Events of World War II have compelled the United States to take an ever increasing interest in the defenses of the Caribbean Sea, an area of great importance to the security of the Western Hemisphere. By transferring destroyers to England under the famous agreement of September, 1940, the American Government secured the right to construct a number of air and naval bases in the West Indies. We have taken other steps, in conjunction with our allies, to safeguard this vital sector from attack. Moreover, careful study has been given to the manner in which France’s changing position in Europe has affected the status of its Caribbean possessions, notably Martinique.
The interest of the American Government in Martinique is not entirely of recent origin. During the period immediately before the outbreak of the European war in 1914, when plans were being made for the opening of the Panama Canal, serious consideration was given to the possible roles of the West Indian islands in any armed conflict involving the United States. As one phase of the larger problem, Major Dion Williams of the United States Marine Corps submitted a detailed report concerning Martinque to the Office of Naval Intelligence at Washington.1 This document, containing information on the population, the resources, and the defenses of the French island, resulted from a reconnaissance of the Caribbean by Major Williams and a fellow officer, Captain H. R. Long.
The two authors of the report were impressed with the strategic location of Martinique:
In case of hostilities involving the United States as principals or allies, Martinique would be of great importance, as Fort de France Bay is one of the largest and best protected harbors in the West Indies.
It is already partially fortified and plans have been made to add to these defenses and to deepen and improve the harbor facilities by dredging and building docks and piers, as it is thought by the French and Colonial Government authorities that the opening of the Panama Canal will greatly add to the importance and prosperity of the island.
The key position occupied by Martinique in the Caribbean, true today as it was in 1912, is substantiated by its long and colorful history. Thumbing back through the pages of the past, we learn that the Spaniards preceded the French in colonizing the American tropics. It was Columbus himself who first claimed the West Indies for His Most Catholic Majesty at Madrid. The value of the new colonies was quickly recognized by the European monarchy, and prior to 1540 the Spanish began settlements on all the larger and many of the smaller islands in the Caribbean. It was not long before other imperialistic peoples became interested in the area. English, Dutch, French, and Danish seamen, coming down the path of the trade winds in their sailing vessels and touching at the West Indian islands, soon asserted their claims to parts of this region whose fabled wealth had stirred the imagination of all Europe.
Columbus sighted Martinique in 1502 while making his last voyage, during which he sailed along the shores of Central America from Honduras to Panama. On June 25, 1635, this insular territory, which is slightly more than one-third the size of Rhode Island, was formally settled in the name of the French Compagnie des Iles d’Amérique.2 The future of the colony was destined to be stormy, since the European powers were to wage persistent warfare for the control of the islands which dot the Caribbean. France’s chief rival in the West Indies proved to be England; and as the fortunes of war ebbed and flowed, Martinique changed hands frequently. The English often possessed it for a period, but in the end the French obtained undisputed sovereignty.3
It has generally happened that the numerous wars of Europe occasioned fighting in the colonial possessions of the contesting powers. In view of this fact, the history of Martinique, like that of the entire Caribbean region, contains considerable action. In general, warfare in the West Indies was essentially of a naval character, for in addition to the sea battles which naturally accompanied major wars, the bodies of water separating the various islands called for strategy in which ships were given important and varied responsibilities. An insular territory was usually captured by the enemy after landings had been effected under the protecting fire of escorting warships. Armed convoys were also frequently needed for transporting troops and supplies to the colonies, or from one colony to another.
