The U. S. Navy must solve three distinct problems. The first is a two- ocean war, resulting from a powerful coalition which might be formed against us within the next year or two. Next is a similar war several years later. This would differ from the first in that there would be time to build new types of ships in numbers sufficient to alter substantially the strategic potentialities of the Fleet. Both of the foregoing assume such a superiority of force against us as to compel the adoption of the defensive in both oceans. A fleet built for defensive operations only would, of course, be useless as a deterrent to war; consequently, it would not serve to protect policies, interests, or even outlying territories. Our third problem then is to build a fleet capable of executing a swiftly successful offensive. Only that kind of an offensive can achieve its aims without excessive cost or undesirable complications. Other intermediate situations may arise, but they can be met if the Fleet is capable either of decisively crushing simultaneous offensives in both oceans or of rapidly carrying through a transoceanic offensive against a single power.
We therefore need a short-range plan and a long-range plan. In order that they may blend harmoniously, the first step is to make the long-range plan. Such a plan is outlined in this paper. It is not submitted with any inflated idea that it offers the last word on a highly complicated subject, but merely to call attention to certain changes with fat-reaching results of interest to all naval officers. This outline first takes up the requirements for the offensive, since even a successful defensive requires the ability to execute counterthrusts; in fact, the best defensive of all is to have a fleet so manifestly capable of the offensive that other fleets will not care to challenge it.
In the offensive campaign, we assume that the enemy fleet is weaker than ours, but sufficiently strong to necessitate the utmost efforts of our entire Navy in order to overcome both the opposing fleet and the special hazards to be encountered in a transoceanic offensive. These hazards include mines, coastal submarines, motor torpedo boats, and shore-based aircraft. Then there is the long distance which damaged ships must travel to reach a base. Finally, comes the difficulty of fuel supply, which is especially trying for smaller units of the Fleet. The problem then becomes one of taking such steps and adding such ships to our present fleet as will enable it to overcome these handicaps of unquestionable seriousness.
For simplification, the discussion of changes needed in warship design is confined primarily to battleships. They are the most important units, and the designs of other types are based either directly or indirectly upon them. Since their characteristics depend upon the tasks they must accomplish and the conditions they must face, the first step is to attempt to visualize such a campaign.
When one begins to study concrete tasks, the realization comes that success or failure may hinge upon the skill demonstrated in gauging various imponderables. This is especially difficult for a navy which has met no real test in 75 years. There are, fortunately, three ways in which this lack of recent battle experience may be largely offset. One is by a thorough program of tests and experiments not only to determine the precise effectiveness of our own weapons and defensive measures but also to appraise as accurately as possible the weapons and defensive measures of the enemy. This places both tactics and design upon a firmer basis, and is the technique so successfully employed by Tirpitz in building up his High Seas Fleet. Another safeguard would be to use volunteers from our regular officers and men in the current war, just as Hitler used volunteers to test material, tactics, and organization in the Spanish Civil War. At least part of the amazing realism in German war plans and of the effectiveness of Nazi material must be attributed to these eminently practical tests and the resulting valuable experience. A final precaution is to plan our initial campaign so that it starts with simple operations for which such overwhelming force can be supplied as to insure success, even though defects in material and methods are discovered. Then these can be remedied before attempting anything more difficult.
On first thought, these precautions might be rejected as betraying a lack of confidence in the ability of our experts. Far from that, they merely indicate a realistic appraisal of the consequences of a wrong guess on the basic imponderables, of the folly of risking our national destiny on untried theories, and of the moral value of scoring smashing victories in the opening phase of the campaign. The importance of the technical factor in modern war is so great that to base plans upon expert opinion alone, when there are practicable means of getting the facts, is negligence just as deplorable as to depend solely upon the game board and to omit tactical exercises for the Fleet. A few timely misgivings as to the invulnerability of the Maginot Line and as to the effectiveness of her anti-tank guns might have saved France from disaster. There will always be some points which must be left to expert opinion, but the more of these we can eliminate by substituting demonstrated fact, the greater will be the likelihood that our war plans can be executed without a hitch.
The initial moves in this hypothetical campaign under discussion should preferably be combined operations, directed against outlying points which are so situated as not only to be of value to us as advanced bases but also to insure that any attempt to interfere by the enemy fleet cannot be supported by large numbers of shore-based aircraft or other inshore weapons.
The first question relating to battleship design then is: What changes are necessary to enable these vessels to function more effectively in amphibious warfare? One lesson of the Dardanelles campaign was the difficulty of knocking out mobile artillery and machine guns. Apparently the supporting vessels must either anchor or steam slowly fairly close inshore while employing guns of intermediate and small calibers to clear the way for the landing party. This involves exposing ships to a hail of bullets and small shells. Unless all personnel, fire- control instruments, ready ammunition, and communication cables are protected from this shower of steel, fire cannot be maintained long enough to destroy or disable the guns ashore. This demand for light armor on all unprotected guns and fire-control stations is reinforced by recent serious casualties among the exposed personnel of British ships, due to bombs landing on deck or close alongside. An adequate defense against these hazards would, moreover, preclude losses from the gunfire of attack planes or the splinters of large shells, and would simplify the problem of dealing with gas.
