“Vinci Non Possum”
Few campaigns in the great parade of wars marching through history reveal in clearer form the basic elements of success, and the application of these elements, than the first naval campaign conducted in American waters—the naval battle of Tenochtitlan, fought in the valley of Mexico more than 8,000 feet above sea level.
The rich empire of the Aztecs was the stake won by the indomitable will of Hernando Cortes, the commander, with a pitifully small nucleus of Spaniards that never numbered more than 600, in the face of the bitter hostility of hundreds of thousands °f Indians owing allegiance to the empire and eager to destroy the white invader.
Leadership, proper estimate of the situation, utilization of domestic stresses, vigor in pushing assaults, ability to reorganize m what an ordinary leader would have considered crushing defeat, proper application of weapons and concentration of power, economic utilization of supplies and their replenishment from the land, and above all comprehensive understanding and execution of the principles of naval strategy—all these factors stand forth vividly in an analysis of the campaign. It is a campaign worthy of study by the warriors of today, for time has stripped away the controversial points so that the sturdy skeleton is revealed for examination, an examination that will result in a better appreciation of the multifold problems confronting a commander, and the ingredients to be compounded for victory.
Romance and adventure of the highest order are to be found in the tale of the campaign, which reached its peak in the construction of 13 small brigantines in the wooded fastness of the Tlascallan territory, the carrying of the ships in knocked- down form over 60 miles of mountain trails and their launching on the shores of Lake Tezcuco, which in 1521 surrounded Tenochtitlan, the present site of Mexico City, and made the Aztec capital an island.
It is interesting to note that in the building of his squadron in Tlascalla and taking the knocked-down vessels overland, Cortes set a precedent which the United States followed some 300 years later in the creation of the American squadron on Lake Erie in the War of 1812.
True, Cortes was an adventurer with an eye to his own personal fortunes, for he was determined to win a place for himself in the New World, but he was always loyal to his king and to Spain. True, he violated orders from the Governor-General of Cuba, but that merely created an additional strength in his will to win, for he had to win a great conquest or face certain execution at the hand of a rival who would have been delighted to have Cortes’ head on the block.
The will to victory, so important to all warriors, be they commanders or men in the ranks, forced Cortes to use every possible means to achieve success. It carried him through a series of battles in the first phase of the conquest, which resulted in winning a powerful ally in the Tlascallans, the hereditary enemies of the Aztecs. This alliance was to stand Cortes in good stead later when the remnant of his army was forced to flee from Tenochtitlan to escape the murderous wrath of the Aztec nobles during Noche Triste. It was the will to win that led Cortes to build the fleet, and to apply the sound principles of naval strategy in order to forge a glorious victory from the ashes of defeat in the disaster of Noche Triste, which could have resulted in utter annihilation of the Spaniards.
Hernando Cortes was a spirit in keeping with his times—a bold adventurer with unusual ability to command men and administer colonial affairs for the benefit of his sovereign. Like many others he came to the New World to seek his fortune, but he did not let his greed overcome his judgment in matters of more vital moment. As u result he achieved what would appear to be the impossible in wresting Mexico from the powerful grip of the Aztecs, a warlike nation ruling with fear rather than benevolence.
Cortes stands forth as one of the great commanders of the world. Shortly after landing in Mexico he was faced with revolt on the part of his small force, not more than 300 fighting men. By his management and treatment of them he not only quelled the mutiny but won the respect and confidence of the group. This small nucleus he led forth against the hundreds of thousands of hostile Indians and by a victory over the Tlascallans won them as allies against the Aztecs. He was a leader of men capable of turning certain defeat into victory. What is more, he did just that.
The might which Cortes challenged with his handful of men was that of the Aztecs, a tribe of Indians who had moved from the north into the Valley of Mexico in the latter part of the twelfth or the first part of the thirteenth century. In the 300 years before the arrival of the Spaniards the Aztecs had conquered the surrounding areas and imposed their rule on the area from the Rio Grande to the Guatemala on the south, except for Tlascalla, a large territory southeast of Tenochtitlan about halfway between the city and the sea. The hardy mountaineers of this region successfully resisted the Aztecs and formed a hostile island in the greater empire. With the extension of their empire the Aztecs built a civilization not less interesting than that of Greece in her prime.
