THE CONVULSION of nature which separated the British Isles from the mainland of Europe determined, for all time, that sea power would exert a tremendous influence upon their history. It became axiomatic that the ruler of the Straits of Dover would rule Britain.
The early Celtic tribes migrated to England by means of crude boats. Barring some sea-borne trade with Gaul (modern France), they seem to have made no attempt to organize a crude navy even for defense. Caesar, in his campaigns of 55 and 54 B.C., encountered no opposition to his invasion of Britain until his forces had landed. Again, Aulus Plautius in 43 A.D. was able to transport his legions from Gaul to Britain without having to face any naval interference.
During the years of Roman Conquest and occupation, no difficulty was experienced by the Roman commanders in maintaining their lines of communications with Gaul. However, in the latter part of the third century, for some unfathomable reason, the Franks, a group of tribes settled along the lower Rhine from Cologne to the North Sea, began to harass the coast of Britain. The exact reason for these piratical excursions is, as I say, difficulty to determine. Whether it was the pressure of the tribes contiguous to their territories that induced them to venture forth in the search of plunder can never be determined with any degree of satisfaction. All that we know is that the depredations of these pirates forced the Romans to take active steps for their suppression.
The first step was to give to one officer, later known as the Count of the Saxon Shore, command of the fortified ports and sea-coast castles. It was his duty to protect the littoral of Britain. Such an arrangement was, as has been proved many times in naval history, an unsatisfactory arrangement. The proper defense of a coast line starts at the enemy’s coast line and not your own.
The official credit for the divination of this fundamental principle belongs to one Maximianus Herculeus, who had received the title “Caesar” at the hands of the Emperor Diocletian. Maximianus, although of peasant origin, had distinguished himself on many fronts as a military commander and his fierce, turbulent spirits complemented the more subtle genius of Diocletian. He at once organized a fleet which, without too much imagination, can be considered the progenitor of the present grand fleet of the British Empire.
In the year 286 A.D. the command of this fleet was given to one Marcus Aurelius Carausius. Carausius was a Menapian of Belgic Gaul. A man of humble origin, he had in his early days been trained as a pilot. He entered the Roman Army and distinguished himself in the campaign against the Baguadae—revolted peasants and bandits of Gaul. As a result of rapid promotion, he was in a position, when the need arose, to receive the appointment as the first British Admiral.
The fleet was based upon Gessoriacum, the present city of Boulogne, and at first the “Admiral” was successful in preventing the Teutonic pirates from reaching their objectives. However, the pecuniary rewards resulting from his captures proved too attractive, or as Gibbon mildly states, “the integrity of the new admiral corresponded not with his abilities.” Carausius made no attempt to prevent the pirates from making their raids, but he was particularly diligent to intercept them when they returned laden with spoils. <"
It may be observed that the one consistent policy followed by the later Roman Emperors was not to share spoils with anyone. The success of Carausius’ interception policy was soon called to the attention of Maximianus Herculeus. He sagely observed that the evidences of wealth that surrounded Carausius were sufficient evidence of his guilt. The sentence of death was passed upon the “Admiral.”
Fortunately, or unfortunately, depending upon the point of view, Carausius received an intimation of his impending doom. Appealing to his followers, whose loyalty he had secured by extreme generosity, he crossed the channel in 286 A.D., took possession of Britain, and “assumed the purple.” A discussion of the conditions in Britain which permitted such usurpation is not germane to this discussion. Suffice it to say that it was the result of the interaction of a bold and enterprising leader upon the poorly disciplined legions and mercenaries hungry for spoils.
“By seizing the fleet,” observes Gibbon, “Carausius had deprived his master of the means of pursuit and revenge.” Again the Influence of Sea Power upon Britain! Maximianus spent the year 287-288 A.D. in the preparation of a huge fleet that was to secure the Straits of Dover and permit the landing of the legions. Shortly after this date, the newly launched fleet was brought into action. Maximianus was not familiar with the naval adage which states, “We build fleets for our enemies when we put them in charge of incompetent men.” The Imperial troops proved unequal to the change of element and were ignominiously routed by the trained sailors of Carausius.
