and in World War I.
Flights Greeted by Largest Assemblage of Warships
On September 29 and October 4, 1909, Wilbur Wright demonstrated to the largest assembly of naval authorities and diplomats in history the practicability of the airplane. Starting from Governor’s Island, by courtesy of Major General Leonard Wood, Commanding the Department of the East, the plane flew over New York Bay and the Hudson River and over the mighty battleships, amidst a deafening chorus of footings, whistlings, cheers, and other forms of greetings.
The Wright plane, with a canoe attached under the pilot’s seat, on October 4 covered 21 miles in 33 minutes over the Hudson, reaching a height of 900 feet. At this time Orville Wright was in Berlin, demonstrating his plane. Cable reports were received that on October 2 he had carried Prince Frederick William for a flight, and that in another flight he had reached the altitude of 1,637 feet in 20 minutes—a marvelous feat in those days.
Among the officials who were to become eminently associated with policy-making and directing the employment of aircraft for naval purposes who were present at those first demonstrations were: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of the Navy George von L. Meyer, Rear Admiral Seaton Schroeder, who commanded the Atlantic Fleet, Rear Admiral Richard Wainwright, Captain W. I. Chambers, Commanders Henry B. Wilson, S. S. Wood, William S. Sims, Hilary P. Jones, Victor Blue, R. S. Griffin, Lieutenant E. J. King, and Ensign A. K. Atkins.
In addition the then Governor of New York (subsequently Secretary of State and Chief Justice) Charles E. Hughes, Third Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips, Commander Robert E. Peary, conqueror of the North Pole, who later organized the National Aerial Coast Patrol, were present.
The above list could be tripled—all names of eminent naval officers and civil and diplomatic authorities. In addition there were the high diplomats of all the nations and officers of the visiting ships.
U. S. Navy Started With Technical Leadership 1910-12
After Wilbur Wright had flown over the Atlantic Fleet and the ships of foreign nations assembled at New York Harbor to celebrate the Hudson-Fulton anniversaries, official Washington expressed great interest in naval aeronautics. The venerable Admiral George Dewey stated that, since we had shown that we could fly much higher than the highest crow’s-nest, he was in favor of having planes for the Navy. Secretary of the Navy Meyer agreed to that. Rear Admiral A. T. Mahan, who had participated in the 1904 considerations of Santos-Dumont’s airship, agreed that he would have to include aircraft with the basic elements that determine the measure of sea power.
Captain W. I. Chambers, who had been present at the demonstrations, was put in charge of the development of aviation in the Navy. An appropriation of $25,000 was made for experiments. A larger sum was refused on the ground that the Army had already been given $125,000 for aeronautics. It was suggested that the Navy could use the army’s planes and schools. Of course, the Army had barely enough to operate its school at College Park, Maryland. But that sum sounded large in those days, and to have six army and naval officers training for flying appeared to be a substantial start.
The Navy started with the distinction of having the only planes that could rise from the water—instead of starting from land. So as to not conflict with the Army, the Navy concentrated on developing a catapult for launching planes from ships. The records, correspondence, and photos of those pioneer experiments in my possession are voluminous. They evidence that the United States Navy was admitted to be in a leading position aeronautically— though the establishment consisted of a temporary desk without a typewriter for Captain Chambers, and the flying that was being done by Lieutenants T. G. Elly- son, John H. Towers (the present Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics), John Rodgers, and V. D. Herbster.
President Taft and Secretary of the Navy Meyer Invited Civilian Co-operation, 1912
At the beginning of the year 1912 the Balkans became drawn into a war which was to continue, with changes of sides, until it became the European War, then the World War. The then President of the United States, Mr. Taft, who had been Secretary of War and was an ardent advocate of world peace, foresaw that it might be a long, spreading war. But he saw that the people of the United States and all the members of Congress—except half a dozen out of both Houses—felt absolutely safe in the protection afforded by the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. It was an election year, with both parties pledged to economy. An appeal on the ground of national danger would have been denounced as war-mongering.
