Introduction.—While proceeding northward to Charleston Navy Yard for overhaul, the U.S.S. Omaha grounded off Castle Island, Bahama Islands, British West Indies, about 0336 on Monday, July 19, 1937. During the approach she was on course 004°, speed 15 knots. Just before grounding, this course was changed slightly to the left. After the ship stranded, Castle Island lighthouse bore 065° from the bridge, at a distance of about 600 yards, with the ship heading 354°.
Castle Island.—Located off the southwestern tip of Acklin Island in the vicinity of Crooked Island Passage, Castle Island light is 389 miles from Miami and 142 miles from Guantanamo. Basically a coral formation, the island is quite low, covered with sand, scrub vegetation, and a few trees. The approach to the island is guarded by a single lighthouse, 123 feet in height. Off the southwestern end, adjacent to the lighthouse, is a very dangerous submerged ledge composed of white and pink coral with a light covering of coarse white sand, interrupted here and there by growths of seaweed. The shallow part of this ledge, 5 fathoms or less, extends offshore about 600 yards around the end of the island. Beyond the 5-fathom curve, the contour of the ledge drops off rapidly into deep water, the 100-fathom curve being only a few hundred yards away from the shallower curve. In calm weather, during daylight, this ledge is discernible by the appearance of its light green, shoal water, especially noticeable in the tropical sunlight which makes the white coral sand very pronounced. In rough weather, the seas build up and break over this coral mass with great force.
Examination of the submerged ledge shows an extremely regular surface—almost entirely free of projections and jagged coral growth. The white coral sand covering is but a few inches in depth. Although termed sand, it has the appearance of a clean mass of finely broken, white chinaware, irregular in size and shape, jagged, sharp, and slippery. Possessed of these qualities, it has no binding power such as would tend to create a suction between a ship’s bottom and the ledge. Beneath this sand, the coral crust is almost as solid as lava or rock. Samples brought up by divers had nearly the weight of an equal volume of hard stone and yet possessed the usual delicate coral porosity. This last feature proved to be a valuable asset in salvaging the ship, for it was found that these samples were capable of being crushed under pressure. It was reasonable to believe that, if the vessel, as grounded on this coral formation, could be slightly moved by rolling, the seemingly impenetrable coral reef might slowly crush under the great pressure exerted by the dead weight of the ship. As will be seen later, this proved to be the case, the ship gaining buoyancy as she dug in.
The greater part of the island formation for miles around Castle Island is of coral origin, dangerous and shallow, and therefore anchorages for vessels of large tonnage are few and perilous. This hazard is amplified by the scarcity of navigational marks and the poor holding ground presented by the hard coral. As a result, it was necessary for the Salinas, one of the rescue vessels, to keep under way during the whole operation.
The Bahama Islands are directly in the West Indian hurricane area. The Pilot Charts show that there are hurricanes during the last 6 months of the year, reaching a maximum during September and October. The Omaha was aground during the latter part of July. The serious danger of a possible storm, which might have rendered salvage operations impossible or ultimately destroyed the ship, was the cause of great concern and anxiety. Luckily, the weather during the whole operation was moderate and clear. The temperature averaged about 85° during the day, in the blazing tropical sun.
To the southward of the island there is a westerly current set of 1 to 2 knots. The prevailing winds during the period of the grounding were generally easterly. This unidirectional combination of wind and current was the source of great annoyance to the assisting vessels during the rescue work.
Salvage fleet.—As soon as the accident occurred the Navy Department was notified by radio and assistance from several sources immediately sought. Fortunately, a varied and unusual assortment of vessels answered the Omaha's request for aid. A review of these facilities will clarify the part taken by each one in the rescue work.
The following craft assisted at some time or other:
Navy.—Salinas, Patriot, Lapwing, Mallard, Texas, Porter, Mahan, Decatur, Leary, Dickerson, Tillman, two 500-ton lighters, 2 navy flying boats (Model PBY-1).
Coast Guard.—Mojave, Tampa, Unalga, Pandora, Marion.
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp.—Killerig, Warbler.
