Sea power is both economic and military. It implies the use as well as the control of navigable waters. This use, however, is dependent upon factors often very remote from the sea and frequently not in any way subject to the control of armed naval forces. Without goods to carry, no merchant marine can exist and it is therefore obvious that the origin of articles of trade and the ways they reach the sea is a vital matter in the establishment and maintenance of maritime commerce. This is generally a question of internal economy alone. Once, however, such a commerce has been regularly established whatever tends to encourage or discourage shipping must have a greater or lesser effect on the economy of those regions which supply the goods or control their transport to the sea. There is, then, a mutual reaction between the conditions in the interior of a country and those on the sea.
It is with these economic aspects of sea power that this article is concerned. History offers many examples of the influence of internal conditions on maritime prosperity, and of profound changes caused in regions, often distant from the sea, by variations in routes or modes of ocean travel. Perhaps the best demonstration of this interaction of sea power and internal conditions is to be found in the history of those Central Asian regions which we now call Iran, Afghanistan, and Russian Turkistan.
Here we have a region which is distant from the sea and does not possess any navigable rivers or waterways. As a matter of fact, such rivers and bodies of water as do exist are to be considered as hindrances to normal traffic rather than helps, except that during countless geological ages they have cut passes into the Hindu Kush and the other mountain barriers which divide the country. Nature seems to have conspired to make this country inhospitable and fruitless. And yet this area was formerly the site of many important and wealthy kingdoms and more than one war was fought to control it. Why was this region once so valuable? Why is it now deserted?
Though the earliest Asiatic civilizations of which we have any definite record grew up near the head of the Persian Gulf, all evidence points to a considerable commerce covering the interior at an early date. In this may be seen the motive for later conquests and imperial dreams. Significant kingdoms flourished away from the coasts and along the valleys which led to the mountain passes. That the land routes increased rapidly in importance as the inland regions became settled and trade grew up is evidenced by the northward trend of civilization in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys. Babylon sprang up near the mouth of the passes coming down from the Iranian Plateau, and Nineveh, farther yet to the north, is also at a natural focus for the routes from Central Asia, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia. Both the regions of Babylon and Nineveh have been the sites of important cities ever since and have Bagdad and Mosul as modern heirs.
The first period, however, about which we have any definite information concerning the hinterland occurs in the rise of the Persian Empire about 560 b.c. The exact limits of the empire to the east are unknown, but it would appear that at the outset it included all the Iranian Plateau. By 512 b.c. Darius the Great had extended his power beyond the Amu (Oxus) and the Syr (Jaxartes) in the north, to the Altai and Pamir Mountains in the East, and to the right bank of the Indus, if not into the Punjab in India.
We have here the first great Central Asian State, whose general outlines we find repeatedly duplicated since. The following empires have occupied much the same territory: Alexandrian, Parthian, Sassanian, Ghaznavid, Mongol, Timurid, Safavid, and Moghul (which two were the last and divided the territory in question more or less amicably). In other words, this was a natural unit and was held together almost continuously for more than 2000 years.
This area is the crossroads of Asia. The great highway from China to the west skirted the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush and then cut across Iran (Persia) where it branched, one fork going southwest to Bagdad and across the desert to Syria and Palestine, while the other went straight west into Anatolia and thence to Byzantium, often via the Black Sea. Almost all trade from India, even that bound for China, crossed this same region, since the passes over the Hindu Kush, bad as they were, were far easier than those over the Himalayas or through the swamps of Assam and Burma. Consequently, whoever held Central Asia could levy toll on all the trade of the eastern world, and though the region was not, comparatively, one of great natural wealth, it had many flourishing cities famed for their art and luxury as well as their manufactures and trade.
Darius the Great is credited with the first definite attempt at establishing a water route between India and the West. After having invaded the Punjab, he commissioned a Greek called Scylax to sail down the Indus and find out where it led. By this and later voyages in the Red Sea it was proved that a sea route from Persia and India to Egypt was possible, and Darius rebuilt the canal connecting the Nile and the Red Sea. One of his inscriptions discovered at Suez boasts, “This canal was built, as I had commanded, and ships passed from Egypt through this canal to Persia, as was my purpose.”