It was determined to encourage civilian activities which might have a national defense value. President Taft himself came to our annual dinner, held January 27, 1912, at which was launched the movement to have wealthy sportsmen acquire seaplanes as they had yachts. Then, under date of March 18, 1912, Secretary of the Navy George von L. Meyer wrote a letter for publication in my magazine in which he said:
I am pleased to learn that the April issue will be devoted to “Marine Flying.” I would like to urge that a certain portion of each monthly issue be devoted to this branch of Aeronautics, for it seems to me that “Marine Flying” promises such an attractive development in the field of useful and dignified sport that it will foster the interest and maritime skill of our yachtsmen and will thus, indirectly, assist in the maintenance of naval prestige.
The strength of a nation, its power for good or evil, is fundamentally controlled by the habits of its people, and it is important for us to encourage the cultivation of that very precious habit or quality recognized by seamen as the “sea-habit” ... I confidently hope that this element in the sporting blood of our yachtsmen will lend vigor to the fascination that supplies the yacht with the wings of the bird.
The Navy’s Part in Solving the Problem When Sportsmen Stated: “We Want Air Cruisers, Not Flying Crates”
Wealthy sportsmen who responded to the Navy’s appeal to them to take up marine flying soon found that Secretary of the Navy Meyer’s “yacht with the wings of a bird” was simply a rectangular float with wings made of bamboo and linen, assembled in a carpenter shop by skilled workers who knew little or nothing of naval construction or the science of aerodynamics.
After the first shock—some of them buying seaplanes anyway—they urged that the Government take steps to provide the needed education to the naval and military aviators. They in turn could teach others. The navy and army authorities answered that they had barely desk room for one officer each in charge of administering the air establishment. There was no provision for teaching the theory of aerodynamics. Congress did not even provide funds for extra wires, turnbuckles, and tools needed to keep the few planes in flying condition. Besides there was an acute shortage of officers and the other branches of the services objected to their officers leaving to take up aviation.
The universities appeared to be best suited to solve the problem. A letter of inquiry brought back answers evidencing that (a) no educational institution was in a position to give a course in the science of aeronautics, (b) there would be no such course until there were teachers to give such a course. After a series of conferences it was agreed that Captain Chambers would prepare surveys describing the aerodynamic laboratories of European nations, and I would publish them with the answers from the presidents of universities. Then we would urge the establishment of a national aeronautic laboratory where scientific experimentations would be conducted and instructors would be trained.
Accordingly I published Captain Chambers’s survey in Flying for December, 1912, together with the letters from the universities.
Naval Constructor Taylor, Appointed by President Taft to Introduce Naval Construction Science in Seaplane Construction, Made Available the Naval Model Basin for Experiments
The evolution of the seaplane from the small flying crate to the giant Mars air cruiser launched November 8, 1941, started in 1913 when President Taft’s appointee, Naval Constructor David W. Taylor, became active.
As stated above, I had arranged to publish the survey of 'Captain Chambers and the letters of the universities, to urge action in providing means for teaching the science of aeronautics. Advance proofs were transmitted to the President, members of the Cabinet, and Congressional leaders. As Flying was about to go to press word came that President Taft would appoint immediately a committee to make a report to Congress on the need of a National Aerodynamic Laboratory, its scope, organization, the most suitable location for it, and the cost of installation.
Publication was delayed until the appointments were received, on December 19, 1912. Then Flying was rushed to press with the addition of the appointments. The Navy was represented on the commission by Chaptain Chambers and Naval Constructor Taylor, who promptly offered the use of the Naval Model Basin and gave sound advice on how to utilize naval practice in building seaplanes.
The Smithsonian Institute regents promptly acted to solve the problem. They authorized the reopening of the Langley Aerodynamic Laboratory on May 1, 1913, and on May 9, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson adopted President Taft’s plan and approved the designation of representatives from the Navy Department, the War Department, the Bureau of Standards, and the Weather Bureau to the first National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics. At that time Assistant Naval Constructor J. C. Hunsaker was sent to Europe to inspect the European laboratories.