The Salinas (fleet tanker) happened to be at the Naval Station, Guantanamo, when the emergency arose. She arrived on the scene Tuesday, July 20, and remained in the vicinity of Castle Island over a week, receiving oil, stores, equipment, ammunition—practically everything the Omaha had to offer in lightening ship. All material, including fuel oil, was sent to the Salinas via the two 500-ton steel open lighters obtained from Guantanamo, the tug work being accomplished by the Patriot. When the Salinas first reached Castle Island, she was comparatively light. Because of her lightness, low power, and expansive sail area with consequent inability to handle readily, it was decided not to use her as a pulling vessel. Preference was given to more suitable craft soon to be made available. In addition, the use of the Salinas as a towing vessel would have seriously disrupted her primary service as a storeship, since it was necessary to have the lighters unloading alongside her for many hours at a time. All powder and shell transferred to the Salinas had to be kept on the topside, which later developed into a difficult problem. The combination of tons of powder and tons of fuel oil, both under a blistering sun, does not constitute a well-balanced cargo. As a result, Tuesday afternoon, July 27, the Salinas was ordered to proceed to Guantanamo to dispose of the Omaha's ammunition.
The Patriot, 98-foot motor tug, likewise came from Guantanamo. She proved to be one of the most valuable members of the expedition. Due to her 7-foot draft, she was the only craft present that could rapidly transfer the lighters from the shallow waters of the ledge to the Salinas in deep water. She was skillfully handled all hours of the day and night and maintained constant service during the whole period, without relief. The Lapwing and Mallard came to Castle Island from the Canal Zone. They assisted in handling lighters, pulling, furnishing divers (Mallard) and general utility work. The Mallard, along with the Texas, escorted the Omaha back to Norfolk Yard, after she was floated.
The Porter was used for the first experiments in wave making. She was followed a few days later by the Mahan which, in turn, was joined by Destroyer Squadron Ten, consisting of the Decatur, Leary, Tillman, and Dickerson. While possessing unusual power, the destroyers were eliminated as pulling vessels, on account of their design and high-speed propellers. The two navy flying boats were ordered by the Department from Coco Solo to Guantanamo, from which place they ferried the writer, under temporary duty orders from Washington as Technical Salvage Officer, to the Omaha. A week later, they similarly brought Captain W. N. Davis, the Merritt-Chapman & Scott representative, from Miami.
The Coast Guard vessels were among the first to offer assistance. Altogether 5 reported—Mojave, Tampa, Unalga, Pandora and Marion. It was decided that little use could be made of the Pandora and Marion, because of their small size and because the number of rescue craft was rapidly assuming the proportions of a fleet. Hence, after conference with the Senior Coast Guard Officer, these two vessels were released from further duty. The other 3 were actively used for pulling and rendered excellent service. Having medium drafts, 15-17 feet, they could come in quite close to the 5-fathom curve, anchor astern of the Omaha, and run their towlines with ease.
The Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., with whom the Navy had an annual salvage contract, dispatched two vessels to the scene. The Killerig, a salvage vessel of mine-sweeper size, came from her regular station at Kingston, Jamaica, with the usual salvage equipment, including 4 beach gears. The Warbler, similarly equipped (formerly the U.S.S. Warbler and sister of the Mallard) reported later from Key West. These two vessels laid out beach gears, assisted in pulling and furnished several minor items of salvage equipment.
Beach gears.—For those unfamiliar with the so-called salvage beach gear, a short description is herewith included. Starting with the outboard end, there is a 7,500-10,000 pound anchor to which is bent about 15-20 fathoms of heavy anchor chain and to which, in turn, is bent a 150—250 fathom 1⅝-inch wire cable. The anchor is planted in the direction in which it is desired to exert a pull. The wire is led aboard through one of the ship’s chocks where it is loosely engaged by a heavy carpenter’s stopper (preventer) on deck. A short distance from this stopper, the wire is tightly engaged by another carpenter’s stopper which is attached to the movable block of a fourfold purchase. The fixed block of this purchase is firmly secured to some staunch part of the ship, such as a bitt, chock, foundation, or structure. The hauling part of the purchase is taken to a power winch or capstan. By applying power to the hauling part, the tackle exerts considerable pull on the heavy wire lead to the anchor. When the tackle becomes two-blocked, the outboard preventer stopper is then jammed to engage the wire, the movable block stopper is disengaged, the tackle is fleeted back to the maximum opening on deck, the movable block stopper re-engaged, the tackle set taut, the preventer stopper disengaged, and everything is ready for another strain on the wire.
