*This article was submitted in the Prize Essay Contest, 1940.
"Domine, dirige nos"
Call it a "phony war" if we will, it is war, nevertheless, that is filling the pages of our newspapers and taking up radio time. The bursting bombs, the sinking ships, the cries of the dying may seem far removed from our everyday life but the very fact that our press and our radio can bring us every censored detail of the operations proves we are not so far away. We recognize, consciously or unconsciously, how closely our lives are bound up with what goes on abroad. We recall the chill that coursed down our backs when a news broadcast from Paris last September was interrupted by the funereal wail of the air raid sirens.
Come what may, are we ready for the future? That is a question which should be in our minds constantly. Are we ready should the wars of Europe and Asia extend to our shores or circumvent our interests? Are we militarily, economically, and psychologically prepared to face the trials of modern warfare? Are we physically capable of preserving our neutrality? And lastly, are we ready for a return to peace since that hoped for state may be as disrupting in its realization as is the state of war? We are told that the peace which followed the last conflict is responsible for many of our ills of today. To prevent the recurrence of such ills in the days to come, the peace which we pray may not be long in coming must be anticipated and we must be prepared to take up the burden which will most assuredly be ours. Of particular interest to the military forces of this nation, our current expansion must be prevented from too sudden a reduction; our defense balloon must not be deflated too rapidly. Our over-hasty demobilization after the last war and the subsequent neglect of our defenses are direct causes of the difficulties we have experienced in our recent efforts to rebuild the strength of our military and naval forces.
While this essay must necessarily deal primarily with our readiness from a naval angle, we must not forget the Army. In the lean days following the last war the Army suffered even more than did the naval forces. Little new equipment was provided and training was on an extremely limited scale. Even with the lessons of war fresh in our minds we failed to recognize the need for an adequately equipped and fully trained land force no matter how small it might be in size. Having organized our Army on a skeleton peace-time basis similar to the European armies, our policy overlooked the fact that without universal military training we possessed no reservoir from which to draw the personnel to put flesh on the skeleton in time of war. The Army's recent reorganization into smaller but more complete units is a decided break-away from our former policy but will provide us with an initial striking force heretofore unavailable. Equipment is being modernized as rapidly as funds will permit. Training in large units such as we have never before undertaken is in progress.
The reorganization of the Army on a strictly American pattern indicates that we are recognizing that our defense problems cannot be solved by following too closely the examples of other nations. The first evidence of our recognition of the folly of such copy-cat methods was our refusal to separate our air strength from the parent services. There is, however, a tendency today to refer too frequently to our "Air Force" as though it were a separate organization detached from the control of the Army and Navy. While the Army may maintain a consolidated aerial striking force under direct control of the higher authorities, it is intended to function in exactly the same manner that a cavalry or other division might, that is, in the fulfillment of the Army's mission. The aircraft carrier divisions of the fleet provide the Navy with a similar combined striking force but neither is devoid of complete control by the Army and Navy; neither can function without the support of other arms; and both are integral parts of the Army and Navy. This paramount principle of interrelationship between all branches of our fighting services must be continuously borne in mind and be our constant guide in expansion, training, and utilization. No one branch should be expanded without corresponding augmentation in all others in order that our national defense may be comprised of a well-rounded and complete whole.
Of what does readiness consist? The major portion of this discussion must be devoted to an examination of this and an analysis of our present position. The determination of a nation's readiness to face the many problems which its future may bring forth is an exceedingly complex question.
With war on the grand scale spreading its havoc once more across a great part of the earth, one of our first considerations must be to decide what modifications in our policy are required, what lessons may be learned from the blood-bath tests which are in progress abroad. Thus far there has been little to learn. No really revolutionary weapon has as yet made its appearance. The threatened German weapon which could not be countered has either not yet been used or, if it be the magnetic mine, can readily be defended against, although, as with so many modern weapons, it further complicates warfare. It does not, however, provide a means of offense which cannot be met. Such a weapon has never been invented.
