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Notes on International Affairs

May 1940
Proceedings
Vol. 66/5/447
Article
View Issue
Comments
Body

War in the North

Norway Enters War.—On April 9 Norway declared war on Germany, rather than submit passively to the “protective occupation” of her territory by German forces. Denmark on the same date felt compelled to submit to such protective oc­cupation. The entry of Norway into the war was precipitated by the British min­ing of three areas on her western coast on the morning of April 8 to bar the transit of iron ore from Narvik. This at once prompted the German demands and the almost simultaneous dispatch of air and naval forces which succeeded in occupying Oslo, Bergen, and other Norwegian ports with slight opposition. Norway’s appeal for Allied aid met with immediate deci­sions on the part of Britain and France to send the utmost naval and military assist­ance available. Sweden for the time being pledged continued neutrality; it was stated that her southern ports had already been blocked off by German mine fields.

The war in the North was preceded by a British note of April 5, which, though not at once published, was understood to pro­test against the use of Norwegian waters as a “covered way” for ore shipments to Germany and to warn that any moves on the part of the Scandinavian states to seek or accept German protection would be viewed as an unfriendly act. The entry of Norway into the war opened wide possibil­ities to the side able to establish control of the Norse Peninsula. It is estimated that two-thirds of Germany’s iron ore require­ments must be drawn from abroad, and chiefly from Scandinavia.

Scandinavian Alliance Barred.— Immediately after the Finnish-Soviet peace there was much talk of a mutual de­fense pact to link Finland with the Scandi­navian states. Active and open steps to conclude such a pact, however, were dropped when official Russian sources de­clared on March 20 that it would be re­garded as in direct violation of Art. Ill of the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty, which pledged each nation not to join in a combi­nation of powers directed against the oth­er. Furthermore it was made clear that the U.S.S.R. regarded Finland not as a Scandinavian state but as one of her Baltic satellites. Thereafter there were fears in Allied circles that Finland as well as the Scandinavian states might seek protection from Russia by favors to Germany.

Finnish Aftermath.—Following the Finnish-Soviet peace treaty, ratified by the Finnish Diet on March 15, discussion in Scandinavian and Allied capitals cen­tered on the question of responsibility for the failure to give Finland effective sup­port. From the speech of Foreign Minister Tanner of Finland on March 13, and of Prime Minister Chamberlain on March 19, it was made clear: (1) that the Allied Pow­ers had furnished material aid in muni­tions and supplies to a degree at least ap­proaching the measure requested; (2) that the Allied Powers were ready to comply with Marshal Mannerheim’s call for 30,­000 or more trained troops to arrive in May; (3) that the only practicable route by which these forces could reach Finland was across Norway and Sweden and this route was “categorically refused on behalf of the two nations concerned”; (4) finally, that this refusal was due to the threats of Germany and the justified fears of the two Scandinavian states that permission to the Allied troops would turn their territory into a battleground of the European war. This afforded basis for Premier Chamber­lain’s statement that in the last analysis responsibility rested “upon the shoulders of Germany.”

Allied War Measures

British Cabinet Shuffle.—The Brit­ish Cabinet shake-up of early April was less radical than expected by “get-on-with- the-war” advocates, and left it still a con­servative government of elder statesmen. Of chief significance was the resignation of Lord Chatfield as Minister for the Coordi­nation of Defense and the dropping of that office. This put Winston Churchill as sen­ior minister at the head of the cabinet com­mittee of the three service ministers with their chiefs of staff and the Minister of Supply, which meets periodically to “make recommendations to the War Cabinet on the general conduct of the war.” The War Cabinet, now reduced to 8 members, still has the final say, but under the new ar­rangement the First Lord of the Admi­ralty may gain a dominant control over war strategy and the co-ordination of all military branches such as he sought but failed to secure in the World War. The only other change of much apparent signif­icance was the shift of Sir Samuel Hoare to the Air Ministry in place of Sir Kingsley Wood, who took Sir Samuel’s place as Lord Privy Seal.

Reynaud Succeeds Daladier.—Slow war progress was chiefly responsible for the upset of the French Ministry in late March and the replacement of Daladier as Premier by his able Finance Minister Paul Reynaud. Daladier remained in the Cabi­net where he can now concentrate on war measures in his old post as Minister of De­fense. Georges Bonnet, discredited since Munich, was dropped and the Foreign Office taken over by Reynaud. The chief re­sult of the reorganization was a broader - basis of party support by the inclusion of 3 Left Wing Socialist Ministers, along with some Secretaries and Under Secre­taries who were further to the Right than any who served under Daladier.

