“The Air has but a chosen few!
All others will be damned!
There is no room aloft for you,
We can’t have Heaven crammed!”
THE ANALOGIES between any new military appliance and those previously in use are seldom considered until long after the differences between the new and the old have been discussed and examined exhaustively. Yet the appropriate sphere of the new implement is rarely defined with accuracy until just such considerations have been meticulously explored. This has not been done with respect to the airplane.
Even the most obvious and elemental analogies that are applicable are rarely discussed. For example, the airplane is fundamentally a vehicle—not a weapon. As such, it may be grouped with the battleship, the cruiser, and the submarine. All traverse a fluid medium in which they are sustained by their buoyance. The ships derive their flotation from difference of specific gravity while the airplane obtains its sustentation by dynamic reaction; but the difference is of no real military importance. Destruction of buoyancy (or stability) by enemy action or accident ends the usefulness of any of these devices.
The ships operate in and on an ocean of water; the airplane in an ocean of air. The maritime ocean ends at the water’s edge; the aerial is world-wide in extent. In traversing these oceans, all these vehicles may often utilize landmarks, but in the final analysis must depend upon the science of navigation. True, the currents of the aerial ocean are stronger than those of the maritime, and an artificial horizon must be used more frequently in the air than on the surface, but these differences are minor and technical. The basic science of selecting the proper course to the destination is the same in both instances.
That these natural analogies are not farfetched is strongly implied by an instinctive and unconscious recognition of their pertinence from a most unexpected source —the aviators of the Air Corps of the United States Army. Almost invariably these gentlemen will ask, when preparing for a flight, “Has my ship been warmed up?” Equally significant in this connection has been the failure of the term “avigation” to achieve general use and recognition over the more cumbersome, although more descriptive, “aerial navigation.”
From the operating standpoint there is no aerial mission that does not have a direct naval counterpart. Cities were bombarded by naval vessels many years before the first airplane left the ground. A plane on a scouting or reconnaissance mission is analogous to a cruiser with tremendous speed and a masthead height of several thousands of feet. The dropping of parachute troops is a specialized form of a naval landing force. Airplanes release bombs which are comparable in size and destructive effect to the projectiles of the big naval gun. Planes can launch torpedoes or lay smoke screens; so can destroyers. On any military mission the differences between the naval vessel and the airplane are merely quantitative. Both are self- contained vehicles in operation and both must return to a base for logistic replenishment. Conversely, the airplane is capable of performing almost every type of naval mission.
The basic gunnery problem of aircraft is closely akin to that of the naval vessel in that fire from a moving base must be directed against a moving target. Even when the problem is simplified by a stationary target, the motion of the firing unit must be considered. Conversely, the basic gunnery problem in land warfare is one of firing from a stationary base at a target which is ordinarily also without movement or which, even if in motion, can rarely change its position during the time of flight of the projectile sufficiently to affect materially the accuracy of fire.
The force of such analogies could be denied were it not for the fact that we now have definite examples of their practical application in actual warfare. In the Norwegian campaign the original basic problem of both the British and the Germans was to put men and munitions in the theater of operations. In this, the Germans had a head start over their adversaries, but their chance of ultimate success depended upon their continued control of a vital sea area—in this instance the Skagerrak. The novelty of troop transport by air has more or less obscured the fact that it is inconceivable that the Germans would have accepted the risk of losing as large a percentage of their naval and auxiliary surface vessels as they did, had not maritime transport been considered absolutely essential. The British Navy, once it swung into action, rapidly gained command of the waters along the Atlantic coast of Norway by a preponderance of surface strength, supported by an auxiliary fleet air arm, but the Germans were able to retain control of the vital Skagerrak area. While Britannia ruled the waves, the Reich regulated the ripples—in the Skagerrak, at least. That this command of a limited sea area was largely implemented by aerial forces, aided by mines, submarines, and a surface fleet of inferior strength, is a minor feature. The objective was to gain and maintain control of a limited sea area. That command of the chosen sea area was so largely exercised by aerial forces is merely proof of the writer’s thesis that air power is sea power.