This hail of small shells from shore batteries could also do considerable damage to the unarmored ends of the ship, for large holes near the water line are a menace to stability as well as to buoyancy. Since such holes may also result from aerial bombing, a further departure from the all-or-none theory of armor distribution is necessary. If it is impracticable to carry the main belt from end to end, a light armor belt should extend forward from the present main belt, increasing in height as it approaches the stem. Holes in it would be relatively small and easy to plug, so that a damaged bow would be much less serious if bad weather were encountered on the long trip back to the base; in fact, the likelihood of having to return to the base for repairs would be reduced. A corresponding belt aft is desirable, but not so necessary. Such belts would have to be either installed between two sets of frames or especially secured in some way to prevent whole sections of armor from being blown off the ship by heavy shells or bombs exploding inboard.
Three further points complete this necessarily brief discussion of combined operations. One is that speed is of no value whatever, since the ships must either anchor or steam slowly in order not to pass their targets too quickly. Another is that these same changes are necessary in varying degrees in types other than the battleship. The final point is that these operations require an unusually good defense against aircraft as well as submarines. They also involve the speedy laying of miles of anti-submarine nets. The value of especially-designed, anti-aircraft vessels, anti-submarine craft, and net layers is correspondingly enhanced.
If these combined operations have not forced the enemy fleet to fight, air raids on his main base and other legitimate objectives must be undertaken. The pressure which can be exerted will depend largely upon the number and capacity of our aircraft carriers as well as upon the ability of the Fleet as a whole to defend those carriers and itself from air attacks and the other hazards of operations in enemy waters.
The probable conditions of a major raid by our fleet air force therefore deserve study. Past experience indicates that intermittent bombings serve chiefly to point out weaknesses in the enemy’s defensive system which he can remedy during the quiet intervals and so exact a mounting toll of the attacking planes. Bombing, then, should be maintained continually until the target is so thoroughly destroyed that it will never have to be attacked again. The Fleet, accordingly, should approach reasonably close to the objective in order to reduce the time spent by bombers in flying to their target and back, as well as to permit them to be escorted by fighters. That gives them a better chance to reach their objective, and enables them to make more trips in a given interval, besides carrying less fuel and more bombs each trip. The carriers should obviously remain in position at least one day in order to permit the planes to make several round trips and to do their job thoroughly.
This close approach and sustained attack have the further advantage that they allow the defending fleet time to come out and offer battle. If it does so, the resulting engagement should prolong things another day. Furthermore, all ships will probably be subject to air attacks for one or two days before reaching the designated position, and for the same interval afterward. In short, such raids involve exposing the Fleet to air attacks and keeping its antiaircraft batteries in action on from 3 to 6 consecutive days. Since future designs must be able to face, not the air forces of today, but of 10 and 20 years from now, they should allow for enough anti-aircraft ammunition to permit at least a week of intermittent firing.
The ever growing number and toughness of the planes a fleet is likely to encounter in such a campaign will probably necessitate a marked increase in the number of anti-aircraft guns. If this number is doubled in future battleships, and if enough ammunition is provided to meet the new conditions, it means the carrying of from 7 to 14 times the weight of antiaircraft ammunition formerly allowed. If we take a middle figure and allow 10 times the former tonnage for this item, drastic readjustments in design are clearly necessary.
This is an unwelcome conclusion; but it must not be ignored on that account, for there is no more certain road to disaster than to attempt the offensive with inadequate means. When all the evidence points to expenditures of anti-aircraft ammunition in the next naval offensive which will be as unprecedented as were the demands for high explosive shells in the land campaigns of 1914-18, it would be fatal to regard past allowances as adequate. Either the requirements for a transoceanic offensive must be calculated with unflinching realism and provided with unwavering resolution, or the idea must be abandoned.
The fundamental trouble is that the necessary factual basis for such calculations does not exist. Those just made were admittedly too crude for use in an actual design; they were intended only to show the necessity for very much larger allowances of anti-aircraft ammunition without pretending to offer a precise answer. A further difficulty is that nobody knows how well the current methods of fire control would work when a thousand or more planes were subjected to the simultaneous fire of hundreds of anti-aircraft batteries. Definite answers to such questions as these are the only realistic basis for war plans and warship designs.
One element in the recent German successes on land has been the intellectual vigor and administrative skill they have demonstrated in obtaining this factual groundwork, instead of relying upon mere opinion or second-hand reports. If our Navy could obtain authorization to send volunteers to man an anti-aircraft cruiser and a squadron of each type of plane for the British, the resulting experience would be of great value to the individuals concerned and would soon remove these questions from the realm of mere speculation. No single step which we could now take would yield such a large return in proportion to risks run. If this is not permitted, could not large-scale experiments be initiated immediately? They should involve at least a dozen batteries firing simultaneously at the maximum practicable number of obsolete planes fitted with automatic control.