This naval victory secured for a time the supremacy of Carausius in Britain. Maximianus and Diocletian acknowledged the usurper who not only successfully dominated Britain, but seems to have been obsessed with the desire of reconstituting the “Empire of the Gauls.” His sea power commanded the waters from the mouth of the Rhine to the Columns of Hercules. He maintained a principal base at Gessoriacum and, in addition, seems at various times to have held possession of the north shore of Gaul. His effrontry reached the supreme height when he ordered coins struck on the obtuse of which he placed the three heads of Diocletian, Maximianus, and himself accompanied by the inscription “Carausius et Fratres Sui.”
In the year 292 A.D., Diocletian and Maximianus invited Galerius and Constantius Chlorus to share the responsibilities of the administration of the empire. Constantius, who acquired the denomination Chlorus from his pale complexion, was of mild and amiable disposition although his youth had been spent in arms. To this Caesar was assigned the defense of Gaul, Spain, and Britain.
Constantius moved immediately against Gessoriacum, the important naval base of Carausius. A mole erected across the entrance of the harbor precluded any possibility of relief from Britain. Gessoriacum fell and with its fall a large amount of stores and supplies came into the hands of Constantius. The ironical twist of the whole campaign was that, after capture of the port, tide destroyed the mole.
The next step taken by the Roman Caesar was to build a fleet and train the necessary personnel. It was not his purpose to throw half-trained sailors against the highly efficient fleet of Carausius. While these preparations were in progress, the welcome news was received from Britain that Carausius had been basely murdered by one Allectus.
Again, we possess little information relative to Allectus. It would seem that he was second in command in Britain and some authorities seem to believe that he committed certain unpardonable crimes. One thing is certain and that is that he was not possessed of the ability and energy of Carausius. For the three years that Constantius was building his fleet, Allectus made no attempt to bring on an action before his opponent’s forces should be equal or greater than his own, a mistake which a number of commanders have made since that time.
In the year 296 A.D., Constantius had his fleet ready for action. Evidently his intelligence department had given him an unflattering picture of his opponent’s ability. Like Lee at Chancellorsville, centuries later, he divided his forces in the face of the enemy, an unpardonable military mistake. One squadron under the praetorian praefect Asclepiodotus set sail with a “side wind” from the mouth of the Seine. Fortune smiled upon their efforts and, in the fog, the squadron slipped by the fleet of Allectus which lay off the Isle of Wight. Asclepiodotus immediately set fire to his ships, thus committing his men to the enterprise. In the successful completion of the first part of the campaign, it had been demonstrated that in the words of Gibbon, “a superiority of naval strength will not always protect their [Briton] country from a foreign invader.”
Allectus had alienated the legions, and when the supreme test came he had only his barbarian mercenaries. These he had posted near London and, hearing of the landing of the Romans, rushed with them to intercept the foe. The battle took place, it is believed, somewhere on the road between Winchester and London. Allectus arrived on the field with his troops harassed and disheartened. They were decisively defeated and Allectus was killed.
The fleeing mercenaries descended upon London and proceeded to plunder, believing that they could escape in their boats from London to their homes in the territory contiguous to the mouth of the Rhine. Fortunately, the fleet under the command of Constantius sailed up the Thames and landed the Imperial troops who restored order. Constantius was hailed as a deliverer and he extended his mercy to the repentant Britons.
The peculiar singificance of Carausius is that he was the first person so far as we know to recognize the inter-relation between Britain and sea power. Perhaps Professor F. J. Haverfield has stated the case as well as possible when he says, “He showed for the first time in history how a fleet might detach Briton from its geographical connection with the northwestern continent. Twelve centuries passed before this possibility was again realized.”