Three decades after having been settled by the French, Martinique felt the impact of the war which gripped the continent. In 1665, Louis XIV sided with the Dutch against Charles II of England. The conflict spread to the Caribbean, and a Dutch naval squadron under the famed Admiral de Ruyter went to those waters and maintained its base at Martinique. The colony repulsed an English sea attack in 1666, and the French then assumed the offensive against the enemy’s near-by possessions. Martinique became a continuous threat to England’s dependencies, and it was agreed at London that the French fleet stationed there should be destroyed and the island captured. An expeditionary force under Sir John Harman attacked Martinique in 1667, and after a battle lasting several days the defending naval units were badly battered, although the rocky isle remained in the control of France. The Treaty of Breda temporarily brought peace to the Caribbean.4
Ten years later, circumstances were reversed; the Dutch were now the enemy rather than the ally of France. Land operations on the continent had reached a stalemate, and the Netherlands, possessing strong sea power, planned to strike elsewhere. Admiral de Ruyter, admittedly the finest seaman in the world, decided to carry the war into the French West Indies. This decision emphasized the strategic relation of the colonial possessions in the Caribbean to a major conflict in the Old World. De Ruyter’s campaign presented for the first time the concept that a maritime nation could offset the advantage of a land power in Europe by a sudden and overwhelming attack against its overseas holdings. A diversion of this type was often tried in the wars of the eighteenth century, but De Ruyter’s imaginative skill originally conceived the basic principle.
In outlining the objectives of the contemplated campaign, the Netherlands leader rightly understood that the center of the enemy’s authority in the Antilles was fixed at Martinique, whose French inhabitants exceeded the entire white population of all the remaining possessions of France in the Caribbean. A Dutch squadron which appeared off Martinique in June, 1673, failed to challenge the enemy forces, for the island was strongly fortified. Meanwhile De Ruyter made preparations for the execution of his plan. Leaving the Netherlands with a powerful fleet of forty- eight vessels, he reached the West Indies in the middle of July, 1674. The governor of Martinique, however, learned of the impending attack by a fast dispatch boat, and the insular defenses had been hastily strengthened. The French warships were shifted into the harbor under the guns of Fort Royal. Unopposed by the French at sea, De Ruyter landed strong forces and assaulted the forts which formed the nucleus of the island’s defense system. Meeting unexpectedly difficult resistance, the Dutch suffered heavy losses. Confronted with the possibility of additional reverses, De Ruyter re-embarked his shattered forces and sailed back to Europe, thereby abandoning his ambitious plans.5
Martinique again was the subject of attack in the Seven Years’ War, 1756 to 1763. The traditional rivals, England and France, fought wherever one or the other owned outlying possessions, and naturally the Caribbean became a theater of war. Taking advantage of inferior French naval strength, England swept the West Indies with strong squadrons. Guadeloupe fell to the English in 1759, but they did not take Martinique until three years later. The island, as before, comprised the key point of French interests in that area, and it also served as the base for an extensive privateering system against the English. It is said that no less than 1,400 English merchantmen were seized during the Seven Years’ War in West Indian waters by cruisers whose principal port was Fort Royal in Martinique. In February, 1762, an English fleet under Admiral George Brydges Rodney, who twenty years afterward played an important role in the Caribbean, co-operated with the land forces in reducing the French island. With the loss of this important commercial and military center, France’s remaining colonies in the Caribbean fell in similar fashion to the English.6
According to precedent, Martinique reverted to French sovereignty under the Treaty of Paris in 1763, but the state of peace was not lasting. A struggle of major proportions between France and England in the West Indies resulted from the American Revolution and the eventual participation of the French on the side of the Colonists. The English had obtained undisputed supremacy of the sea in the Seven Years’ War. Conditions were now radically changed, and France was able to send strong segments of its fleet to the Western Hemisphere. The English, though still the possessor of impressive naval strength, were beset with many troubles. American privateers harried their ships in the North Atlantic, and war was about to break out with the Dutch over the issue of contraband trade with the Colonies.
Seeking to profit from England’s weakened state, the French, employing Martinique as a base, set out to capture the former’s possessions in the Caribbean. The first phase of the offensive witnessed in swift succession the capitulation of Dominica, St. Vincent, and Granada. Early in 1780, Admiral Rodney returned to the Caribbean as commander of the Leeward Islands station; in April of that year he fought an indecisive battle with De Guichen near Martinique. Reinforced by additional ships under Rear Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, Rodney adopted an aggressive policy. Separating his command, he ordered Hood to blockade Fort Royal and to intercept a large French convoy which was reported on its way to the West Indies. Simultaneously he undertook operations against the Dutch island of St. Eustacia.