Thus a trade began through both the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea which paralleled the older land routes. It was not, however, until nearly two centuries later that the water traffic became a serious menace to the land routes. Alexander the Great, among the many cities he named for himself, founded Alexandria in Egypt as an entrepot for Mediterranean commerce. A greater destiny, however, was reserved for this city than for the others he built. The breakup of his empire after his death, and the disorders caused by the Parthians and Scythians in Central Asia made the land routes unsafe and resulted in Alexandria’s rapidly becoming the center of oriental trade via the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.
In time the Parthians and Kushans established some measure of order in Central Asia and the land routes revived. Changes in Europe did much to help this revival. Augustus not only brought an end to the civil wars which had been disturbing the Roman Empire for nearly a century, but in 28 b.c. he completed the conquest of the eastern Mediterranean lands. The increase m prosperity which resulted from these two achievements led to an enormous increase in the demands for luxuries in the West. Eastern products such as Chinese silks, Indian textiles, spices, ivory, indigo, precious stones, even wild animals, found a ready market.
This trade appears to have been about equally divided between the land routes and the waterways which were controlled by Arabs and other non-Roman peoples. Very soon, however, a fundamental change took place. About the year 50 a.d. Hippalus, a Greek sea captain, discovered the effect of the monsoons and made it known in the West. The way was open for Roman ships to go from Egypt to India and return in comparative safety.
Definite data are lacking whether the increase in sea traffic which followed this discovery was a contributing factor in the decline of the Parthian Empire, or whether that decline encouraged the use of the new route, though the latter view seems more reasonable. In any case, sea trade flourished and Roman ships frequently went as far as Cape Comorin in India where they met the spice fleets from China and the East Indies, but there is no evidence of Roman ships ever venturing farther (probably because they had not yet acquired the use of the compass and lacked suitable charts). There is a record in Chinese annals of a Roman envoy arriving by sea about the year 166 a.d., but in all probability he sailed in a Chinese or Malaysian ship from India. It is odd that, with all this increase m oriental trade, the Romans never made a serious effort to reopen the Nile-Red Sea canal of Darius, which by now had silted up.
The Persian Gulf and land routes throughout this period were much disturbed by the continuous disorders which wracked the Parthian Empire and by the unsettled conditions along the coasts. But in 223 a.d. the rise of the Sassanian Empire re-established order and the northern routes again gained in popularity. This is attested by the relative decline of Alexandria and the sudden rise of other centers, of which Palmyra is the best known in history. But if further evidence is sought it may be found in the transfer in 324 a.d. of the capital from Rome, not to Alexandria at the end of the water routes, but to Constantinople at the end of the overland highways.
Thereafter for several centuries the focus of trade in Europe lay too far to the north to encourage the use of the sea lanes, while the Sassanian Empire, even in its decline, maintained security throughout Central Asia. This state of affairs encouraged land trade which was only sporadically interfered with by the wars between Rome and Persia. These wars though frequent were by no means continuous.
The Moslem conquests of the seventh century were so rapid and so complete that instead of hindering they augmented the overland trade, as may be seen by the removal of the capital of the Caliphate from Mecca to Damascus where it might control the trade routes. Later wars on the northern frontiers tended to close the caravan routes while the establishment of order in the Persian Gulf encouraged the removal of the capital again, this time to Bagdad, where it could control both land and sea routes. Thereafter until the sixteenth century trade seems to have fluctuated between the land routes and those of the Persian Gulf, depending largely on internal conditions.
Even that trade which went by sea in this period depended largely on land communications. This is especially true of the Chinese trade. We have already mentioned that most of the trade between China and India traversed what is now Afghanistan. As trade between India and Europe was perfected along the Persian Gulf or through the Arabian and Red Seas, much of the western commerce of China in such commodities as silk, tea, rhubarb, porcelain, and other luxuries, turned south after crossing the Pamirs and, descending the Indus to the sea, continued its way by water.