As soon as the outcome of this struggle for the control of Norway became apparent, commentators frenziedly burst into print, proclaiming loudly that air power had usurped the traditional sphere of sea power. These perversions of the true lesson of the Norwegian campaign were so plausible and so numerous that they appear to have captured and held public opinion. For the significance of how abruptly such assertions terminated after Dunkirk has been largely overlooked. In that operation, the British were able to exercise command of the vital sea area despite their general numerical inferiority in aircraft. This was an obvious refutation of the thesis that air power has superseded sea power, and the aviation super-enthusiasts were temporarily silenced. While the full story of the evacuation of Dunkirk has not yet been told, information now available indicates that this operation provides no precept for those who would depreciate the value of the airplane as an implement of war. On the basis of these data, events at Dunkirk may be summarized as follows. The German Army had moved so rapidly since the beginning of the Battle of Flanders that adequate advanced base facilities for all available units of the Luftwaffe were not available. In addition, the German Army was still fighting the main French Army and a large percentage, if not the greater portion, of the Reich’s aerial forces were being utilized in that area. Both of these factors reduced the number of German planes that could be maintained in the air over Dunkirk and the adjacent portion of the English Channel.
The British, on the other hand, were able to concentrate their aerial forces—and their fighters in particular—in Sussex and Kent, and to operate these planes from established bases in those areas. The distance these planes were required to fly before reaching the actual scene of operations was less than half of that which opposing German aircraft were obliged to cover; a factor of considerable importance in the case of fighting planes with their limited endurance of flight. Hence, for the first time, the Royal Air Force was able to engage the Luftwaffe on terms approaching numerical equality. In addition, the British there confronted the Germans with a tactical surprise in the form of the Bolton Paul Defiant; a two-seater fighter featuring for the first time in aeronautical history that universally utilized principle of naval gunnery—fire from a center-line turret![2]
The problem faced by the British in effecting the evacuation of their expeditionary force was one in which the most pressing factor was time. Owing to the lack of port facilities and adequate troop transports, every conceivable type of surface craft was used. Obviously such vessels were practically without anti-aircraft defense and the few batteries of such guns on the light naval vessels of the escort were entirely inadequate. Hence, the British were forced to place their primary dependence upon their aerial forces to exercise control of a chosen sea area. While some reports state unfavorable flying weather obtained during a portion of the period in question, there was extensive aerial activity. That so few losses were sustained despite the exceptional vulnerability of the “transports” to aerial attack is ample evidence that the British aircraft accomplished their mission. Britannia ruled the waves—but from the air, and thus provided another example of why air power is sea power.