The activities of the German raiders have not presented any novel situations but we have rightly delayed the construction of two new cruisers until we might examine the possible effects of heavily armed surface craft on the carrying out of our mission. The practicability of raiders such as the Deutschland must be seriously questioned when the results up to this time are considered in the light of the original cost of vessels of this type and the practical certainty of eventual destruction. The battle between the Graf Spee and British cruisers confirms the former belief in the impracticability of designing a ship invincible to recognized types. The Deutschlands of modern warfare are most certainly headaches to the powers-that-be, but will not win wars.
So it is with the airplane versus battleship controversy. The bombing plane has added to our worries but we have yet to find that any greater damage can be inflicted by it than can be suffered from the blows of surface or subsurface craft. Poland and Finland may have fallen prey to the horrors of destruction from the air, but we may discount the results of bombing against well-defended objectives. It has seemed a "phony war," but if either side believed major successes could be achieved against the other by the use of waves of bombers, something more concrete would have taken place long before this. This is not intended to imply that bombers may be dismissed lightly. Adequate protection must be provided and every nation should be prepared to return blow for blow. To devote undue attention to one arm, however, at the expense of any other would be the height of folly. We may learn lessons from Europe's wars but our defense plans should be based on our own situation.
The feat of a German submarine commander in slipping his vessel into the fastness of a supposedly well-protected British naval base and destroying a major ship is to be admired but it does not mean that we should devote all our energies to the provision of nets and protective mine fields. The lack of suitable net-laying ships and mine layers has been pointed out on many occasions. One lesson we should learn from this war is that our fleet must comprise every type which modern warfare may require. But let us use reason and be conservative in the proportionate energy devoted to each type.
Material is apt to overshadow other considerations in our examination of our readiness. It is conceded that without suitable equipment our ability to carry out our mission is hampered and, consequently, the question of combatant ships looms large. Possession of mere numbers of ships is not enough. Their material condition is of even greater importance. We have never been able to devote sufficient attention to this factor. Every annual report from the Navy Department points out certain lacks of essential improvements and now that we have at last come to the realization that ships, like every other mechanical device, require periodic overhaul and replacement of worn parts we find ourselves in the midst of an emergency necessitating the employment of every available vessel. Reconditioning of battleships, carriers, and submarines as authorized will probably be delayed until the vessels can more safely be spared from the fleet. However, the fact that we have been able to return some 70 of our old destroyers to active service within a short period is fairly good evidence that the material condition of our ships is not as bad as might have been expected from the years of neglect they were forced to endure.
Our strength in underage combatant ships must be looked upon as the backbone of our naval defense. For some years we have been engaged in a planned, consistent effort to build up that strength. After many years the attempt to obtain a continuing authorization from Congress met with success. The Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 was expanded by the 1938 law. The majority of ships provided by these enactments have been laid down but we are still short in some categories. As is known, the authorizations of existing law do not provide for any specified number of ships but merely state aggregate tonnages which may not be exceeded. It is somewhat difficult, therefore, particularly in view of the abrogation of the last London Naval Treaty by its principal signers following the breaking out of the present war, to indicate what the remaining authorizations may be used for before the authorized tonnages are consumed. However, with the expectation that the current individual tonnages of various classes will not be materially exceeded in the immediate future we now have remaining out of prior authorizations sufficient tonnage, without considering ships which will become overage, to lay down 1 additional aircraft carrier, 4 to 7 cruisers, dependent on individual ship tonnage, 47 destroyers, and 8 to 15 submarines, again dependent on size of ships (Dec. 1939). This number of ships is greater than could be handled by existing experienced yards in any one year.
In his last annual report to the Secretary of the Navy, the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Leahy, stated:
Fleets of the major powers are now expanding rapidly, but provided they do not expand beyond what we now believe to be their building programs, the Chief of Naval Operations is of the opinion that the Navy built, building and authorized, together with the bases in existence and in prospect, will provide sufficient protection for the vital sea frontiers of the United States.
This statement by an officer of Admiral Leahy's standing should be carefully considered especially in the light of the fact that our existing authorizations have not yet been expended. Even with the full realization that war abroad has undoubtedly brought about considerable expansion of the building programs of all belligerents, the question which confronts us is: Is it wise to expand our paper strength further until ships now authorized have been undertaken? It would seem that it might be more advisable to complete the ships we may under existing legislation, man them at full strength, provide vital secondary equipment and, in every respect, round out our entire defensive scheme. Ships alone do not make a navy.