In every case it is to be observed that whenever a responsible government gave any degree of security, the land routes flourished, even though for caravans bound on very long journeys they were slower. This suggests that the land routes were at all times preferred. Such a conclusion is contrary to the accepted opinion, which has only considered modern standards of speed and comfort. Nevertheless the evidence tends that way and it might be well to examine why this might be so. If we remember that commercial transport seeks certain objectives and confine ourselves to those in our discussion, our task ls simple. Basically the requirements of transport are security, economy, comfort, and speed.
Admittedly, the so-called Silk Route from China took three years to traverse Asia. On its way it was forced to cross several deserts, wind through narrow defiles, and climb high passes. In summer the traveler was exposed to the burning sun as he passed through arid wastes, and in winter he staggered through blinding blizzards. Despite these hardships, however, the road had its attractions. From the earliest times local chieftains, and even emperors, found a source of profit in this trade and their major concern was the policing of highways so that the traveler, except in times of war and civil strife, might travel without molestation. Both his goods and his person were safe, and if he behaved himself and did not talk too loudly, he was not disturbed as to his opinions and beliefs. furthermore, efforts were made to cater to his comfort as well as security.
There were recognized stations every 10 or 20 miles, even in the deserts, and at these points there were post houses. Such a post house, called a caravanserai, was in reality a fortified village artificially maintained by the government for the convenience of travelers. Here was not only a garrison to protect the route, but often a mosque, shops supplying food and fodder, stables for horses and other beasts of burden, and rooms to accommodate all who chose to use them. Except for what one bought and whatever gift he chose to give the doorkeeper, there were no charges for the services offered. Rich and poor might share the conveniences of the serai. In addition the caravans themselves were composed of a large body of men representing all walks of life and one could be assured of finding among their number company which would prove congenial on the journey. Finally, the diverse cities and countries and holy places which were visited gave one something new and interesting at every turn. When it is remembered that credit systems were not so well established as they are today, and that the merchants often traveled with their goods, it may be seen that from the trader’s viewpoint the overland route was not necessarily so disagreeable, nor yet so tiring as a study of the map might lead one to suppose.
At the same time, neither the time involved nor the cost were so important as they are today. The goods carried were all of them such that they represented great value in small bulk. Profits were calculated in a mark-up of hundreds of per cent and not on the basis of a quick turnover, which made a difference in time of transit relatively less important. And finally it must be remembered that a prejudice against usury and interest was general in the earlier days, just as it still is in Central Asia, so that the loss on frozen capital was not considered.
These latter factors, of course, hold true for the cost of sea transport as well. The important difference between the two modes of travel lies in the relative insecurity and discomfort of marine travel. In the first place boats were small and difficult to manage. Furthermore they were not seaworthy; medieval travelers have universally remarked that the vessels in use in the Persian Gulf were lightly built and held together by wooden pins and ropes made of bark, much as were the boats of the ancient Egyptians. In addition charts were poor. Under such conditions there was great danger from even a moderate storm when the cargo might have to be jettisoned, and even without storms many ships were lost on reefs and uncharted rocks. In such a case the cargo was usually a total loss, even though the passengers and crew might escape in safety.
But these were not the only hazards of ocean travel. The seas belonged to God and did not generally fall under the jurisdiction of governments. Hence there was seldom any policing, and piracy flourished. The coasts of Arabia and the Persian Gulf were admirably suited to this occupation. No power seems to have been able to protect shipping in these waters for any length of time, in spite of convoys and sporadic raids against the strongholds of the freebooters.
Finally, there was the discomfort of ocean travel. We have already commented on the general unseaworthiness of the vessels. This naturally meant that they rode badly and, since the average merchant was not a sailor, the passengers did not enjoy the experience. In time of storm or bad weather, they must choose between exposure on deck, or being huddled in a dark, unventilated, nauseating hold. Lastly, the traveler was required to carry his own supplies (as indeed he was on land) but had no assurance of being able to replenish his stores at regular intervals nor of securing fresh supplies of water.