Lieutenant Towers Flew Air Mail to Get Training and Captain Bristol Administered from Half a Desk in Admiral Fiske’s Office
Accustomed to congressional liberality in making available billions of dollars for aeronautics, people do not realize that within the life of Rear Admiral John H. Towers there were no funds for training planes and Towers flew air mail to get training!
Lieutenant Towers had been assigned to the Curtiss School at San Diego, California. Glenn H. Curtiss himself was the teacher. The Curtiss factory at Hammond- sport, New York, was a combination carpenter shop and metalworker’s shop. Parts were made by hand and assembled into planes as orders were received. The few planes at the San Diego School were very much overworked in the winter of 1911-12. The students had to wait for their turn, Lieutenant Towers among them.
In April, 1912, a flying meet was held at San Diego. Among the features was mail carrying. The plane entered for that meet was taken from the training. Towers could either remain idle or fly the mail at the meet. He decided to fly the mail and get the training. An outcome is that good prices are now paid for envelopes postmarked April 7, 1912, carried by plane piloted by Lieutenant John H. Towers! They are rare prizes for philatelists.
If Lieutenant Towers could not get a training plane, the officer in charge of the administration at Washington could not get a desk and a typewriter. Captain Chambers often apologized in his handwritten letters for his inability to have them typed. Admiral Bradley A. Fiske tells in his book, From Midshipman to Rear Admiral (page 539) how he induced Captain Mark L. Bristol to become the director of aeronautics, then had to loan him half of his desk on which to administer—that half desk being the entire establishment.
The scantiness of pilots and planes did not deter the naval authorities from authorizing the formation of the first “Aviation Squadron” to operate with the Atlantic Fleet off Guantanamo, Cuba, in February-March, 1913, following the Caribbean alarm and Mexican disturbance. Lieutenant Towers and Ensign Chevalier won the admiration of the Fleet by their accurate reports on the location, course, and speed of naval forces participating in the maneuvers.
Adoption of the Airplane as an Arm of the Fleet, 1914
The adoption of the airplane as an arm of the Fleet was announced by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels in a letter dated May 19, 1914, addressed to me in which he summarized the Navy Department’s aeronautic activities. He stated:
Aeroplanes are now considered one of the arms of the Fleet, the same as battleships, destroyers, submarines, and cruisers.
The letter is published in full in my Textbook of Naval Aeronautics, which, though out of print now, may be consulted in most naval and public libraries. It will be found on pages 137-138.
The occasion of the adoption of the airplane as an arm of the Fleet was the sending of the air units with the fleet to Vera Cruz in connection with the Mexican trouble, in April, 1914. That was before the advent of World War I, therefore the United States was the first naval power to operate aircraft with the fleet under conditions approximating warfare.
Secretary Daniels’ letter had ' been drafted by Captain Bristol from his half of Admiral Fiske’s big desk, in the office of the Secretary of the Navy’s aid for operations. I had called on the Secretary to offer the use of civilian planes and aviators. He stated that he had been flooded with such offers and had turned them over to Admiral Fiske, who had turned them over to Captain Bristol. Being a newspaper publisher himself, Secretary Daniels welcomed a request for information that would result in reviewing an important situation.
Admiral Fiske and Captain Bristol welcomed the opportunity of making known that planes were now part of the fleet and that the Navy did not need the civilian aviators and planes because only one scouting flight was made daily over Mexican territory, and these flights were made by Lieutenant P. N. L. Bellinger and Lieutenant John H. Towers.
Roosevelt Championed “Delivering the Goods” to Britain and Russia in 1914, When Germany First Protested against Sale of American Aircraft to the Allies
President Roosevelt first expressed his “deliver the actual goods ordered” policy in 1914, when Germany first protested against sale of American aircraft to Britain and Russia.