Due to the available deck spaces for these tackles often being of different length, the two-blocking of the 8 gears during the salvaging never occurred simultaneously. In fact, it was seldom that more than 2 gears at a time were ever fleeted back to obtain a new grip. The operation, even with the assistance of a winch, required 20 to 30 minutes to accomplish. This was a serious loss of time during a high tide pull. To avoid having to repeat this process too often, the longest open stretch on deck was utilized to allow the maximum possible opening of the tackles. The blocks employed in such tackles are usually of metal, about 15-inch size, rove with a special, flexible ⅝-inch wire. Wooden blocks with manila rope can be used but they are not as satisfactory. The wire and sheaves are kept well lubricated to reduce friction. Any indication of slackness in the hauling part of the tackle is taken up by the winch, possibly only a few inches at a time. Thus, the small hauling wire is kept in a constant state of high tension. When properly laid out, a group of beach gears exerts considerably more pull than several vessels hauling together. The strain is steady, can be applied constantly over a long period and, in case the ship should creep, the advance is always cumulative, since the gears prevent any possible loss of ground already gained.
While beach gears are used primarily for direct pulling, they may be employed as preventers to keep the bow or stern of a vessel from working in the wrong direction. By properly planting the gears at various angles from a ship, almost any desired resultant directional pull can be obtained. The number of gears that can be employed is somewhat limited by the deck space aboard ship, the number of chocks and bitts, the availability of power winches, the sea room around the ship and the suitability of the anchoring ground in the vicinity. Eight were used in connection with the Omaha and, for a fine form ship such as she, with all wires tending aft, this number proved to be all that could be comfortably handled, especially considering the additional towing hawsers coming over the stern from the four pulling vessels. In this case, with so many wires and hawsers, there were insufficient chocks, bitts, and power winches to handle them. To partially remedy this situation, the Warbler's after steam winch or hoister was taken off, brought aboard by lighter, bolted to the Omaha's stern just abaft the after gun mount, and operated by running steam and exhaust lines from the after engine-room.
Grounding.—At the time of the accident, the Omaha had just been relieved by the new gunboat Erie as flagship of the Special Service Squadron. In consequence, she was moderately light in fuel oil and very light in provisions, stores, and fresh water. There was a normal ammunition supply aboard. The estimated draft prior to grounding was: Forward 16 feet, 11 inches; aft 16 feet, 5 inches; or a mean of 16 feet, 8 inches. Under these conditions the vessel displaced about 8,993 tons. After striking the reef, the draft was: forward, 7 feet, 0 inches; aft, 17 feet, 9 inches; or a mean of 12 feet, 4.5 inches. The displacement had dropped to 6,540 tons; in other words, the ship was bearing by an amount equal to 2,453 tons.
Unfortunately, the grounding occurred at almost high high tide. In the vicinity of Castle Island, the tidal range is practically negligible, being at best about 1-2 feet. Due to wind, current, and location of the island relative to other shoals and near-by lands, the tides are irregular and difficult to predict. These two factors, the lightness of the variable load and the unfavorable tidal conditions, seriously complicated the problem of flotation, for there was but comparatively little readily re-movable weight aboard for lightening ship and only minor help, if any, could be expected from the tide.
The Omaha was trimmed 6 inches by the head when she grounded. She was without list. Although steaming at 15 knots, the vessel struck the sloping ledge very gently. She quickly and evenly decelerated as the bottom engaged the smooth coral reef. The bow pitched lightly upward once, apparently lifted by its own wave movement, and then the vessel landed for a full stop. The contact and resultant stoppage were not of the grating, collision type, but more of the nature of a moving mass being evenly retarded with brakes. The lightness of the impact was such that many officers and men were not awakened, but slept on until collision quarters was sounded a few moments later.
Immediately upon grounding, all engines were backed at full speed astern. However, these early efforts to pull off by engine power were without result and it was then realized that the vessel was hard bound. Soundings along the length of the vessel were taken on both sides. A quick survey indicated the vessel to be bearing heavily, possibly well over half its middle body, almost upright transversely and trimmed by the stern. After daylight, a check was made on the earlier soundings taken around the ship, which showed the high water depth to be between 10-11 feet at frame 35 (see page 1322). An internal survey of the ship revealed that little, if any, flooding had taken place, indicating that the shell plating was practically intact.
Meanwhile, efficient and orderly emergency operations were undertaken at once to float ship. The vessel had been steaming under 3 boilers; 3 more were cut in while the engines were used repeatedly, backing as often as the condensers would permit. The main injections had been practically buried in the top surface of the ledge and as soon as the engines were used, the condensers heated dangerously, being almost devoid of circulating water and partially clogged with coral sand.