In the face of such dangers and discomforts is it any wonder that until the end of the sixteenth century the land routes were preferred, even though they might often take longer?
However, this preference which had been characteristic of Eurasian trade from the dawn of history was not so absolute and unchangeable as one might believe. In the course of a single century new navigational methods, new sea routes, and better ships were destined to make sea travel safer and more comfortable than before, as well as quicker and cheaper. About the year 1410 Portugal turned her attention to the discovery of a water route to the East. In 1497 Vasco da Gama, after rounding the Cape of Good Hope, made his way to southern India. Soon he was followed by a host of Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and later English and French explorers and adventurers anxious to exploit the riches of Asia. A new era had begun. By 1522 Magellan’s fleet had sailed around the world and 20 years later a maritime trade with China and Japan had begun. Soon all the trade which was bound for Western Europe from India and the East began to be deflected from the old overland routes and from the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea to the new route around Africa.
The mere opening of this route to European ships would not, however, have had the profound effect on Central Asia that it did have had it not been for the developments which followed in the matters of ship design and navigation. The long and dangerous voyages across the turbulent Atlantic or around Africa to India and China demanded larger and more seaworthy vessels. As a result, questions of design received close attention and during the succeeding century there was a greater advance in size, seaworthiness, armament, and comfort than in the preceding thousand years. At last the European merchant vessel developed into a man-of-war, capable not only of carrying a large cargo and defending itself, but of attacking its enemies and preying upon its rivals also.
There were, of course, many hazards and uncertainties still connected with the sea route to the East, but the profits were fabulous and more than covered all expenses and losses involved. The dream of great and sudden wealth outweighed all considerations of personal safety and comfort on the part of travelers. It is little wonder that the sea routes flourished.
Naturally this increase in sea trade had an adverse effect on the trade of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf as well as that which went overland. Both Italy and the Ottoman Empire, which had grown wealthy from this commerce, began to fade, as did Central Asia. It was, nevertheless, some time before the results of this sea traffic began to be fully apparent. The discovery of an all-water route to India had not at first so much supplanted the old routes as opened an important new market for Eastern products. Spain’s discovery of America had resulted in vast quantities of gold and silver bullion being brought to Europe, particularly in the West. This American gold was undoubtedly a potent factor in the development of Eastern trade and perhaps accounts, in part at least, for the magnificence of the Mogul Empire which grew up in India during the sixteenth century.
But yet another reason why the effects of the sea trade on Central Asia were not immediately apparent may be found in the use of the Safavid Empire in Iran at this same time. In establishing order after a period of chaos this empire encouraged a natural increase in the internal prosperity of this region which tended to hide the effects of the maritime competition. At the same time the markets of Eastern Europe still offered an active demand for eastern goods and these were still served by the old lines of communication.
In time, however, the merchants of Western Europe became purveyors to most of the markets formerly dominated by the Italians and Turks, and when that occurred the overland trade from Asia to Europe virtually ceased. The reason for great empires in Central Asia no longer existed. It is significant that neither the Safavid nor Mogul Empires ever made any serious effort to control the region of Badakhshan which is the key to all overland trade in Central Asia. They were content to share their authority. Had this commerce been as important as formerly, they would, like their predecessors, have disputed the possession of this region bitterly. When they disintegrated in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, there was nothing left to justify the empires which Nadir Shah of Iran and Ahmad Shah of Afghanistan attempted to create. Central Asia lapsed into oblivion so far as world importance was concerned.
Nevertheless, there was still enough commerce to support a number of local kingdoms, if not world-shaking empires. There was the natural internal trade of such a region. Caravans carried the silverware of Tabriz and Isfahan to India and returned bearing Kashmir shawls, Kabuli furs, and Chinese tea. A vast network of exchange extended overland from India to Anatolia, and from Mesopotamia to Samarkand. Furthermore the trade from western and northern China to Central Asia and to India was virtually undisturbed. Camel trains, thousands strong, still made rendezvous at Kabul each spring before setting out to cross the Hindu Kush and the High Pamirs on their long trek to China. But even this regional and purely internal economy was destined ultimately to undergo great changes as a result of the increase in power of the western seafaring nations.