The rule of the Aztecs was cruel and harsh, permitting no deviation from the will of the ruler. Levies of troops and supplies were frequent and heavy, and when Cortes landed he found a condition that could be turned to his advantage. The vassal tribes wanted freedom from Aztec rule, but having felt the weight of Aztec arms and wrath were not disposed to translate desire into action, nor to aid an invader whose puny force they were sure the Aztecs would simply engulf in spite of strange weapons that made big noises and spit fiery death.
In addition these tribes resented the coming of invaders from an unknown race. Although passive most of the time tribal resistance did reach peaks of open attack on the invaders, but the tribesmen were poorly equipped to battle men armed with mail and firearms and were not at first given aid by the Aztecs. The Spanish cavalry was a frightening sight, for it was the first time the Indians had seen a horse. The attacks made were inspired by some of the Aztec nobles, and served Cortes well, because they unified the Spanish force and gave the men confidence in the ability of their commander to lead them successfully against great hordes.
Throughout the Aztec scheme of government was woven a heavy and bloody thread of religion which included human sacrifice and torture as a fundamental rite. Montezuma, like all of the Aztec emperors, was high priest in addition to being trained in the arts of war. He, however, turned principally to the priesthood for counsel and advice, to the natural dislike of the arrogant and warlike nobles.
In the dim past of the Aztecs there had been a beneficent fair-haired god with a flowing beard called Quetzalcoatl, one of the few kindly gods in the Aztec theogeny, whose rule was known as the Golden Age of Anahuac, for he taught the art of cultivating the soil. In some godly quarrel Quetzalcoatl incurred the anger of the principal deities, who disliked such unwarlike teachings, was vanquished and forced to leave the country. Tradition had it that this fair-complexioned god departed eastward from the Valley of Mexico, and disappeared over the surface of the sea, prophesying his own return.
Within the ruling class in Tenochtitlan there was dissension, somewhat similar to that throughout the empire. The war lords had created a ruthless and heavy handed regime, which had no appreciable opposition, so they felt keenly the lack of wholehearted support from Montezuma. Certain of the priesthood, desirous of advancing their influence, opposed the war lords by advocating greater leniency. They warned against further drastic looting of the empire and predicted that Quetzalcoatl would return to punish the offenders. There was a widespread revival, in 1510, nine years before Cortes arrived, of the belief that the fair-haired god would soon return.
Cortes, after a brief but hectic residence in Cuba, was made commander of an expedition to find Juan de Grijalva, who had left Cuba a year before and had disappeared in the western sea. Cortes’ orders were merely to search for the missing expedition, and included no instructions to land and conquer. On the contrary, the orders and instructions of the Governor-General frowned definitely on any such action. Cortes had cause to distrust Don Diego Velasquez, Governor of Cuba, especially after the Governor ordered Cortes’ death and made futile attempts to prevent his sailing.
Late in February, 1519, Cortes disobeyed orders and set sail with his squadron of six ships, leaving port a few hours before soldiers arrived to seize him. A few days later a landfall was made off Cozumel Island and on March 4 the squadron anchored off Rio de Grijalva. This was an important point in the history of the expedition, for it was there that Cortes met the Aztec woman Malinal, who was later known as Dona Marina. Dona Marina not only became the paramour of the doughty commander, but also served as his chief interpreter, intelligence aide, and counselor in tribal customs and Indian methods of warfare. It was Dona Marina who told Cortes of the Quetzalcoatl myth and aided him in carrying off the impersonation.
Progress up the coast was enlivened by a series of hostile encounters, but the squadron arrived at Villa Rica de Vera Cruz April 21 and established its land base. The search for Grijalva was abandoned. From the time of landing until the inland march was started, August 16, the camp was a scene of several attacks and counter-sorties.
During this period the ugly head of mutiny reared itself in the Spanish ranks. Certain members of the company were dissatisfied with the success of the expedition from the standpoint of gold and treasure seized and proposed taking things in their own hands, or at least forcing Cortes to sanction more extensive looting. They preyed on the fears of the more timid, who saw little chance for their scant ranks to defeat the hordes of Indians around them. Cortes dealt with the leaders of the mutiny in a masterful manner, quelling the malcontents and forcing them to render strict obedience.
