German sea and air forces already have taken a notable toll of British naval power in the Atlantic. They have interfered seriously with innocent shipping bound between neutral countries. Hostilities have occurred in and off American waters. Small neutral states with which the United States has had friendly and profitable relations, which have engaged in no threatening or aggressive actions, which have been the seat of democratic government and stability in Europe, one by one have been attacked and overrun. One of these, Denmark, owns Greenland, which abuts on the American Hemisphere. The establishment of Nazi power in Denmark may well result in a forced cession of part or the whole of Greenland. Should Britain as well as France be defeated by Germany, cessions of territories will assuredly be part of the price of peace. Such territories may well include possessions in or near the American Hemisphere.
In the Pacific region Japanese armed forces have invaded and occupied large areas of a nation with which this country has historic ties of amity and good will. They have repeatedly violated the rights of the United States and of other nations. They have placed themselves athwart all lanes of maritime communication with China. Ultimate seizure of British, French, and Netherlands’ possessions in the far Pacific is known to have been contemplated in high quarters. Any such action would result in the encirclement of the Philippine Islands.
With such facts and possibilities in mind, it may be useful to review the policies and commitments of the United States. Under the Monroe Doctrine, with its interpretations and amendments, which is still a vital part of national policy, the United States has proclaimed its determination that (1) no portion of the American continents and insular areas shall be further colonized by non-American powers; (2) no European (or Asiatic) political system shall be imposed therein; (3) the independence of any American country shall not be overthrown by any non-American state; (4) no part of the American Hemisphere shall be alienated by cession or by forceful means to any non-American country. By the more recent Declarations of Buenos Aires and of Lima, the United States has affirmed with the other American Republics a “continental solidarity,” embracing “decision” to maintain and to defend the solidarity, the sovereignty, the peace, security, and territorial integrity of any American Republic “threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them.” The United States is bound by treaty to defend the independence of Panama and Haiti. By implication of treaties, it is at least morally bound to defend Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. In his speech at Kingston, Ontario, August 18, 1938, President Roosevelt told the Canadians, “I give you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire.” By the Declaration of Panama, October 3, 1939, the Under Secretary of State agreed with the Foreign Ministers of other American Republics that the American Republics “are as of inherent right entitled to have those waters adjacent to the American continent,” and delimited as far as 300 miles seaward, “free from the commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation.” In short, the United States has assumed an undertaking to protect against alienation the entire American Hemisphere, extending from Baffin Island to Tierra del Fuego. At the present time an expedition is in the Antarctic, with Congressional support, to claim territory there for the United States.
Commitments involving the Pacific region likewise are extensive. For six years to come the country is obligated to protect the integrity of the Philippine Islands, which are 6,858 miles from the continental United States and 4,767 miles from the naval base at the Hawaiian Islands. Undefended Guam, Midway, and Wake lie between. Possessions in the Samoan Islands are 2,260 miles from Hawaii; while the Aleutian Islands lie 2,046 miles from Hawaii and 1,707 miles from Puget Sound. By the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, the United States is involved in any situation affecting the sovereignty, independence, or territorial and administrative integrity of China. By the Four Power Treaty of the same year, the United States is bound to consult with Britain, France, and Japan in any “controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving” the rights of the said powers “in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions” in the Pacific, as well as to “communicate” with them “in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately,” in case “rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power.” Although not pledged to defend Australia and New Zealand, or the Netherlands Indies, this country could hardly view with equanimity foreign aggression against those lands. American protective influence, then, must be exercised in the Pacific from the Bering Sea to Cape Horn, possibly to the Antarctic, and from Panama to the China Sea.
In addition to these undertakings, mention must of course be made of the responsibility resting upon the government under all circumstances of assuring the protection of the lives and property of American citizens wherever located. Although such protection normally may be procurable through the use of diplomacy, account must be taken of the fact that in certain regions for a considerable time to come naval units will in all probability be needed for the adequate and instant protection of American life and property.