The first Russian orders had been placed with the Curtiss concern in 1912, after Glenn H. Curtiss, C. C. Witmer, and John D. Cooper had trained the first Russian naval aeronautic contingent and established the first Russian air station at Sevastopol.
The Russian order was not, therefore, the outcome of the declaration of war, in August, 1914, though it increased following the declaration of war, and the Russians sent a purchasing commission to the United States.
The British order was the outcome of the planning of the first transatlantic flight in 1913-14. Rodman Wanamaker had adopted a plan to win the $50,000 prize which had been offered by Lord Northcliffe to the first who flew across the Atlantic, worked out by a committee of which I was a member. The Navy Department assigned Lieutenant Towers to guide us.
Since it was to be an Anglo-American affair, Mr. Wanamaker had engaged Commander John C. Porte, of the British Navy, to pilot the America, as the transatlantic seaplane was named. Everything was ready, and I had sent a telegram from Hammondsport, New York, where the America was demonstrated, to New York, to have a dozen flags ready, “to take to England,” when a delay occurred, followed by the electrifying report that war had been declared.
The America’s flight to England was off. Instead came the offer from the British Government to buy the America and as many more as Curtiss could deliver.
Germans Held That “America” Was a Vessel and Could Not Be Delivered
The German Government protested to the United States Government against delivering the America seaplane on the ground that it was a vessel and was subject to the restrictions provided in Art. 8 of the Convention Concerning Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War.
As there had not been any adjudication of the status of seaplanes under international law, and I had written a number of articles on “Air Laws,” I was invited to the conferences of the State Department and the naval authorities.
Assistant Secretary Roosevelt had been a yachtsman before becoming Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He was well versed in marine jurisdiction, as well as jurisprudence. He had studied law at Harvard and Columbia, had been admitted to the Bar of New York in 1907, and had practiced law until he became a member of the New York Legislature. As State Senator he had had three years of experience in drafting and considering legislation. He was, therefore, competent to advise the State Department on the subject.
There was, however, no data in the Federal Government regarding aerial jurisprudence. The subject was new. The rules for flying had been made and enforced by civil aeronautic organizations in all countries, and even the military and naval aviators passed civilian flying tests and received civilian pilot certificates which evidenced their qualifications.
To meet the German protest against the delivery of American seaplanes to England and Russia the State Department and the Navy Department sought all the information available on aerial jurisprudence of all countries. The official notices of “forbidden zones” which European nations had issued, and I had published in my magazine, Flying, were carefully studied. But they did not apply to the German protest.
“Is a Seaplane a Vessel, Subject to the Same Restrictions as Ships?”
The State Department and the Navy Department created an international law board to consider such questions as: “Is the seaplane a vessel, subject to the same restrictions under international law as ships?”
Robert Lansing, the then Counsellor of the Department of State, and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt were the two civilian government officials who were to shape the policy. The naval members of the board were Captain H. S. Knapp and Captain J. H. Oliver. When they called on the flying unit at Pensacola for such information as they had on the subject they received data which I had transmitted to Lieutenant John H. Towers in answer to a letter from him dated March 21,1914, reading as follows:
Flying School Naval Aeronautic Station Pensacola, Fla.
March 21, 1914
Mr. Henry Woodhouse,
Aero Club of America,
297 Madison Avenue,
New York City, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Woodhouse:
If you have any literature on Rules of the Air, as regard avoiding collision, will you please mail me a copy of the same.
Yours truly,
J. H. Towers
An examination of the data from different countries which I had transmitted to Lieutenant Towers did not reveal any actual adjudication of the question of whether a seaplane was legally a vessel.
For a time it was feared that the Secretary of State, William J. Bryan, the great Commoner, would hold that a seaplane was a vessel—and would stop delivery of the seaplanes consigned to England and Russia. Secretary Bryan did not hold that position long.