By 1842 England, which had been the first country to invade India successfully by sea, had gained the political and economic control of most of the peninsula. In this same year by means of her so-called Opium War she forced China to accept Indian products brought by sea. This, of course, only affected the coastal regions and of itself might not have been so important to the land routes, had it not been concurrent with a new mode of land travel which in the beginning, at least, tended to favor the coastal regions.
Railways began cutting inland from the coast, tapping the resources of the interior and displacing caravan routes. It soon became quicker, safer, and cheaper to send goods by rail to the coast and then ship them by steamer than to send them by caravan. As railroads pushed into China and India the sea absorbed more and more of what had been the internal trade of Central Asia. By 1875 railways crossed India and reached up the Indus as far as Peshawar. By 1883 the Russian roads had reached the Caspian by way of Merv, Bokhara, and Samarkand. There remained some trade from China to Iran and India but each new railway reduced this. As railroads pushed up through Assam and Burma, the longer western route via Afghanistan was abandoned. Year by year the trade decreased until what will probably be the last camel train bearing goods for China left Kabul in the spring of 1934.
Even for shorter distances the preference for sea routes is marked. As an example of the effect of the combination of rail and water on communications it is sufficient to cite the way mail is sent from Kandahar in Afghanistan to Teheran in Iran. The distance overland is about 1,100 miles and yet a letter must travel about 2,500 miles to reach its destination. First it is taken by motor to Quetta (70 miles), thence by rail to Karachi (530 miles), by steamer to Bender Shahpur (1,200 miles), and again by rail to Teheran (700 miles). Other goods nowadays are sent the same way and it may be said that at the moment overland trade, even for short distances, is dead and that the development of sea power has brought an end to the importance of Central Asia.
But there are implications in the present situation which should not be ignored. Just as at an earlier period the conditions in the interior controlled the prosperity of marine commerce, there are indications that much of the present sea trade, at least for short distances, may be done away with by internal changes. We have already pointed out that the railroads at first tended to increase the coastal trade. This was true only so long as they pushed in from the coast. As soon as they began to connect with each other in the interior they paralleled the sea routes with lines of communication offering equal security and greater speed and comfort, though not always so economical. That such interior railway systems are a potential menace to shipping has been long recognized and explains the active antagonism of the British to the Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad before the World War of 1914-18. A no less real, though much less open, opposition to the trans-Iranian Railway which was completed in 1938 will be recognized by anyone who has lived in Iran during the last decade. Proposals that spurs be built from this line connecting the Anatolian and Caucasian railroads with those of Baluchistan or the Transcaspian area are viewed by the government of India with grave concern, not merely for strategic and military reasons but because of the economic results of such a move. Such a system would tend to develop a purely regional and internal economy and would bring an end to the coastal trade. It would also tend to bring Central Asia into the economic orbit of Moscow and Berlin overland and lessen the influence of Britain which comes by the longer sea lanes through the Persian Gulf and the Arabian and Red Seas. The further construction of railroads in this area is, then, a definite threat to sea power.
But the situation of late years has been complicated by other inventions than the railroad. The automobile and airplane have both come into general use and serve to supplement or supplant the railroad as a means of internal communication. And against these the naval powers are unable to act. Political pressure, bribery, and financial intrigue, even war, have been used in the past to slow down the construction of railroads. But it is less easy to prevent the purchase of trucks and motorcars by private individuals or to persuade governments that highways in the interior should not be built and maintained. Today Iran is crossed by a network of well-metaled arterial highways. For several years trucks have been crossing the Hindu Kush via the Shibar Pass along a road which was only officially completed in 1938. In Russian Turkistan, according to all reports, there are excellent highways of both military and economic import honeycombing the entire area even into the high Pamirs. There is every indication that these new lines of communication are bringing this region a new and greater prosperity than it has enjoyed for the last two centuries.