About 0400, all members of the crew not otherwise occupied were sent well aft to trim ship. Orders were given to transfer 200 tons of fuel oil to the after tanks. Meanwhile, 140 tons of boiler and other fresh water were pumped over the side; 34 tons of boiler water were shifted from the forward group of boilers to after feed bottoms. All boats were lowered, as well as the 2 planes. Soon after daybreak, a 3,000-pound anchor was carried out on the starboard quarter as a preventer to keep the vessel from changing heading toward the beach, the sea and wind then being from the southeast. After breakfast, the arduous task of shifting the forward ammunition aft was started.
Problem of flotation.—A general survey of the situation at the time showed that from a salvage viewpoint, the cruiser was structurally sound except for a general crushing in of the bottom where it contacted the reef. The condition of the shell and framing in way of the machinery spaces appeared to be a source of worry, especially the forward engine-room where even the deep vertical keel plate was in a state of near-rupture. The vessel was upright, and appeared to be in no danger, relative to stability, provided the removal of weights was judiciously handled.
It was calculated that if the ship could be lightened by 1,500 tons, leaving approximately 1,000 tons burden to drag off, there would be a chance of pulling her clear. An early survey of the easily removable weights, including fuel oil, fresh water, provisions, stores, 3-inch A.A guns, ammunition, anchors, portable armor, spare ladders, booms, deck gear, and scores of miscellaneous material, showed that there was doubt of ever reaching the 1,500-ton lightening weight desired. If this weight proved to be insufficient, then it would be necessary to remove the more difficult items, such as 6-inch guns, catapults, and machinery, which would require the availability of a shallow draft crane alongside, capable of at least a 15-ton lift. This would consume weeks of precious time.
The element of time in salvaging the ship was a factor of highest priority. The possibility of a hurricane or heavy storm in this area was ever present and if such occurred under the existing conditions, it would have been an easy matter for the vessel to pound to pieces. With this in mind, tentative plans were discussed relative to methods of landing the personnel, flooding ship to hold it on the ledge, and other extreme measures. The damage under the forward engine-room was such as to cause grave concern in the event of heavy weather. Even the main injections were leaking between the shell and the main valves. The flooding of any of the machinery spaces would have seriously delayed the salvage work and advanced it toward the heart of the hurricane season. With such thoughts in mind, speed was considered the essence in lightening ship.
Preliminary work of flotation.—The immediate problem ahead, therefore, narrowed itself into three operations:
- Rapidly strip ship of every nonessential portable weight.
- Make daily pulls with beach gears and tugs.
- Provide rolling movement to the ship by means of destroyers, or await heavy weather.
If the vessel failed to move under these conditions, then it would be necessary to further lighten ship with the aid of a floating crane, work the ship off with hydraulic jacks (a very tedious, drawn-out job), or employ more drastic means.
The work of lightening ship actually started within an hour after grounding. The following table shows the total estimated amounts removed, by the close of the days indicated:
It will be noted that some days but little weight was removed, while other days great amounts were taken off. The larger figures include the disposal of certain liquids, such as boiler water, potable water, and fuel oil. By July 27, there was very little material left aboard ship capable of being removed by manhandling. Several scouting trips were made through the vessel in an endeavor to spot other portable weight capable of easy removal. Many heavy items, although not removed, such as the 6-inch guns, catapults, loading machines, davits and deck lockers, were partially dismantled, and in some cases certain equipment where originally welded to a deck or bulkhead was burned off with a torch. The seriousness and speed behind this stripping was not without its humor. From the depths of the ship came some articles and gadgets that had been hidden in storerooms and hang-outs for years, some of which could not be identified either as to name or use!
As a part of the lightening-ship operation, the two bow anchors were unshackled and placed aboard a lighter. The two chains, which had been run out to their bitter ends, were piled up on the ledge directly below the hawse pipes. Thus their weight as a part of the ship was practically eliminated and yet they were still available for further use. When the Omaha was finally being hauled into deep water, these chains unpiled and dragged along, holding the bow from slewing with the wind and current.
* Daily estimates. Total later proved to be 1,514 tons.