The State Department’s Answer to the German Protest
After an examination of all available records the State Department and naval authorities proceeded to study the German protest in the light of Art. 8 of the Convention Concerning Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, cited in the German protest. It read:
A neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations against a Power with which that Government is at peace.
It is also bound to display the same vigilance to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, which has been adapted entirely or partly within the said jurisdiction for use in war.
Since there had not been determinations by courts of competent jurisdiction, the question was resolved to a single point, and the German Government was advised by the State Department that it had been determined that
. . . both the hydro-aeroplane and the aeroplane are essentially aircraft; as an aid in military operations they can only be used in the air; the fact that one starts its flight from the surface of the sea and the other from the land is an incident which is no way affects their aerial character.
Accordingly, the Curtiss company and other aircraft manufacturers were advised that they could deliver the planes ordered by the British and Russian governments to the full extent of their capacity to produce. The seaplane America was immediately shipped. It was the largest seaplane produced at the time. It had a flying radius of 2,000 miles at a speed of approximately 100 miles per hour.
Seaplanes of the America type were shipped as fast as they could be manufactured, and were employed in submarine and convoy patrol as fast as received in England.
Assistant Secretary Roosevelt’s Decision to Implement His “Deliver the Goods Policy,”
Plus Naval Academy Training, Plus Naval Construction Experience in 1915-16
Substantial progress was made in 1914- 15 in the construction of seaplanes and production. The influence of Naval Academy training, plus naval construction experience, became evident in the seaplanes that were produced by American manufacturers.
The combination carpenter shops and metalworker’s shops in which handmade flying crates had been produced had grown into factories where air cruisers were manufactured as boats were manufactured in shipyards. Deliveries were being made to the Army and Navy in the United States and to England, Russia, and other countries in increasing number. The Model Basin in Washington, the Langley Laboratory, and several universities were beginning to produce trained minds as well as tested models and formulas.
But the shadow of war was lengthening. The European War was in fact becoming a world war. British and German ships were operating in American territorial waters. The Latin American countries were practically cut off from North America by ships of the belligerent nations. The United States was taking stock of its national defense resources and was finding that ten times greater speed was necessary. But the appropriations made by Congress met only a fraction of the need.
In that critical situation Assistant Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the necessity of giving effect to the “deliver the goods” policy in the following letter and statement which appears on the opposite page.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy Washington
Eastport, Maine August 10, 1915
My dear Mr. Woodhouse:
I beg to acknowledge your letter of August 5th and take pleasure in sending you a short expression which you can use in the September number of “Flying” if you care to. I sincerely hope that at the next Congress we shall get increased appropriations for the aviation work and when I get back to the Department this autumn I expect to do all possible to perfect the organization for a much larger aeronautic service.
Very sincerely yours,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Henry Woodhouse, Esq.,
The Aero Club of America,
297 Madison Avenue,
New York City.
Roosevelt’s First Effort to Implement His “Deliver the Goods” Policy Thwarted in 1915-16
On his return to Washington, September, 1915, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt proceeded to plan the implementation of his “deliver the goods” policy aeronautically.
NAVY DEPARTMENT.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S OFFICE.
WASHINGTON.
For September Number of "Flying".
Once upon a time the great, question in the United State was whether and how and when the country should go back to a gold basis. After the expenditure of much ink and paper and argument a worthy statesman remarked one day "the way to resume is to resume." And the United States caught the idea and resumed.
Everybody knows that this country did the pioneer work in aviation, that hundreds of Americans have devoted their time and thought to the development and actual use of aircraft, that for military reasons it is absolutely essential that the aeronautic arms of the Army and Navy be increased, not by doubling, but a hundred fold; and most important, we know that in this country we have the mechanical and personal ability thus to build up this branch of essential national defense.
We know the necessity. We have lately realized, I am glad to say, the shortcomings of our preparation and we have as a whole insisted that these shortcomings be made good. We know now as a fact and not as a theory that aircraft are an essential to the conduct of war and .that they are an essential to both branches of the profession of war on land and sea. We may dream of a day when every ship will be a submarine and when the science of navigating the air will be complete; but these dreams can serve but little to accomplish the actual work at hand in this particular year of grace in which we live.