Rather than embark immediately on a new combatant ship program we might be wiser to complete the ships now authorized and concentrate on supplying the badly needed auxiliaries which our fleet now lacks. Our neutrality obligations have forced the commissioning of a number of old auxiliaries which were never entirely suitable. We are not preparing ourselves for possible involvement in the war by resorting to the use of antiquated craft to support the operations of our existing combatant vessels. The bill which Mr. Vinson presented to Congress originally provided for 200,000 tons of auxiliaries and 400,000 tons of combatant ships. As passed by the House, 75,000 tons of additional auxiliaries and 167,000 tons of combatant ships would be authorized. The same section of the suggested bill repeals, however, the auxiliary ship provisions of the Expansion Act of 1938 so far as they relate to vessels which have not yet been laid down or acquired.
When hearings were held on the expansion bill in 1938 the Navy stated it needed 93 ships of approximately 390,600 tons in the auxiliary classifications. The total mentioned did not include many types of ships invaluable to the proper operation of the fleet; these must be considered in addition to the 390,600 tons. After deducting modern -auxiliaries built and building we find that we have need for a total of 259,220 tons to supply even the vessels which the Navy has stated are required.
Without going into further detail it may readily be seen that the proposed total of auxiliary ships is inadequate even to furnish the vessels previously claimed to be necessary. Besides those ships we have need for cargo ships, transports, submarine rescue vessels, net-laying ships, light mine layers, patrol vessels, and miscellaneous auxiliaries. In addition, we must realize that every combatant ship added to the fleet requires auxiliary vessels to service it. The total of 390,600 tons was determined on the basis of the combatant vessels provided for in the last expansion bill. Already the fleet is submitting frantic pleas for additional repair facilities. What would our situation be with many more tons of fighting ships to repair and service?
Going back for a moment to the lessons we may learn from the war abroad, there is one question which is closely allied with our discussion of auxiliary vessels. The reported use of magnetic mines has put a premium on the availability of wooden mine sweepers. So far as is known, our experimental program does not include the construction of such vessels. While every ship which can possibly be used for sweeping is being pressed into service abroad, we have but 2 mine sweepers building and 2 authorized to do the work of the 21 required with the fleet itself. We should not be immune from the danger of magnetic mines even at our distance from the present scene of hostilities if circumstances demand our entrance into the present or any future war.
If we are weak in auxiliaries and no adequate provision has been suggested to make up for our deficiencies, our situation With regard to lighter-than-air craft is even worse. Airships may not be a panacea for all our naval ills but their history in the last war is such that we are well warranted in providing at least a small number of such craft suitable for operation as adjuncts of the fleet. This number would include both rigid and non-rigid types, the former for use as airplane carriers and the latter as patrol ships and for general utility duties. We have not given the airship a fair trial. For neutrality and anti-submarine patrols the non-rigid is unequaled even with the astounding advances made in patrol plane operations. In case of war we should find ourselves in need of such craft and there is no better time to provide them and train the required personnel than in the comparative quiet of our present peacefulness.
The Navy's "Little Brother" is what the Merchant Marine has been termed. Human big brothers may exist without their younger kin, but this brother the Navy cannot do without. The relationship in war between these two floating forms of defense is too well known to need repetition and so we may concentrate for the moment on the position of our merchant fleet when peace returns. If, during the present crisis, we are unable to maintain commercial carriers in operation, we shall find ourselves once more in the position we were in in 1919 when we had to spend millions on the spade work of developing routes. That is what was behind the attempt to transfer our old ships to foreign registry after the enactment of the neutrality legislation. If other neutrals—might we say less timid than we are?—use the present state of war to capture from us the trade we formerly controlled, we shall find that when peace returns there is no place for us on the sea lanes of the world—or certainly the sea lanes which traverse the proclaimed combat zones. If there is no place on the seas for our merchant ships in peace times we cannot maintain the mercantile reserve which in a future war we should find so necessary. It may seem a vicious circle but whether the Merchant Marine exists for the Navy, or the Navy for the Merchant Marine, both are vital to the successful prosecution of any naval war.