Although everyone realizes that an adequate defense against aircraft is absolutely indispensable to an offensive campaign, this is only the negative side of the matter. The positive side is that such a defense also affords a means of whittling down enemy air strength and morale in order to facilitate the offensive tasks of our own fleet air force and to increase the likelihood of enjoying aerial superiority in the fleet engagement. If fire-control technique, ordnance design, supplies of ammunition, and skill of personnel permit the collective gun power of a modern fleet to be turned simultaneously and effectively against the hostile air force, casualties there are bound to mount too rapidly for endurance.
It is noteworthy that this type of campaign creates automatically a situation in which the defending fleet is forced, not merely to fight, but to seek a clear-cut decision. Consequently, superior speed is no longer necessary either to compel action or to press that action to a definite conclusion. The outcome will depend upon nothing but striking and resisting power. The emphasis on armament is increased by the limited space and time which will be available for pursuing a beaten fleet and exploiting a victory. Every effort must therefore be made to achieve annihilation in the main engagement. This is increasingly difficult because improved facilities for laying smoke screens make it easier to break off an action which has been definitely lost. The obvious remedy is to have enough guns to cripple so many of his valuable ships in the initial burst of fire that he will be compelled to make an effort to extricate them. The importance of protection is also accentuated by the fact that a battle line so thinly armored that it can engage only at extreme range is clearly ill-suited to a campaign in enemy waters. That can be carried through only by a fleet which is prepared to engage at any time, regardless of visibility.
The battle offers several new problems, of which the chief is the defense of aircraft carriers. After deployment they can no longer be protected by the anti-aircraft batteries of the entire Fleet. Neither could they be hidden so as to escape attack any more than an elephant could be concealed on a ballroom floor. Therefore, the logical place for them is where they can be employed most effectively and protected most easily. This is a few miles on the unengaged beam of the battle line. Here the obvious type to defend them against air attacks is the anti-aircraft cruiser. They are also especially vulnerable to submarine attack, due to the fact that they must steam on straight courses while flying planes on and off. Their adequate protection is sufficiently important to justify the building of specially designed vessels for anti-submarine screening.
There are, however, several other fields of usefulness for such specialized craft. If they were used to patrol in wide zigzags from 1,000 to 3,000 yards on both sides of the battle line, they would afford considerable protection, yet be far enough away to run little risk from hostile “shorts” and ‘overs.” The importance of anti-submarine screening during combined operations was previously noted. Finally, merchant vessels and fleet auxiliaries will always require such an escort. This screening can best be done by units which have been designed for that express purpose; partly because such duty requires unique armament and equipment; and partly because a specialized design will cost less to build and man, besides offering a smaller target of greater maneuverability. Such vessels could also serve in the defensive screen the night before, and the night after, a battle. All destroyers of the regular type would then be free for their true offensive tasks. Economy of force therefore demands the building of numerous anti-submarine destroyers or escort vessels. It would be simpler and more logical to call them submarine destroyers, since that is their mission.
The building of such craft is not enough in view of the haphazard technique and inefficient depth-charge attacks by all navies in the World War. Should we not establish an anti-submarine school and recognize anti-submarine operations as a distinct specialty, as was done by the British? That has been the path of most rapid progress in other lines of effort, and the increased efficiency of British anti-submarine operations speaks for itself. Furthermore, a school is the only means of providing adequate training for the large number of men which must be employed in such duty in war time. Finally, such training would reduce the number of men and ships which must be devoted to purely defensive tasks.
Mines in large numbers are another hazard which must be faced in such a campaign. The necessary countermeasures are so well known that only two points are worth mentioning. One is that the added emphasis which is placed on underwater protection and damage control necessitates more weight and space for defensive purposes. The other is that the highest practicable rate of sweeping will always preclude a high fleet speed during operations which necessitate the use of mine sweepers.
The great improvement in motor torpedo boats cannot be ignored. Fortunately, the small automatic guns in multiple mounts as developed by the British to counter low-flying aircraft are also an ideal weapon against small, fast targets on the surface. If our new ships mount enough such guns to deal with dive bombers and torpedo planes, they will be well equipped to meet this additional menace.
No discussion of the hazards of fighting in enemy waters would be complete if it ignored the long distance which damaged ships must steam before reaching dry dock. Aside from the previously mentioned additional armor for the bow, the best way of minimizing damage in general is to reduce designed speed in all classes of warships in order to increase armament and protection. Another constructive measure would be to improve equipment for towing disabled vessels so as to obviate the repeated breaking of towlines which caused so much trouble in the World War.