The new prosperity is vastly different from the old. In ancient and medieval times Central Asia was the tollgate of all Asiatic trade from China on the east to Turkey in the west. The new economy is local and regional. In the past the commodities which entered into trade were those which represented high value in small volume. Today bulk goods and raw materials are not only feasible but profitable. While the region is not suited to extensive agricultural development and, with the exception of petroleum, does not have exploitable mineral deposits, still it can produce certain raw materials for the world market. Already Afghanistan and Iran are shipping cotton to Russia by rail and to Japan by sea. This is possible only because of the superior land communications. At the same time the airplane is beginning to enter the picture, for the transport of the more valuable and less voluminous articles, such as semiprecious and precious stones. Lastly, the increasing industrialization of the entire area, marked as it is by sugar and textile factories and similar manufacturing plants, has been reducing the demands of this region for foreign products so that there has been a relative decline in the shipping necessary to supply the needs of Central Asia from the coast.
Conclusion
Thus, we find the history of Central Asia in relation to sea power divided into five periods. Until 1497 land travel was preferred and the use of sea routes varied inversely as the order prevailing in the interior. When order prevailed shipping declined, and when interruptions occurred on the land routes the maritime commerce increased. From 1497 to 1707 land trade from Asia to Europe progressively declined until only an internal Asiatic trade remained. This continued undisturbed until in 1842 the Opium War and the introduction of the railroad brought about a new era marked by the substitution of coastal and deep-sea shipping for almost all internal communications. Since about 1925 the interconnection of railroads, the use of the automobile and airplane, and the construction of motor highways promise to re-establish an internal regional economy. This would seem to be somewhat analogous to the first phase when land communications were preferred.
If we accept the foregoing analysis of Central Asian history as sound, we are inevitably led to the following conclusions which would appear to be of more than local application:
- Sea power is both military and economic. It implies both the control and the use of navigable waters.
- The economic effectiveness of sea power is determined by the area served by the seaports. Not only the resources but the condition of communications in the interior are vital factors in the growth or decline of sea power.
- Commercial transport has four objectives which have different relative values under different conditions: Security, economy (which implies profit), comfort, and speed.
- Trade will go by that route which offers superiority in regard to one or more of the four objectives (security, economy, comfort, and speed) and the amount of preference will be determined by the degree of superiority. If land travel is safer, those who desire safety will go by land; if sea trade is quicker, those who desire speed will go by sea, etc.
- Trade, whether by land or sea, implies an exchange of goods or services. The more self-sufficient a region becomes, the less need it has for foreign commerce and consequently the less the influence which can be exerted by foreign powers on its politics or economy.
Having deduced these rules from a study of the history of Central Asia, let us attempt to apply them to conditions in that region in order to determine what the future may be.
In the first place Central Asia appears to be entering a period of prosperity as a result of improved systems of land communication. As a result, even if the absolute amount of maritime commerce does not decline but remains stationary, it will be increasingly less important to the prosperity of the region as a whole. Consequently the political or economic pressure, short of war, which can be exerted by England or any other naval power will progressively decline. At the same time the establishment of a regional economy will tend to unify this area again and may ultimately result in the development of a great Central Asia state comparable in size to that of Darius the Great, or Timur-i-leng. On the other hand this regional system may in time tie so closely with the economy of Russia and Germany that this area will be absorbed by a vast Eurasian state dominated by one or both of these peoples. Should such a thing take place, Asia, which has never yet had a great naval power (Japan excepted), would again develop entirely on internal lines and the naval needs of such a country would be strictly military, being determined as a function of politics and prestige rather than of vital economic necessity.
Even if all this should not come about, we can consider that the opening contention of this article has been proved. The use of navigable waters is dependent on factors often very remote from the sea and frequently not in any way subject to the control of armed naval forces.