At first, two attempts to pull off were made every day, one on each high tide. This interfered considerably with the use of the lighters, winches, and unloading, so it was decided to reduce the efforts to one pull a day on the higher of the two tides. While there was a strain on the beach gears and towlines, it was not possible to bring the lighters alongside, use the decks with freedom, or utilize the winches for hoists. Hence, having to stop twice a day for 3 to 4 hours for a pull meant a serious loss of time in lightening. On July 21, the Killerig arrived with 4 beach gears and started to lay them out at once. It was not until the Warbler arrived on July 25 that 4 more such gears became available.
During the early procedure of removing weight, laying out gears, and pulling, the Porter arrived on the scene. She was employed in producing experimental waves, making several 35-knot runs on various courses. It was found that she could actually roll the Omaha through a few degrees despite the flat contact and the enormous bearing pressure of the vessel upon the ledge. One heavy broadside wave gave the ship a terrific side slap which changed her heading about 7°, opened or cracked several pipe lines in the forward engine-room, and made the pumps, condensers, exhaust trunks, and other machinery units move back and forth in a dangerous manner. Steam was turned off in this room as a matter of safety. Because the Porter was merely passing through on her way to the west coast to join the fleet, she remained for only about 2 days. Her place was taken by the Mahan which arrived July 26 and conducted further experiments, at 25 knots. Practically all feasible directions of approach were tried.
After a considerable number of runs, it developed that a course of 105°, cutting just in front of the bows of the pulling vessels, was the most effective and least damaging to the ship. This procedure did not evoke any cheers from the pulling fleet for they were in a rather precarious position, to say the least! Some had anchors down on the ledge with plenty of chain out and were hauling full power on the end of the Omaha towlines. Had a destroyer steering gear jammed, had the towline of any of these vessels suddenly parted, or had the Omaha slid off the ledge without warning, just as a destroyer was about to pass at 25 knots, the chances of a serious accident were very great. At night, the towing vessels kept their bows illuminated so that the destroyers, in their approach, could easily gauge them. The earlier Porter trial runs at 35 knots indicated that such a speed was excessive. The wave movement was violent and dangerous, in that the forward engine-room, the weak spot of the damaged vessel, received too great a racking or twist. The more moderate speed of 25 knots ran a gentle wave front upon the ship’s quarter with just enough force to move her and no more.
When the Omaha rolled, it was not exactly on her center line, but on an axis at a slight angle to it. This was due, apparently, to the uneven contact of the ship on the coral ledge. The crushing of the bottom showed that while the ledge did not have any projections sharp enough to pierce the hull, it did have some large humps capable of denting it in at various places. In some respects, these humps or ridges proved valuable, for, although they caused extra damage locally, this uneven distribution of pressure between ship’s bottom and ledge assisted in creating a suctionless contact whereby the ship was readily rolled or rocked.
A set of docking keels located well outboard, near the turn of the bilges, acted as an obstacle to the rolling of the ship. It was estimated that a continual rolling movement would break up these keels, thereby allowing the vessel more freedom of movement. Such proved to be the case. The increased rolling, after the destruction of the docking keels, became rather violent as the flat bottom engaged the hard coral on the half roll, ending in a sudden thump with each contact.
The wave-making destroyers, cutting across the bows of the pulling vessels, always were in comparatively deep water. The wave front, as developed from this location, was almost imperceptible to the eye. However, as soon as it struck the shallow water of the ledge, it built up in amplitude until, by the time it reached the ship, each wave motion was clearly visible and its action was distinctly felt by the ship. After passing the Omaha, the wave motion continued toward the beach where it ended in a series of breakers. It was necessary to send the fleet of ship’s boats and small craft, which were using the protected cove near the lighthouse as an anchorage, out into deep water before the wave making was started at each high tide; otherwise they would have beached or swamped.
To observe the time of high water, the ship’s force installed a tubular draft gauge with float on the starboard side (shallow side) abreast the bridge. As a check, a tidal signboard gauge, in black and white, was mounted ashore. It must be remembered that the higher of the two tides during the salvage operation occurred at night. Hence, the periods for pulling were the longest during darkness, lasting from 3 to 4 hours. It was necessary to watch the tidal movement constantly before and during each high water. This was vitally necessary at the beginning of the salvage operation when an endeavor was being made to acquire tidal information. There was no such data available (except general information) concerning the exact tidal range, the currents, and the time of the tides. The range was so small and so easily affected by wind and current that, for the first few days, the readings were more or less of an enigma rather than a solution to the knowledge being sought. The necessity of utilizing every inch of tidal range was imperative, considering the tons per inch to be 50, or 600 tons to the foot.