To prevent any possibility of desertion Cortes ordered the six vessels in his squadron burned, after stores, rigging, and fittings had been removed and stored ashore. The immediate effect was to increase dependence of his men on him and force them to support his plan of action. The ultimate effect of the scuttling was not foreseen, but it was to be the means of turning bitter defeat into brilliant victory.
While establishing his base, quelling the mutiny, and dealing with the tribes around Vera Cruz, Cortes became the beneficiary of the Quetzalcoatl myth, more particularly the prediction of the priests and belief of the people that the god would return to alleviate their hardships. Montezuma himself was a victim of the superstition and tendered a cordial welcome through a series of envoys sent to the Spanish camp. These peaceful, though inquisitive, overtures changed in character as political pressure in Tenochtitlan made itself felt on the emperor. The war lords were not inclined to believe in the divine origin of the Spanish leader or his retinue, and the cordiality of the envoys diminished.
At no time did Cortes place too much trust in the friendliness of the envoys. Acting upon the advice of Dona Marina he did nothing to dispel the Quetzalcoatl myth. He did his utmost to develop the belief and told some of the tribes he conquered in battle to disregard the levies from Tenochtitlan and to regard him as the proper representative of their new sovereign, His Majesty Charles V, the King of Spain. Although outraged by such instructions, the Quetzalcoatl myth stayed the hand of Montezuma, and the Spaniards were saved from the extinction that might have been theirs had the Aztecs struck when the land base was riven with revolt and weakened by fear of the great numbers of warlike natives surrounding it.
As Cortes marched inland, Montezuma still withheld action, in the belief that a fearful fate would befall him and the Aztec empire if the wrath of the god was stirred. The Aztec ruler saw tribe after tribe defeated in conflict. Even his most powerful enemies, the Tlascallans, bowed to the power of the invader. This conquest, which the Aztecs had been unable to achieve, strengthened Montezuma’s belief that Cortes was the reincarnation of the fair-haired god, and the emperor invited Cortes and his force to visit Tenochtitlan as his preferred and honored guests. The war lords objected, but dared not openly oppose Montezuma.
The Tlascallans were defeated only after a bitter battle, but in accordance with the policy he followed throughout the campaign, Cortes did not insist on vindictive retribution or the death of the leaders of the Tlascallan army. Instead he made an alliance with the Tlascallans as he had with the other tribes, and this alliance was to stand him in good stead, for while the vassals of the Aztecs repudiated their alliances when the Spaniards were chased from Tenochtitlan during Noche Triste, the Tlascallans stood by their agreement in the Spanish hour of peril. It was from the haven in the land of the Tlascallans that Cortes reorganized his force, built his fleet, and launched the naval campaign that broke the power of the Aztecs.
The leniency Cortes showed the conquered tribes gave added credence to the Quetzalcoatl myth, for benefactors were rare in Aztec politics or godships. Even the war lords were hard put to explain how any mortal warrior could be so kind to those he had defeated—there were no blood sacrifices in victory, no imposition of additional levies, none of the recognized prerogatives of a victor in their light.
Knowing that Montezuma had at first refused to permit an envoy of the Spaniards to visit Tenochtitlan, Cortes was not completely trustful of the new overture of friendship, but decided to accept. The Spanish force during the long campaign of fighting en route from the seacoast to the land of the Tlascallans had exhausted its supply of gunpowder. The resourcefulness of Cortes was demonstrated when he sent out foraging parties to examine the crater of Popocatepetl and a series of caves he had observed. From the crater sulphur was obtained and from the caves saltpeter. The forests of Tlascalla provided the materials for charcoal, and within a short time the powder deficiency had been corrected. When this was done the Spanish force, augmented by troops from the Tlascallans, started for Tenochtitlan.
The great capital of the Aztecs was an interesting city. It was built on an island of roughly oval shape in the western half of Lake Tezcuco and connected with the mainland by three causeways, built to expedite passage of Aztec warriors. The causeways were wide enough for eight horsemen to ride abreast.
The causeways extended through the city, forming the main streets and dividing the metropolis into four districts, vestiges of which can still be seen in the modem City of Mexico. Canals and lagoons pierced the island, making it possible for the native pirogues to bring their freight into the center of the markets. Openings in the filled portions of the causeway permitted the canoes to circumnavigate the island.