One of the favorite arguments of those who believe the advent of the airplane has greatly diminished the scope and influence of sea power has been that the airplane is, in effect, a long-range gun and that hostile fleets cannot operate within the radius of action of shore-based aircraft. This, they maintain, has extended the influence of air power some hundreds of miles beyond the coast and correspondingly reduced the area over which sea power can exert its influence. This could be refuted in kind by asserting, with equal logic, that the long- range-gun effect of the airplane has, on the contrary, made coastal towns of many communities some hundreds of miles inland and consequently extended the sphere of the influence of sea power. Both arguments, however, are specious as the advent of the airplane, while extending the area in which contact between forces operating from land and sea is possible, has neither increased nor diminished the influence of sea power. The airplane has, instead, complicated the problem of gaining, maintaining, and exercising command of the sea by increasing the number of means by which such command may be attained or disputed. For example, while the threat of shore-based aircraft has prevented the British Mediterranean Fleet from maintaining a close blockade of Italian ports, it cannot be denied that the tremendous influence of sea power is exerting itself in that region in favor of the British cause. Recent events illustrate how the airplane complicates the problem of sea command for both sides in that area. The threat of shore-based aircraft has generally served to keep surface units of the British Fleet a respectful distance from the Italian (if not the Albanian) coast. On the other hand, the British Fleet air arm has denied the use of the geographically advanced base of Taranto to the Italian Fleet.[3]
It may be argued that the incidents described in this paper were incidental to amphibious or purely naval operations and that our analogies would not be applicable to operations over land. However, aerial tactics, maneuvers, and combat are conducted according to the same principles regardless of the nature of the medium over which they take place, and strikingly resemble corresponding naval actions. Even when operating over land, the airplane must be guided by navigation, act as a self- contained unit while operating, and return to the base when supplies of fuel and arms are depleted. Command of the air (whether over sea or land) is like command of the sea, in that it is seldom absolute, and becomes less so when the forces by which it was gained are temporarily withdrawn. For the air and the sea, unlike the land, cannot be occupied completely and permanently. In fact, it might be argued that the advent of the airplane, instead of limiting the scope of sea power, has actually made all warfare in which aerial forces are used amphibious in character, even though a city reservoir may be the largest body of water within the theater of operations. One might even go further and state that all mechanized warfare bears a close analogy to purely naval conflict. Any naval man who has seen a formation of tanks maneuvering in response to radioed orders from its commander might well be pardoned the assumption that the actions of the Panzer divisions and their supporting Stuka dive bombers, in their dash for the Channel after the “break-through,” might have been more nearly predictable and have produced less of a psychological shock to a commander conversant with naval strategy and tactics.
To return to items having a more direct bearing upon the basic theme, consider the situation in the main theater of the present war. The majority of the newspaper headlines deal with the bombing of cities and other shore objectives. In effect, such efforts are substantially analogous to bombardments of coastal objectives by naval forces. Ostensibly, the purposes motivating these attacks are the destruction of civilian morale through fear of personal injury and economic disaster, and the impairment of logistic supply of the hostile armed forces. Obviously, such bombardments must be opposed or their ostensible purposes might well be accomplished. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that during the World War, London and other British cities were bombed, even though it was fully recognized that little could be accomplished by way of direct result. Indirectly, however, these World War attacks were distinctly profitable for the Germans as a considerable amount of the total British war effort, in the form of troops, airplanes, anti-aircraft guns, and ammunition, was diverted from the decisive scene of action on the Western Front. Similarly and to a far greater degree, the German aerial attacks on British towns and cities in the present war have compelled a diversion of effort from the imperative British necessity of exercising command of the sea in the area adjacent to Great Britain. Whether the direct or indirect effects of the German bombing of England will prove greater remains to be seen, but it is axiomatic that Great Britain cannot exist unless a continual stream of food and other supplies reaches her ports. And certainly every plane and anti-aircraft gun assigned the primary mission of preventing aerial bombardment of centers of populations impairs the British ability to ensure the safety of their vitally essential maritime commerce. Thus the airplane is being used indirectly, as well as directly, to interfere with the exercise of command of the sea by the belligerent enjoying that advantage.
Prior to the World War, command of the sea connoted practically undisturbed enjoyment of its consequent privileges. The only possible way to interfere substantially with the exercise of sea command was to reverse the entire situation by success in battle. The appearance of the submarine provided an implement by means of which the inferior naval power could attempt to deny its opponent the advantages naturally accruing from his command of the sea. The development of the airplane provided another instrumentality capable of use in identical fashion, and the combination of submarine and airplane has changed the formerly simple problem of exercising command of the sea into one of complexity and potentially great difficulty. Parenthetically it might be argued that the submarine and the airplane are more akin in many respects than any other two instrumentalities of war. Both can operate tactically to limited extent in a third dimension. Both are structurally weak but can destroy the most powerful surface vessels by essentially surprise attacks. Both attempt to evade the efforts of surface craft to destroy them; the submarine by concealment, the airplane by its speed. And finally, but most important of all, both may be used to interfere with the exercise of sea command.