The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy customarily states:
Operations of our naval forces . . . have been conducted in accordance with the United States naval policy to maintain the Navy in sufficient strength to support the national policies and commerce and to guard the continental and overseas possessions of the United States.
Rear Admiral Clark H. Woodward, in a recent article in The American Journal of International Law, says:
The Navy’s primary mission is to defend the nation in war and to prevent invasion. In times of peace its main purpose is the potential service it renders as the silent supporter of our national policies and our maritime commerce.
The geographical and strategical considerations involved in the fulfillment of existing national policies and commitments impose a considerable task upon the American Navy. It is hazardous to venture long-run deductions from present-day facts. However, the seriousness of the situations which now confront the United States, and which give evidence of developing even more in the future, warrant the giving of thoughtful consideration to the naval policy and naval establishment of this country.
The policy of the Navy Department for some years has been to organize the Navy for operations in either or both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Until 1938 the naval situations in the Atlantic and the Pacific were such that a policy of this nature was entirely satisfactory. The developments in the far Pacific during the past three years, nevertheless, have indicated the wisdom of moving a portion of the American Fleet westward in the Pacific, and the impossibility of detaching any major part of the Fleet for Atlantic duty. American policies in the Pacific, the vast distances which must be encompassed in fulfilling them, Japanese policies, and the Japanese naval establishment point to the fact that there is no margin of naval superiority possessed by the United States which will justify it in transferring from the Pacific to the Atlantic any large number of units for an Atlantic Squadron.2
From 1920 to 1938 no real cause for uneasiness regarding American rights and interests in the Atlantic area was present. The British and French Governments indicated from the time of the Washington Conference that their naval planning did not involve competition with the United States; that they had no designs upon territory under its protective watch; that war should not be allowed to become the means of settlement of differences with the United States. Until 1933 the German Government pursued a policy of peace, and was in no position to threaten others. The Italian Government, although possessed of a more potent military force, was preoccupied with interests and activities in Europe and the Mediterranean region.
1938 saw the situation materially altered. The Nazi Government in Germany had galvanized the German nation into a powerful military machine backed by national policies of aggression and conquest. Likewise, the Italian state had been placed upon a military footing and launched upon a forward campaign abroad. Statements of responsible officials served to indicate that both nations had ulterior designs upon overseas territories. Evidence was brought forward of interference in the internal affairs of American Republics and of movements organized to set up alien control within some of those states. Ambitions were asserted so to weaken British and French power as to acquire thereby territories at present in their possession.
How important have German and Italian sea power become? As of July 1, 1939, their fleets were rated as shown on page 1300.
These figures are of ships built. They include old, overage, and outmoded vessels still retained in service, of which the United States has a considerable number, especially in the battleship and destroyer classes. Data on Japan may be incomplete as Japan releases no information on her armed forces.
Class Germany Italy
Battleships | 7 plus | 4 building | 4 plus | 4 building | |||
Aircraft carriers | 0 |
| 2 |
| 1 |
|
|
Heavy cruisers | 2 |
| 3 |
| 7 |
|
|
Light cruisers | 6 |
| 4 |
| 14 |
| 14 |
Destroyers | 44 |
| 10 |
| 130 |
| 12 |
Submarines | 50 |
| 21 |
| 105 |
| 28 |
To the fleets of these powers must be added (in a manner and with conclusions differing from such as might be drawn with respect to Japan) the air arm. Exact figures are lacking for the German air force. However, it has been generally accepted that at the time of the Munich Agreement in 1938, Germany possessed an air force of unequalled strength in Europe, capable of influencing the most vital diplomatic discussions. At the same time Italy was reported to have 1,861 units on active service. The proximity of the European nations to one another, the demonstrated effectiveness of aircraft in disrupting and destroying transportation and communication facilities on land, and the efficiency of German aviation have made of the German air arm a most important adjunct to German sea power. German air and sea power combined possibly may be able to inflict serious destruction of British sea power. Should this be done, American rights and interests in the Atlantic area might well become the object of critical concern to all serious-minded citizens, even though Germany’s initially much inferior naval strength would be bound to emerge much weaker from such a struggle.
