From the days of oar-driven galleys, nations at war have resorted to the weapons of blockade whenever their naval resources and the geographical position of an adversary permitted.
The sea forces of Rome imposed more than one blockade to contribute to that Empire’s conquests. But Britain has furnished history with more examples of efficient blockading as a powerful weapon of conquest than any other nation in the world. British frigates played havoc with the commerce of the American Colonies, and the first World War saw England’s sea-borne ring squeeze the lifeblood out of Germany.
United States naval history provides only one example of a major blockade imposed by ships flying the Stars and Stripes, previous to that time when Yankee cruisers, gunboats, converted yachts, and even armed tugs quickly and completely throttled the minor commerce Spain carried on in and out of Cuban ports in 1898.
The Union blockade of Southern ports of entry was undertaken in 1861 only after some debate as to whether it would be better for the government to declare all Confederate ports closed or to proclaim a blockade in fact. President Lincoln settled the matter on April 19, 1861, six days after Fort Sumter surrendered, by issuing a proclamation declaring a blockade of the Confederate coast from South Carolina to Texas, and on the 27th extended it to cover Virginia and North Carolina, making a coastline of over 3,000 miles to be blockaded, greater in extent than the entire Atlantic coast of all Europe.
The action confronted the Navy Department with the problem of enforcement with only 42 ships-of-war in commission, with most of the steam seagoing ships on foreign stations. The days of paper blockades had passed and international law held that “blockades, to be binding, must be effectual.”
There were frequent diplomatic complications with neutrals at first, but ships taken from merchant service were requisitioned into the Union Navy wholesale and the blockading forces were gradually increased. When the Secretary of the Navy asked the principal shipowners of New York to aid him in procuring vessels for blockading service, they formed a committee which decided 30 sailing ships would be needed. The degree to which they grasped the problem is revealed by the fact that it took over 600 ships, mostly steamers, to accomplish the blockade.
There were 28 old ships-of-war lying dismantled at the various navy yards and all worth repairing were fitted for sea as rapidly as possible. All merchant vessels that could carry guns, even tugs and New York ferryboats, were hastily converted into fighting ships. All navy yards and private shipbuilding plants were working overtime.
There were not enough skilled workmen to meet the demand, and naval officers had to personally direct unskilled artisans or work with their own hands at fitting these vessels with their guns. This nondescript navy went to sea to take stations along the Southern coast, many of the ships to render spectacular service thanks to the skill of their officers and men. One of the richest prizes captured, the swift blockade-running steamer Circassian, was taken off the Cuban coast by one of New York’s old Fulton ferryboats.
The lack of officers and men was as great a handicap as the shortage of ships. A total of 322 officers had joined the Confederate service while the Northern naval stations could provide only 207 seamen for immediate detail. Many officers and men from the merchant service volunteered and were given elementary training in handling big guns at gunnery schools hastily set up at navy yards, then hurried to sea. In three years, over 50,000 men were afloat on ships of blockading squadrons.
The blockaders off all important Confederate harbors were usually composed of several heavy ships with a few lighter vessels. But it was impossible to apportion ships in this manner along the entire 3,549 miles of coast and it sometimes happened that Confederate ironclads attacked the light craft. A typical case was the sinking of the Keystone State and the capture of the Mercidita by Confederate rams off the South Carolina coast.
Vigorous remonstrances were made against the blockade by some of the foreign nations, on the ground that it was ineffectual, and that it was impossible to blockade such an extent of coastline, but the British government, after making a careful official investigation of the subject, and compiling a list of vessels that had evaded United States blockading ships, did not venture to pronounce the blockade insufficient. It was reluctantly admitted that proof of the efficiency of the blockade was conclusive and that in no previous war had the ports of an enemy’s country been as effectually closed by a naval force.
Many of the islands controlled by foreign governments, and lying conveniently near our coast, had good harbors that afforded admirable bases for the blockade runners. One of the busiest of these was Nassau and the Navy Department finally sent Lieutenant Commander Temple to Nassau to study the extent of the contraband trade from that port.
He went in the guise of a civilian to ascertain official and public sentiment, and while there managed to be present at an official dinner. There were many indications that a generally hostile feeling against the United States existed. The old French consul, almost overcome with emotions, managed to sputter: “Ze American people zey zink zey are somewhat, but zey cannot!” This terse presentation of his views was received with such uproarious applause that Temple was no longer in doubt as to the attitude of the people of Nassau.
