TRAINING the landing force is a problem which causes little concern aboard most ships of the Navy. If it arises at all, the reason may usually be found in an impending inspection or street parade, either of which occasions certain dislocations of the routine afloat, as well as a great deal of minor inconvenience to individuals. A landing under service conditions, as part of a military operation? Let the Marines do it—and there the landing force question eases to a standstill.
Without exploring the numerous occasions in naval history when ships’ landing forces have been called upon to act ashore in a military capacity, the present times allow an excellent case to be made out not only for the maintenance of landing forces aboard ship, but for their maintenance in readiness for actual operations. It is a usual observation, however, that such matters naturally fall to the Marine Corps, within whose special province they lie. This is true—so far as the strength of the Corps and the availability of personnel at widely separated points will permit. It is true, also, that the Fleet Marine Force is an integral part of the fleet and is at the disposal of commanders afloat for any military operation to be undertaken. Naturally, in major operations against professional opponents, the FMF will do the work. But for minor operations, such as those incident to raiding, to political intervention in trouble-spots, and to the far- flung and multitudinous independent missions required by hemispheric or world campaigns, the FMF cannot be dispersed to perform small duties which a well- trained single ship’s landing force could readily handle. Any study of cruiser operations reveals numerous minor landings, all of a semicombatant type, but none of sufficient gravity to occasion more than brief skirmishing. Examples are the destruction of radio, cable, or other communication facilities ashore at isolated points (a specialty of the first Emden); or the destruction of fuel or naval supplies (witness the recent British raid upon the Mediterranean island of Castellorizzo, or that to the Lofoten Islands); remote but essential submarine and aviation facilities will furnish attractive objectives as well. A different role, but one which will frequently require implementation by a trained landing force, is that of local intervention, not directed at the achievement of political aims, but for the pacification or neutralization of towns and adjacent areas. In a world in which governments have developed an alarming tendency to change rapidly, and particularly as we draw nearer to the instability of a post-war period, there can be no doubt that our Navy will have to act as a tranquilizing force, much as it did in the years following the World War. Finally, detached operations will require the military services of trained prize crews, men not only able to bring a prize to port, but to guard themselves against being overpowered during the process. Consideration of the matter will discover numerous other opportunities for the landing force. Let us examine its present state.
“Out of sight, out of mind” has few better exemplifications than in most ships’ landing forces. Because a warship’s primary mission is afloat, and because it is physically difficult and inconvenient to exercise or train the landing party, training is infrequently administered and often in the wrong dosage. Like all other training toward a specific goal, that of a landing force needs not only man-hours but a progressive program and plan. Most ships, it is true, provide annual periods in which all hands are allowed to familiarize themselves with rifles, pistols, and other small arms, but this familiarization often extends to no more than a haphazard discharge of ammunition, for which personnel are unprepared and without the most elementary background of basic knowledge. Few indeed are the ships with a year-round program for the landing force, although such a program need not entail any greater expenditure of man-hours than would occur during present landing force familiarization exercises as they are usually now conducted. The benefits of program and policy scarcely require enlargement. Thoughtfully applied, they can be as useful to the landing force commmander as to the gunnery officer, the engineering officer, or any other department head with the responsibility of conducting constant training toward an end.
In the face of criticism, however, it is a natural rejoinder that the landing force cannot be well trained aboard ship because of the physical limitations involved. No one can learn to be a soldier inside a warship’s compartments, nor, in particular, can a sailor, whose time is well occupied with ship’s drills, watches, and cleaning stations. Therefore, what can be done toward improving the state of training?
The first requisite is a training program, an orderly year-round schedule with certain definite limitations and goals in mind. It should be sensibly based upon the actual amount of time which can be spared, upon the general level of existing instruction in the particular ship, and upon the probable missions which the ship’s landing force might be called upon to carry out during war or any conceivable emergency. Such a program must be progressive, simple, and faithfully performed. Its instructors probably would—in the beginning at least— come from the officers and noncommissioned officers of the Marine Detachment. By means of judicious coaching and out-of-hours help, much could be accomplished by ship’s junior officers and petty officers.