Hood patiently patrolled Martinique waters while waiting for the French vessels. In April, 1781, an enemy convoy did make its appearance, but it was escorted by a naval squadron under Francois Joseph Paul, Comte de Grasse, who had been placed in charge of France’s military effort in the West Indies. The French Admiral forced a junction with the four warships which were blockaded at Port Royal and came to grips with his English adversary. A general engagement took place at long range, and after it had been broken off, Hood went to St. Eustacia where he informed his superior of De Grasse’s arrival. This incident was not without significance. If Hood and Rodney, operating together, had encountered and defeated De Grasse when he approached Martinique, the outcome undoubtedly would have made it more difficult for the Colonies to win the war.7
By reaching Martinique safely, De Grasse was in a position to cause the English much embarrassment. He seized the island of Tobago, the only insular possession that interrupted the communication lines of the French Windward Isles with Spanish-controlled Florida. This action assured the French of fresh provisions, and deprived the hostile cruisers of all refuge in those parts. Later De Grasse sailed to Haiti, where he received urgent dispatches from Washington and Rochambeau to proceed northward against the English. The ensuing Battle of Chesapeake Bay, in which the French fleet soundly trounced the opposition, was one of the decisive actions of the Revolutionary War.
Returning from his outstanding triumph in the north, De Grasse rested at Martinique and began massing the most powerful naval force that France ever mustered in the Caribbean. Plagued by poor health, Rodney returned to England, leaving Hood in charge of a fleet which was not strong enough to challenge De Grasse. On February 19, 1782, Rodney came back and resumed command of naval operations in the West Indies. A period of watchful waiting followed. The French Admiral wished to join a Spanish fleet off the north coast of Hispaniola before moving against Jamaica, England’s most valuable Caribbean colony. While he maintained headquarters at Port Royal, the fleet of his opponent assembled at Gros Ilet Bay, St. Lucia, some 30 miles to the south.
In order to observe the other’s movements, Rodney established a chain of frigates within signaling distance of one another, the last ship in this group anchored within sight of Martinique. Rodney wanted, if possible, to force a battle before De Grasse had the opportunity to make contact with his Spanish allies. Departing from Port Royal in April, 1782, the French expeditionary force encountered the fleet under Rodney and Hood, and the latter won the decisive Battle of the Saints in the channel between Guadeloupe and Dominica. Unable to assemble a second great fleet, France never challenged the English again in the Caribbean.8
Besides serving as the chief base in the Western Hemisphere for the French Navy, which in itself was of great value to the American Colonists, Martinique had other influence upon the outcome of the war. The Americans were hard-pressed for munitions and supplies of all kinds, and without them the continuation of the struggle would have been doubtful. It was not unnatural that many of these supplies should have been procured from Europe via the West Indian islands. In the latter group, the Dutch island of St. Eustacia and Martinique served as important depots for transshipment of goods to the mainland. England seized and occupied St. Eustacia after the Netherlands openly entered the war against her. Therefore, it was of great importance to the successful efforts of the rebellious Americans that Martinique remained in French hands throughout the entire Revolution. If this supply base had fallen to the English, it would have represented a serious setback to the struggling Colonists.
At the beginning of open hostilities with the mother country, the thirteen Colonies hastened to maintain, as far as possible, their commercial ties with Europe by means of the West Indies. The revolutionary government endeavored to continue trade with the Caribbean area and a convoy service was introduced for this purpose. The American navy stationed agents in various parts of France and its dependencies. In July, 1776, William Bingham, appointed to such an office at Martinique, sailed aboard an armed Continental ship to his post. An English man-of-war engaged the vessel near Port Royal, but the attack was beaten off and the diplomat reached his destination safely.
Bingham and his successors performed their duties well. Circumstances required that great care should be taken to acquire military supplies, especially naval stores, which were sorely needed at all times. Arms, ammunition, and clothing were brought to Martinique for transshipment to the United States. One prevalent practice was for French vessels to go to the insular territory, where their cargoes were discharged and exchanged for American produce. The chief staple in this traffic was tobacco, delivered to Martinique in Continental vessels, which returned to the Colonies with military supplies. In this connection, Bingham did a vast amount of work, buying, building, manning and fitting out merchant ships, directing cruises, and providing protection for the unarmed craft.