The resignation of Daladier on March 20 followed a vote of 239 to 1 in the cham­ber in support of the government, but with over 300 abstentions, which Daladier chose to consider as an unfavorable vote. Reynaud’s new ministry two days later was approved by 268 votes, with 156 against and 111 abstaining, a majority of but one in the whole chamber, though the Ministry gained by some later accessions. For the future the chances appeared at least fair that French prosecution of the war would be stepped up by the shifted roles of Reynaud and Daladier. The new Premier, long an opponent of appeasement, has been largely responsible for the far- reaching financial and economic agree­ments binding France and her British ally.

Friction with U.S.S.R.—A stiffer tone in Allied relations with the Soviet Repub­lic was noted after the Finnish settlement, though it appeared probable that radical and labor elements in England and France would prevent an open break unless precip­itated by Soviet action. In France this in­creased hostility was manifested by the demand for the recall of Jacob Suritz, So­viet Ambassador at Paris, on the grounds that, for some not fully revealed reason, he had sent an uncoded telegram from Paris after the peace with Finland, congratulat­ing his government on its victory over “Anglo-French instigators of war.” In England trouble with the Soviets arose over the detention at Hongkong of two state-owned Soviet vessels, one laden with tin and antimony and the other with cop­per, and both bound for Vladivostok. In­stead of being released, the ships were turned over to the French Navy and held in ports of French Indo-China.

These blockade activities in the Pacific were connected with reports that not only minerals but Dutch rubber might be reaching Germany via Vladivostok, and with rumors also of preparations for a Ger­man submarine base in the Whale Bay area on the Siberian Pacific coast. How­ever, in view of Japanese objections to British naval measures in the Japan Sea and other waters close to Japan, it was be­lieved the blockade operations would for the present be kept at long range.

Germany and the Balkans

Strife for Balkan Produce.—The key to Germany’s immediate policy in the Balkans is undoubtedly the fact that a peaceful Southeastern Europe producing oil and foodstuffs for export to the Reich is far preferable to a region invaded by Russia or ravaged by Blitzkrieg. Hence presumably the advice to Hungary, fol­lowing the Brenner Pass meeting of the Axis dictators, that she had better lay aside her claims on Rumania till after the war. Hence the efforts of Germany to line up the three dictatorships—Russia, Ger­many, and Italy—in an agreement to pre­serve the status quo in the Balkans (again for the duration of the war) and confine the conflict to the Western Front. Hence also the Nazi efforts, mingled with threats of punishment such as that of Poland, to induce Rumania to accept the role of pur­veyor of food and oil to the Reich in ex­change for pledges of security. This secur­ity offer to Rumania, carrying with it long­term guarantees from Russia and Hungary, was made in mid-March, but was pro­nounced “intolerable” by King Carol since it involved, among other things, accept­ance of a pro-Nazi Iron Guard member in the Rumanian Cabinet, demobilization of troops, a sacrifice of domestic economy to German demands, and an end of neutral­ity and Franco-British guarantees. Still the German trade delegation headed by Dr. Karl Clodius settled down for a long stay at Bucharest, seeking there as else­where in the Balkans to increase exports to Germany, speed up transport, and combat the efforts of “Enco”—the newly estab­lished English Commercial Corporation, Ltd.—to buy up Balkan products and choke off German sources of supply. Re­ports of March 9 stated that Germany had demanded the right to police the whole course of the Danube in order to insure the safety of this vital supply route.

Russia and the Axis.—If Germany’s aim has been to bring her two highly di­vergent partners, Russia and Italy, into a working combination, the success was not evident either in the reports of the Brenner Pass conference of early March or the speech of Foreign Commissar Molotoff to the Supreme Soviet on March 29. In his speech M. Molotoff again stressed Soviet neutrality and retention of a free hand, and he took occasion to mention that Italy was among Finland’s supporters in the late war. As for the Brenner Pass meeting, Ital­ian comment served chiefly to emphasize that, whatever the designs of the Italian Government, the Italian people want peace, and that, though they have swal­lowed the Axis, they might choke on its northern extension.

America and the War

The Welles Mission.—The results of Under Secretary Welles’ 6-week tour of European capitals, February 16-March 28, and talks with war leaders were but spar­ingly revealed in the President’s statement after his return. Mr. Welles, according to the President, had made important con­tacts and gathered valuable information. He added that “even though there may be scant immediate prospect of any just, sta­ble, and lasting peace in Europe, the infor­mation made available to this government will undoubtedly be of the greatest value when the time comes for the establishment of such a peace.” As for American views expressed by Mr. Welles abroad, the only ones revealed had to do with Secretary Hull’s well-known desire for removal of barriers to international trade. And as for America’s share in the peace settlement, the comment in European quarters sug­gested that the peace would be made by the nations winning the war.

