Within a month after the outbreak of the present European war, representatives of the 21 republics of the Western Hemisphere assembled in the City of Panama to chart a course of continental neutrality and solidarity. The representatives of these American republics, mindful of their position as neutrals and unwilling that their states again become involved in a European conflict, formulated a joint American policy which is aimed to give protection against such danger. One result of this continental unanimity of policy that is of possible far-reaching Significance is the Declaration of Panama, an outstanding document in the history of neutrality. This Declaration, drawn up to safeguard American rights as neutrals, made an innovation in international relations by establishing a specifically defined zone around all of the Western Hemisphere, except Canada, which is to be kept free from belligerent operations. This “maritime zone of security” includes all normal maritime routes of communication and trade between the countries of America, by covering roughly a distance averaging 300 miles to seaward of the continental coast lines. The 21 American republics hold that these waters must be free from any hostile act by belligerent nations “whether such hostile act be attempted or made from land, sea or air.” To this end, naval vessels, with the aid of air forces, may police these greatly extended territorial waters, barring all hostilities and permitting only legal passage to belligerent ships.
The President of Panama immediately notified the nations at war of this American Declaration in order to obtain their compliance, which thus far has not been forthcoming. In fact, the neutral waters of this security zone have been violated a number of times since its establishment. The battle of Uruguay in December, 1939, between the German pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee and British cruisers took place within sound and almost within sight of the coast; a German freighter, Wahama, was sunk off the Brazilian coast in February, 1940; the German motorship Hannover was scuttled to escape capture by a British cruiser in Mona Passage; a German tanker was pursued almost to the Florida coast; and the German luxury liner Columbia was destroyed by her crew to escape a British man-of-war to the eastward of the Virginia Capes. Energetic protests have been lodged with the European belligerents at violations of this neutrality zone. The excerpts from the British replies thus far made public have taken the position that, while they are anxious to assist all neutral countries in keeping war from the proximity of the neutral coasts, it must be for them to decide whether to accept restrictions which would limit their use of certain well-established rights. Moreover, such a zone has no legal status and hence is unenforceable under international law. It disregards the time-honored internationally accepted 3-mile maritime belt over which a state exercises sovereignty, and sets up a 300-mile belt solely on the authority of this Declaration. Hence, the recent establishment of this broad defensive sea area raises the question of the legal extent of the marginal maritime belt and its standing in international law in regard to both neutrals and belligerents.
Neutrality is defined as the legal status arising from the abstention of a state from all participation in a war between other states, the maintenance of an attitude of impartiality in its dealings with the belligerent states, and the recognition by the latter of this abstention and impartiality. From this legal status arise the rights and duties of neutral and belligerent states. The neutral states possess such rights as freedom to sail the high seas and to carry on certain commercial relations with the belligerents and with each other so long as these rights lie within the limits prescribed by the law of nations. On the other hand, it becomes the duty of neutral states to enforce a governmental attitude of impartiality towards the belligerents and to maintain the integrity of their land areas and territorial waters by compelling belligerents, if necessary, to respect their sovereignty. These rights and duties are specifically stated in the Rules of the Treaty of Washington in 1871 as well as in the Hague Convention of 1907.
This modern doctrine of neutrality was slow to develop and it was not until the nineteenth century, when it worked to the interest of belligerents to remain on good terms with neutrals, that the status of nonbelligerent states was accorded any serious consideration. But by 1800 the so-called “Great Powers” had organized permanent armies and navies which were kept in a state of readiness for action, with the result that strong neutrals were treated with respect lest they should side with the enemy; while neutrals became increasingly careful to prevent any justification for invasion. In this period there is found armed neutrality whereby either individual states or groups of states used their men-of-war to protect their neutral commerce. Such was the case in the First Armed Neutrality of 1780 when Russia, Denmark, and Sweden took military measures for the purpose of defending their rights as neutrals against Great Britain, especially in the matter of contraband lists. Again, Russia called into existence the Second Armed Neutrality in 1800 because of Great Britain’s refusal to exempt from visit and search neutral merchantmen under convoy. Both of these Armed Neutralities proved of importance later as their principles were made the basis of the Maritime Convention of 1801 and the Declaration of Paris of 1856.
Events in the last World War, as well as recent ones in the present European conflict, have made it apparent that international principles of neutrality have failed to safeguard adequately neutral states possessing either desirable position or resources. Consequently, by 1917 practically all of the commercial states in the world were driven to belligerency and took part in the fighting. Again, at the present time the world is learning that the position of neutral states, as individual units, is hardly more tolerable than that of belligerents. Formerly, the value of neutral support, and belligerent pressure which was exerted to obtain it, made a policy of neutrality frequently difficult to follow. Now, apparently, if support is not immediately forthcoming from the less powerful but economically useful neutral states, their neutrality is ruthlessly violated. Hence it would seem that a return to something like the group action of the old First and Second Armed Neutralities offers the only safeguard to states that would be impartial and remain out of the conflict. It is possible that the joint action of the 21 American Republics at the Conference in Panama may be, consciously or unconsciously, working out some such arrangement. This time, at considerable distance from the conflict, the modem joint neutrality of the Americas aims to keep American citizens and commerce away from hostilities and hostilities away from the Western Hemisphere. This latter objective ls to be accomplished by means of this newly established “security belt” with its breadth a hundred times greater than the customary mileage and its legal status under international law still a debatable question.