The way to develop aeronautic defense is to build and train. National defense affects the whole country. The primary duty lies on the Congress to authorize this work of building and training. This done it is the duty of the two great Departments of national defense to carry out the construction and to furnish the men and the means for using the finished product.
It is our clear duty as individual members of a great association called the United States of America to use every endeavor to protect that association, to interest the other members of that association in its protection and to use our individual and collective energies to see that the governing body of that association shall not merely lay plans and make pledges, but shall deliver the actual goods ordered. The way to build is to build.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
He returned to Washington determined, as he had stated in his letter to me, “to do all possible to perfect the organization for a much larger aeronautic service.” That required larger appropriations as well as additional personnel—and that was exactly what every branch of the Navy needed. That is what the heads of all the bureaus told Mr. Roosevelt when he mentioned the importance of enlarging the aeronautic service of the Navy. Evidences of depletion in all the branches of the Navy piled up on Mr. Roosevelt’s desk with suggestions to the effect that if he knew how to get appropriations from Congress and additional officers and men, he could be a savior to the long established branches of the service which represented the first line of defense. That thwarted but did not stop Mr. Roosevelt.
A program was worked out with Captain Mark L. Bristol, then in charge of Naval Aeronautics, with the aid of a handful of progressive naval officers and civilian aeronautic authorities. The civilians were indispensable in those days because of the acute shortage of material and officers and men. We often held aviation meets at which were assembled more seaplanes and pilots and spare parts than could be assembled by the Navy. Such meets also brought the best European craft, motors, and pilots, which made it possible for the Navy to see Europe’s best without having to assign officers to go to Europe, or to overburden Lieutenant Towers, who was then Assistant Naval Attaché in London.
On October 6, 1915, was held the first official meeting of the Naval Consulting Board, the chairman of which was the famous inventor Thomas A. Edison. The nation’s leading inventors, two from each of the mechanical sciences, appointed by technical societies, were members of the Board, whose functions included the consideration of new inventions and devices for national defense.
Call on Civilians to Aid in “Delivering the Goods” When Act of Congress Limited Naval Aviators to 150, on Eve of America’s Entry in World War I
The Naval Appropriations Act for 1917 —the year when the United States entered in World War I—limited the number of naval aviation officers to 150. When that limitation was pointed out, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt said: “It would not be so bad if we could get the hundred and fifty—or half that number in the next three months. There is no such outlook. Every branch of the service is out for the few Annapolis graduates.”
Fortunately Rear Admiral Robert E. Peary, the conqueror of the North Pole, had organized the National Aerial Coast Patrol in 1915, the officers of which included the Vice-President of the United States, Thomas R. Marshall, and a number of United States Senators and Representatives, heads of bureaus, and civilian leaders of the national defense movement. Under its auspices, and with the encouragement of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, had been organized the famous First Yale Unit, headed by F. T. Davison, Artemus L. Gates (the present Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air), and Robert A. Lovett (the present Assistant Secretary of War for Air). A dozen organizations were cooperating.
Assistant Secretary Roosevelt called a conference, which met in his office in November, 1916. It was attended by the heads of all the Navy Department’s bureaus and the leaders of the civilian national defense organizations. As executive director of the National Aerial Coast Patrol, I presented a list of training camps which we had established and of civilian aviators we had enrolled, with their planes.
Mr. Roosevelt immediately authorized the civilians to proceed to prepare themselves for such services as submarine patrol, coast patrol, civilian air defense, air-raid precautions, co-operating with the Navy, etc.
The “Deliver the Goods” Policy-Nationalized during World War I
The “deliver the goods” policy was nationalized following the adoption, on April 6, 1917, by Congress, of the joint resolution declaring that
the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared.