The people of the United States have never believed in the construction and maintenance of an armed force in excess of the minimum required for national defense and security. They are convinced that the aggressive actions and designs of Germany, Japan, Russia, and Italy are morally and legally wrong. While they are convinced that such aggression must be resisted and ended, they are equally inclined to the view that the economic and political welfare of all countries, including those which now are aggressors, would be advanced by a complete renunciation of conquest of foreign peoples, by limitation of armaments, and by resort to a system of international co-operation and freer trade. Because of their belief in the soundness of such propositions, the people of the United States will continue to promote their adoption by others. Nevertheless, at the same time, so long as the countries of North and South America are menaced by the policies, armaments, and actions of overseas nations, they will insist upon an armed force adequate to keep aggression from these shores.
If American interests in the Atlantic area must be guarded by armed force, they cannot be adequately protected by a fleet stationed in mid-Pacific and concentrating its energies upon situations prevailing there. Direct attack upon the continental United States is not likely. It is conceivable against Canadian territory and the foreign possessions in the Caribbean. It is possible against the weakly defended countries of Latin America. A fleet in the Pacific may be able to dash to the Panama Canal in time and with sufficient force to repel direct attack thereupon. It might not, however, be able to reach Newfoundland or southern Brazil in time to prevent a potential enemy from across the Atlantic attacking and entrenching itself upon such territories.
Canada has proclaimed herself at war. As a belligerent her territory and shipping are legitimately open to attack by enemy armed forces. At the moment it is hardly probable that her enemy would risk the forces required for any major operation against Canadian territory. Germany has now occupied Denmark. Forced cession of title to Greenland may well be demanded by Germany—a demand Denmark would now be in no position to refuse. It is possible that aerial or naval raids may be launched upon certain eastern focal points of Canada from Greenland in order to harry or delay shipments of war supplies or troops to Europe. The experience of those who have reconnoitered Greenland has been that while flight to and from that territory is attended by considerable hazard, due to fog and ice, it is not impossible. Raids emanating from Greenland might be directed at the Straits of Belle Isle, the transatlantic air base at Botwood, Newfoundland, at Halifax, Nova Scotia, or St. John, New Brunswick.
Would the United States be obligated to take military action in the event of such raids? Americans certainly would not be disinterested spectators in any raids upon the Maritime Provinces. However, it seems plausible to assume that the United States is not obligated by the President’s Kingston speech to repel such raids when Canada is a belligerent and the United States is neutral. The President spoke of action in case “domination of Canadian soil is threatened.” The story would be a different one should a menacing German armed force be assembled in southwestern Greenland, an expedition landed on Canadian soil, or hostile air and naval bases be established by force there.
The steady expansion of German power and boldness, the lightning character of her military moves, warn foreign nations that they must not overlook contingencies which may be developed. If the British Fleet should be very considerably destroyed, hostile armed forces might be landed at many obscure, sparsely populated, undefended coastal hamlets and inlets on the coasts of Newfoundland, Labrador, and Quebec. Such action would challenge the Kingston pledge and threaten the northeastern United States as well as Canada. Should such a situation emerge, can there be doubt as to what the interests of this country would demand?
An Atlantic Squadron was established in 1939. At the present time this is composed of 3 old battleships of the 1912-14 class, 1 aircraft carrier, 5 cruisers, and several flotillas of destroyers, many of which are recommissioned World War vessels. Such a body of naval power is hardly adequate insurance against possibilities of which there are forewarnings.