In the earlier stages of the blockade the contraband running was conducted from Chesapeake Bay to the mouth of the Rio Grande by ships of all types, sizes, and nationalities. Coastal steamers were successful for a time, and small sailing vessels also made profitable trips until the blockaders increased in numbers. Capture, destruction, and withdrawals from such hazardous trade then thinned out this first group of contraband carriers. The flow of the supplies of the sorely beset Confederacy dropped to a trickle and prices reached unprecedented heights. Cotton, bringing $.08 a pound in the Confederacy, was quoted at $.60 in England.
This state of affairs prompted the formation of English stock companies to run swift steamers through the blockade. Officers of the Royal Navy obtained extended leaves and, under assumed names, sailed as masters in this exciting and profitable trade. The list of blockade-running captains also included officers of the Confederate Navy who had resigned their commissions in the United States Navy. The Confederate government also embarked in the trade, procuring fast steamers and sailing them under the British ensign with Confederate naval officers on their bridges.
The first Confederate government ship to run the blockade was the Fingal, an armed steamer, built on the Clyde, and having a speed of 13 knots. She carried a cargo of arms and ammunition, and was commanded by Captain J. D. Bullock, a former United States Navy officer who had served under Admiral David Farragut.
The Fingal easily ran into Savannah, but for many months she tried vainly to get out with a cargo of cotton. Finally the attempt was abandoned and she was cut down to make a hull for the ironclad ram Atlanta. On June 17, 1863, the Atlanta sallied out of Savannah, with two steamers loaded with sight-seers tagging along to watch the cumbersome ship raise the blockade. The Atlanta attacked the U. S. monitor Weehawken and in 15 minutes had been disabled and captured by the monitor. The spectator boats hastily returned to the harbor.
The extent of blockade running was never ascertained with accuracy. Old records indicate that in one period of 90 days 50 ships left Havana to run the blockade. Early in 1864, 6 steamers left Bermuda in one 24-hour period, all bound for Wilmington, N. C. Only one of these succeeded in running by the blockaders. The rest were either driven off, run ashore, or captured.
One Nassau merchant said if a steamer had the luck to run into Charleston with merchandise twice, and to run out with cotton twice, the Yankees were welcome to her after that. An old captain who had made 16 trips successfully, said his profits had been at the rate of 800 per cent. A net profit of $300,000 for a round trip was not uncommon.
One of the most successful ships was the Giraffe, afterward called the Robert E. Lee, owned by the Confederate government, and commanded by Captain John Wilkinson, who had been an officer in the United States Navy before entering the Confederate Navy. She was an iron steamer, built on the Clyde in 1862 and having a speed of more than 13 knots. She cost $160,000 in gold, and ran the blockade 21 times before she was captured. During that time she carried out 7,000 bales of cotton, worth $2,000,000 in gold. From $300 to $500 in gold was paid in advance for a passage on a blockade runner; and $2,500 in gold was paid as freight money from Bermuda to Wilmington on a box of medicines that was small enough to be put in the cabin of the steamer Whisper.
The blockade-running captains usually received about $5,000 in gold, and the pilots from $2,000 to $5,000 in gold for a round trip. Three or four days were usually occupied in making the run between the coast and Nassau. The steamers frequently carried a Charleston pilot as well as a Wilmington pilot, so that if entry into one port was impossible they might try to run into the other.
During the war United States naval ships captured or destroyed 1,504 blockade runners. The value of those captured aggregated $31,000,000, while no estimate was ever reached of the values of cargoes thrown overboard by the crews of darkened steamers racing to avoid capture. A Confederate naval officer once said that all the approaches to Wilmington Harbor were as thickly paved with valuable merchandise as the road to hell was with good intentions.
The most valuable prize taken by the blockaders was the steamer Memphis which brought $510,000. She was captured early in the war by the U.S.S. Magnolia, once a blockade runner herself, and commissioned as a gunboat. The least valuable was the little sloop Alligator which brought $50 after her capture by the gunboat Tahoma. A number of the most important prizes were taken by mere chance, while many a long, hard chase resulted in the overhauling of an empty vessel, the cargo having been thrown overboard in the efforts to escape.