Great buildings were erected by the Aztecs to impress the common people and the vassal tribes with the might and glory of the emperor. There were palaces, barracks, and teocallis, on the top of which the blood sacrifices were made by the priesthood in full view of the populace.
To provide drinking water for the population, estimated at 300,000 persons, an aqueduct had been built across the lake from the hill of Chapultepec, now the site of the Presidential Palace.
None of the architectural masterpieces of the Aztecs survived the desolation visited upon Tenochtitlan by the Spaniards after their victory, but the visitor of today in Mexico can find the remains of the lake in the saline marshes around the new capital and trace the old district delineation created by the causeways. Cortes ordered the lake drained soon after his final occupation of the city.
Marching over the southern causeway, through the guard and control station at Xoloc, where the two land approaches met, Cortes led his troops into Tenochtitlan November 8, 1519, as guests of the emperor. Elaborate welcoming ceremonies were carried out and the march along the causeway had been enlivened by maneuvers of the native pirogues in the lake alongside. One of the palaces was turned over to Cortes as his headquarters and for his troops.
Acting on information received through Dona Marina, but against her advice, Cortes seized Montezuma shortly after arrival and made the emperor a hostage prisoner in his own castle. This was an error for it precipitated a reign of discontent among the people which broke into open revolt, quelled only when Montezuma made a direct appeal to his people and told them Cortes was treating him as a guest and was rendering the honors due his royal rank. The more serious aspect of the seizure was in freeing the nobles opposed to Montezuma’s policy toward the Spaniards from the restraint of the emperor’s immediate presence in the royal court. The seizure prepared fertile grounds for the propaganda spread by these nobles that the ruler no longer acted of his own volition in matters of state. Even the priests were alarmed at this strange return of hospitality and their influence in the royal court was appreciably lessened.
Four months after Cortes moved into Tenochtitlan a new danger arose from the rear the arrival of Panfilo de Narvaez, sent by Governor Velasquez to capture and return Cortes to Cuba as a prisoner. Cortes was informed of the arrival of Narvaez with 300 men, by a lieutenant left at Vera Cruz to maintain the base and guard the supplies stored there.
With the promptness of decision and action that characterized him, Cortes, with a small group of Spaniards and a large number of Tlascallans, moved at once against Narvaez and by surprise attack surrounded and captured the entire force. Cortes’ oratory and personality soon won Narvaez and his troops and they took their place in the Spanish ranks as loyal supporters. This increased the Spanish force to approximately 600 men. To insure against desertion Cortes burned the vessels in the Narvaez squadron, after removing the stores, rigging, and fittings as he had done in the case of his own ships.
While in Tenochtitlan Cortes pursued a course of conciliation toward the lesser nobles of the court, and more particularly toward the priests. The clergy in Cortes’ force were opposed to this attitude because they were fired with a zeal to proselyte and convert the heathens to Christianity, even if it meant slaying them.
Although a sturdy and valiant trooper, Pedro de Alvarado, Cortes’ second in command, who was left at the capital with the main body of troops, was not the diplomat and conciliator his chief was, and when Cortes returned to Tenochtitlan after defeating Narvaez he found the fires of revolt at white heat because Alvarado had succumbed to the pleas of his padres and had launched a campaign to belittle the Aztec religion and force the tenets of Christianity upon the Indians. He had sanctioned an attack on the principal teocallis, or Aztec temple.
In mid-June of 1520 the first openly hostile demonstration against the Spaniards broke out in the attack on a Spanish patrol. The fires of hatred burned fast and the Aztec warriors, egged on by the war lords and the thoroughly incensed priests, made a demonstration in front of the palace occupied by Cortes. Acting on his own suggestion, Montezuma mounted a parapet to implore his people to act peaceably, only to be greeted by a shower of stones. One struck him in the head and a few days later, on June 30, he died of a fractured skull—and undoubtedly a broken heart.
Death of their ruler and the reunion of the war lords and priests galvanized the Aztecs into action. On the day Montezuma died Dona Marina told Cortes of an Aztec plot to trap the Spaniards in the palace and kill them without mercy. Meanwhile several Spaniards were captured and sacrificed in the bloody rites of the priests on the high altar of a teocallis in plain sight of their comrades behind the palace walls.