During hostilities, the territories and territorial waters of all belligerents, together with the high seas, fall within the Region of war, while neutral territory and ds littoral waters become areas wherein hostilities and warlike activities are unlawful. Not only does it become the duty of a belligerent to respect the sovereignty a neutral state, but also it becomes the duty of the neutral to enforce its neutrality if it would maintain its respected position impartiality. When hostilities involve belligerent navies, the littoral sea area, over which a neutral state may exercise its sovereignty and control of coastal traffic, becomes of primary importance. Since the early eighteenth century this sea belt, from the logical necessity of self-defense, bus been held to be about one marine league or three miles in breadth. This distance was approximately the effective range of cannon shot from eighteenth-century shore batteries and has become the generally, although not universally, recognized width of the maritime belt. As be range of projectiles fired from modern heavy guns has steadily increased, the question has frequently arisen of the desirability or even validity of a 3-mile limit against a jurisdiction determined by effective control from the shore. Great Britain, France, and the United States as well as other seacoast states still adhere to the “shore batteries” rule, but Norway claims a maritime belt of 4 miles, while Spain claims one of 6 miles and the Institute of International Law has voted in favor of the latter. By decree of October 18, 1912, France claimed a maritime belt 6 miles wide for all purposes of neutrality. After the outbreak of the World War Italy, when still a neutral, by decree of August 6, 1914, likewise claimed a neutral maritime belt 6 miles wide, and Great Britain ordered her cruisers to respect it. The United States in 1863 was most emphatic in upholding the 3-mile rule then generally recognized by nations, and when Spain claimed a 6-mile maritime belt around Cuba, we stated that if any state had succeeded in fixing for itself a larger limit, this had been done by the exercise of maritime power, and constituted an exception to general understanding. Later the attempt made by the United States from 1920 to 1924 to deal with a formidable “rum-fleet” by extending enforcement of the Volstead Act 12 miles off shore did not meet with international acceptance.
The World War saw unprecedentedly large areas of littoral seas involved in claims and counterclaims of jurisdiction. In 1917, the United States, like Japan in 1900, established “defensive sea areas” extending well beyond the 3-mile limit. Great Britain declared the whole North Sea to be a “military area,” and Germany responded with an equally extensive counter “kriegsgebiet,” so that the entire sea area, including practically all the European commercial sea lanes, was proscribed, and the practice became systematized as a means of warfare. Surface and submarine craft, floating and submarine mines enforced respect for these extensive “war zones” with the result that they were entered by neutral ships only at their peril— a situation illegal under international law. Hence, in emergencies, it would seem that states, like primitive individuals, act in whatever way will give them advantage, particularly when the belligerent states are large and powerful and the neutrals not greatly to be feared.
Since the region of war has come to depend solely upon the belligerents, their power and their ability to coerce or control independent neutral states, does it not seem elementary logic that neutral states should stand together in declaring, even enforcing, their neutral rights—that they should go even farther, and themselves establish “neutral defensive sea areas,” and maintain them by military force if necessary? And does it not now become the part of political and economic, as well as military wisdom, to develop and expand the “defensive sea areas” of 1914 into the 300-mile joint neutral security belt around the 21 neutral American Republics?
Since the principles of sovereignty and neutrality under international law leave to the discretion of the individual state measures necessary to support its position, there is precedent for the United States alone, or in conjunction with her sister republics, to resort to joint and even to armed measures to protect their territories, their neutral commerce, and their territorial waters. In the present war, with its use of indiscriminate unprovoked air attacks and “blitzkrieg” methods, neutral states must counter with more drastic protective undertakings. For the Americas, a 300-mile maritime belt is not too extensive to claim as a protective sea wall for this hemisphere. Such a wall, guarded by the combined war and aircraft of the 21 neutral republics may, for the time being at least, keep war out and let peace and trade flourish within. Moreover, if the Declaration of Panama is to be more than an impressive but ineffective gesture, the signatory nations must take measures to enforce this sea wall. Such enforcement has been inaugurated already by the naval and air “neutrality patrols” found along both coasts of the United States and some of the southern republics. That such a measure must be considerably strengthened, probably at great cost in men, ships, and planes, is not to be doubted. If it serves its purpose of keeping neutrals neutral and hostilities away from American shores, it will have fulfilled its immediate mission, as well as a more far-reaching one of cementing closer the interests of the American republics. If enforcement of neutrality in this enlarged maritime belt is effective, it is probable that post-war law of the nations will be altered to recognize a broader belt than the outmoded 3-mile limit.
The war of 1914 became a World War largely as a result of violations of the neutrality of smaller states, and the present European conflict gives every indication of following in the same pattern on an even more ruthless scale. In the light of conditions of modern attack “the false teaching of geography that a distance of several thousand miles from a war-torn Europe will give us some form of mystic immunity which can never be violated” must be corrected. The fact that the position of the Americas has become less secure, both from a purely physical and an economic point of view, must be established firmly in this hemisphere. Consequently, since violation of the neutrality of the Americas is now possible, it is a precaution the republics later may appreciate to have an extension of their neutrality zone 300 miles to seaward rather than wait to have such a violation occur within the old “three-mile limit.” At least, this 300-mile limit will give American seapower, the first line of national defense, more sea room and greater opportunity for effective, decisive action.