Early in the operation, it was learned that, due to current and wind, it was next to impossible for a vessel to take a line from the Omaha and make a direct pull to the southward. If she headed up considerably to save herself, it was not long before the wind and current would swing her around 60° or more to the westward (clockwise). On a few occasions, when 3 or 4 vessels were pulling, those to windward, catching the full strength of these forces, were soon swept down upon the others like an open fan in the act of being closed. Even when using two vessels on one line, the outboard vessel primarily as a guide to hold the other up, such an arrangement was not entirely successful. It was necessary to have the pulling vessels, in many cases, come in close enough to the reef to anchor. In moderate weather, which prevailed most of the time, they were then able to maintain their position, hold on to the towline (while not pulling), and exert a good healthy pull by easing out their anchor chain enough to allow the vessel freedom to tow while holding position. This saved many hours of preparation necessary to pass lines, attain formation, and work up to maximum power. Anchoring on the edge of the reef required nice seamanship, for there the soundings fell off rapidly from a few fathoms to 100 fathoms in about 200 yards distance. The hard, curved ledge was a very poor biting ground and many a dropped anchor kept sliding into deep water, much to the embarrassment of the ship concerned.
Hauling off.—Late on Tuesday, July 27, all preparations for a major effort to pull the Omaha off were completed. Over 1,500 tons had been removed, 8 beach gears had been set out, sufficient pulling vessels were available, the weather was favorable, and a destroyer was available, with a promise of 4 more the following day. Hence, that evening at high tide, a pull was made from 1,900 to 2,100 using the Mahan as a wave maker. The Omaha rolled very freely through a few degrees and the beach gears were set up as tightly as possible. The ship’s heading during the evening’s pull changed from 342½°-350°. There is some doubt as to whether or not she actually moved off 2 or 3 feet. However, there were indications of a slight movement and hopes arose decidedly.
The next day, July 28, on the morning high tide, further efforts began at 0910, using 8 beach gears, the Mallard, Tampa, Killerig, and Warbler for towing, and Destroyer Squadron Ten, plus Mahan for wave making. Commander, Destroyer Squadron Ten in the Decatur, plus Dickerson, Tillman and Leary, had previously stood in just before 0600. All of the destroyers, as the Mahan had done the day before, steamed across the bows of the pulling vessels at 25 knots, course 105° true. After passing the pulling vessels, they turned right 180° to a reverse course and later turned right again 180° to repeat the run past the shoal. In other words, the course was a large oval with flat sides, not unlike that of a race track. The 5 destroyers originally maintained a moderately close formation but eventually, before the operation was completed, they opened out over the whole course so that the distances between ships were more or less equalized. It is interesting to note that the wave motion created by the Mahan, a slightly heavier vessel than the other 4, was readily discernible from the others. All wave motions were so amplified upon striking the shoal water that there was no difficulty in discriminating between those of the two different tonnages charging by.
At 1009, an hour after the morning operation had started and after the Omaha had rolled many times while under the tension of the beach gears, the stranded vessel made a distinct movement astern, accompanied by more freedom of rolling and a slewing motion. From this point on, the ship slowly gained distance astern during each run made by the destroyers. Meanwhile, the wooden docking keels continued to pound off, allowing greater movement. Unfortunately, the morning tide seemed to ebb rapidly and at 1252 the operation was discontinued when no further movement was observed. During this pull, the Omaha actually moved off the ledge about 25 feet—a happy thought for all hands, to say the least!
It was evident, upon the completion of this first successful pull, that structurally the hull was to take a severe beating before final flotation. During rolling, the already damaged portions of the outer shell, trans-verses, floors, bulkheads, and longitudinals were additionally stressed to an extent easily visible to the eye. The hull structure in way of the forward engine-room, particularly, was subjected to serious rocking, slewing, and twisting and there is no doubt but that many of the damaged, bent, or partially ruptured plates, shapes, and built-up members were severely taxed. However, even in the face of these facts, the necessity of pulling the vessel off the reef at the earliest possible moment was paramount and greatly overbalanced the additional damage wrought in salvaging her in this manner. It is estimated that possibly a quarter of the total damage inflicted upon the Omaha occurred while pulling her from the reef.