Even more important than the ships which make up our Merchant Marine is the spirit of the men who man such ships as we may have. All may not be as dark in this direction as it has been painted on occasion but there is ample evidence that subversive elements have been at work which weaken this important branch of our national defense. We must consider this question from the angle of what effect these subversive elements might have if the Merchant Marine personnel were to be closely associated with our regular Navy. No wonder Admiral Henry A. Wiley, now a member of the Maritime Commission, used such strong terms in writing to the President of the National Maritime Union. Among other statements he said:
For the information of those you would victimize in their distress, it should be stated that the Maritime Commission is not authorized. . . to offer direct relief to the unemployed. It was, however, authorized to establish the United States Maritime Service for the training of American seamen to the end that we might have a merchant marine personnel second to none.
The Commission's record shows beyond a doubt that it is discharging its responsibilities in this matter. American seamen are quartered better aboard ship, fed better and paid better than the merchant seamen of any other nation...
I have observed your activities rather closely for the past three years. You and some of your associates have conferred with me at this office from time to time. I had hoped that in time and through experience you might develop qualities of leadership worthy of the responsibilities of your office. However, my hopes in that respect were apparently as baseless as the charges to which you now give currency.
Earlier in his letter Admiral Wiley referred to "the example of your [Mr. Curran's] leadership which apparently is motivated by powers outside yourself and the organization." The men themselves are all right; they are the same type of men who in the Navy daily face the risks of all those who go down to the sea in ships. It is the leaders who are responsible, and they and their motives are weaknesses in our plans for defense.
We need not search beyond the deplorable sinking of the Squalus to be aware of the spirit which permeates throughout our entire naval personnel. Men who will face death calmly, surrender any hope of rescue for themselves that their mates may be saved, are the sinews of any military force. Morale is a prerequisite of a successful armed force, we are told, and it is high in our Navy. It would be sheer folly to repose too much confidence in this state of morale unless we exert the proper effort to maintain it. We have read much of the promotion ills of our naval forces. Enough has been written for us to know that all is not well. Finally blighted careers are but incidental for there constantly lurk behind each officer the demon of failure of selection, the ogre of age in grade, the bugaboo of "fitted but not best fitted." They are not pleasant companions in an intensely competitive age when one's every effort should be devoted to better preparing himself to carry out his allotted task. Far be it from the mind of this writer to imply that any officer of the Navy may be influenced by the unsettling conditions which now govern their chosen careers, but let us not rely too completely on their faithfulness alone.
A short time ago a civilian, in discussing the propriety of expecting men to bear arms in defense of this nation, said that certainly they deserved better than $30 a month for risking their lives. Secretary Edison has pointed out that the "present inadequate pay" of the naval service is "occasioning discomfort and hardship." We ate well aware that subversive influences are at work among our enlisted personnel. We cannot be sure of eradicating such influences merely by legislating against the distribution of literature of a subversive nature. We must first eliminate any ground which might be fertile fields for the sowing of such subversive literature. Contented personnel are not interested in such disloyal suggestions. It is time we removed any possibility of our enlisted men—or their officers—being tempted by the always fallacious but sometimes appealing propaganda the disciples of Stalin may distribute.
Morale alone cannot man ships. Personnel in adequate numbers is also needed and yet there is rarely an official statement from the Navy Department regarding our readiness which does not mention our lack of man power. The latest report of the Bureau of Navigation states that the average allowance of our ships was 85.6 per cent of war complement. The report rightly recommends that in view of the demands arising from recommissioning vessels now out of commission or in reserve, ships of the fleet be fully manned with complements of war strength. At present only our submarines carry 100 per cent complements. With our reserve forces inadequately trained the need for a greater number of regular personnel is more pressing.
The situation is similar with respect to both officer and enlisted personnel, but the training of officers is a lengthier process and our attention should be concentrated upon supplying an adequate number. Studies indicate that 8,671 line officers are necessary to fully man with peace-time allowances the Navy now authorized and building. The Act of June 23, 1938, allows a total of 7,562, which number, based on expansion through the Naval Academy alone, will not be reached until about 1950. Our maximum authorized expansion in material will have been reached prior to that time at the present rate of progress. As of June 30, 1939, there were only 6,877 line officers available.