A further complication in transoceanic war is fuel. The problem for submarine destroyers is especially difficult, partly because they must patrol at a speed slightly higher than that of the vessels screened, and partly because their small size precludes any great fuel capacity. The use of fast fleet tankers is a partial solution, but the disadvantages of fueling at sea—especially in the presence of submarines— demand that it be minimized. What single step would do so much to simplify this problem as the definite adoption of a moderate fleet speed?
It might be argued that high speed would be a great advantage in enabling the Fleet to hurry through the danger zone from enemy bombers. The first thought is naturally to minimize the interval during which our ships would be exposed to air attack. Reflection, however, indicates that little would be gained by haste, even if the speed of mine sweepers and the fuel capacity of light craft permitted it. The primary purpose of such a raid is to force the opposing fleet out to fight, and it should be given a reasonable interval to come out. High speed would merely defeat our own ends.
Whether the hostile air force starts attacking at the earliest possible moment or not is a matter of indifference. The more its onslaughts are strung out, the better chance our anti-aircraft gunners have of defeating it in detail, and of destroying enough planes to make the task of our own air force perceptibly easier. When surprise is wanted, it could best be attained by timing the operation to coincide with a foggy or rainy spell. Everything would then depend upon the skill of our meteorologists in developing long-range weather forecasting.
After the raid is completed and the Fleet starts its return, speed will probably hinge upon supplies of fuel or the necessity for towing disabled vessels. The point here is that the faster the Fleet, the fewer its antiaircraft guns, the scantier its ammunition supplies, the less its armor, and the more fuel it consumes. The more mobility is stressed in design, the more likely the Fleet is to have both a fuel shortage and disabled vessels to tow back to the base. It is another instance where more haste means less speed.
This completes the necessarily sketchy review of the transoceanic offensive. The two-ocean defensive war will be studied before any attempt is made to sum up.
In this two-ocean campaign, our inferior numbers can best be offset by compelling both our opponents to accept the heavy handicap of transoceanic warfare. The problem then becomes one of what steps to take and what ships to add to the Fleet to enable it to defeat both these offensives so crushingly that they will never again be attempted.
The first step will be to prevent the enemy from seizing an advanced base. Accordingly, we must concentrate all the force of every description which we can possibly muster and place it between him and his first objective. To do this, we need suitably located bases of our own, not only for the Fleet itself, but also to permit maximum employment of shore-based airplanes, motor torpedo boats, mine layers, and coastal submarines. This subject of bases has been so admirably treated by others that the only further point worth mentioning is the value to us of a base in the Falklands. This, of course, is not our most pressing need; but in case of damage to the Panama Canal, a base there would be priceless. Even in a one-ocean war, it would be important to keep an eye on all ships rounding the Horn. Although no large sums should be spent on any outpost so remotely situated, a base for patrol planes and a harbor for refueling would be highly advantageous.
The campaign against a stronger coalition also emphasizes the value of all weapons and vessels which can be manufactured on short notice. This necessitates preparations for quantity production of airplanes, motor torpedo boats, mines, mine layers, and coastal submarines. The same thing applies to defensive units: submarine destroyers, patrol craft, and mine sweepers. The first step is the occasional placing of educational orders for units of each type to insure that modern, thoroughly- tested designs are always on hand, and that industrial plants are ready for quantity production. This is being done, except for mines and coastal submarines. Should it not be extended to them?
In rallying all available forces, the G.H.Q. Air Force should not be overlooked. This might serve as a powerful reinforcement if it had received peace-time training with the Fleet, and if arrangements had been made for its temporary transfer to naval command in any predominantly naval war. Any plan for mere voluntary co-operation can result only in confusion, cross purposes, and lost motion. If there is any idea of employing the G.H.Q. Air Force against enemy ships, that employment should be under naval command to insure co-ordination of effort. History has shown too clearly the folly of dual command for anyone to defend it. Should not arrangements then be made for the G.H.Q. Air Force to participate in annual fleet maneuvers, and for this temporary transfer in the same way as the Coast Guard is taken over?
The value of reinforcing the Fleet with quantities of motor torpedo boats will depend upon several things besides their number. Here is a type with which nobody in our Navy has had any war experience. This lack could quickly be made good by allowing a few of our junior officers to volunteer for a few months’ service with the British. Upon their return, they could be used as instructors in a motor torpedo boat school for training yatchsmen to man such craft. These officers who volunteered would run serious risks, but they would gain the most valuable of all training while acquiring information which would benefit the entire Navy.
The next consideration is the changed requirements in the ships which compose the Fleet proper. As before, what follows is confined primarily to battleships.