Effective striking power is dependent upon the proximity of supporting and operating bases. There are seven navy yards capable of furnishing equipment and repairs to some or all parts of a fleet on the Atlantic coast of the United States. These are sufficient for the defense of our own shores, but what about the situation if the country should be called upon to implement the Kingston pledge with military action? Assuming that the “domination” be directed at the points mentioned above, what are the distances confronting naval vessels moving from Boston? The Straits of Belle Isle are 1,300 miles away via Cape Race, and 1,100 miles via the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Botwood is 1,200 miles steaming. St. Johns, Newfoundland, and Halifax, Nova Scotia, are 900 and 390 miles, respectively. These are not excessive distances over which to operate. Should enemy occupation be effected on the coast of Labrador, with a supporting base in Greenland, the strategic situation would be altered. The only naval base on the Canadian coast is at Halifax. It is small and incomplete. For maximum efficiency, a naval base should be available in Nova Scotia or Newfoundland capable of giving complete service to the largest British and American vessels, and supplemented by air fields and defense installations in New England, the Maritime Provinces, Newfoundland, and Quebec.
The problems posed in the defense of territory in Laitn America are of considerable magnitude. Foreign attempts directed at the Lesser Antilles, the Guianas, portions of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina are thinkable. Any force bold enough to commence an aggression against the eastern coast of one of the Central American countries would have to pass into waters closable by the United States, and would have to battle American vessels able to operate from a half dozen points simultaneously. It would also be confronted with an air force which might be flown concurrently from several different bases in vast numbers.
The Bahamas, the Greater and Lesser Antilles, and Venezuela are vital to the United States. Here lie the keys to the security of the Panama Canal and the Central American states. From here come indispensable petroleum, tropical foods, and raw materials required by American industry and consumers. While defense of the northern Antilles and the Canal Zone may be adequately provided for, comparable defenses and facilities do not exist among the islands lying between the Virgin Islands and Venezuela. These lands, especially rich in raw materials, are so incompletely defended at the time being they may be regarded as an Achilles heel of the Caribbean. Their continuance in friendly hands is imperative. The United States cannot, without grave danger to itself, permit any overseas power not now owning territory north of 10 degrees North Latitude and west of 50 degrees West Longitude to acquire by forceful or pacific means, in war or by treaty, any territory in this area.
Present developments at Puerto Rico will provide a base for an air force able to range the adjacent seas and prevent an unfriendly force from reaching the Antilles without warning or counterattack. Additionally, would it not be desirable for the United States to have permanently at hand for the more adequate protection of this important area several capital ships and cruisers of latest construction, plus a proper complement of smaller vessels able to operate in the shallow waters surrounding the islands to menace an attacking force with a torpedo and mine barrage?
The enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and the Inter-American agreements and declarations with respect to South American countries present formidable problems. Distance is a factor of prime consideration. From the naval base at the Canal Zone to the mouth of the Amazon River it is 2,280 miles. From the same base to Natal in Brazil the distance is 3,100 miles (3,523 from New York), as contrasted with 1,795 miles for a hostile force setting out for that same point from Rio de Oro on the west coast of Africa. Should the hostile fleet operate from Bissau, Portuguese Guinea, or from Freetown, Sierra Leone, following a defeat of British naval power in the Atlantic, the distances from the established naval bases at those ports to Natal would be only 1,570 and 1,600 miles, respectively. In either of these events, an American fleet proceeding from the Canal Zone, or from any more remote operating base, would be at an initial time-space disadvantage. This would increase the farther south the fleet had to go to repel or to dislodge a European aggressor.
No fleet can operate efficiently for any length of time more than 2,000 miles from a base. While American vessels might be fueled and provisioned at a number of ports between the Canal Zone or Puerto Rico and Recife, Brazil, the fact remains that at the moment there is no naval base belonging to any power in the intervening space capable of furnishing the fleet with all of its other needs. There is no dry dock capable of taking a capital ship. Neither is there any dockyard with crane equipment or armament supplies competent to handle a major job upon a battleship. Hence, any American fleet having to make contact with an enemy off Natal or farther to the south would be going into action in a less efficient condition than enemy vessels based on the west coast of Africa. This handicap would be overcome only if the action took place below Rio de Janeiro, and if the American vessels were accorded full use of the docks and yards at that port.