Various suggestions have been made with a view to remedying the deficiencies in the number of officers available. Efforts have been made to secure funds for the employment of Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates with the fleet for a period of one year. The assignment to the fleet of aviation cadets as they graduate from Pensacola has relieved the situation only in part. It would seem that in a period of emergency such as the present reserve officers might be absorbed into the fleet and shore establishments in greater numbers and for extended tours. Such extension of active duty service to all classes would provide invaluable training heretofore denied more than an extremely small percentage of the total number of officers in the Naval Reserve. Assignments of this nature should not be limited to junior officers inasmuch as the senior officers are in equal need of training and could relieve regular officers of many administrative duties upon which they are now engaged. Even if limited mobilization is necessary to procure sufficient reservists it seems warranted as a result of our tremendous expansion of material and our increased responsibilities arising from the enforcement of our neutrality laws. If federalization of the National Guard was deemed necessary when we were in pursuit of Pancho Villa, certainly our present stake in world affairs warrants at least partial mobilization of our Naval Reservists.
As an indication of the serious lack of officers and our inability to meet the demands, it may be mentioned that during the past year the industrial yards requested increases in officer allowances totaling 41 per cent over their existing allowances. The Bureau of Navigation was unable to grant these requests even in part. Certainly there are reserve officers available for many duties in the yards and at other shore establishments and it is hoped that the deficiency appropriation requested of Congress at its next session will provide for placing them on active service and thus relieve regular officers for duty afloat. A greater number of reserve officers is now being given some form of training. Much still remains to be done, however. With our yards at a higher employment peak than even during the last war, demands for officer personnel must be met unless there are to be undue delays in the carrying out of assigned tasks.
The training of our personnel would appear to have reached as high a standard as that of any naval service in the world. It is to be regretted that shortage of officer personnel necessitated the recent withdrawal of so many under instruction at the Postgraduate School in order that old destroyers might be recommissioned. Even prior to the present emergency, shortage of officers caused a reduction in the number of officers which could attend the courses at the Naval War College. Efficiency of the fighting forces is closely dependent on the number of officers and men who can be spared for special training, and peace-time strength should be based on having sizable groups under instruction at all times. Considering training as a whole there is probably less reason for worry than in many other directions. Our officers and men are of an extremely high standard of education and general intelligence and these qualities compensate, to a limited degree, for weaknesses in other directions.
Mention has already been made of opportunities which the present emergency presents for giving training to the Naval Reserve. It is significant that the Bureau of Navigation recently reported that,
In general the mobilization efficiency of the Organized Reserve which is dependent upon various factors, such as the filling of volunteer quotas authorized to complete mobilization strength, training facilities and armories, may only be considered as good.
The Organized Reserve is the branch of the supporting service which should be immediately available and fully trained upon mobilization. In the past fiscal year the Bureau of Navigation had slightly more than $9,000,000 available for the training and maintenance of a Naval Reserve which comprised 12,986 officers, 1,032 Aviation Cadets, and 41,985 enlisted men. Considering that the greater part of the available funds went to the Aviation Cadet program, far too little remained for a branch of the naval service upon which we must place great reliance in time of war.
Great efforts are being made to improve and extend the training of the Naval Reserve. Those in close touch with the reserve forces will readily recognize the progress which has been made in recent years. Much remains to be done, however, before we can be satisfied that our secondary forces are prepared to take their places in the war-time naval establishment. One-twelfth of our Volunteer Reserve officers ordered to training duty in an entire year is inadequate; a total of 93 Merchant Marine Reserve officers trained out of 3,821 available is also insufficient. Many—too many—of our reserve officers have never had any training duty but have been dependent on correspondence courses and, where possible, lectures which, on the whole, impart but slight knowledge of the duties they are expected to carry out when they fulfill their agreements to serve the nation when required. We should not rely too much on the patriotic motives which originally prompted men to join the Naval Reserve. They should be given some concrete inducement; if not monetary compensation, at least the opportunity to better fit themselves for their allotted tasks.