Martinique was important in another fashion. Long before France actively entered the war as the formal ally of the Colonies, the island served as a major military and naval base for the Americans. Continental privateers frequently put in at Port Royal to be refitted, repaired, or provisioned, or to escape threatening weather. The American agent disposed of many prizes seized by the armed raiders. Bingham himself commissioned a number of privateers with American captains and crews composed of French or Spanish sailors. The extensive cargoes captured by these and French privateers caused prices to rise in England’s Caribbean possessions. Martinique also functioned as a communications and intelligence center for the United States. Bingham gathered information about the West Indies and Europe, which he forwarded to the mainland, and Congress occasionally routed dispatches to France through Port Royal; moreover, the American representatives and commercial agents in France communicated with the United States via this friendly outpost.9
Not many years after the Colonies succeeded in achieving their independence, the French Revolution appeared upon the scene. Events accruing from this domestic upheaval again threw Martinique into the cauldron of war. It was a source of irritation to the English that they had been unable to capture the French colony during the American embroglio, particularly since enemies of the Empire had used the small island to good advantage. Rodney and other English admirals emphasized the strategic location of Port Royal in the Caribbean. Following the execution of Louis XVI in 1793, England took the field against the French republic. In adherence to the established pattern, fighting broke out in the West Indies, where an initial attack against Martinique failed. However, in February, 1794, a powerful force under General Sir Charles Grey and Admiral Sir John Jervis returned, landed at several points on the insular territory, and overwhelmed resistance. The French colony remained in the possession of England until the Peace of Amiens.10
It is an ironic aspect of the changing positions of the powers in the Caribbean that Martinique should have been in English hands during the period of the undeclared naval war between France and the United States, 1798-1801. For in the American Revolution, when France was originally friendly to and later allied with the Colonies, Martinique aided the Americans appreciably, but subsequently, when France and the United States became temporarily estranged from each other, the European nation, as a result of English action, was prevented from using the Caribbean base against its former ally. The commercial importance of the West Indies made that region one of the principal centers of naval activity during the Napoleonic wars. A large share of the Caribbean trade fell to the United States, and for this reason American shipping was peculiarly exposed to the aggressions of the belligerents. The French National Convention threatened American commerce by directing the capture of vessels carrying provisions and merchandise belonging to the enemy or bound for an enemy port. In the place of Martinique, which was held by England, Guadeloupe was used as the base of operations for French cruisers and privateers which preyed upon American merchantmen in the West Indies.11
Following the renewal of war between England and France in 1803, Martinique was a point at issue regarding the rights of the United States as a neutral in trading with the West Indies. An English admiral arbitrarily proclaimed a blockade of the island’s whole coast. The United States objected to this procedure, and the Government at London reprimanded the naval officer. Instructions were sent to him that blockade measures could only be applied to specified ports, and that neutral merchantmen should be given the consideration due them under international law.12
Martinique also became a factor in the strategy envisaged by Napoleon for an invasion of England. On February 23, 1805, the admiral in charge of the French naval forces in the Antilles was ordered to remain there until he received further instructions from Paris. In a series of separate but concentric movements, the various sections of the French fleet confined in continental ports were to break through the English blockade, join a squadron of Spanish ships at Cadiz, and then proceed to Martinique. This tactical operation was to be executed in such a manner as to confuse the English and split up their naval strength. Gathered together under a single command in the West Indies, the French and Spanish armada was to descend upon England.