In summation, the airplane bears many striking analogies to other naval types. In action, it is a self-contained vehicle finally dependent upon a logistic base. It traverses a fluid medium in which it is sustained by a form of buoyancy. It utilizes the science of navigation. With, of course, varying degrees of efficiency, practically all naval functions can be performed by aircraft, and one or more types of naval vessel can execute almost any mission which may be assigned aircraft. The maneuvers and tactics of aircraft are substantially naval in character. The gunnery problem of the airplane is essentially the naval one. And the airplane and the submarine are the two naval types peculiarly capable of interfering with the exercise of sea command.
Aerial forces were used to gain and exercise sea command in the Skagerrak during the Norwegian campaign and to exercise that function off Dunkirk during the British evacuation of that port. In the Mediterranean, successful attacks by the British Fleet air arm at Taranto have destroyed the usefulness of that port to the Italian Fleet. Aerial bombardment is analogous to naval bombardment. The necessity for defending inland cities from aerial bombardment has diverted British forces that might otherwise have been utilized for the essential task of commerce protection. For these reasons, the writer believes that, instead of providing a new manifestation of martial might, air power is, substantially and essentially, sea power.
Complete acceptance of this doctrine requires acquiescence in the theory that all conflict involving aerial forces should be considered amphibious warfare. Such agreement definitely would carry no implication tending to deny the necessity of land forces for aerial support and cooperation, or to depreciate the importance of training for such purposes. It does, however, demand recognition that the necessity for training in naval operations is not only urgent, but of primary importance, to all flight personnel of the defense forces. Even if the thesis of identity between air power and sea power is rejected in its entirety, it cannot be denied that the full aerial strength of a nation will frequently be required to participate in naval operations. Whether such activity is to be co-ordinated effort with the fleet, or merely unsupported operations against naval objectives, is immaterial to the fact that all aviators should be able “to speak the language” of naval strategy and tactics.
Application of the foregoing to the specific case of the United States may be considered from three viewpoints: complete agreement, partial acceptance, or complete rejection of the conception that air power is sea power. Full acceptance would involve a reconsideration of the present distribution of aerial forces in the defense organization and probable transfer of a large portion of the authorized strength of the General Headquarters Air Force from the Army to the Navy. Partial agreement would call for an arrangement whereby those squadrons would operate with the fleet and receive naval training approximately half of each year. Even complete disagreement with our present theme cannot obscure the fact that some naval training of Army aviators would definitely enhance the efficiency of the national defense. In any event, the basic minimum in this connection should be participation by the full strength of the General Headquarters Air Force of the Army in the annual fleet problem.
Naval aviation is so essential a part of the fleet, and its control and coordination so essentially a naval problem, having to do with the control of the sea in just as great a degree as the operation of surface ships, that to take the air personnel out of the navy, to make the whole air force a thing apart, owing allegiance to a different authority, supplied and administered by a different agency, would be a handicap equal to taking our Admiral's destroyers away from him and putting them under the Coast Guard, in the Treasury Department.—Eliot, The Ramparts We Watch.
[1] This article was submitted in the Prize Essay Contest, 1941.
[2] The Bolton Paul Defiant was extremely effective at Dunkirk. One squadron of 18 of these planes was reported to have shot down 37 German aircraft without the loss of one of their own units. Since that time this type has been proved defective due to the discovery of unsuspected “blind spots” and is reported to have been withdrawn from service. However, this does not serve to limit the possibilities of center-line turret fire from aircraft any more than did the lack of seaworthiness of the Monitor diminish the usefulness of this principle to surface vessels.
[3] See U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings of August, 1937, page 1132, which states “. . . . the existence of a hostile fleet air arm tends to deny or limit the use of geographically advanced bases and anchorages . . .” Also, the same issue, page 1129, last paragraph, for a fairly accurate forecast of the British attack on the Italian Fleet in the Harbor of Taranto.