Before we leave the question of personnel let us for a moment dwell on the "war from within" which, under the guise of Communism, or Naziism, or any other "ism," has for its aim the destruction of our form of government and the substitution of an alien system. Efforts have been made to introduce subversive literature into the fleet and into our navy yards. Slight headway has been made and we need have little fear that the naval service will permit much to be made. The seeds of Communism may find receptive ground among certain dissident elements and among some of the self-styled intelligentsia. Other things being equal, they fall on sterile ground when that ground consists of men trained according to navy standards and imbued with the spirit and traditions of the Navy. The further we may spread such ground, the better it is for the country as a whole.
A fleet is only as strong as its bases are widespread. Without adequate servicing facilities within easy reach of the scene of possible operations, the full power of a naval force cannot be exerted. Tied to the apron strings of home bases a nation's fleet might as well be converted into coastal defenses. Home bases are necessary but they must not overshadow the need for overseas bases. Britain's far-flung bases permit her to operate her ships without restraint. On the other hand, Germany's raiders, deprived of the use of any friendly port, are forced to wander the face of the ocean, destruction just one step behind. While other nations have been building up chains of well-equipped bases, we have pursued a policy of hesitation often dictated by political considerations which were frequently unjustified in view of the result at stake. When, after years of realizing the importance of Guam in our defense plans, it was possible to include this island in the list of points where new bases should be established, it was eliminated for fear we might offend our only possible enemy on the other side of the Pacific. Certainly Japan has never been as considerate of our feelings in her continuous reaching out to ever greater lengths from her own shores.
The last High Commissioner to the Philippines Paul V. McNutt, after relinquishing his office, recommended that we hold on to those islands. He declared that the Philippine Islands represent the key in our potential bases with which we may be able to safeguard American interests in the Pacific. The defense of the Philippines offers a tremendous problem but not an insoluble one. Whether the islands will be given their full independence or retained in dominion status is for policy to decide, but our right to construct and maintain a first-class naval base should never be abandoned. The maintenance of a free flow of commerce has been one of the fundamentals of our foreign policy. Without overseas bases from which our naval craft may operate in the defense of such commerce our policy becomes a vain dream. Fixed defenses in the form of bases are a substitute for tremendous forces of fighting ships and a vital necessity no matter how limited or how extensive in numbers our ships may be. The question of the retention of the Philippines and their inclusion in our defense plans, in conjunction with the provision of adequate bases in our intermediate possessions, must be decided before long. Our decision must be made with our own safety as the sole basis of consideration. Other nations do not bow to our feelings when they determine their policies and it is time we adopted a similar selfish attitude.
Some writers are inclined to recommend the construction of naval bases as though the world were ours and we could merely express a wish to build a base and sovereignty of the territory would immediately be turned over to us. Such is not the way of nations. However, certain islands near our shores or commanding the approaches to our interests are important in our strategic outlook. One of these is the Galapagos, which may or may not be vital to us as a base. Their possession by an unfriendly power would be detrimental to our defense and, to prevent their acquisition by any other nation than their present owner, it would be advisable for us to purchase them. If purchase is impossible, a long-term lease might answer our purpose equally well. The mutual interest of the nations of this hemisphere in preventing inroads of alien doctrines may well facilitate the transfer of strategic points to the sovereignty of the one nation fully capable of defending them—the United States.
The base development recommended by the Hepburn Board is well under way. Improved facilities are being provided for aviation units of the Navy from Alaska to the Canal Zone, in the mid-Pacific, throughout the Caribbean area, and along our eastern seaboard. Never before has such an extensive program been in progress. Our continental bases are being strengthened not only by construction for naval account but as a result of the army's expansion. The same is true of our bases in Hawaii and the Canal Zone. The end is not yet in sight but naval development is a never-ending process. As strategic considerations vary, so must our base policy, but that there is continual progress none can deny. The completion of our present program will greatly extend the radius of operation of our fleet. The limits of our interests will not have been reached but policy, in co-operation with our military and naval forces, must determine the extent of those interests and provide for their defense.