Coincidently with the return of Mr. Welles, the German Government made public a series of alleged “Polish Docu­ments,” consisting chiefly of supposed communications of the Polish Ambassador at Washington reporting conversations with Ambassador William C. Bullitt and Joseph P. Kennedy, and purporting to show that in the pre-war period America gave encouragement for Polish resistance. Though not very sensational even if genu­ine, the contents of the documents were vigorously denied by the parties concerned and were described by the President as propaganda, to be taken “with a grain of salt, or preferably two or three.”

Liberals Win in Canada.—The Ca­nadian parliamentary elections in late March, on the issue primarily of the vigor of the Mackenzie King Government’s prosecution of the war, resulted in an un­expectedly sweeping victory for the veter­an Liberal premier, who has led the gov­ernment almost continuously since 1921. The Liberal majority of 115 in the lower house was still further increased and there were prospects that even the Senate, whose members hold life tenure, would soon have a Liberal majority. Shortly after the election it was announced that the new Canadian Governor General to succeed Lord Tweedsmuir would be the Earl of Athlone, younger brother of Queen Mary. The Earl is 66 years of age, and after a long military career was Governor General of South Africa, 1923-30.

Arbitration Proposed for Oil Dis­pute.—After a long period of relative in­activity in the dispute between the Mexican Government and foreign oil companies, the American State Department again took up the question in a note of early April formally proposing that the Mexican Government submit the question to arbi­tration. This renewal of interest was seen in some quarters as having a connection with the bill now before Congress for re­peal of the foreign silver purchase act, and also with a bill, referred to the House For­eign Affairs committee, which would au­thorize an investigation of recent United States-Mexican relations. The author of the latter measure, Representative T. C. Hennings of Missouri, declared in a state­ment that the United States can now “contribute to world order ... by insisting on a rigid adherence to the principles of in­ternational law, at least by the nations of this continent.”

Pattern of Things to Come.—Writ­ing in the April number of Events, Fred­erick L. Schuman, author and Professor of Government at Williams College, expresses strong doubts as to an unassisted victory for the Allies in the European War. He concludes:

This writer believes that if all the powers per­sist in their present courses Nazi Germany can in the end break the stalemate and defeat the Allies; that Nazi Germany will in fact defeat the Allies unless Moscow or Washington support them in arms; that Russia is lost to the West; and that America should not and will not permit Allied de­feat, despite isolationist and pacifist pleas for pas­sivity. Herein lies the probable pattern of events to come.

Far East

Wang Regime Installed.—After pre­paratory conferences of Japanese advisers and Chinese henchmen, the Japanese-sponsored “Central Chinese Government” with Wang Ching-Wei as acting President was formally set up on March 30 at Nan­king. The Nationalist flag—white sun and blue sky on a red background—was adopt­ed to bolster the contention that the new government was a restoration of national authority supplanting the “liquidated” setup at Chungking. The North China Provisional Government and Central Chi­na Reformed Government were abolished, though in North China a “political affairs commission” was to continue local admin­istration with much the same corps of offi­cials. The Japanese Government had already (March 13) pledged full support for the new regime, but it was noteworthy that in Premier Yonai’s statement of that date there was no reference to the rights and interests of foreign nations in China, respect for which had been assured in Wang’s Shanghai Manifesto. Nobuyuki Abe, retired general and former premier, was appointed special minister in charge of Japanese interests in China, with au­thority which was declared to include con­trol of Japanese military forces.

Success of this new venture in puppet rule in China would depend on its accept­ance by Chinese leaders and people in the occupied areas, on its ability to override or come to terms with its rival at Chung­king, and on its recognition by foreign states. Of such recognition Japan was able to report favorable assurances from Spain, Italy, and possibly from other European powers. The American State Department, however, declared on March 30 that the new government appeared to be “following the pattern of other regimes set-up in China under the aegis of an out­side power,” and that the United States would continue to recognize the Govern­ment at Chungking, which it believed still had “the allegiance and support of the great majority of the Chinese people.” Viscount Halifax also declared on April 3 that there had been no change in British eastern policy, which was still guided by the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty, and that there had been no change in the British view as to the legitimate govern­ment in China.

At Chungking the establishment of the new government was met by defiance and new plans for continuing the war. In re­turn for increased Soviet assistance, it was reported that Chiang Kai-shek had pledged an end to clashes with Chinese communist leaders and closer co-operation in an “all­-China anti-Japanese front.”

Shanghai Elections.—In the elections for the Municipal Council of the Shanghai International Settlement, set for April 11, the Japanese announced that they would nominate 5 instead of 2 candidates. Prior to the election the Council had included 5 British, 5 Chinese, 2 American, and 2 Jap­anese members. It was assumed that in the new Council the Japanese would control the Chinese as well as their own members and thus have majority representation. In Shanghai the Japanese population is esti­mated at 20,000, with about 3,000 taxpay­ers entitled to vote. British votes number about 2,800, German 600, and American 500.

Digital Proceedings content made possible by a gift from CAPT Roger Ekman, USN (Ret.)

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