The Aztecs decided not to attack the Spanish garrison until after funeral rites for Montezuma had been completed. On the night of July 1, Cortes started the retreat over the western causeway toward Tacuba and caught the Aztecs by surprise. Had the Spaniards not been able to benefit from the few minutes of Aztec inactivity in the surprise, Noche Triste, as the night of the retreat was known in Spanish colonial history, would have been a massacre.
Thoroughly aroused and convinced that Cortes was in no manner related to Quetzalcoatl, the Aztecs attacked the retreating Spaniards with terrific fury and harassed them the entire length of the causeway. Slaughter among the Indian allies of Cortes was particularly heavy and about half of the Spanish nucleus was wiped out.
The blood-maddened Aztec hordes attacked the rear guard, which made a glorious fight to protect the main body by a withdrawing action and by destroying the bridges in the causeway. The native pirogues swarmed along the causeway and poured murderous flights of arrows into the flanks of the retreating army. However, Cortes had planned the movement well and had indoctrinated his officers thoroughly, for the retreat was made in good order and did not become a rout, despite frightful losses.
Before entering Tenochtitlan Cortes, suspicious of Aztec intentions, ordered construction of two sailing vessels, designed to aid in a retreat if necessary. These were scuttled by the Aztecs the day Montezuma died, a fact which warned Cortes that the intelligence of the threatened massacre received by Dona Marina was well founded. These vessels were the first wind-driven ships seen by the residents of the valley.
On reaching the mainland Cortes directed the retreat northward and around the chain of lakes in the northern part of the Valley of Mexico through the pass of Otompan. Although continual skirmishes marked this phase of the retreat, the Aztecs, still in mourning for Montezuma, did not push home their attacks, and Cortes was able to reach the safety of Tlascalla, separated from the valley by a mountain range.
Although badly wounded in the fighting on the causeway, Cortes immediately started reorganization of his force and planned a counterattack. In Tlascalla Cortes was confronted with an anti-Cortes faction which desired the nation to accept the proffers of Aztec envoys, who reached the Tlascallan capital shortly after Cortes entered Tenochtitlan, to abandon the hereditary hostility between the two tribes and in order to make common cause against Cortes, at least until his army could be exterminated. The commander of the Tlascallan army defeated by Cortes led the anti-Cortes group and endeavored to have the council of elders abrogate the agreement with Cortes, contending that success of the white man would mean ultimate loss of power and subjugation of the Indians. The old warrior was unsuccessful and the Aztecs left with word that the Tlascallans would not abandon Cortes.
This was gratifying to Cortes, but it also convinced him that plans for his future campaigns would have to be made so well as to insure success or else his prestige and alliance with the Tlascallans would fail. He knew that the Indian respects nothing so much as prowess and success in war.
After the disastrous retreat Cortes found that, with the exception of the Tlascallans, all the tribes who had joined him while his star was in ascendancy had deserted and returned to allegiance with the Aztecs. The efforts to dislodge him from Tlascalla coupled with these defalcations warned Cortes to be fearful lest the Tlascallans also abandon him.
The Aztec war party gained complete control of the nation and set about to hunt Cortes down if he dared leave Tlascalla. Cuitlahuac succeeded his brother, Montezuma, for a short reign, ended by death through illness. Then Guatemozin, leader of the war lords and nephew of both Montezuma and Cuitlahuac, ascended the throne. Under his guidance Aztec morale was stiffened and the last trace of the Quetzalcoatl myth dispelled. Acting on information from within the Tlascallan nation, Guatemozin prepared to repel another attack on Tenochtitlan and concentrated levies of allied warriors from all parts of the empire in the capital.
Through Dona Marina, who remained faithful to her lover, Cortes learned of this. In making his estimate of the situation Cortes realized that he would have to defeat the tribesmen just outside of Tlascallan territory and gain control of the southeastern lake shores before any successful attack could be made on Tenochtitlan. He knew enough of the Aztec method of warfare to realize that if his force could attack outposts in this sector it would drive the Aztec force into a greater concentration within the capital.
The visit to Tenochtitlan, even though it ended in disaster, had taught Cortes much about the terrain and economy of the city. He knew the causeways were avenues of convenience and that the principal supplies of food and trade and the massing of troops which led to his retreat had been transported across the lake in the native pirogues. He further knew that all males in the Aztec empire were warriors and would rally to the defense of their emperor.