While the provision of adequate overseas bases is of primary importance, the availability of sufficient vital supplies to permit the carrying on of war on the grand scale is equally necessary in our defense scheme. Doubts are beginning to arise with regard to our reserves of oil. With mechanization expanding daily the demand for fuel increases in direct proportion. No longer can an army feed its transport from the country it traverses; no longer can a navy subsist on salt pork and move under sail. Other well-styled "strategic materials" are also vital. Many must come from abroad. The authority to purchase and store supplies of the most necessary of these materials is a decided step in the right direction. The supplies should be acquired as rapidly as possible and maintained in stock. Careful study must also be given to our reserves of fuel and, if necessary to the defense of the nation, an embargo must be placed on the export of oil (as recommended by at least one naval authority).
These material considerations, important as they are, are but a part of our worries. Our principal concern at present is the preservation of our neutrality. Our revised neutrality law was intended to avoid with more certainty the causes which might lead to our entering the war. Similarly, the Declaration of Panama entered into by the 21 republics of this hemisphere was intended to keep the war from our shores. The efficacy of such an unsupported declaration, however, is questioned and none of the belligerents has agreed to observe its provisions. Great Britain's statement is representative of the reception which the declaration received abroad. In part it read:
It is understood . . . that belligerents are to be invited to accept the limitation of their operations which would be involved by the scheme. This is clearly the wisest way of proceeding, since while belligerents, and particularly the Allies, may be anxious to assist all neutral countries in keeping war from the proximity of their coasts, it must be for them to decide whether or not to accept restrictions which would limit their enjoyment of certain well-established rights.
No nation at war could afford to receive a similar declaration in any other manner. Even the restrictions of the 3-mile limit have proved embarrassing to belligerents in the past. They certainly cannot be expected to adhere to a more extended neutral area. One wonders whether there was ever any intention to prohibit belligerent operations in the neutral zone. More likely it was intended merely as an arbitrary zone outside of which the nations of this hemisphere desired that war be kept. It is striking evidence of the anxiety of the Western Republics to keep themselves aloof from the causes of war. High-minded as such desires may be they do not, in themselves, prevent the commission of acts which may infringe neutrality. At this very moment there is nothing short of force to prevent a belligerent submarine lying on one of the trade lanes radiating from our principal ports (as they did in the last war) and destroying the commerce which is bound from and to such port.
Our own neutrality must be dependent to a degree on the actions of our neighbors. The ink was still wet on the Declaration of Panama when there were reports of certain Latin-American nations supplying German submarines. Regardless of the truth of such reports the danger of such action remains. We hear much of the defense of the Western Hemisphere and it usually revolves around the guns and ships required to protect the nations which nature has divided from the tribulations of Europe and Asia. Of far greater importance than guns and ships is the spirit which lies behind the pronouncements of the leaders of these nations. Hemisphere defense is more a problem of mutual cooperation than it is of the material weapons which each nation can supply for the common defense. Thinking and acting as a whole with mutual trust and common leadership, we need have no fear for the safety of these Western lands, but dissent from the common welfare must be met With the full resistance of the combined might of the majority.
We recognize only too clearly that the welfare of the other nations of this hemisphere is closely allied with our own future. Our future is only slightly less closely tied up with developments in other regions of the world. Our investments abroad are heavy; our interests are many. Would that it were possible to evaluate these in such concrete terms that we could determine at what point our possible losses might warrant the effort of war. Until we determine where our desire for peace turns into the need for war—until we determine a definite foreign policy—the scope of our national defense rests on unsolid ground. A navy or an army cannot be fully adequate to the tasks expected of it unless the extent of those tasks has been defined. Have we abandoned the defense of our commerce as a feature of our foreign policy by requiring the withdrawal of such commerce from its rightful paths because of the risk of loss from belligerent action? Our existing neutrality policy indicates this may be the case. We have spent many millions in an effort to build up a merchant fleet capable of serving our needs in peace and war but, immediately upon the threat of unlawful warfare, we have withdrawn our ships and turned over the carriage of our goods to competitors in the ocean trades. Shall we similarly withdraw our protection from our overseas possessions because aggression has been successfully used against weaker nations like Poland, Finland, Latvia, and the others which have had to bow to threats and force? These are questions which we must answer before we can determine our readiness, for readiness is an unknown quantity until we have decided for what we must be ready.