The concentration of the allied fleet at Martinique only partially succeeded, a fact which spelled disaster for the ambitious project. Although several of his associates were unable to carry out their assignments in slipping past the blockading forces of the enemy, Admiral Pierre de Villeneuve sailed out of Toulon and evaded Horatio Nelson, who maintained a close watch upon the French naval base. Arriving at Fort de France (formerly Port Royal), Villeneuve noticed that the traffic in and out of the colonial port was considerably hampered by an audacious stroke of aggressiveness on the part of English sailors. The latter had seized and fortified a large shaft of rock off the southwest coast of Martinique. Named H.M.S. Diamond Rock, it was garrisoned by a man-of-war’s crew and protected by shore batteries. Villeneuve finally starved this unusual stronghold into submission. Outmaneuvering Nelson for a second time, the French commander sailed for Europe, marking the end of the last display of naval power by France in the Caribbean. On October 21, 1805, the Battle of Trafalgar obliterated Napoleon’s grandiose invasion scheme.13
Martinique was last occupied by the English in 1809, and it was not returned to France until December 2, 1814. This seizure was regarded, in part, as a preventive measure, since England wanted to forestall the use of the French island by the United States in the serious difficulties which had arisen between the two countries. In doing so, the English avoided a repetition of events during the American Revolution, when the Caribbean isle had so effectively helped the Colonies. To make the reversal of conditions complete, Martinique was utilized throughout the War of 1812 as the headquarters of His Britannic Majesty’s naval forces in the West Indies.14
From this point on, the history of Martinique was more peaceful. Fifty years later, Confederate commerce raiders occasionally obtained supplies in Fort de France and other Martinique ports. Early in the war, the Sumter, a converted passenger liner of 500 tons under the command of Captain Rafael Semmes, ran the blockade from New Orleans and preyed upon northern shipping. Prior to making a trip across the Atlantic, Semmes sailed into the harbor of St. Pierre, Martinique, and successfully negotiated for the necessary supplies. The Sumter was not as yet ready for sea, when the United States steam-sloop Iroquois, a vessel superior to the Confederate ship in speed and twice its weight and fighting power, appeared in the roadstead off St. Pierre.
There was widespread excitement among the local populace regarding the possibility of a clash between the two ships. The Iroquois, anticipating an attempt by Semmes to escape, kept a close vigil offshore. Much to the chagrin of the Union sailors, the Confederate vessel managed, under the cover of darkness, to leave the port unnoticed. During a more advanced stage of the war, Semmes, now in command of the famous commerce raider, Alabama, was forced to take refuge momentarily at Fort de France. As before, he escaped from the neutral harbor and eluded his pursuers.15
The Civil War period also witnessed the failure of Napoleon III to create an empire in the Americas. The thirst of the French Emperor for overseas conquest led to the establishment of Maximilian upon the throne of Mexico. A large expeditionary force (1862-67) was sent from France to bolster the authority of the ill-fated monarch. In this connection, Martinique proved highly useful as a naval base and supply depot for the numerous transports and cargo vessels which were dispatched from the continent of Europe to Mexican ports.16 This incident was a concrete example of how a Caribbean possession could be employed by a European power to expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere.
The Spanish-American War disrupted the peace of the West Indies and resulted in the elimination of Spain from that area. Although Martinique was neutral territory, its relation to the tactical maneuvers of the belligerent navies is not without significance. Immediately following the outbreak of open hostilities in April, 1898, a Spanish fleet commanded by Admiral Cervera left the Cape Verde Islands ostensibly for Puerto Rico. At this juncture the armed forces of the United States were preparing to effect a landing in Cuba. There was considerable speculation about Cervera’s objectives and the size of his fleet. Some sections of the European press asserted that he was carrying out a brilliant feat of strategy which would bring disaster to the Americans.
After days of uncertainty, naval intelligence at Washington learned that Cervera had appeared off Martinique. His presence in that sector suggested an attempt to relieve the blockaded city of Havana or a bombardment of the Atlantic coast. It is not unlikely that the Spaniards tried to coal in one of Martinique’s ports. Adhering to the recognized rules of neutrality, the French colonial authorities probably refused to grant such a request. An American scouting mission was sent out to verify the reported location of the Spanish fleet near the French possession. In turn, Cervera did not wish to come unexpectedly upon the United States naval forces, and he dispatched a torpedo destroyer into Fort de France to reconnoiter. It happened that an American warship of a similar type, also in the search of information, had arrived a few hours before in the adjacent harbor of St. Pierre.