The plan he conceived was brilliant, almost paralyzing in the boldness of its conception. It was to force concentration of virtually all Aztecs in Tenochtitlan and then lay seige to the city by gaining control of the land end of the causeways and command of the lake surface.
Upon return to Tlascalla, Cortes’ nucleus of Spaniards was reinforced by 150 men sent by Governor Velasquez as reserves for Narvaez. The entire reserve abandoned its assigned mission at Vera Cruz and cast lot with Cortes. Needless to say, Cortes welcomed this addition with enthusiasm.
In Cortes’ expedition was one Martin Lopez, master shipwright from Spain. He had followed Cortes throughout the early campaigns, and had been one of those spared during Noche Triste, although his section was almost completely wiped out by the Aztecs.
Cortez ordered Lopez to the Tlascallan capital to take charge of building 13 brigantines, each about the size of a 35-foot motor sailer. The gear, rigging, fittings, and other equipment saved from the ships burned at Vera Cruz were transported into the mountains. Trees in the Tlascallan forest were cut into timbers. With three Spanish carpenters as assistants Lopez started training Tlascallans in some of the rudiments of shipbuilding, and succeeded in organizing them into a general construction crew. Actual building started in September, 1520.
As each vessel was completed it was given a hull trial on the waters of the Zahuapan, hauled back on shore, taken down and prepared in packs for transport to the shore of Lake Tezcuco. The parts were designated with marks which enabled reassembly without the danger of getting the parts or gear of one vessel mixed with that of another.
As soon as he had started Lopez on his task, Cortes opened his campaign against the surrounding tribes, waging a series of battles against the more prominent cities. The maneuver was part of the plan to push on toward a base on the lake shore, and the various assaults were so timed and scattered as to keep the Aztecs and their allies so busy they did not have time to recuperate, or concentrate at any one point away from Tenochtitlan.
Working parties in the meantime had been in the field for powder materials and the supply had been greatly augmented.
On December 24, 1520, Cortes started his main movement into the Valley of Mexico with a Spanish nucleus of 500 men, of which 40 were cavalry, and an allied force of Tlascallans, Cholulans, and Tepeacaens, the latter tribes having again been won away from the Aztecs, estimated at 150,000.
After a series of skirmishes and a pitched battle, Cortes captured Tezcuco on New Year’s Eve. This was made the base for the naval phase of the campaign, the phase which brought victory to Cortes and the Spanish colors. The city was located 1½ miles from the lake. Cortes immediately put a crew of 8,000 Indians at work digging a canal to the lake, erecting stocks for the brigantines, and constructing locks in the canal to accommodate the ships over the elevations between the city and the lake. Within two months the canal, 12 feet wide and 12 feet deep, was completed and all was in readiness for the squadron to be assembled.
Stationing a garrison at Tezcuco to protect the base, Cortes set off with the main body of troops on a swing around the southern chain of lakes, of which Lake Xocbicalco and Lake Chaleo were the principal units. Itztapalapan was sacked and the grain stores of the Aztecs seized as the capital prize. Chaleo, Quauhananuac, and Tacuba, under the brow of Chapultepec, were captured. Cortes’ estimate of the situation was correct, for this swift drive through the valley caused a withdrawal of Aztec forces into Tenochtitlan.
Early in the spring the shipbuilding was completed in Tlascalla and Cortes was notified that the ships were ready for transfer. Parts for the 13 brigantines were transported on the backs of allied Indians over 60 miles of rough mountain trail to Tezcuco. The transfer was made in 4 days, an outstanding achievement in itself.
Transferring headquarters to Tezcuco, Lopez started at once the task of assembling the units of the fleet on the stocks already built. Cortes left a strong garrison guard for the shipyard, for he knew the Aztecs realized the power of sailing vessels, as a result of demonstrations of the two built before Noche Triste. His surmise was correct for three attempts were made to destroy the vessels on the stocks.
With solemn ceremony, the 13 brigantines were launched in the canal April 28. Each ship was then taken down the canal for a sailing trial on the lake. One of the vessels was eliminated from the fleet because of poor sailing characteristics. The final trials over, each vessel was armed with one small cannon. Three hundred Spaniards were assigned to the fleet, with an experienced seaman in command of each ship.