The actual speed at which the Omaha moved during the haul is comparable to that of the proverbial snail. Only occasionally could the motion be detected and then usually as the vessel, under strain, made a fresh start or jump, creeping a few inches, then stopping. Never did she run freely, so to speak, except just prior to her final release, and even then many of the personnel did not detect the actual instant of flotation. On one occasion, during a series of heavy waves, she made a slow, steady run of about 15 feet.
At 2030 the same day, Wednesday, July 28, the towing vessels took a strain as before, all beach gears were set taut, and the destroyers started 25-knot runs. The evening tide was a little higher than the morning tide and up to 2358, when operations ceased, the Omaha had moved about 40 additional feet. This made a total movement of 65 feet, and again hopes ascended! During the early evening, it appeared that the ship might be floated that night. While no one would have objected to seeing her slip off the ledge, it would have presented a rather difficult problem had she been freed during darkness. She had 8 heavy steel cables (beach gear wires) secured to her, 4 heavy manila hawsers, 2 dragging anchor chains, and a division of destroyers charging around close aboard, in addition to the 4 towing vessels between the destroyers and the powerless Omaha. The disposal of all of these vessels and equipment in an orderly sequence, while working close to a dangerous reef, would require exact seamanship even in broad daylight.
At 0900, Thursday, July 29, the same “team” used before was sent in to start the game—8 gears, 4 towing vessels, and 5 destroyers. By 1000 the Omaha slowly moved and continued to do so until about 1200 noon when the tide started to ebb. The vessel was, without doubt, “on the run,” but would soon stop with the lowering tide. Hence, it was decided at 1212 to change the destoyer course from 105° to 130° to produce a more violent roll by bringing the wave front about abeam. The change was immediately effective. At this time, the ship was hanging on the ledge primarily by the forward third of her length. The newly induced heavier roll, in spite of the receding water, was forceful enough to keep the vessel rolling and, under the pulling strain, she continued to work off. At 1300, the battle was almost over, for then she moved as fast as the slack in the beach gears could be taken up. Finally, at 1332, the Omaha was entirely water-borne and afloat.
Final disposal.—The towing was not stopped until a few minutes later when the vessel was clear of the edge of the reef. By this time, of course, the beach gears were ineffective and the Omaha was held almost dead in the water by the towing vessels and the two anchor chains which were still dragging on the ledge. She lay-to, in this manner, in spite of the beam wind and current, until the eight beach gear wires were cast off and two of the towing vessels were relieved. The disposal of the towing equipment was exceedingly orderly and well executed by the Omaha and her assisting fleet, considering the mixture of Navy, Coast Guard, and commercial salvagers involved. A quick inspection by the watch aboard revealed no leakage or flooding due to the final pulling off. The Omaha’s two bow chains were heaved in from the ledge. The Warbler then towed the Omaha to an anchorage in the lee of and to the northward of Castle Island light, while the Killerig stood by with a stem line for checking. About 1730, the Warbler anchored with both anchors. The Omaha thus rode all night on the end of the Warbler’s towline with the Killerig standing by.
Unfortunately, the Salinas was at Guantanamo when the Omaha floated. Upon hearing of the Omaha’s release, she expedited her return, arriving off Castle Island the following day, July 30, about 0900. Early that morning, the Omaha tried out her machinery, using only the center (after) engines, and found the power plant in satisfactory condition to warrant moderate steaming. The Salinas then came alongside in deep water and delivered fuel and fresh water. While this progressed, considerable deck material previously transferred to the Salinas was returned to the Omaha. Preparations were soon completed for sea.
At about 1600, July 30, the Omaha got under way for Hampton Roads in company with the Texas and Mallard, escorting vessels. The weather was very moderate all the way to the Chesapeake Capes; nothing eventful occurred except the warming of some Omaha turbine bearings. With a speed of 10-11 knots, the vessels arrived in the Roads early Tuesday morning, August 3. Information relative to special docking had been radioed ahead, everything was in readiness at the yard, and the Omaha was dry-docked that same morning.
Dry-docking.—The vessel was able to enter dock approximately without list and with about 6 inches drag. It was a normal docking except for the following extra preparations:
- An additional soft Douglas fir block capping was added to each block from frame 5 to frame 92, tapering from 6 in. forward to zero aft.
- To compensate for the missing docking keels, parallel substitute keels were provided on the dry-dock blocks.
- Six hauling blocks, forward of the docking keel areas, were provided on each side, as a precautionary measure.