This situation raises a serious question. If the United States, acting in co-operation with the other American Republics, or by itself, is expected to prevent overseas aggression against the territories of South America, ought it not to be enabled to meet a foreign force at least upon a basis of strategic equality? If this be so, should not land, or the use of land, be made available to it by cession, long-term lease, or other device, for the construction of suitable naval and air bases in at least two places between the Virgin Islands, or the Canal Zone, and Natal, Brazil? Given such bases at say Trinidad, and at some point this side of Natal, in addition to the use of the present small naval base of the French at Martinique, the United States forces, if of adequate size, might operate effectively enough to assure the safety and integrity of all regions likely to be seriously menaced by unfriendly armed forces.
What forces ought to be available for this protective mission? Judging from what is known about the armed forces of powers which may have ulterior designs on Latin American territory, the United States should have available for use south of the Antilles several superspeed, extreme armament capital ships. To these should be added high-speed, large-gunned cruisers, and the corresponding numbers of subsidiary and supporting vessels all of maximum speed and cruising range. Speed and cruising radius must compensate for distance; striking power must ensure destruction of an enemy force.
The Central and South American territories, rich in raw materials, profitable as markets for European manufactured goods and relatively sparsely populated, offer temptation to European aggressors. More than 100 years ago American statesmen wisely discerned that the security of the American Hemisphere was unitary, that an overseas attack upon one section threatened all territories, that overthrowing the political institutions of any one American country jeopardized those of all the others. If this was true 100 years ago when the frigate and horse offered the fastest modes of transportation, and when propaganda was transmissible only by mail, by gazettes with small circulation, and by word of mouth, how much more so is it true today with motorized transport on land, sea, and in the air, and with the modern newspaper and radio. The lodgement of a hostile, aggressive, and totalitarian force anywhere in the American Hemisphere would threaten all countries. Consider what might be done by a power entrenched at some point in South America. It might establish powerful broadcasting stations, distribute gratis and wholesale to the natives radio receiving sets adjusted for such stations only. It might then reach masses of ignorant, compliant natives, stirring up revolt in many quarters. More importantly, however, the bombing craft of such a power might range over large sections of the Southern Hemisphere, forcing subservience at the point of destruction. Bombing planes having a cruising radius of 750 miles, based on Porto Alegro in Brazil, could easily command Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Asuncion, and Rio. Planes with a cruising radius of 1,500 miles when loaded, and based on the same place, would command practically all of Argentina and Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, and half of Brazil. Planes based on Natal and having the larger cruising radius would be capable of bombing all save the extreme western part of Brazil, parts of Bolivia and Paraguay, together with the Guianas to the north. Similar planes based on Bolivian soil would be able to bomb all of the capitals of the South American countries.
The conceivable may not happen. It is to be hoped that it will not. Nevertheless, the success with which European aircraft have flown to and from South America, the extent to which European capital has been invested in and developed aerial transportation facilities in several of the South American countries, and the report of political and military, or semimilitary, activities in various places, all warrant observation and concern. Flight across many of the areas of the southern continent involves conditions not ordinarily met with elsewhere. Knowledge of these conditions and extensive data upon them are necessary adjuncts to the effective discharge of any call which might be made upon the air force of the United States. The enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and the Inter-American Agreements by the use of naval power may be accomplished without entering the jurisdiction of the Latin American states. The enforcement of the undertakings through the use of air power, on the other hand, must reckon with operations within the air space subject to the jurisdiction of the several states. Because of the nature of the laws of many of the countries, the United States must depend upon close co-operation by the authorities of these countries. It is to be hoped that the Lima Declaration will find ready implementation both in practical details and prior to the appearance of any incident likely to threaten the solidarity, the sovereignty, the peace, the security, and territorial integrity of any American Republic.
British sea power commands the seas today. It affords a first line of defense for the American Hemisphere. The possibility that this power might be so weakened or destroyed as to be no longer such a defense must not be totally ignored. The time to organize a defense as costly and as slow of completion as a modern naval, air, and coastal force is before and not after the British power becomes jeopardized; before and not after an aggression (such as that of Denmark and Norway) has been committed in the Americas. The fact cannot be overlooked that the situation in Europe, and the development of the modern means of warfare have created a threat to the Atlantic front of the American Hemisphere not existent in comparable manner heretofore. Do not the national policies, the international commitments, and the basic interests of the United States call for the presence of a powerful fleet in being in the Atlantic Ocean? Should not this be supplemented by a proportionate air force, together with arrangements for, as well as for the use of, additional naval and air bases?