The governor of Martinique, wishing to preserve the neutrality of French territorial waters, ordered retention of the two vessels so that they would not depart within 24 hours of each other. That night the Spanish destroyer lifted anchor and rejoined the main squadron. On the basis of the news received, Cervera abandoned the idea of going to Puerto Rico and proceeded to Curacao, where the Madrid Government had previously stationed colliers for his use. Toward the middle of the summer, the Spanish fleet met a crushing defeat at Santiago de Cuba.17
The possession of Martinique by neutral France gave Cervera more freedom of action than he would have otherwise enjoyed. Information secured by the scouting ship at Fort de France enabled him to ascertain the whereabouts of the American fleet. This incident is of interest in another respect, for an account of Martinique’s naval history touches upon a problem which is of importance to the American people. From time to time it has been argued that, in accordance with the dictates of sound military policy, the United States should control all the key points in the Caribbean. A forceful exposition of this kind was made by Professor William R. Shepherd of Columbia University in an address to the National Conference on Foreign Relations of the United States on May 30, 1917.
Professor Shepherd, referring to the European colonies in the Caribbean and their inhabitants, stated, in part:
The future of these islands and peoples is a matter of vital concern to the United States. The reason for it lies in the observance of the sound national principle that small areas located near the territory of a great power should belong to it, rather than a distant country…
Because of their nearness to the territory of the United States and to the Panama Canal, and because of their remoteness from the territory of their possessors, this country has, and ought to have, a paramount interest in their destiny, both for its own sake and for theirs. Naturally and strategically a part of the United States, they are a potential menace to its welfare and security as long as they remain under European control…
Possibly the colonies may have some strategic value to their owners as naval bases. If so, against what power? This is an obvious question that has an obvious answer—the United States.18
It is not an easy task to derive principles from the naval history of Martinique and the other West Indian islands which would throw light upon the more recent interests of the United States in the Caribbean region. In the specific case of Martinique, we have seen that the French possession played a role of varying importance in a number of major wars involving the United States. Most of this action was restricted to the earlier periods of our history. Aside from the conflict with a weak Spain, it is true that the United States has not gone to war during the past 125 years with one of the European nations which own Caribbean territories. In view of this fact, a statement about the exact relation of Martinique to some future armed struggle between the United States and a formidable opponent in the Caribbean remains somewhat in the realm of speculation.
If England had openly entered the Civil War on the side of the Confederacy, the English undoubtedly would have used their Caribbean bases to good advantage. Such a hypothetical situation probably would have demonstrated more clearly than the Spanish-American War the degree of effectiveness with which a hostile nation could employ the West Indian islands against the United States. The two cases are inherently different. While England possessed the most powerful navy in the world, Spain was no match for the United States. In 1898, Spain controlled Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other islands in the Antilles, but the European monarchy was so enfeebled that we were assured of a comparatively easy victory. Spain’s navy was not strong enough to permit raids from her colonies upon the exposed coast of the United States. Moreover, only a minimum of effort was needed to oust the Spaniards from their outlying possessions.
The naval position of the United States has been vastly changed since the termination of the war with Spain. Several new factors have made their presence felt with reference to the Caribbean area. The first of these was the construction and operation of the Panama Canal, and the second, the rapid development and widening scope of air power. Today the United States is waging a gigantic struggle on far-flung battlefronts, and the continued availability of the Canal for our use is of utmost importance. Our entire military and naval strategy in the war would be seriously affected if the traffic through this vital interoceanic passage were interrupted. Events of World War II have proved that the man-made waterway should be safeguarded from air as well as sea attack.
It is in this sense that Martinique commands renewed attention at the present time. The political events which have prompted the United States to cast an observing eye in the direction of the small island need not be discussed here.19 For our purpose, it is sufficient to note that conditions in Europe have given additional significance to the question of Martinique’s strategic location in the Caribbean. It is not by mere circumstance that Fort de France was mentioned so frequently with respect to the history of the French dependency. This colonial port, which reputedly has the finest harbor between Cuba and South America, distinguishes Martinique from the other islands in the same region. Natural advantages exist here which are unequalled at any of the West Indian bases leased to the United States by England. The harbor space embraces some 15 square miles of protected water, an area large enough to permit anchorage of our entire Atlantic fleet.