Damage.—It is not intended to give a detailed description of the entire damage incurred by the Omaha during this grounding. However, a condensed version of the material injury is included herewith.
From internal examination (later verified by inspection in dry dock), the keel with all attached transverse frames, adjacent longitudinals, floors and plating, approximately between the bow and frame 93, appeared to have been bodily crushed upward in the manner of a gentle slope, estimated to be a few inches at the bow and tapering to zero at the after end of the damaged area. The impact caused the wrinkling or buckling of practically all transverses and longitudinals in that area. The ruffled outer hull plating, including all riveted connections and joints, remained generally intact, there being only a few minor leaks and no flooding. Considering the terrific bearing and scoring pressures between the hull plating and the almost concrete-hard coral, and later the induced rolling and rocking movements, the resistance and tenacity exhibited by the outer hull plating are most remarkable. Not a single outer plating rivet carried away, nor was any joint badly strained in the entire damaged area of the hull plating. The forward port propeller struck a high spot on the ledge as the vessel grounded, causing damage to two of its blades.
Internally, the forward engine-room bore the brunt of the grounding. Apparently there was a high coral knob in this vicinity and, while probably crushed down considerably by the enormous pressures developed as the ship passed upon the reef, it still projected up enough to cause the adjacent hull structure to go through rather weird contortions on each roll. One could plainly see the movement of condensers, turbines, pumps, and other units in this engine-room when the vessel racked and rolled. The softer metal pipes, such as the condenser injections and ejections, were quite wrinkled and twisted as a result. Some of the other stiffer piping snapped or carried away. Besides the general hull damage, the machinery itself suffered considerable misalignment, and many joints, pipe lines and couplings were sprung. Practically all main power units had to be carefully inspected and realigned after the hull repairs.
Conclusion.—The morale of the officers and enlisted men during this casualty was excellent. For several days all hands worked to a state of almost physical exhaustion, under a blazing tropical sun, in an endeavor to strip ship as quickly as possible. At night it was a common sight to see scores of men sound asleep on the plain steel decks where they had dropped in a state of exhaustion, without thought of breaking out their bedding. As the reduction of weight included fresh water, its issue soon became limited to very small daily amounts per man. Fresh water bathing eventually dropped out of the picture, and toward the end even a face- and-hands wash was a luxury. The laundry was secured and dungarees, shorts, and what-have-you became the uniform of the day. The heavy labor of moving weights of all types, dirty and rough in many cases, was hard on the working clothes normally possessed by the crew. With the curtailment of fresh water, practically no clothes washing was done. Most of the men stripped from the waist up and further developed their Caribbean coats of tan. In spite of the long hours, lack of pleasures, and inconveniences, there existed a most commendable spirit and devotion to duty. During this disaster, the vital military accent was never lowered, which speaks highly for the whole command.
In characteristic seamanlike manner the Coast Guard vessels were there early and stayed late—until the job was completed. The co-operation of the several cutters and advice of the officers in command showed sound judgment and mature experience. The splendid efforts of the Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., commercial salvagers, who were called in under contract by the Navy to assist, contributed much toward the early flotation of the Omaha. The Killerig and Warbler had worked in this area previously and therefore the problem was not new to them.
Considerable has been said in the foregoing of the timely assistance rendered by the large supporting navy fleet. While the ship assortment was wide and varied, the co-operation was nothing less than perfect. Usually before each pull a conference of commanding officers was held aboard the Omaha, so that all hands knew exactly what was to take place. Many valuable suggestions and remarks were made at these gatherings. Communication between all units present was largely by radio, supplemented by visual or bridge signaling. Transmission was alert, rapid, and flawless.
During the whole operation, there were no lives lost nor casualties of any kind, except minor injuries to two of the commercial salvage personnel. Considering the tons of material that were quickly transferred from all parts of the vessel through various hatches, doors, and unusual routes, utilizing at times makeshift gear for handling, the record of the complement is deserving of the highest praise.
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The ability to reach a correct decision without delay is not an inherited characteristic as many suppose. It is a habit of mind that is the result of systematic self-training in decisions applied to all situations, both great and small, as they arise in our daily occupations. A correct decision necessarily involves a logical consideration of all available information and experience. But many men who have both this knowledge and experience are comparatively unable to decide their line of action, simply because they have not trained their minds to do so. This training is essential to the development of this faculty. It is of great importance in all walks of life, but it is wholly essential in military life.—Sims, Military Character.