The policy defined in the closing paragraph of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt’s letter of August 10,1915, became the dominating policy of the United States. It is not, therefore, a new policy, an expedient created to give effect to the “Lease-Lend” program in 1941.
Basically, there happened in 1917-18 practically what happened in 1941-42. Liberal appropriations were made to meet the emergency, and the training and production programs were expanded as fast and as far as those in charge could act.
As is usually the case under emergencies, the officers and men and the equipment were sent where it appeared best at any time.
The wisdom that comes after the event may be helpful to guide the future, but does not help to improve the past. It would, therefore, be idle to dwell on what might have been done better. It may be stated, however, that 2,000,000 officers and men were transported overseas in 18 months—which was half the time required by the British to deliver 2,000,000 officers and men to France. However, British ships carried 49 per cent of the Americans overseas. American ships carried 45 per cent; Italian ships 3 per cent; French ships 2 per cent; and Russian ships 1 per cent.
What was accomplished by the United States Navy aeronautically was summarized by Assistant Secretary Roosevelt as follows:
President Roosevelt's Report on How American Aviators Patrolled the “Neck of the Bottle” of the A. E. F. Life Line
When in August, 1918, I found on visiting France a complete chain of Naval Aviation Stations engaged in a systematic patrol of the waters of that “neck of the bottle” through which our troops and supplies had to pass, I had but to examine the weekly charts of German submarine operations to realize how much our aviators were doing to make these waters safe.
To the men engaged in these duties, whether on land or actually flying, there came few of the thrills of actual war, but they will always have the deep satisfaction of knowing that their work, though silent, counted much in the winning of the war.
I venture to predict that when the records of the German naval activities become available, we will find that the enemy also recognized the importance of the American Navy in the air as well as on the seas.
There is one outstanding feature of American Naval Aviation in the Great War—it conducted actual and active operations against the enemy for many months, and conducted them with credit and success.
When the United States entered the war, our Naval Aviation was almost less than a nucleus in both materiel and personnel. In the summer of the following year, our Naval Aviators were doing patrol work in American-built planes, not only in our home waters but also on the coasts of England, Ireland, France, and Belgium.
In addition, we were conducting operations on a large scale with lighter-than-air craft in France and were taking an important part in the work of the Northern Bombing Group near the Belgian Border.
Taking the work as a whole, from the conception and working out of the broad operating plans in the very beginning down to the training of the personnel, the creation of the materiel and the final operations against the enemy, the enterprise must be stamped with the approval of the country as a whole.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Acting Secretary of the Navy
Naval Air Force Reduced to One-Tenth in Two Years, 1919-21
The period between 1919 and 1921 was a period of deterioration for naval aeronautics in the United States.
When the Bureau of Aeronautics was organized, in 1921, there were left only about 300 naval aviators and 4,000 enlisted men out of the 3,000 officers and 30,000 enlisted men who were in the service at the end of the World War.
That was a reduction to one-tenth of a force that was hardly adequate even for a peace-time air service. It was the dispersion, without compensatory returns, of the investments and efforts of years.
The deterioration was not confined to officers and enlisted men. The equipment suffered correspondingly. The 1,200 planes and 26 airships and 21 naval air stations in the United States at the end of the World War had become obsolete and suffered constant reduction in number and usefulness.
That condition was due to the economy enforced after the World War and applied to all branches of the Army as well as the Navy. It appeared more severe in naval aeronautics because naval airships were perishable in nature, due to deterioration of fabrics, and naval planes and equipment suffer all the deterioration of land ones, plus the disintegrating effects from sea water and sea air.
The fact that the war was still on in the Near East and strife was in evidence also in Europe, Asia, and Africa made such reduction in naval aeronautic effectiveness appear more dangerous than it would have been if there had been peace in the world.
The “Do What You Can Within the Appropriations” Policy, 1922-40
While it is true that naval aeronautics did not fare well during the years 1923 to 1927, it is a fact that its appropriations were actually larger than the appropriations for military aeronautics. Both services were granted barely enough to replace worn-out equipment and experiment with new craft and devices. Having extensive frameworks for larger organizations, the Army and Navy followed the policy of “Do what you can within the appropriations granted.”