Cortes staked his all when he launched the final phase of the campaign May 10. The fleet took to the lake, the army was divided into three parts, with each assigned the task of gaining command of one of the causeways into the city, and a raiding party was dispatched to destroy the aqueduct at its source on Chapultepec. Cortes took command of the army section assigned to seize the southern causeway, and established his headquarters at Xoloc.
Warned of the impending attack, the Aztecs decided to concentrate on destruction of the fleet and assembled approximately 1,500 pirogues to meet the 12 brigantines one at a time as they came out of the mouth of the canal. Here again the Aztecs failed, for instead of attacking each brigantine as she came out of the canal, the pirogues were kept at a safe distance by Spanish shore guns until all the ships were lined up in the lake and ready for action. The Aztec plan of overwhelming the fleet by smothering it in a mass boarding attack nevertheless almost succeeded, for as the battle started the wind suddenly died and left the brigantines becalmed, giving the native craft a tremendous advantage in mobility.
Fortunately for the Spaniards the wind sprang up just as the pirogues made their approach in a wide crescent and the first naval battle in American waters was under way. Bowling along in a fresh breeze, the brigantines penetrated the formation of pirogues and inflicted heavy damage by cannonade, use of small arms and ramming. Despite the greater weight of the brigantines and the power of firearms, the Aztecs fought a hard battle and retired only after half of the pirogues had been sunk, leaving the Spaniards in command of the lake.
The land attacks were successful and the Spanish armies gained control of the causeway terminals at Tepejacac, Tacuba, and Xoloc. The raiding party succeeded in wrecking the Chapultepec end of the aqueduct, so the city was forced to get water out of the brackish lake or from the few springs on the island.
Command of the lake was not unchallenged, for the Aztecs made many attacks against the brigantines, endeavoring to cut single ships out and destroy them in detail by mass envelopment with pirogues. Soon the Aztecs resorted to stratagem. Heavy timbers were cut, sharpened, and made into submerged palisades in the shallower parts of the lake. Canoes were to entice the brigantines into these traps where the brigantines would become unmanageable because of fouling the obstructions and could be overwhelmed by the pirogue mass attack and boarding. Two of the brigantines were led into the traps by what appeared to be merchandise carrying pirogues and were lost with all hands a few days after the first pitched battle. That loss warned the other commanders of the danger and undoubtedly prevented greater destruction of the Spanish fleet.
As the troops advanced along the causeways the brigantines operated on the flanks, keeping the war canoes, which had caused so much havoc in the melancholy retreat of the previous year, at a safe distance, and at the same time making attacks on the flanks of the opposing Aztec forces.
Effective as this work was, the principal contribution of the fleet was in the blockade of the city proper, which kept the Pirogues from transporting food, supplies, or troops. The blockade was not complete, or pirogues were able to steal through the cordon during the dark hours, but it did prevent the transportation of sufficient supplies to maintain the large army force m the capital city. Operation of the fleet au another effect, that of diminishing the supplies voluntarily sent by vassal cities, who were only too glad to escape the Aztec yoke and willing to do so when it appeared that Aztec power was definitely on the wane. Many cast aside all allegiance and joined the Spanish forces. Aztec wrath could no longer reach them.
Despite this great pressure, the Aztecs held out until August 15, when the blockade and the attacks of Cortes’ land forces combined with weakness created by famine and pestilence brought about by over-crowding in the city and failure of the water supply caused collapse of the defense.
Guatemozin tried to escape in a pirogue, to reorganize his allies on the mainland, but was captured by a brigantine and returned to face Cortes. The formal surrender then took place and the power of the Aztec was replaced by that of Spain.
In the final analysis it was the greatness of Cortes as commander that brought victory to the Spaniards and gave the King of Spain the rich empire of Mexico. It was because of his greatness that his handful of fighting men were able to evade the terrific pressure of numbers thrown against him by the Aztecs and the Tlascallans. True the Spaniards were armed with firearms, while the Indians were not, but the mass attack plan of battle used by the Indians would have worn down the spirit of a lesser commander and resulted in defeat through sheer weight of numbers.
Cortes’ greatness is founded on his comprehension of principles of war and his ability to use them to full advantage. He had the ability to make a thorough estimate of the situation confronting him, reach a decision, formulate a detailed plan, and push that plan through to completion, despite what appeared to be unsurmountable obstacles. Of such stuff is a great leader made.