Suppose a stronger fleet were to start across the Atlantic. As it approached this side, its movements would ordinarily be so faithfully reported by our submarines and patrol planes that our surface forces would not require superior speed either to avoid a surprise engagement under disadvantageous conditions or to interpose between the enemy and his first objective. Neither would our fleet need greater mobility to bring on a battle, since interposition between the invaders and their objective automatically forces a decision. That offensive fleet, moreover, now has the power to compel action either to prevent its seizure of an advanced base or to put a stop to its air raids. As a result, higher speed in our fleet no longer enables it to delay action until some chosen moment. The important point is that the battle would not be a chance and unsought encounter; rather it would result from the creation of a situation in which both sides wholeheartedly seek a decision. The inconclusive sparring and withdrawals of 1914-18 would be replaced by a fight to a finish.
In that fight, the first fact to be faced is that our Fleet must expect to be outgunned at the start. No intelligent enemy would attempt a transatlantic campaign without an initial superiority in numbers. Our battleships should therefore be designed with a sufficient factor of safety in their protection to enable them to survive this opening burst of gunfire long enough for better shooting and shore-based reinforcements to make themselves felt. Thicker armor with equal or superior striking power would also automatically secure the advantage of inflicting prior damage. This would go far toward offsetting an initial superiority in numbers. It does not follow that maximum gun power should not be sought in our designs; on the contrary, the more big guns in our fleet, the less the likelihood that such a campaign will ever be launched against us.
Another item to be considered in such a battle is ammunition. If, for example, every three of our ships must face four enemy ships, the allowance for each of ours should be one-third larger than is necessary in a ship-for-ship duel. These allowances on both sides proved to be inadequate in the World War. At Jutland, for example, Scheer’s leading battleships had fired away a dangerous proportion of their heavy shells before the main action began. They carried 90 rounds per gun, so 135 rounds should be regarded as the minimum, and 180 rounds as the desirable allowance. Steps for increasing the accuracy life of guns also become of renewed interest.
Future naval battles will probably see further development of a tendency, notable at both Tsushima and Jutland. This was the punctuation of the battle by definite lulls, resulting from the temporary withdrawal of whichever side was being heavily hit. These fluctuations in the relative number of hits scored are likely to be more extreme in the future, due to the influence of the simultaneous battle in the air. Whenever one air force is able to drive the opposing spotting planes out of the air while protecting its own spotters, its fleet will gain a temporary advantage so overwhelming that the opposing fleet will have to put down a smoke screen and break off action until it can get relief spotting planes into position. In any closely-fought battle, aerial superiority will probably change hands several times with more frequent lulls in the surface fighting.
This tendency toward shorter periods of fighting will influence design in two ways. One consequence will increase the importance of inflicting maximum punishment during these briefer rounds in the gun fight. In other words, it will emphasize the need for mounting the most powerful main batteries it is practicable to install. Design will also be influenced in that these more frequent lulls will preclude the utilization of superior speed for gaining some possible advantage in wind or light. The relative courses of the two fleets will be determined by these withdrawals and attempts to maintain contact, not by any long-drawn- out tactical maneuvering. In short, the tendency toward more frequent lulls transfers emphasis from speed to gun power. When speed was of negligible value at Jutland; when it is far less likely to be of any value in future battles; and when the new conditions accentuate the demand for armament, ammunition, and protection—in the face of such a situation, who would suggest that we sacrifice the essential qualities in order to obtain a higher degree of the nonessential?
Although we have seen that superior speed would not be needed to press the battle to a decision, few realize its decreased utility for exploiting a victory. Once the opposing admiral gives up all thought of anything but flight, he can use smoke screens, destroyers, light mine layers, and submarines to make a direct pursuit prohibitively risky. The harrying of a beaten fleet will therefore fall primarily upon our light surface vessels and aircraft. The battleships, regardless of their speed, can do little more than to follow along on the flank to deal with disabled enemy units.
Another notable feature of such a battle is the time available for exploiting a victory. Any fleet which had to recross the Atlantic to reach its base would be exposed to further attacks for a week or more. The effectiveness of the pursuit would then be a matter of fuel capacity rather than of designed speed. If our light forces were designed to hit hard and keep on hitting, they could convert victory into the Nel- sonic ideal of annihilation. Consequently, not only the battle itself but also its thorough exploitation call for renewed emphasis in the designs of all types of warships on armament, protection, and supplies of ammunition, fuel, and torpedoes.
The Fleet must be regarded as a unit composed of interdependent types, each of which plays a vital part in the efficient functioning of the whole. The effectiveness of the battleships in the main action will probably depend upon the ability of the Fleet Air Force to keep our spotting planes in the air and enemy spotting planes out of the air. The battle line will also be severely handicapped if our light forces are unable to dominate the area over which it must pass. The vigor and duration of the pursuit will be decided by the condition of our destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers after the main action. The condition of the carriers will depend upon how well they have been defended by the anti-aircraft batteries of other vessels. This, in turn, will hinge partly upon the extent to which reductions in speed have permitted additional anti-aircraft guns and ammunition to be supplied to all components of the Fleet.