The United States has no aggressive designs or ambitions upon any country or territory in the American Hemisphere. The American Republics and the powers holding territory in this Hemisphere need have no apprehensions over any increase in the size of the armed forces of this country. The United States has no desire to go to war with any nation. However, it cannot tolerate foreign aggression against lands lying in this part of the world, or armed intervention aimed at a permanent alienation of any territory in the Americas. The United States has no desire to monopolize for itself the riches and the products of the American countries. It has no thought of forcing any American nation to trade with it to the exclusion or detriment of any foreign state. Every American Republic has a full and equal right to trade with whomsoever it will. The raw materials and products of these Republics, as well as their markets, are as open to Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia as they are to the United States. The Americas are a part of a world economy. The exigencies of this economy and of the modern technology require that the riches and wealth of this part of the world be shared with all other parts. Only as the wealth of nations, to use a phrase once classic, is used to promote the welfare of all nations will world peace be promoted and assured. The United States believes that the trade barriers between nations should be lowered and leveled, save where legitimate trade is used to advance unlawful and wrongful aggression. There it draws a line.
In common with the other American Republics, the United States would prefer to follow the profitable pursuits of peace, respecting the rights and interests of others, as it expects them to do in return. It would prefer to arrange international relations on the basis of reason and mutual agreement, rather than upon the basis of suspicion, competitive armament, wars of nerves, or armed conflict. But, like its neighboring Republics, it believes that treaties are to be made in good faith and to be observed. When others are prepared to act on such propositions, the American Republics are not likely to be wayward in making agreements for the fuller opening of their markets and supplies of raw materials, and for the limitation and reduction of armaments. Nevertheless, the American Republics stand resolved that no portion of this Hemisphere shall become another Manchuria, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Denmark, or Norway for the aggressor nations. The best assurance now that no territory in this part of the world will become the object of another Munich, another March 15, or another Blitzkrieg, is the presence in this region of a naval, land, and air power so large and well prepared that even political and military extremists overseas will see the futility of planning any aggression or intervention here.
The United States has acquired much wealth and power as a result of its trade and relations with the American countries. It cannot ignore the responsibility of providing in some adequate measure for their, as well as its own, security and future integrity. This must be the province of an Atlantic Naval Policy for the United States.
When all is said and done, a naval policy of one power, even when designed to protect others, is but a solitary, insufficient thing. It is like an imperfect vaccine applied to an individual in the presence of an on-sweeping plague. It may or may not protect the inoculated; it is no prophylaxis for others. Collective immunization, compulsory quarantining of infected persons, and the relentless prosecution of public health measures designed to clear up the sources and conditions which breed disease have long been established as the only proper scientific procedure for coping with disease. Is there any reason to believe that such measures are any less valid for dealing with aggression, conquest, and war, the international pestilences of mankind? The defense of the United States, the aversion of attack upon the Americas—both are part of a problem confronting all peace- loving nations. The statesmen of the American Republics have been proceeding along sound lines in seeking to remove the causes of friction and difficulty within this region, and in uniting forces for common and solidary action. But this will not suffice. Aggression must be caught at its source, quarantined by the will of all before its ever increasing force sweeps beyond the confines of continents. The nations of Europe can no more stamp out alone the virulent and high-mortality type of aggression now loose in the world than can village doctors who never concert their energies to stop an epidemic sweeping a nation. The security of the America’s is bound up with the security of all peoples intent on pursuing the ways of peaceful trade, negotiation, and life. There will be no assurance for the United States, for Canada, or for the nations to the south until all are united in a regenerated international organization and government, embracing all states, endowed with power to ferret out and resolve the detailed problems which fester in the relations of nations, endowed with power to act immediately and forcefully against aggression wherever and by whatever title it may appear.