In a realistic piece of conjecture, we might, for the sake of argument, imagine that Martinique has fallen into the hands of an enemy. Under existing circumstances, a hostile fleet based at Fort de France would probably be crushed without much difficulty by the preponderately superior naval and air forces which the United States could hurl against it from near-by points. Moreover, a direct naval assault aimed at the Panama Canal from Martinique would stand a good chance of being intercepted before its objective were reached. Strictly speaking, it is likely that the increased efficiency of air power has made it possible for the United States to counter more effectively than heretofore any enemy naval operations which might originate from Martinique. This development in the perfection of air power has an opposite effect. Bombing planes flown from airfields on the Caribbean island or catapulted from aircraft carriers in adjoining waters might in a single attack do serious damage to the Panama Canal.
A sudden shift in conditions within the Western Hemisphere might bring other considerations into play regarding Martinique’s importance. If an unfriendly military power were entrenched in South America, Fort de France would prove valuable to the United States in a further strengthening of the Caribbean defenses. It is now believed that the Lesser Antilles are the weakest part of the existing chain of American bases in the West Indies. Martinique unquestionably commands a key position in this group. In the meantime, the patrol of United States destroyers off Martinique has been mute reminder of the insular territory’s extended naval history.
1. A copy of this report, dated May 15, 1912, may be found in the National Archives.
2. In 1935, when the three hundredth anniversary of the founding of Martinique was celebrated, a number of articles and studies on the history of the colony made their appearance. For a list of these, written largely in French, see Grace Gardner Grinin and Dorothy M. Lourainc, Writings on American History, 1935, pp. 459-61.
3. A brief summary of the more important military and naval actions involving Martinique is included in La Martinique, Agence Généerale des Colonics, Paris, 1925, pp. 5-6.
4. Charles S. S. Higham, The Development of the Leeward Islands under the Restoration, 1660-1688, London, 1921, pp. 38-54.
5. Arthur Percival Newton, The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493-1688, London, 1933, pp. 297-301.
6. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, Boston, 1894, 6th ed., p. 314.
7. John Francis Steele, writing in the Washington Post, July 14, 1940, stated, “It is probably known to few Americans that one of the most momentous happenings of American history occurred in these waters; that our liberty and independence rested upon the movement of the French fleet at Martinique and its inimitable Commander, Admiral de Grasse.”
8. There is abundant reference to the role of Martinique in the sea warfare between England and France during the period of the American Revolution. For standard accounts, see Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, Major Operations of the Royal Navy, 1762-1783, Boston, 1898; Walter Adolphe Roberts, The French in the West Indies, Indianapolis and New York, 1942.
9. Gardner Weld Allen, A Naval History of the American Revolution, Boston and New York, 1913,1, pp. 233, 253, II, p. 591; Charles Oscar Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution, Chicago, 1906, pp. 305-06.
10. Roberts, op. cit., pp. 233-34.
11. Gardner Weld Allen, Our Naval War with France, Boston and New York, 1909, pp. 34-35.
12. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812, London, 1905, I, p. 99.
13. Roberts, op. cit., pp. 231-32; Harold C. Deutsch, The Genesis of Napoleonic Imperialism, Cambridge, 1938, pp. 320-21.
14. Walter Adolphe Roberts, The Caribbean; The Story of Our Sea of Destiny, Indianapolis and New York, 1940, p. 238.
15. Montague Bernard, A Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War, London, 1870, pp. 275-82.
16. La Martinique, loc. cit.
17. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain, Boston, 1899, p. 90 ff.
18. William R. Shepherd, “The Attitude of the United States toward the Retention by European Nations of Colonies in and around the Caribbean,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. VII, New York, 1917, pp. 200-13.
19. For accounts of this kind sec Roberts, The French in the West Indies, op. cit., pp. 307-18: James K. Eyre, Jr., “Martinique, A Key Point in Hemisphere Defense,” The Inter-American Quarterly, Vol. Ill, October, 1941,
pp. 82-88.