Organization is as important as material, personnel, and policy. There has been much talk of the need for bringing the organization of the Navy Department up to date. Recent changes are believed to have strengthened the make-up of the bureau system and to have co-ordinated the various offices engaged in design and construction. One of the main arguments against reorganization at this time has been that any change would slow down the progress of building. If that be true in time of peace and changes are deemed necessary, what would be the result in time of war? Utter confusion is the only possible reply. It is not intended to assert whether or not reorganization is advisable but merely to point out that if any change is required it should be made now and not in the heat of hostilities. The same is true of the organization of the fleet. It is as yet too early to determine whether the absorption of large numbers of recommissioned ships has been carried out with ease. We are fortunate perhaps in having a trial period in which to partially mobilize our ships. The lessons we are learning thereby will prove valuable if general mobilization is later found necessary. The Army has decided to remodel its units on the basis of our special requirements. We may even have waited too long for this change but the changes now being made will prove more valuable than if they were delayed until an enemy is at our gates. Co-ordinated organization of the two fighting forces is equally vital and if at present we are weak in this a commission to supplement the activities of the joint boards would be advisable providing its purpose was not forgotten in a maze of inconsequential detail.
Which brings us to the question of "armchair strategists" and self-styled "military experts." The stock in trade of many of the civilian writers of today (and naval officers themselves are not always immune) seems to be criticism. They do not stick to facts and the reading public appears to gorge itself on inaccuracies served in palatable style. Cleverness of handling is more of an asset than facts. This is not meant as condemnation of the few well-informed and conscientious civilian writers who deal in facts and whose interest has assisted in bringing the Navy to the point where it is today. But criticism alone does no good. It was the repeated attacks of a civilian writer which brought about the threatened investigation of defects in new construction. Before the writer is a letter from a recognized authority on naval and military affairs, written in reply to the suggestion that he refrain from his continual criticism. He says:
Of course I don't agree with you about criticism. I feel that the only way to get most things done in the Navy Department or in the War Department is to criticize vocally, frequently, and drastically. Neither service pays much attention to anything except public opinion.
That is a broad accusation and one that it might be difficult to support. However, it is an indication of what the Navy and War Departments may be up against.
There have been instances where only public opinion could accomplish required changes. Many times individuals of the services have displayed a narrowness of viewpoint not entirely conducive to progress. The case of the airship may be cited. With every authoritative technical body in the United States behind further development, the support to be expected from the direction most necessary to results has been confined to a handful of officers branded by their colleagues as "airship enthusiasts."
What the critics forget, however, is that armies and navies are made up of individuals with all the potentialities of other humans to err. They also forget that while we may have encountered obstacles in our designs, had a few sternposts crack, or a few destroyers that rolled more than was good for them, other navies and armies have similar difficulties. We advertise our faults to high heaven; the others remain so conservatively mute. If only we might know how many foreign warships have been found wanting, if only we were aware of the confusion which attends their radical departures from well-trod paths of effort, our own errors might well seem infinitesimal by comparison.
For years we hoped and fought for expansion of our armed forces. It may seem a paradox now to suggest caution. With a world torn by war there may be no difficulty in obtaining almost unlimited expansion for both the Army and the Navy. Peace will follow war, however, and we must foresee a period of leanness as we now see a time of plenty. Unco-ordinated expansion is what we must guard against. Expansion for the sake of expansion must be avoided. The Army can use only as many anti-aircraft guns as it can man; the Navy only as many ships as it has trained and adequately paid personnel to put aboard them. Co-ordinated and systematic development of all armed forces and of each of their component parts is our need.
A reply to the question "Are we ready?" may be expected. None is offered. We must decide first for what we should be ready and, on that basis, examine what we have. An attempt has been made to point out wherein lie our weaknesses and where our strength. Our problems of defense are not the defense problems of Europe or Asia. They are ours alone and while we may plead that the Lord direct us, the solution of our problems must lie with ourselves.