Captain Lloyd L. Crandall. —Rear Admiral Brumby’s brief and succinct article in the February issue of the PROCEEDINGS cannot fail to be of value and interest to all practical navigators.
To me, it was of particular interest because the method described is one I have used by choice, both for Polaris and for other stars on or near the meridian, during several years of seagoing in the Merchant Service.
That so few other navigators appear to have heard of, or are known to have used, the method described is not only somewhat surprising, but is a further graphic testimonial to the direct, practical usefulness of the mission to which the Institute’s PROCEEDINGS is dedicated.
Curiously enough, Admiral Brumby’s method of checking the sight, by decreasing and increasing the sextant angle by one minute above and below the horizon, coincides with my own initial practice. Later, however, another practical extension of the the method recommended itself.
With precomputed altitudes, the Polaris sight is, when possible, taken first, followed by prompt observations of the two east- and west-bearing stars—and immediately succeeded by another observation of Polaris. Naturally, the two latitudes obtained from Polaris check each other, allowing for the slight run between; and this accurate latitude is used in working the stars obtained for longitude.
When another star or planet is on or near the meridian bearing south, this, of course, eliminates the necessity for the second Polaris check for latitude—this body being used instead of Polaris.
Saturn is exceptionally useful when on or near the meridian in this respect. An old observation book used by me during 1928, while in the offshore and intercoastal trades, records my daily observations of Saturn against Polaris with precomputed altitudes in this same manner every consecutive evening for several weeks at sea, through practically the complete limits of the ex-meridian tables from East to West.
A check of these figures shows the initial sight, usually of Polaris, took place at an average time of 20 minutes after sunset; the final sight at an average of 12 minutes later. All sights were taken unassisted, using a stopwatch and the chartroom chronometer.
The method is ideal for general use in the Merchant Service. In the average merchant vessel there is but one watch officer on duty on the bridge while at sea, contrary to the usual custom of regularly carrying two watch officers on bridge duty at sea which prevails in many of the larger passenger and naval vessels.
Ordinarily, the average merchant officer, except for a wheelsman, is alone on the bridge during the entire 4 hours of his watch. He is the sole, responsible lookout on duty during this period—accountable for the ship’s safety even while engaged in his duties connected with necessary celestial navigation.
Under such conditions, the method described by Admiral Brumby has, in addition to the items of a clear sky, greater accuracy, speed, and simplicity, the further excellent recommendations of better terrestrial visibility as well as less chart- room time in a period of rapidly growing darkness.
Those who use, or have used, this method will, I feel sure, vouch for it as a source of real satisfaction to any navigator who finds real pleasure and gratification in accurate star navigation; will readily agree with Admiral Brumby that, “always excepting the meridian altitude of the sun,” the most useful observation can well be “A Daylight Sight of Polaris.”
Future Cruisers
(See page 163, February, 1941, PROCEEDINGS)
Commander H. E. Rossell (C.C.), U. S. Navy (Retired). —Lieutenant Percival’s article entitled “Future Cruisers” contains several interesting and important suggestions about the design of warships. One of these is that,
The manifestly correct procedure is to decide what the ship is intended to do and what qualities it requires to do them most efficiently, and then to obtain the widest practicable margin of superiority in those essentials by sacrificing non- essentials.
This principle might be altered to advantage by inserting after “to do” the phrase “as an integral part of the fleet.” Failure to observe the principle thus modified has been all too common and has resulted in the appearance of freakish types of warships of little use to a fleet or indeed in any capacity. Recent examples are the German “pocket battleships” of the Graf Spee class.
Another important suggestion by Lieutenant Percival is that we revert to a fleet speed of 21 knots. In this connection the following remarks of one of the greatest figures in the field of warship design, the late Rear Admiral D. W. Taylor, are of current interest.
The fast battleship idea has had proponents in the past, and the remarkable marine engineering developments of the last twenty years have made it practicable to design future battleships much faster than those of the past. However, doubtless the question of the value of speed for a man-of- war will be debated in the future as in the past. I have seen theses endeavoring to demonstrate that “speed is a weapon.” Even if this were so, it would be a weapon detrimental to practically all the other qualities, offensive and defensive, of a war vessel. It seems to me that if we look at the matter from a common sense point of view, speed has its principal value when it is necessary to accomplish one of two results, namely, to run away or to catch an enemy that is running away.[I]
Of course any quality incorporated in the design of a warship carries with it a price. In the case of speed, however, the price is a variable quantity which increases as about the third power of the speed. Moreover, as Admiral Taylor pointed out, high speed in a warship, in addition to being costly in itself, is detrimental to the other qualities of the vessel.
A rough analogy would be the case of an apartment house in which space was rented for a fixed sum multiplied by the third power of the number of rooms and in which the comfort and security of the occupants decreased as the number of rooms increased. Under such conditions most tenants would be content with modest quarters.
But to get back to warships, let us speculate on the effects of a reduction of the fleet speed to 21 knots. The characteristics of all types would be affected as would their cost in dollars and cents, for few features of warships are as expensive as propulsive machinery. We should construct ships of each class with more offensive and defensive strength than ships now being built or, alternately, we should obtain the present qualities (except speed) on less tonnage and at reduced cost.