The interdependence of the various types of ships is of special moment, because of the unprecedented freedom to select objectives which an air force enjoys by virtue of its extreme mobility. The result is that if larger units of the Fleet are made practically invulnerable to air attack, the enemy planes will naturally transfer their attention to the more easily disabled vessels. The vulnerability and exposed position normally occupied by destroyers during approach and battle make them especially attractive targets. Although they mount a powerful anti-aircraft battery, available weight and space prevent them from carrying sufficient ammunition to keep their guns in action for the prolonged periods necessary under present conditions. This shortage of ammunition, lack of defensive strength, and exposed position make them especially vulnerable to air attack. Recent heavy losses in British flotillas point unmistakably to the need for changes. Unless destroyers are given a defense against aircraft which is proportional to their value, enough of them might be lost to hamstring the operations of the Fleet. This new element in tactics demands a reconsideration of formations for approach and battle, of designs for all classes of ships, and of the composition of the Fleet.
Realism is sometimes promoted by picturing the sort of battle line our fleet is likely to face in such a campaign. What kind of battleships would Germany, for example, be likely to build as a preliminary to a transatlantic war? Their existing vessels give us no hint, for they were designed as units of a raiding fleet, not a battle fleet. Probably the best clue is their 1917 battleship design which they decided upon after digesting their experience at Jutland. The only pertinent information dropped by Scheer in his High Seas Fleet was of a conversation in which he convinced the Emperor that new battleships should emphasize the traditional qualities of that type rather than attempt to achieve the speed of a bat- tie cruiser. According to Hector Bywater, whose sources of information were unusually good, they planned a division of “dreadnought destroyers.” These were to be of low freeboard, maximum armament, and massive armor; so as to outclass completely all existing capital ships. Shortly afterward, however, they decided upon unrestricted submarine warfare and dropped this ambitious design. Nevertheless, a probable revival of this rather staggering conception was indicated in their 1939 decision to double the 135-foot width of the Kiel Canal. They would hardly have undertaken such a large project while straining every nerve to rearm and while suffering from a labor shortage, unless that widening was a vital link in war plans. Hitler’s personal views on this subject, although written long before he achieved supreme power in Germany, are of interest. In Mein Kampf, p. 375, he wrote:
A navy which from the beginning cannot be brought to the same level with its prospective enemy, purely in terms of numbers, must try to replace the lack in numbers by the superior fighting power of the single ships . . . modern technique has now advanced to such an extent and has arrived at so great a uniformity in the various civilized States that it must be considered impossible to give the ships of one power a considerably greater fighting value than to the ships of the same tonnage of another State. But it is far less conceivable to attain superiority with smaller displacement as compared with a greater.
Suppose that a fleet containing a division of these “dreadnought destroyers” were to start across the Atlantic. To be specific, suppose that this spearhead was composed of units of 18-21 knots, armed with 18-inch guns, and plated with 20-inch armor. Or suppose that they mounted sixteen 16-inch guns and had an 18-inch main armor belt. Even in this latter and less threatening case, who would not prefer to face them in ships with equal or superior armament and protection, rather than in units which had sacrificed these qualities to attain high speed? In view of the growing co-operation between totalitarian powers, it is likely that Japan would follow Germany’s lead in design. In any case our Pacific Fleet would wage the same type of campaign and would require the same characteristics as our Atlantic Fleet.
This review of both offensive and defensive campaigns indicates that the new conditions influence design in three ways. First, they require moderate increases in the weight devoted to the main battery, to major caliber ammunition, to underwater protection, and to heavy armor. Next, they require a probable doubling in the weight of the anti-aircraft battery, an enormous increase in its ammunition supply, and a widespread employment of light armor. Finally and fortunately, they permit a sharp reduction in speed for these reasons: it is useless in amphibious warfare and for delaying action; it is no longer necessary for forcing a battle; it is of negligible value in a fleet engagement when we know in advance that protracted maneuvering for some minor tactical advantage will be out of the question; and it is highly unlikely to be of substantial value in exploiting a victory. Consequently, the extent to which we can attain superiority in the characteristics most essential to the fighting efficiency of our future battleships depends upon how far we dare to reduce their designed speed.
The answer hinges largely upon the units already built or now under construction. The reported 27 knots of the six North Carolinas fits them admirably to serve as fast wings for the existing 21-knot battle line. Three powerful units in the van and the same in the rear would provide adequate strength. This means that their 27 knots could still be used advantageously, even though future battleships were designed for 21 knots. The 33 knots of the four larger units just laid down would be ample for use at the extreme end of the line to deal with supercruisers. If we used one at each end, this would leave two for independent missions, reinforcements, and replacements. These ten fast battleships and a corresponding number of aircraft carriers would meet all requirements for a high speed striking force, so the Fleet would not lack in that respect if future battleships were much slower. In short, if we wish to do so, we can still return to a 21-knot battle line without wasting the speed of the faster units now building. The practical question then becomes one of whether future designs should be based on a battle line of 21 or 27 knots.