Expressed in appropriations, the naval and military aeronautic policies of the
Year |
Navy |
Army |
1922 |
$13,413,000 |
$19,200,000 |
1923 |
14,803,000 |
12,895,000 |
1924 |
14,793,000 |
12,436,000 |
1925 |
15,328,000 |
12,798,000 |
1926 |
14,981,000 |
14,911,000 |
1927 |
19,256,000 |
15,256,000 |
1928 |
20,300,000 |
20,602,000 |
1929 |
31,300,000 |
24,630,000 |
1930 |
31,430,000 |
34,690,000 |
1931 |
32,033,000 |
35,823,000 |
1932 |
31,145,000 |
31,479,000 |
1933 |
25,245,000 |
25,439,000 |
1934 |
21,957,000 |
23,324,000 |
1935 |
19,156,000 |
27,646,000 |
1936 |
40,732,000 |
45,383,000 |
1937 |
38,588,000 |
56,397,000 |
1938 |
49,500,000 |
58,618,000 |
1939 |
58,075,000 |
70,566,000 |
1940 |
82,798,000 |
184,464,000 |
1941 |
94,202,000 |
285,886,000 |
Progress was, however, made in naval aeronautics during the period beginning 1922, when the other branches of the Navy were crippled by the treaties for the limitation of armament. Among the major developments were the building of aircraft carriers, torpedo planes, large bombers and dirigibles, and equipping capital ships with planes.
The creation of the Bureau of Aeronautics by the Act of Congress of July, 1921, the adoption of the Five Year Plan of 1925 with the creation of the office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, the policy of automatic expansion of naval aeronautics commensurate with the increase of combatant surface ships provided in the Vinson-Trammell Bill of 1934, and the creation of the Aircraft Battle Force were major developments in naval aeronautic policy during the operation of the limitation of armament. Many took place under the direction of Admiral E. J. King. Other developments were the outcome of joint Army and Navy, and Army, Navy, and Department of Commerce agreements.
On the advent of World War II President Roosevelt voiced the need for 50,000 planes. In July, 1940, Congress authorized the 15,000 planes program. The naval air stations were increased to more than 30 before Japan declared war on the United States. A two-ocean aeronautic program was authorized by President Roosevelt to correspond with the two-ocean Navy.
The appropriations for 1941 for both the Navy and the Army aeronautic programs were increased during the year to over $5,- 000,000,000. The actual net increase depends on how much of the production of aircraft, engines, and equipment will be delivered or held for Great Britain, Russia, and other nations under the Lease- Lend program. The Navy’s policy is, therefore, subject to changes. It must continue to “Do what you can within the appropriations.”
You may depend on it that it is more in your own power than in any one else’s to promote both your comfort and advancement. A strict and unwearied attention to your duty, and a complaisant and respectful behavior, not only to your superiors, but to everybody, will ensure you their regard; and the reward will surely come, and I hope soon, in the shape of preferment; but if it should not I am sure you have too much good sense to let disappointment sour you. Guard carefully against letting discontent appear in you; it is sorrow to your friends and a triumph to your competitors, and cannot be productive of any good. Conduct yourself so as to deserve the best that can come to you, and the consciousness of your own proper behavior will keep you in spirits if it should not come. Let it be your ambition to be foremost on all duty. Do not be a nice observer of turns, but forever present yourself ready for everything, and if your officers are not very inattentive men they will not allow the others to impose more duty on you than they should; but I never knew one who was exact to do no more than his share of duty, who would not neglect that when he could do so without fear of punishment.—Admiral Collingwood’s advice to a young officer, 1787.
1. See Admiral Chester’s article in the September, 1906, issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings for account of Commander Chester’s 1904 experiments. Also Proceedings for July, 1883, and for June, 1904.