The scope of shipboard landing force training is rather severely limited to school periods, barring the infrequent moments when part or all can be set ashore—usually on a stadium field or baseball diamond— for a bit of close-order drill. Yet it is fortunate that much which is now basic in warfare can be thoroughly learned over a blackboard or a disassembled small arm. To attain an excellent state of basic training, there are required but a few hours of monthly shipboard classwork and a budgeted period ashore. The sequence of annual training should run as follows:
(a) progressive year-round classwork aboard ship; (b) firing and marksmanship with basic weapons; (c) practical exercises ashore.
School for the landing force can be conveniently divided into two concurrent courses, the first for officers and leading petty officers alone, the second for entire units. The mission of the first is to furnish key personnel with advance information and background on what will be less minutely imparted to junior or nonrated men. The mission of the second is to give specific units sufficient basic training to carry out their particular duties under anticipated service conditions. Naturally, it will be impossible to make a well-rounded soldier out of a bluejacket—nor can any reasonable individual expect such attainment from individuals who are already engrossed in the complex and responsible matter of being good man-of-war’s men. On the other hand, it will be possible, particularly with an intelligent and enthusiastic group, to give every man a good understanding of his own specialty, whether it be as a rifleman, a machine gunner, a pioneer, or a signalman.
For all hands, regardless of special mission, a few subjects should be regarded as basic. Their application is universal, and cuts across the entire military endeavor. Every member of a landing force, therefore, should know them. Thus, as a preliminary to more specialized instruction, the basic subjects ought to be mastered. Accordingly, a basic course is laid out; afterward, the landing force may be divided into smaller groups according to the particular missions of its components. Upon completion of basic and special training, the force would be ready to fire its weapons on the range. Thereafter for a few days, it should be allowed to combine all previous instruction into a group of short, practical exercises in the field; all of these could be executed within the neighborhood of any rifle or combat range sufficiently commodious to accommodate a ship’s landing force as it now goes ashore for firing.
To avoid the fault of over-generalization as to what can be done in the premises, a specific program is set forth. The time allotted for each subject will naturally vary from ship to ship, according to the needs of other activities and to probable wartime missions. Nevertheless, a small time expended as here suggested will produce results. Basic instructional material may be found in the Landing Force Manual, 1938, and in the reference publications cited therein. The program follows:
BASIC SUBJECTS
(To be completed by all personnel)
Subject Nature of instruction
A Individual instruction without arms and with the rifle; close-order drill, the squad, platoon, and company.
B Mechanics, functioning, and marksman
ship of the rifle, pistol, Browning automatic rifle, and bayonet; hand grenades
C The infantry pack; shelter tents.
D Sanitation, hygiene, and first aid; defense against chemical attack ashore.
E Interior guard duty; the duties of a sentinel on post and over prisoners.
SPECIAL SUBJECTS FOE RIFLE PLATOONS ONLY
RA Extended order; combat signals.
RB Scouting and patrolling; marches and security.
RC Organization and tactics of infantry.
SPECIAL SUBJECTS FOR THE MACHINE GUN PLATOON
MA Machine gun drill.
MB Mechanics and functioning, the .30- caliber Browning machine gun
MC Technique of fire.
SUBJECTS FOR THE SPECIAL WEAPONS PLATOON
SA Gun (or mortar) drill.
SB Mechanics and functioning, the 37-mm.
gun or 81-mm. mortar, as appropriate.
SC Techniques of fire.
SPECIAL SUBJECTS FOR THE PIONEER PLATOON
PA Camouflage.
PB Defensive works.
PC Demolitions.
PD Rigging.
CURRICULUM FOR OFFICERS AND PETTY OFFICERS
A-E All basic subjects (plus the special subjects appertaining to the landing-force component to which assigned).
OA Map and aerial photograph reading.
OB Offensive and defensive combat, the squad, platoon, and company.
OC Small wars (emphasis on the attack and defense of towns as covered in LFM 17); domestic disturbances.
Note. —Signalmen, radiomen, hospital corpsmen, and miscellaneous supply and service personnel of the landing force may be given special instruction or assigned to existing courses as may be appropriate.
Study of the foregoing table will indicate that every subject may be more than partially taught under classroom or shipboard conditions, and that only a few, such as close-order drill, extended order, shelter tents, and the tactical subjects, require any time spent ashore. Any such periods available would of course be welcomed and valuable, but training may proceed in most aspects without them.
Such a program, it may be argued, could be more properly carried out at training stations. This is true. But training-station instruction not continued can easily be forgotten, and preparedness, in landing forces as in other naval activities, is at a premium. A few hours of such training may be well rewarded in an emergency.