Three serious disadvantages of a decision for the faster battle line immediately loom up. First, the maximum fleet speed would remain at 21 knots until the last of the existing battleships is relegated to the second line. The dearly bought speed of a growing number of new battleships would thus be useless for many years after their completion. Second, the fleet speed permitted by the presence of mine sweepers and the fuel capacity of submarine destroyers would usually prevent the practical utilization of a higher fleet speed. The third disadvantage is the changes which would be required in other types by the definite adoption of a 27-knot battle line and a 33-knot fast wing. Cruiser speeds would have to go up to between 36 and 40 knots, while destroyers would need between 45 and 50 knots. Such speeds would require enormous quantities of fuel; and, of far greater importance, would smash all hope of readjusting their designs to meet the new conditions. Correspondingly higher speeds would also be necessary for aircraft carriers and submarine destroyers. A fast battle line would mean a fleet unable to face either the extra hazards of an offensive campaign or the superior numbers of a defensive campaign, a fleet which could run but not fight, and which could not even run after hostile bombers had gone to work on it.
The higher speeds cannot be regarded as a defense against bombers; for a long, fast ship with a large turning circle is not appreciably harder to hit than a short, slow vessel with a smaller tactical diameter. It is, moreover, fundamentally unsound to waste tonnage in a futile attempt to compete with the airplane in speed. The logical course is to exploit the one great weakness of all aircraft, vulnerability. To do this, the designs of all warships must emphasize qualities which are incompatible with extreme speed.
A clearer idea of what is involved in our main issue can be obtained by comparing a fast battleship with a slow one, while bearing in mind that the same considerations apply with even greater force to other classifications in which an exorbitant price is already being paid for extreme mobility. Suppose we take two 45,000-ton battleships, one of 27 knots, and the other of 21 knots. Although the saving in machinery weight and space, cost of building and upkeep, and number of men required in the engineer’s force are the advantages usually stressed for the slower ship, those are only the beginning of the gains resulting from a marked cut in speed.
Other advantages spring from the fact that a slower ship means a shorter, wider hull. First, the hull itself will weigh less than in a long, narrow ship of the same displacement and structural strength. That short, wide hull also requires fewer running feet of armor belt and underwater protection. The result is a saving both in weight and in the precious space below the armored decks. If added to the space saved by the smaller power plant, this means much more room for storing the greatly increased supplies of ammunition demanded by the new conditions. The previously mentioned savings in weight are augmented by the fact that the slower ship requires only one heavily armored uptake, while the faster ship must have two. Without these savings in weight and space, the necessary increases in armament, ammunition, and protection would involve fantastic growth in size and cost. This factor of cost must be weighed with care in view of the scale of rearmament everywhere.
Another advantage of the wider hull is improved stability. This permits the mounting of either bigger guns or more of them, and maximum exploitation of the two best gun positions the ship affords— those on the center line at each end of the ship. Improved stability is also desirable from the standpoint of damage control.
The shorter hull also means a smaller turning circle. The many occasions in the World War upon which collisions were narrowly averted, torpedoes were dodged, or hostile craft were rammed by a timely touch of the helm—all are eloquent testimonials to the value of maneuverability.
A further point is that the faster the ship, the higher must be the freeboard forward. The futility of increasing speed without providing additional freeboard was illustrated at the beginning of the Norwegian campaign when H.M.S. Renown was unable to buck a head sea at a speed sufficient to press her action against the slower Scharnhorst. The British battle cruiser had the speed to overtake, and the guns to sink, her German antagonist; but low freeboard and insufficient flare in the bows combined to render that dearly bought speed useless. More freeboard means more hull weight, taller and heavier barbettes, decreased stability, and increased size of target.
Speed, moreover, is the costliest characteristic of a warship. When H.M.S. Renown, for example, was re-armored, a 50 per cent improvement in protection was obtained by enlarging displacement only 20 per cent. The higher cost of increasing speed can be seen by comparing H.M.S. Revenge with H.M.S. Hood. Both these ships have approximately the same striking and resisting power. The 40 per cent superiority in speed of the Hood necessitated a 44 per cent addition to displacement. That is to say, the cost in tonnage of increasing speed by any given amount, say 40 per cent, is roughly 2\ times the cost in tonnage of increasing protection by 40 per cent. The relative cost of heavier armament would ordinarily be even less than that of stouter protection, for the latter usually takes up a greater percentage of the displacement.
There are also minor disadvantages of higher speed. First of these is that the greater length of the faster ship means a larger target. Furthermore, the larger power plant requires more openings in the armored decks. Each such opening constitutes a defensive weakness. Finally, the more speed is emphasized in the design, the greater the likelihood that this expensive characteristic will be lost in the crucial test of battle.
It all boils down to this. On the one hand, increasing speed means either disproportionate growth in size and cost or fatal sacrifices in the essential qualities of a fighting ship. On the other hand, reducing speed means transferring emphasis from an unreliable and speculative characteristic of slight and decreasing value to those substantial qualities which are not merely of greater importance but are absolutely vital to success under the new conditions of warfare.
Mahan expressed himself unequivocally upon the speed of fleets in general and battleships in particular as follows:
The great end of a war fleet, however, is not to chase, nor to fly, but to control the seas. . . . When speed, not force, is the reliance, destruction may be postponed, but can be escaped only by remaining in port. . . . Not speed, but power of offensive action, is the dominant factor in war. . . . Force does not exist for mobility, but mobility for force. It is of no use to get there first unless, when the enemy in turn arrives, you have also . . . the greater force. . . . The time has come to say plainly that its [speed’s] value is being exaggerated; that it is in the battleship secondary to gun power.—Lessons of the War with Spain, pp. 82-83.
He wrote that 40 years ago when battleships were capable of from 15 to 19 knots. What would he say today when current designs call for 27 to 35 knots? when the number and size of the guns as well as the quantity of ammunition they must carry is far greater? when the multiplicity and effectiveness of the weapons they must face demand much stouter protection? when the airplane and other new types offer incomparably faster and more economical means of observation and pursuit? and when the value of speed, strategic as well as tactical, is greatly diminished, if not demolished?
If it is agreed that future designs in all classes should be based upon a 21-knot battle line, this means a marked increase in beam for future battleships. It is not only this reduced speed but also the necessity for improved underwater protection and the need for additional magazine space which point to a beam of approximately 140 feet for future battleships of 45,000 tons.
There is, moreover, no assurance that displacements will not go far above that. It is instructive to note that even so farsighted and historically-minded an officer as Mahan wrote in 1898 that “ten thousand tons represent very nearly the minimum, and twelve thousand the maximum, of size for the battleship.” If anyone had then predicted that displacements would be more than trebled in less than 20 years, the only response would have been a hearty laugh. After all, what reason is there for Mahan’s generation, or this, or any other generation to assume that the pinnacle of size has been reached? It is natural to make that assumption, but it is not logical when we know that there is an arms race now under way which makes the one of 40 years ago seem leisurely and mild, and when we know that all navies have awakened to the importance of ship-for- ship superiority.
If we do not allow in all our plans for these probable increases, some future battle may leave our Commander in Chief lamenting, like Jellicoe after Jutland, over the folly of building ships to fit existing facilities, instead of altering facilities to accommodate the kind of ships needed. In view of the available facts, should not the new set of locks at Panama be redesigned to take ships with a beam of at least 180, and preferably 200, feet? If it is still practicable, should not the locks be lengthened and made even wider? Does not the same thing apply to dry docks under construction which are not too far advanced to permit alteration?
In conclusion, the building of a tough, hard-hitting fleet, able to meet squarely either the growing hazards of an offensive campaign or the superior numbers of a defensive campaign, would be no leap in the dark; on the contrary, it would mean adherence to our demonstratedly sound naval traditions. These, born in the days of wooden ships, were firmly established during and after the Civil War. The veterans of that 4-year struggle saw so much action that all artificiality and bias had been knocked out of their viewpoint by the disillusioning and repeated impact of hostile shells. They had fought ironclads, steam frigates, rams, submarines, forts, field artillery, infantry, cavalry, and even bushwhackers. The amazing variety and intensity of their active service gave them a broad, sound, practical grounding in their profession which fitted them to speak with unique authority on battle conditions and requirements. They did not have to theorize, they knew. The battleships designed while their influence still dominated the Navy Department are therefore of special interest.
The last of these was probably the old Alabama. In the following table, she is compared with coeval British and German units in order to illustrate the difference between the views of our veterans and their foreign contemporaries.
Name of ship | H.M.S. Canopus | U.S.S. Alabama | S.M.S. Kaiser |
Displacement | 11,500 | 13,000 | 11,000 |
Main battery | 4-12” | 4-13” | 4-9.4” |
Secondary battery | 12-6” | 14-6” | 18-6” |
Main belt | 9” | 16½” | 12” |
Turret armor | 10” | 17” | 10” |
Designed speed | 18 | 16 | 18 |
If ships of the three navies for almost any year are compared, similar differences will be noted. The British were willing to sacrifice armor for speed, guns, and numbers. The Germans accepted inferiority in armament to achieve superiority in protection. Our authorities, however, reduced speed and numbers to attain marked superiority in both striking and resisting power. The wisdom which comes after the event indicates that our veterans were right. Since those days, our relative needs for armament, ammunition, cruising radius, and defensive strength have greatly increased; while the value to us of speed has decreased. If this is so, should not our new designs be even less like those of other navies and more distinctively American than ever before? Are not traditions which have had their soundness demonstrated in the supreme ordeal of battle worth sticking to, regardless of momentary fads and fancies in other navies? Let them hang up all the new speed records they care to; our Navy is interested not so much in performance over the measured mile as in celerity in winning wars.